RedLegs Baseball

2012: Spraying Bullets

2012-01-12T09:14:00.000-08:00

A few quick hits from Redsville:

***It's difficult for me to reconcile the flurry of activity surrounding the Reds THIS offseason with the sheer lack of activity LAST season. I still feel like there's much more to the story. It simply doesn't add up. Why would Walt Jocketty stand by and watch the season slip away last year, but make costly moves, via free agency and trade, to improve this year? What's the difference between this year and last? Were the Reds under stricter budget constraints last year? Is Jocketty motivated by a lack of job security this year? Did Jocketty receive new information of a type that made the decision to trade Yonder easier? I just feel like we're missing a big piece to the 2011 puzzle, one that would go a long towards explaining one of the most frustrating seasons of recent vintage.

***The Reds named Mack Jenkins assistant pitching coach at the MLB level. I wouldn't know Mack Jenkins if he jumped out of my soup, but I approve of this idea in the abstract. Given the struggles of the rotation last year, it certainly can't hurt to add a new voice to the coaching staff.

***For my money, the Reds should be pushing hard to trade for Travis Snider. The Reds have a hole in leftfield and could use another lefthanded bat in the lineup. Snider seems like an ideal change of scenery type player who could blossom in new surroundings. And, given that the Jays could reasonably be souring on him, Snider could be priced to move.

***Just for the record, I still think it was a mistake for the Reds not to pursue Matt Murton and Erik Bedard. Murton is a player in need of a legitimate opportunity. He plays leftfield very, very well and his offensive profile is of the type that the Reds could really use. His baseline is likely .285/.350/.450 (though it could be better in GABP), which means that he would have slotted in nicely in the 2nd spot in the lineup. He wouldn't have excelled in any area, but he would have provided a contact based approach to a lineup that is occasionally inconsistent due to the high rate of strikeouts. Murton is the type of undervalued talent who could be a very good value in his first 4-5 years of service time. Once he hits free agency, he may look less desirable, but that's a worry for a future date. Last year, Murton spent time in Japan and broke Ichiro's single season hit record. That type of experience could only increase his confidence and likelihood of success in the Majors. Now that Yonder is gone, Murton strikes me as being a borderline ideal acquisition.

As for Bedard, I think he was the steal of the offseason. The Pirates signed him for $4.5M. Last year, Bedard started slow, was truly brilliant for two months, suffered an injury that cost him a month, and then finished out the season respectably. While the injury did cost him a month or more, it was a knee injury unrelated to the arm injuries that had previously derailed his career.

I thought Bedard was a good candidate to bounce back in 2011. And, I think he's poised to contribute at a high level in 2012. In 2009, Bedard pitched only 83.0 innings for the Mariners before he underwent major shoulder surgery. After rehab, his velocity had completely returned, he was throwing well, and on the verge of returning to the majors in 2010 when he had to undergo a second shoulder surgery. That surgery cost him the entire 2010 season, but that surgery was minor in comparison to the first. So, the minor shoulder surgery was less of a threat to his career than the major one and it actually gave him more time to recover from the major surgery. So, Bedard was ready in 2011.

He'll always be injury prone, but that is more than factored into his $4.5M salary. At that price, even half a season of good production would be worth it.

***I recently wrote about the sweeping changes being undertaken in two NL Central front offices. However, what I didn't include in that write-up was an interesting Reds related subplot. It was reported that part of the reason why Walt Jocketty parted ways with the St.Louis Cardinals is that he was unable to get along with then Cardinal V.P. Jeff Luhnow. That was then. Now, Luhnow is the new GM in Houston, one of the teams completely overhauling their front office in an effort to move towards a data-driven model of operation. Of course, the dispute being Luhnow and Jocketty could have been a clash of personalities, but more likely it was a clash of ideologies.

In my previous write up, I discussed the data-driven approach that Luhnow seems to want to implement and the difference between an organization built around the skills of individual employees and an organization that creates a structure to drive the operations. All of which begs the question, was the friction between Jocketty and Luhnow driven by the latter's staunch belief in statistical analysis and the former's preference for more traditional scouting? Or, does Jocketty favor an organization built around the brilliance of the individual more than the structure of the organization? More than likely, the answer is both.

In the end, I suspect that Luhnow was tasked with implementing an organizational structure in the Cardinal organization and Jocketty simply could not operate effectively within such a structure. Either the Cardinals outgrew Jocketty or Jocketty and the Cardinals simply grew apart. Whatever the reason, I wouldn't be surprised if, on some level, bad blood developed between the Astros and Reds. Of course, the fact that MLB, in its infinite wisdom, is moving the Astros to the AL West probably undercuts such a rivalry before it could even flare up.

*** Does anyone out there believe that Aroldis will be developed as a starter? The Marshall trade and the Madson signing are "all in" kind of moves. Given that our rotation seems to be set with (1) J.Cueto (2) M.Latos (3) B.Arroyo (4) M.Leake (5) H.Bailey, there seems to be no room for Aroldis. In light of their "win now" mindset, it simply doesn't make sense for the Reds to keep Aroldis at triple-A to develop as a starter. It seems highly likely that he'll join Madson and Marshall to give the Reds an electric back of the bullpen.

For better or worse, Aroldis became a reliever the moment the Reds decided to rely on him in their MLB bullpen.

Light Bulb: MLB Front Offices and the Power of Information

2012-01-06T22:51:00.000-08:00

Lately, I've come to a number of realizations, not all of them baseball related but all of them relevant. First, the quality (such as it is) of the writing on this blog is directly related to what I read. If I'm not being exposed to new ideas and information, much of which I can apply to baseball and the Reds, then my writing tends to stagnate. Second, and as an example of the first point, over the past week a number of writings have combined to help reshape my view of Major League Baseball front offices, their role and how they operate.

In part, my revised view is a happy accident relating to (1) a very good book ("The Powers That Be" by David Halberstam) that I'm reading about the information distribution business (aka: media) and how it shapes all facets of American life and (2) the revolution happening in the NL Central this offseason. It has taken a surprisingly long time for the new wave of baseball thinking to reach the Central, but this offseason has seen it hit with Tsunami like force. For all intents and purposes, the wave started on the West Coast where the A's were looking for a way to compete. It spread gradually in a few directions, but the next big step was when it was carried across the country and landed in the uber-competitive AL East where the Boston Red Sox were looking to change decades upon decades of futility. Now, after penetrating both coasts, the new wave of thinking and operating is coming to an NL Central team near you. Both the Astros and, most noticeably, the Cubs have changed GMs and are beginning to completely overhaul their front offices and their overall methods of operating. That makes for interesting times in the NL Central and challenging times in the future for the Reds.

In light of the efforts of the Northside regime to, once again, overcome decades and decades of futility, I've become more interested in how and why these new front offices are able to effectively change the culture. We're talking about cultures so flawed and consistently ineffective that fans and media created "Curse" narratives, Bambinos and Billygoats, to explain their lack of success. Facing that level of consistent futility, it can be safely assumed that there was something greater at work than the individual talents of the GM. The problem had to be systemic, as countless GMs were rotated in and out of the top posts in these organizations and yet the futility continued. So, the problems clearly ran deeper than just the individual talents of one person.

That was the state of my thinking when I read the following from David Halberstam:

"What it lacked, (Ben) Bradlee and his friend Phil Geyelin sometimes agreed, was cruising speed. The New York Times had cruising speed, the Times was not a product of one or two men's talent and brilliance, it was the sum of its many parts, often at the expense of the individual talent. The Times was special because of its awesome and often stifling structure, it could carry weaker reporters and raise them to the general level of the product just as frequently as it pulled more talented reporters down to that same level. The Times was on a plateau, a moderately high one, all by itself; the (Washington) Post was a series of peaks and valleys."

Even though the blurb discusses the issue in the context of newspapers, it applies equally to organizations of all types. To build a consistently successful organization requires implementation of an effective structure. In Major League Baseball, an effective structure is one that supports quality decision making by consistently increasing the probability of making a successful decision: Cruising speed. A less structured organization may be able to generate success in spurts, but any type of consistent, sustained success requires a structure. It's the system vs. the individual distinction, basically the difference between an organization built on the individual talents of a GM and an organization built on a structure that lends itself to a systematic way of operating.

With that in mind, it becomes much clearer what the new regimes in Chicago and Houston are attempting to do. Basically, harness the power of all the organizational assets into an effective and efficient system for the collection and distribution of data. Over the years, unsuccessful organizations have either had no structure at all or, even worse, an ineffective structure that has been ingrained into the organizational fabric by each and every decision made. The efforts of these front offices to install new structures became even more clear when I stumbled across this story, discussing Jeff Luhnow's efforts to rebuild Houston's front office, on MLB.com:

HOUSTON -- Jeff Luhnow has long been a proponent of sabermetrics, so it shouldn't come as a surprise that one of his first duties as Astros general manager was to bring in someone to help sort through the massive amount of data that's available.

Luhnow announced Tuesday he had hired Sig Mejdal from the Cardinals, where he had worked with Luhnow for the previous six years and was most recently the team's director of amateur draft analytics. Mejdal's title with the Astros will be director of decision sciences.

The Astros also announced they had hired Stephanie Wilka as coordinator of amateur scouting, a position previously held by Mike Burns before he took a job as an area scout with the Blue Jays.

Mejdal was involved with modeling, analysis and data-driven decision-making throughout all levels of the Cardinals organization and was a key contributor in the Draft decision processes that led to more Major League players than any other organization during that timeframe.

"It's a capacity that he was involved in and helping us build when I was with the Cardinals, and he had a lot skills and passion in that area," said Luhnow, who was hired away from the Cardinals last month. "He's going to be a key member of the front office."

Luhnow described Mejdal's new role as a systematic method of combining all the information you can collect on players, whether it's using previous performance information, health and medical information and opinions of scouts who have laid eyes on players.

"It's really a systemic approach to combining all the information into a decision-making tool to assist people, whether it's the scouting director or farm director or general manager, in making decisions," Luhnow said. "There is a pretty significant component with it that's data-driven and based off of using stats from the past to project future performance. It's definitely a critical component."

Wilka, meanwhile, has previously worked in the PR department of the Red Sox and served as executive director of the philanthropic arm of the Dodgers. She has an undergraduate degree from Harvard and a law degree from Pepperdine.

"She has a passion about baseball and should be a good addition," Luhnow said.
Mejdal earned two engineering degrees at the University of California at Davis and later completed advanced degrees in operations research and cognitive psychology/human factors. He has also worked at Lockheed Martin in California and for NASA.

Mejdal has been active in baseball statistics and analytics since earning his membership in The Society for Baseball Research (SABR) while in grade school.

The article lays out the approach that the Astros wish to implement and the importance they place on information of all types and from all sources. The long running debate of sabermetrics vs. traditional scouting has overlooked the key point, namely that ALL valid information is of value to the organization. The Astros' decision making is data-driven and ensuring both the quality and volume of that data is paramount to the success of such a system.

To me, there are also inferences to be drawn from the article based on both the people hired and their respective job titles. It's clear that Luhnow's prime objective in the early going is improving the information gathering and distribution abilities of the organization. After all, a decision maker is only as good as the information on which he relies.

Oddly enough, I first heard of Sig Mejdal from the book Fantasyland, which detailed a writer's attempt to win his fantasy baseball league by hiring a team that blended the traditional scouting viewpoint with statistical analysis, the latter viewpoint strongly represented by statistical analyst Sig Mejdal. But, one of things that strikes me as particularly interesting in this blurb is his job title: Director of Decision Sciences. A job title which seems to both (1) indicate the importance the organization places on data and (2) set his individual responsibilities as everything right up until the decision point.

In a data-driven system like this, the information flows in an upward direction from all points in the organization. In essence, the organization is a pyramid with all information flowing from the base up to the top, where the decision makers reside. If you generate a consistent, reliable flow of information, then you improve the ability and effectiveness of the decision maker. Further, the organization can have sustained success because, to a certain extent, once the decision maker installs this system he himself becomes more fungible. If all the information for making the proper decision is readily at hand for the decision maker, then the specific abilities of that decision maker become somewhat less important. The decision is driven by the process, not the individual. At that point, you have established a measure of organizational intelligence, which supersedes, and should outlast, any single individual.

As for the second hire, Stephanie Wilka, at first it seemed an odd one. I don't know anything about Ms. Wilka, so I'm only going off what is written in this article. At first, she didn't strike me as being qualified (though she could certainly be an undercover scouting genius), but upon further review it seems patently obvious that it was my understanding of the requisite qualifications for the job that was wrong. If someone is hired as the Coordinator of Amateur Scouting despite having no background in scouting (bringing instead public relations and ??philanthropy?? experience to the table), then it seems likely that her responsibilities are something other than rating players on the 20-80 scale. In actuality, I believe her job is ensuring the proper flow of information up the ranks. She's not there to scout, but rather to manage those who do, ensuring both the quality and flow of the scouting information coming from her underlings. It's important to have those who generate the information, but it's equally important to have those who verify the quality of the information and facilitate its distribution. Again, this hiring seems to be an organizational effort to ensure that good information flows up to the top of the pyramid for consideration by the decision makers.

Finally, once the information is gathered and arrives at the pinnacle of the pyramid, it has to be properly compiled and presented to the decision maker for it to be useful. So, it's not enough just to collect and compile the information, but it has to be readily sortable and accessible for the decision maker. And, not surprisingly, many organizations have implemented proprietary computer programs to manage the data generated by so many different sources.

For example, the recent Sports Illustrated Moneyball issue had an article that discussed "Carmine", the Boston Red Sox proprietary data management program:

Now I can click on the screen... ." Epstein says as he executes a few keystrokes, "... and call up ... there's [Jacoby] Ellsbury."

A trove of information pops up about the Boston centerfielder. It includes some proprietary statistical data, including Boston's in-house defensive metrics (the popular ones cannot be trusted, especially in one-year samples) and an overall empirical valuation that combines offense, defense and baserunning metrics. Carmine automatically updates the numbers, including projections, every day for every player in professional baseball.

Carmine also guards less quantifiable data, including the first report filed on Ellsbury in 2003, two years before he was drafted, as well as eight follow-up reports chock-full of anecdotes culled from interviews with his coaches, trainers, college SID, opposing coaches, summer league coach and others. There is a story about a foot injury "no one knew about" that explained a brief slump in the Cape Cod League in '04. There is the story of the day in '05 when two cross-checkers worked out Ellsbury in a San Diego gym because of rain: The 21-year-old picked up a stray basketball and threw down a monster dunk, confirming their reports on his athleticism. All those notations—which a decade ago would have consumed just two or three sentences under "makeup" in most teams' player files—are separate from the actual nuts-and-bolts scouting report on his skills.

Each spring the typical area scout for the Red Sox will follow about 50 players on his watch list. Cross-checkers will see about 100 players each. They all file background reports with Carmine every time they see a player. "That's a lot of information," Epstein says. "But that's where you get the edge. You're not going to have the most success with the most obvious, readily available information."

In short, I have gained a new found appreciation for the power of information and the importance of those mechanisms, institutions, and entities that distribute said information. It is becoming more and more apparent that in the modern game, knowledge truly IS power. Accordingly, much of the organization is designed solely for the purpose of collecting and generating valid information, ensuring the proper flow of that information up to the proper decision maker, and enabling that decision maker to access it in a usable format. Further, establishing that type of structure is what generates long-term, sustainable success, as it doesn't rely on individuals, but rather on the collective power of the organization.

It remains to be seen to what degree the Reds utilize such a data-driven system, but the competition is certainly hitting the ground running. Make no mistake, competition is coming to the NL Central. Competition does one of two things: 1) it drives an organization to become more efficient and effective in order to succeed or 2) it destroys those organizations that fail to adapt and evolve to meet the challenge. It remains to be seen which path the Reds will follow, but the competition has arrived and is in the process of getting stronger. The Reds need to be ready to meet that challenge. And, they need to start now.

2012 Breakout Candidate: Homer Bailey

2012-01-01T15:23:00.000-08:00

Homer Bailey continues to be an enigma. He arrived in 2007 amidst much fanfare, reputed to be an elite pitching prospect with dominating stuff in an organization that simply didn't produce them. However, despite the hype, the reality has proven to be something else entirely.

From the moment he arrived, Homer has somehow managed to be less than the sum of his individual parts. Not only did his performance disappoint, but his stuff was underwhelming. He resembled nothing like the top of the rotation power pitcher that was rumored to be climbing the organizational ladder. He seemed to lack an understanding of how to pitch, which limited the effectiveness of his repertoire. He showed flashes of brilliance, but overall it has been a long, disappointing career arc for Homer. However, slowly but surely, Homer has been trending upwards over the years. Now, those improvements may have reached the critical mass necessary for a true breakout performance in 2012.

First and foremost, Homer has demonstrated linear improvement in his walk rate. In each and every season since 2007, Homer has reduced the rate at which he puts hitters on base per via the base on balls. And, the benefits of putting fewer runners on base are obvious, as fewer base runners typically means fewer runs allowed. Here's how Homer has done in this department:

BB/9

2007: 5.56
2008: 4.21
2009: 4.13
2010: 3.30
2011: 2.25

In addition to improved control, resulting in fewer walks, Homer has also demonstrated improved command, resulting in an improved ability to control the strike zone. For example, Homer is trending upwards in First Pitch Strike Percentage (F-Strike%). As you would guess, F-Strike% is just the percentage of "batters faced" for which the first pitch was a strike. This includes anytime the count was 0-1 after the first pitch and anytime the ball was put in play on the first pitch. It's obvious that a pitcher will get better results when working in a pitcher's count than in a hitter's count and, not surprisingly, statistical analysis bears this out. So, the more often a pitcher can get ahead of a hitter, the better results he is likely to produce.

All that said, here is how Homer has done in the first-pitch strike department since he first arrived on the scene in 2007:

F-Strike%

2007: 54.6%
2008: 57.8%
2009: 55.7%
2010: 60.4%
2011: 62.4%

Once again, Homer is demonstrating tangible improvement in his pitching skills. The Major League average F-Strike% for all players from 2005-2008 is 59%. Since 2007, Homer has improved his ability to start each batter faced off with a strike, which tilts the probability of success decidedly in his favor.

Another area in which Homer has demonstrated marked improvement is in his ability to generate swinging strikes, which is an underrated attribute in a pitcher, as there is a correlation between swinging strikes and strikeout rate.

Here's how Homer has done since 2007:

SwStr%

2007: 8.9%
2008: 5.4%
2009: 7.9%
2010: 8.4%
2011: 9.3%

League average for SwStr% is roughly 8.0%, so Homer has gradually improved to the point where he's well above league average. Obviously, there's some overlap in these areas of improvement, as his ability to throw more first pitch strikes puts the hitter on the defensive and his improved command inside the zone also improves the overall effectiveness of his offerings. In light of the improvements Homer made in both first pitch strikes and swinging strikes, it's not surprising that he has also improved his strikeout rate, which now falls more in line with a power pitcher profile.

Here are Homer's strikeout rates since he first arrived on the scene:

K/9

2007: 5.56
2008: 4.46
2009: 6.83
2010: 8.26
2011: 7.23

The improved strikeout rates over the past two seasons have been encouraging, as the low strikeout rates early in his career long belied the scouting reports on his plus stuff. Basically, it appears the former is finally coming into line with the latter.

The upward trend makes it likely that Homer has finally learned how to properly harness his arsenal. At this point, his skills have improved and made him into more of a pitcher, rather than just a thrower. However, there are two components of production, (1) performance level and (2) work load. It doesn't mean much to have an elite level of performance if you can't provide that performance level over a significant workload (i.e. Rich Harden), just like it doesn't mean much to provide a massive workload at a mediocre performance level (i.e. Bronson Arroyo circa 2011). So, while Homer is pulling his performance level upward, he still needs to maintain that performance level over an appreciable number of innings.

So far, that has been problematic for Homer, who has put up the following workloads in his career:

Total IP

2007: 45.1
2008: 36.1
2009: 113.1
2010: 109.0
2011: 132.0

Final Thoughts

When I got around to looking at Homer this offseason, I was surprised to see that his peripherals were lining up rather nicely for a breakthrough season. While there remains no guarantee of health and Homer has yet to log more than 132.0 innings in a season, he is definitely trending in the right direction. And, given that his improvement is a trend (largely linear over each successive season), it's easier to be confident that his improvement is sustainable, evidencing a possible breakthrough, than it would be if his improvement was more erratic and volatile.

If Homer can maintain his 2011 level of performance, then he should have a good 2012 season. But, if he increases his performance level yet another tick in 2012, then he could have a very good season. And, a very good season out of Homer Bailey would give the Reds starting rotation a very formidable troika.

At this point, it's looking like the question isn't whether Homer will be better in 2012, but rather by how much? If I was a betting man, then I'd have to look at these peripherals and say "quite a bit."

2012 Top Prospect List: #7 Ryan LaMarre, of

2011-12-25T13:41:00.000-08:00

Ryan LaMarre
Height 6-2, Weight 205, B/T: R/L, DOB: 11/21/1988
2010 Redlegs Baseball Prospect Ranking: #11

It's been an interesting transformation for the Reds farm system. As we all know, back in the Marge Schott era, the Reds gutted the scouting and player development departments in order to save costs and funnel that money into the 25-man roster. Ultimately, Marge's actions to cut costs did nothing more than shift those costs onto the backs of future Reds teams. Not surprisingly, it caught up to the Reds in a big way. However, after several missteps, their renewed efforts at developing their own players has paid off.

It's a process that seemed to happen in stages, as the first wave of players seemed to be offense-first players who manned the corner positions (Votto, Frazier, Francisco, Bruce, etc). The next wave seemingly focused more on up-the-middle players (Cozart, Hamilton, Mesoraco, Stubbs) who offered more athleticism and diversified skills.

Ryan LaMarre, with his blend of tools and skills at a premier defensive position, followed comfortably on the heels of that second wave when the Reds drafted him with the 62nd overall pick in the 2nd round of the 2010 draft. LaMarre didn't waste much time negotiating, electing to sign on the dotted line to get his professional career underway immediately.

2011 Season

Heading into the 2011 season, one could reasonably have expected LaMarre to take a step forward based on his decision to quickly sign his first professional contract. By signing early, he logged invaluable experience in the form of 254 low-A ball ABs at the tail end of the 2010 season. Organizations value that early experience so highly that the new Collective Bargaining Agreement moves the signing deadline for draftees up to an earlier date, which permits them to squeeze in a bit of professional experience in their draft year. Unfortunately, despite getting an early start to his career, LaMarre's 2011 season didn't include the step forward that seemed almost inevitable, as he simply didn't drive the ball like he had in the past.

LaMarre started the season at high-A Bakersfield where he logged 117 games and 445 ABs in which he hit .279/.347/.371/.718 with 6 homers, 52 steals in 66 attempts, and a 97/42 K/BB. For the Blaze, LaMarre hit line drives at a14% clip, but posted a BABIP of .342, which means that there was a bit of hit luck involved, as the line drives didn't support the BABIP. So, it was in spite of both the power outage and the unsustainable batting average that LaMarre was promoted up to double-A to finish out the season.

For double-A Carolina, LaMarre logged a mere 15 ABs in 5 games. Obviously, the organization just wanted to give him a taste of things to come in 2012. Despite the inconsequential sample size, we'll take a quick look at his double-A numbers anyway. For the Mudcats, LaMarre hit .267/.421/.333 with 3 steals and a 3/3 K/BB ratio. His line drive rate jumped up to 18% and he wasn't overmatched in his first experience above A-ball.

While the power production has been underwhelming, LaMarre still managed to reach double-A in his first full season of professional baseball, which is encouraging even for a polished college prospect. LaMarre will likely return to double-A to start the 2012 season and could be on the fast track to the majors if he proves up to the challenge.

Swing Mechanics

To me, the standout characteristic of LaMarre's 2011 season was the sheer lack of power. It was not something I was expecting, especially since LaMarre posted slugging percentages of .404, .599, and .649 in his three years at the University of Michigan. Clearly, power was never a problem for LaMarre in the amateur ranks, so one possible explanation for his professional power outage would be the switch from metal to wood bats, but I don't believe that to be the cause. LaMarre has, in interviews, proven to be very cognizant of the difference between metal and wood bat swings and the need to develop the latter. Not to mention, in the past, he has had good success in the wood bat Cape Cod league. So, I suspect the power outage has its roots in mechanics, more particularly LaMarre's reworked swing.

First, let's take a look at what LaMarre was doing at the University of Michigan, courtesy of prospectjunkies:

As you can see, he has a high leg kick and strong hip rotation and lower body action to his swing. He really lets it rip. Now, here's what he was doing in 2011 for Bakersfield, courtesy of RedsMinorLeagues:

The thing that jumps out at me the most is the new and different stride. Interestingly enough, last year I expressed concern about the length of his swing and the length of his stride, so it's curious to see that he made some changes to his lower half. Here is what I wrote in last year's LaMarre scouting report:

"However, his stride and swing both have a bit of length to them. In the professional ranks, he will likely need to tighten up his swing and shorten his path to the ball to reach his ceiling. If he doesn't, then he may be susceptible to hard fastballs in on the hands. He also may need to work on keeping his hands inside the ball, which isn't a type of swing you see all that often in the metal bat college game where pulling the ball is frequently the name of the game.

Overall, LaMarre has good swing mechanics that could enable him to hit for both average and power. He may need a tweak or two, but he has a sound foundation on which to build his offensive game."

Unfortunately, it seems like LaMarre has made more than a mere tweak, as he has completely reworked the action of his lower half. And, it would seem, not for the better. In fact, if that is the swing he was using on a regular basis in 2011, then it doesn't surprise me at all that his power has vanished.

When some hitters fall into a slump, you hear them describe their problem as "being slow to get the front foot down." To me, LaMarre now has the exact opposite problem.

LaMarre still uses a slightly wider than shoulder-width stance. His stance has a bit of forward lean to it, as his weight is largely on his front foot before he unweights his front foot to begin the stride, which transfers the weight to the back foot before it comes forward again as the stride is completed. However, if you look at LaMarre's new stride, which contains two parts, then it almost seems detached from the rest of his swing. He strides forward, landing on the ball of his foot with his heel in the air and holding his foot in this position for a moment. He then rolls off the ball of his foot and brings his heel down to the ground as his hips rotate. So, he interrupts the flow of his weight transfer from back to front, then lingers in the weak position of being on the ball of his front foot before firing the hips.

For comparison, at the plate Albert Pujols starts in a spread out position, then uses a stride that consists of raising his front foot up onto the ball of his foot and putting it right back down where it started as his hips fire, but it's one continuous, uninterrupted motion. On the other hand, LaMarre's stop-and-start stride makes the lower body action herky-jerky, robbing it of torque and power. He starts wide and gets wider, then tries to fire the hips while standing on the ball of his front foot. You simply can't effectively fire the hips if there is a pause between the landing of the stride foot and the firing of the hips.

In fact, LaMarre's stride seems disassociated from the rest of his swing to the extent that the lower body is largely removed from the swing. This is especially problematic due to the fact that most of the power in the baseball swing is generated by the lower body, so if you hinder that action or eliminate it entirely then you are left largely with an upper body swing. And, upper body swings simply don't generate much power. So, the fact that LaMarre's swing changes have significantly restricted his lower body action almost necessarily means that the power will decrease.

As for the upper body, I still really like LaMarre's swing. He starts with a high back elbow, which he drops when he fires his swing. He does a nice job of throwing the barrel of the bat at the pitch and gets good extension, both of which lend themselves to generating power. At the same time, he maintains good bat control and balance by keeping both hands on the bat during his follow-through.

Overall, I still think all the components are there for a fundamentally sound swing that will play at the MLB level. However, I think the changes he made to his lower half are a step in the wrong direction. Last offseason, I thought he needed to tighten and shorten up his swing as he climbed the ladder, but the changes he ended up making have robbed his swing of lower body action, creating a disjointed swing where the upper and lower halves simply don't work in tandem. It's very difficult to generate power without incorporating the lower half, especially a strong hip rotation, into the swing.

If LaMarre needed to tighten up his swing in 2011, then in 2012 he really needs to focus on effectively reincorporating the lower half back into his swing. LaMarre has far too much power potential to consciously sacrifice it, especially since the benefits to be reaped from his restricted lower body action are negligible, at best. In fact, I'm hopeful that that is not a swing to which he had fully committed, but rather an attempt to work through a swing flaw by temporarily incorporating an exaggerated lower body move.

Athleticism, Speed, and Defense

The old adage that "speed doesn't slump" certainly rang true for LaMarre in 2011, as he remained a force on the bases despite an underwhelming offensive season. Between the two levels, LaMarre swiped 55 bags in 69 attempts, good for a 79.7% success rate. Clearly, he can be a weapon on the bases.

Overall, LaMarre is a very good athlete who has excelled in other sports. In fact, his manager, Ken Griffey Sr., compared him to Fred Lynn. Evidently, I'm just long enough in the tooth to appreciate that as being especially high praise, as the athletic and graceful Freddie Lynn pulled off the stunning feat of winning both the AL MVP and the AL Rookie of the Year award in the 1975 season. LaMarre attributes his impressive speed to hockey skating drills, which he believes helped him generate strength and explosiveness in his legs.

LaMarre teams with Billy Hamilton to give the Reds organization a speed dynamic that they haven't had in recent memory. LaMarre also makes good use of that speed out in the field, where he covers a lot of ground in the outfield. His aggressive style of play in the field may also have its roots in hockey, as he isn't afraid to lay out for the ball to make a play.

In 2011, LaMarre played 122 games in centerfield and 14 games in rightfield and he has the tools to stick in centerfield as he climbs the ladder. The only thing that would necessitate a move to a corner outfield is the presence of a superior outfielder ahead of him, which Drew Stubbs may well be. But, if that comes to pass, then LaMarre should be able to comfortably slide to a corner spot.

LaMarre did suffer an ankle injury when his foot hit the first base bag wrong, landing him on the 7-day disabled list. But, the injury was minor and didn't slow him down for long, which is important given the importance of speed to LaMarre's game.

LaMarre's speed helps raise his prospect floor, as even if the bat doesn't reach its ceiling, he could still provide value as a pinch runner/defensive replacement at the MLB level. But, if the bat does develop, then pairing it with his speed could make him a legitimate impact player at the Major League level.

Final Thoughts

LaMarre is a player I actually wanted the Reds to draft, so obviously I liked him before he got to the Reds organization and his 2011 season did nothing to diminish my appreciation for his game. He offers a nice blend of tools and skills, floor and ceiling, and athleticism and baseball IQ. He's not a finished product and certainly has some development left to do, but his 2012 season at double-A will likely provide a very telling data point to his career trajectory.

Will he reintroduce power to his game and emerge as a potential MLB starter? Or, will his numbers remain down against the tougher double-A level of competition, likely sending him down the path taken by so many 4th and 5th outfielders?

Overall, I remain bullish on LaMarre and slot him in at #11 on the list. I look forward to seeing what 2012 brings for LaMarre...hopefully, a reincorporation of his lower body into his swing.

The Mat Latos Trade

2011-12-21T23:03:00.000-08:00

Wow!

People complain about GM Walt Jocketty being too deliberate or overly analytical, but when he does decide to take the plunge, he certainly makes a damn big splash.

The first example was the Scott Rolen trade, which pundits hated. The current example was the Latos trade, which pundits also hate. Of course, I liked the former and I like the latter.

There are two components of the trade that need to be considered. First, the theory underlying the trade. Second, the execution of the trade.

The Underlying Theory

Obviously, the underlying theory implemented by the Reds was trading the future for the present. Trading prospects for established MLB talent. Trading from a surplus to address a weakness. Consolidating value in the 25-man roster at the expense of the farm system. The Reds finally realized that the present includes a window for success that may only be open until Votto reaches free agency.

Clearly, the underlying theory of the trade was solid. Of course, it was also so blatantly obvious that it's difficult to give Jocketty much credit for implementing it. In fact, it was painstakingly obvious to anyone who follows the team that this is the type of trade that needed to be made. In fact, it's the exact type of trade for which I was clamoring last offseason and it's been more than a little frustrating for the organization to fail to execute such an obvious strategy.

For those Yonder and Yasmani fans out there who wanted to keep them, well, sorry, but that was never a realistic possibility. From the moment Yonder was drafted, it was obvious that the Reds were going to have a problem. He may have been the best player available, but he was also incapable of playing anywhere else but first base. The idea of playing him out of position was a non-starter, as his defensive deficiencies at other positions would have dragged down the value of his offensive production to the point where his trade value would outpace his actual value. When those are your limitations and you have an MVP winner ahead of you, well there's really no where for you to go but out of town.

The story is largely the same for Yasmani, as Mesoraco is just a better prospect. As a,result, there was no simply no room for Yasmani. Despite some fan suggestions, the notion of a platoon between the two was a non-starter, as limiting their playing time would have been a waste of one or two of the assets. If you platoon them, then their actual value would simply be outpaced by their trade value. It just wouldn't work.

As for Brad Boxberger, he's an intriguing relief prospect, but he's still a reliever. And, relievers have an inherent volatility which limits their value. There aren't many relievers who maintain a consistent level of dominance and those who do seem to feature a more dominating repertoire of pitches than Boxberger possesses. Unless he can step up and consistently dominate in high leverage innings, then his loss won't be difficult to overcome.

Fortunately, the farm system exists for one purpose, namely to support the major league team. That purpose can be achieved through the development and promotion of homegrown prospects or by trading those prospects away for established MLB talent. The paths diverge, but ultimately end up in the same place, namely an improved 25-man roster.

Now that it has finally happened, it's impossible not to give the underlying theory high marks. However, regardless of how good the theory may be, the team still needs to execute it properly for the trade to be a good one.

The Execution

Well, similar to the aftermath of the Scott Rolen deal, the pundits are up in arms over the price the Reds paid. Personally, I had no problem with the price paid in the Rolen deal and don't really have a problem with the price in the Latos deal. Personally, I think we overpaid to a greater extent in this deal than we did in the Rolen deal. Even so, I think the overpayment was justified and made sense for where the Reds are as an organization.

Depending on where an organization stands in the win cycle, the price they should be willing to pay would differ. For a team in need of a particular player to get them over the hump and into the playoffs, it only makes sense to pay a premium. That's where the Reds stand right now.

For me, it's not so much the price paid, as the risk inherent in such a deal. The Reds made the move they NEEDED to make, but it's a move that is inherently risky. They just traded four players for one. In doing so, they consolidated the total value of four roster slots into a single slot, which is exactly what the team needed. However, such a move also consolidates the risk. Instead of diversified risk spread over multiple assets, the Reds now have all their eggs in a single basket. So, it's a high risk, high reward trade.

Of course, given that the Reds NEEDED to make this move and that this move has inherent risk, the success of such a deal all comes down to picking the right pitcher. If you are going to push all your chips into the pot, then you'd better pick the right hand on which to do it.

For me, the Reds reeled in the best option available this offseason. Frankly, I'd rather have Latos than Trevor Cahill, Gio Gonzalez, Jonathan Sanchez, or even James Shields. He just seems the best combination of polish, upside, salary, and length of time under team control. So, given what was realistically available, I think the Reds did it right.

Latos has had very good success so far in his career, but that success has come while pitching for the Padres and Petco Park. People have jumped at the park effects in pointing out that his career ERA is 3.11 at home and 3.57 on the road. Obviously, it's important to point out that leaving Petco for Great American Ballpark will act as a drag on his numbers. At the same time, I think the NL West context is somewhat under-examined, as the division combines big ballparks with weak offenses to create a very favorable environment for pitchers. And, Latos won't be bringing that environment with him to Cincinnati.

I do, however, have two problems with this trade:

1) That it didn't happen sooner

To me, this is the most egregious part of the trade. This is the trade that I wanted to see go down last year. If it did, then the gamble would have been lower risk. First, we would have landed a pitcher with a higher established baseline of production and a lower level of risk. Additionally, we would have avoided wasting an entire season of our win cycle. It would have cost more in monetary terms, less in prospect terms. Even so, it would have been a better time for such a substantial gamble, as it would have been lower risk and provided more chances to pay off.

When you are a smaller market team, then your chances for success are typically a small window. When you have Joey Votto on the verge of free agency, Brandon Phillips getting long in the tooth, and the baling wire in Scott Rolen's shoulder getting more distressed by the day, then it's a borderline unforgivable sin to waste an entire season of your window. Windows don't come around very often and they aren't open very long when they do.

After a breakthrough season in 2010, it was unsurprising to see the Reds regress in 2011. Typically, when a team breaks through to a new level of performance, they follow it up with a step backward. The reason is simple, as success is typically the result of an occurrence of a number of positive events that simply cannot be expected to happen again the following season. To offset that, you have to take tangible steps to improve the team. The Reds didn't do that in 2011. They have learned their lesson. Still, it hurts to waste a season of MVP caliber production from Joey Votto.

2) Tossing Edinson into the Deal

Well, you could have knocked me over with a feather, but to me this is the objectionable part of the price we paid for Latos. It just feels like a big mistake to include Edinson in this deal. And, I say that as something less than a fan of Edinson. Frankly, I didn't want Edinson to return to Cincinnati in 2012,. as his attitude and continued status as thrower instead of pitcher are reasons to part ways with him. However, I do think he has some trade value, even if we just treated him as if he did not. And, frankly, I just can't get behind the idea of wasting the value of an asset.

At the time of the trade, Edinson was undeniably the most unpopular player on the roster, so I fully expect this opinion to be equally unpopular. Regardless, I do think Edinson has some value and, frankly, I think he's the key to determining the winner of the deal. Keith Law thinks its Yasmani Grandal. I think it's Edinson.

To me, dealing Yonder, Yasmani, and Boxberger for Latos is a much more palatable price to pay than including those three AND Edinson. The reason is fairly simply, I could easily see Edinson getting back on track in San Diego. In fact, it wouldn't surprise me if Edinson puts up numbers in Petco that are similar to what Latos puts up in GABP.

In 2008, his first with the Reds, Edinson was a 4.2 win player. In 2010 and 2011, Latos was a 4.0 and 3.2 win player, respectively. So, once upon a time, Edinson was as valuable, or perhaps more valuable, than Latos has been in each of the past two years.

In 2009, Edinson did not pitch after June 1, as his season ended in Tommy John surgery. He made it back in July 17, 2010, but as impressive as his recovery time was he probably came back too soon. Realistically, both his 2009 and 2010 seasons were undone by Tommy John surgery.

However, there is little to excuse his 2011 season. His 5.71 ERA and 1.57 WHIP sealed his fate in Cincinnati. In fact, he was so bad that he was demoted to triple-A. However, there are a few positives to be drawn from that point forward, if you look hard enough.

In triple-A, Edinson tossed 87.1 innings of 2.37 ERA, 1.16 WHIP, and 83/29 K/BB ratio. Overall, solid numbers, most encouraging were his 3.0 BB/9 and 8.6 K/9 ratios. And, while it was lost in the team's late season fade, he carried some of that improvement with him back to the majors in four September starts.

In his September starts, Edinson posted a 4.94 ERA and a 7.3 K/9, but a much more respectable 3.8 BB/9. Strides were made in the free pass department and the existence of those strides was reinforced by his pitch data.

In his four starts, admittedly a small sample size, Edinson took steps forward in percentage of strikes thrown and percentage of first pitch strikes. In September, Edinson tallied a first pitch strike 57.8% of the time and threw strikes 63.8% of the time. On the season as a whole, Edinson had a first pitch strike rate of 54% and threw strikes 60% of the time. So, he showed improvement when he returned to the majors.

So, to a certain extent, he was getting back on track. And, when he's right, he has significant value, but now we've tossed him into a deal as if he had none. Add in the fact that he's heading to Major League Baseball's best park for pitchers and will be yet another year removed from his TJ surgery and it seems entirely possible that he'll get back on track in 2012. If he returns to form and becomes a 3 or 4 win player for the Padres, then Yonder, Yasmani, and Boxberger are almost pure profit for the Padres and they'll win this deal in a walk.

Final Thoughts

Overall, this deal is strong and long overdue. The underlying theory and the execution of it both work. It's been a long, agonizing, exhausting march towards the completion of this deal, but the Reds have finally gotten serious about improving this team and taking the next step forward.

The Reds paid a heavy price to make this deal happen, but it was the right move and one that was long overdue.

2012 Top Prospect List: #4 Zack Cozart, ss

2011-11-26T14:28:00.000-08:00

Zack Cozart
Height 6-0, Weight 195, B/T: R/R, DOB: 8/12/1985
2011 Redlegs Baseball Prospect Ranking: #8

Zack Cozart is one of the top middle infield prospects in the system and one who is now in a position to capitalize on the dumpster fire that was Paul Janish's 2011 season. Fans were clamoring for Zack Cozart's arrival long before the Reds invited him to the party, but giving Janish an extended look was the wise, albeit painful, decision. Despite his detractors, Janish had enough positive attributes to make him an intriguing play, as he featured plus defensive skills at a premier defensive position, good plate discipline, and a line-drive generating swing. However, as the sample size increased, the likelihood of him being in the organization's future plans decreased, as Janish proved that the Reds simply couldn't rely on him to hold down a full-time gig. Second-tier prospects are rarely handed a starting job more than once and Janish doesn't have the type of upside that will easily enable him to play his way back into the organization's plans. Despite the outcome, the Reds, given their limited financial resources, need to try to capitalize on every asset, so taking the time to make an informed decision on Janish was one of the better decisions in a season short on good decisions. The end result was flawed, the process was not. As a result of the extended look, the Reds can now confidently turn the page on the Janish-era and give Cozart the bulk of the work at shortstop.

2011 Season

As a result of the Janish experiment, Cozart logged 77 games and 350 plate appearances at triple-A. For the Bats, Cozart more than held his own, posting a .310/.357/.467 slash line with 7 homers, 9 steals, and a 51/23 K/BB ratio. His BABIP was .351, which isn't quite as unsustainable as it sounds when you factor in his robust 26% line drive rate. His performance coupled with the struggles of the MLB shortstop contingent earned him a promotion to the majors.

At the major league level, Cozart put up equally impressive overall stats, but his peripherals were uninspiring. Cozart hit .324/.324/.486 in 38 plate appearances across 11 games, managing to crank 2 homers with a 6/0 K/BB ratio. While that's an impressive debut, he'll have to improve his peripherals for it to be sustainable. His line-drive rate was an underwhelming 9.7% and his failure to draw a walk in 38 trips to the plate is mildly disconcerting. And, while we are undeniably dealing with meaningless sample sizes, his home (1.385 OPS)/road (.500 OPS) splits support the notion that he'll get a boost from that notorious righthanded hitter haven known as Great American Ballpark.

Overall, Cozart generates line drives at a good clip and has solid pull power, which should play well in the cozy confines of Great American Ballpark. At this point, Cozart seems to have established his baseline level of performance,which can be characterized as "good enough" across the board. He'll hit some homers out to left and slap some singles to right, but I wouldn't expect much power or well-driven balls to centerfield or rightfield. He's not a walk machine, but controls the strike zone well enough....for a shortstop. He makes contact at a good clip, so strikeouts won't be a significant problem. He has good instincts on the bases, but the stolen base likely won't be as big or effective a weapon in the majors as it was in the minors. Cozart will likely continue to profile out as more of a counting stat creation than an impressive rate stat player, which isn't a problem in light of his ability to hold down one of the premier defensive positions where "good enough" is really all that's required.

Swing Mechanics

At the plate, Cozart uses a fairly simple, fundamentally sound set of swing mechanics. He starts with a slightly wider than shoulder width stance and a high back elbow. He has a quiet pre-pitch approach, the only noise being a small bat waggle to keep loose while waiting for the pitch. He stands very tall and remains tall throughout, an appearance amplified by the limited lower body action in the swing.

In order to effectuate his weight transfer, Cozart lifts his front foot up and takes a very small stride forward. He doesn't overextend in his stride, which is appropriate in light of his contact based hitting style. In actuality, Cozart is more of an upper body hitter, as he really doesn't rotate inward to cock the hips. When the stride doesn't cock the hips, then it becomes difficult to incorporate the lower body in the swing. There simply isn't much rotational energy in the swing, rather incorporating a more straight back and through action.

As for the swing itself, it's fairly compact and short to the ball, but long and loose in the follow-through. The former emphasizes contact rate at the expense of power, while the latter enables full extension but may hinder bat control.On the follow-through, Cozart frequently lets go of the bat with the top hand.

While Cozart stays balanced throughout his swing, that speaks more to his limited lower body action and limited power production than an impressive fluidity and balance. I've written before about being impressed by the fluidity and balance in a hitter's swing, but that was on a hitter who fired the hips and generated a lot of rotational energy and swing velocity. It's very impressive to see a hitter maintain balance and fluidity by effectively controlling the various high energy forces of the swing. It's less impressive to see a hitter maintain balance by controlling rather limited forces in the swing.

Here's a look at Cozart in action as he collects his first MLB hit:

Overall, Cozart has simple, but effective mechanics that should serve him well enough as a glove-first, up-the-middle player.

Defensive Ability

The old adage is that if you watch a team of players on the field in pregame warmups, you should be able to spot the shortstop in the first few minutes. It's something of an eyeball test that works because shortstop is the premier defensive position in baseball and only the best defensive players can hold it down. And, of course, Major League shortstops are the absolute cream of the crop, as the flawed are whittled down and down as they climb higher up the ladder. Zack Cozart certainly passes the eyeball test, as he certainly looks the part.

Cozart looks the part because of his smooth actions in the field and soft hands when receiving the ball. What he does, he does very well. However, the questions on Cozart's defense revolve around his range and arm strength. But, you won't see either of those potential issues in the following clip:

Cozart should be a very solid defensive shortstop, but may ultimately lack the type of range necessary to be a true impact player with the leather. The sample sizes aren't large enough or the defensive metrics accurate enough to state it definitively, but to me it feels like Cozart's range is a tick below that of Paul Janish. It should, however, still be above average.As for Cozart's arm, it's definitely a tick or two below the howitzer that doubles as the right arm of Paul Janish, which means that Janish not only reached more balls due to his range advantage but was also able to convert those balls he reached into outs more effectively than Cozart due to his ability to get the ball to first base in less time.

Cozart frequently throws from a lower arm slot than most shortstops. It's common for second basemen to throw from a lower arm-slot because of the angle and distance of their throws, which allows them to throw to first base without coming up out of their crouch. It's a different story over on the other side of the bag, as shortstops frequently have to throw much more over the top because of the angle to first and a sidearm arm slot frequently results in throws that tail and run to the arm side.

Final Thoughts

In the final analysis, Cozart grades out fairly well and should, in light of Paul Janish's offensive implosion, hold down the shortstop position for a few years. However, his 2011 season was cut short by an injury to his left elbow caused by a collision at second base. The injury required Tommy John surgery, but should be fully healed by the time spring training rolls around. The elbow injury also limited his sample size and masked an impending regression, which may have created unrealistic expectations for Cozart's offensive abilities going forward.

In light of poor peripherals and an offseason spent rehabbing instead of working on his game makes Cozart a prime candidate for an underwhelming 2012 season. He'll have to prove he can make adjustments to be an effective offensive player, but regardless he'll always profile out as a glove-first player.

When I see Cozart play, he strikes me as being a poor man's Alex Gonzalez, the former Red and more recently the 2011 shortstop for the Braves. Like Gonzalez, Cozart seems unlikely to hit for high batting average or get on-base at an impressive rate, but Cozart likely has a tick less power and a tick less range at shortstop than A-Gon.

For now, all of this is enough to land Cozart at #6 on the list and on the hallowed Cincinnati shortstop ground for the foreseeable future.

Twitter and Facebook

2011-11-26T14:17:00.000-08:00

Well, I've been tinkering around with Social Media as of late.

First and foremost, I've been tinkering with Twitter since the playoffs started. I haven't really publicized it, as I've been trying to figure out how to best utilize it. Twitter seems designed for breaking news and snark, neither of which has been a focus of this blog. I always intended this blog to be analytical and objective/fair in nature, so breaking news and snarky comments never really fit into what I wanted to do. So, I'm still determining whether I can add any value in what I'm trying to do through Twitter, but I'll be tweeting links to my blog posts and my thoughts on various baseball related topics. So, you can now follow me at: Lark_11

As for Facebook,. I created a basic fan page for the Redlegs Message Board associated with this blog. Originally, it was intended to be a way to increase membership by having members "like" the page. This is still in the very early stages, but we'll probably have some updates to it from time to time. For now, you can visit the page at the following address:

http://www.facebook.com/pages/Redlegs-Baseball-Message-Board/154784571282771?sk=wall

Anyway, back to regularly scheduled programming.

2011 Top 25 Prospects

2011-11-20T21:51:00.001-08:00

Time for a bit of housecleaning to get ready for a new season. Unfortunately, I didn't get around to writing them all up, but, for posterity's sake, this was what my complete list looked like for 2011.

1. Aroldis Chapman, lhp
2. Yonder Alonso, 1b
3. Devin Mesoraco, c
4. Billy Hamilton, ss/2b
5. Yasmani Grandal, c
6. Yorman Rodriguez, of
7. Todd Frazier, inf/of
8. Zack Cozart, ss
9. Juan Francisco, 3b
10. Dave Sappelt, of

11. Ryan LaMarre, of
12. Donnie Joseph, lhp
13. Brad Boxberger, rhp
14. Henry Rodriguez, 2b
15. Ismael Guillon, lhp
16. Neftali Soto, c/inf
17. Danny Dorn, 1b/of
18. Juan Duran, of
19. Drew Cisco, rhp
20. Tucker Barnhart, c

21. Junior Arias, ss
22. J.C. Sulbaran, rhp
23. Daniel Corcino, rhp
24. Cody Puckett, 2b
25. Juan Silva, of

AFL Rising Star Game: Brad Boxberger

2011-11-06T11:46:00.000-08:00

I had the opportunity to watch the last 6 innings of the Arizona Fall League Rising Star Game. Unfortunately, that means I missed the battle of 1.1 vs. 1.2, as Gerrit Cole took on Danny Hultzen in the early innings. The matchup failed to live up to the hype as Cole couldn't keep pace with Hultzen. Cole gave up 5 runs and 4 hits in 2/3rds of an inning, while Hultzen struck out the side in the first on 14 pitches and didn't allow a hit in his two innings of work.

Overall, I was impressed with the talent on display, even though on paper I didn't think it would be all that impressive outside of Mike Trout and Bryce Harper. Still, there were a few impressive players, including Will Myers. Myers had a down year in 2011 as he struggled through injuries, but looked good at the plate and moved very well in the field for a converted catcher. He looks to be fully back on track.

Most interestingly, at least to Reds fans, was the work of Brad Boxberger. Boxberger worked a 1-2-3 inning, so he worked out of the windup the entire time and featured a fastball that sat in the 94-95 mph range, a change-up with very good late sink, and a power slider in the mid-80s.

Boxberger squared off against S.I. cover boy and uber-prospect Bryce Harper. And, encouragingly, Boxberger made very quick work of him. It took Boxberger just four pitches to strikeout Harper. Boxberger started him off with two change-ups with very good sink, the first of which was off the outside corner. After starting him off down in the strike zone, Boxberger then changed the eye level by elevating the fastball. His third pitch was a 94 mph fastball up, but was too far inside. The fourth pitch was likely a do-over of what the third pitch was supposed to be, but this time with better execution. This time, Boxberger elevated the fastball and hit the target set by the catcher at or a tick above the top of the zone. Harper took a hack, but couldn't catch up to it.

The final line speaks for itself, as Boxberger acquitted himself very well in his appearance, but here are a few observations that won't show up in the box score:

1) Boxberger has some looseness to his delivery, an appearance largely caused by his long arms and the big arm swing he uses in his windup. After breaking his hands, Boxberger uses a large circle to bring his pitching arm up into proper throwing position.

2) Boxberger threw a handful of sliders during his appearance, but I thought it was noticeable from his mechanics when he was throwing it. I'm not entirely sure what it was, but his delivery was different when he threw the slider. First impression was the arm speed was different, but the slider is generally more of a power pitch, so I'm not confident that that's what it was. If it wasn't that, then it had to be either the grip on the pitch or the arm slot. Whatever it was, I thought his mechanics differed on the slider than on the fastball and change-up, which could be a problem against sophisticated hitters at the MLB level.

3) While the slider underwhelmed me, the change-up impressed me a great deal. His change-up had a significant amount of sink to it (almost to the point where it looked like a true sinker), which would play well in Great American Ballpark. Additionally, such heavy sink gives him a nice weapon that most power pitchers do not possess. Power pitchers are typically fly ball pitchers because they utilize their stuff up in the zone. Boxberger has the fastball and strikeout rate of a power pitcher, but if he can continue to generate such significant sink then he should be able to work effectively in both the top and bottom of the strike zone.

Swing Mechanics and Random Draft Thoughts

2011-09-28T22:41:00.000-07:00

Every once in a while, I run across something that piques my interest for some reason or other. I was watching a few highlight clips and stumbled across a Jason Kipnis homerun that seemed noteworthy, especially in light of the recent Adam Dunn post. The contrast between the swing mechanics of Dunn and Kipnis was striking. As for Kipnis, I was really amazed at just how still he stands in this clip:

Kipnis stands as still as a statute while waiting for the pitch. I'm not sure I've ever seen someone stand quite THAT still at the plate. He's calm, poised, and comfortable just waiting on the pitcher. Unlike Dunn, Kipnis's stance doesn't require any pre-pitch movement to get into hitting position. Kipnis starts in proper hitting position and simply has to fire the swing when the time comes. He is in perfect hitting position before the pitcher even begins his windup. Dunn, on the other hand, has a long way to go before he gets into hitting position and doesn't get into anything resembling proper hitting position until after the pitcher reaches the apex and starts to unpack his leg kick.

It's not easy for most hitters to stay relaxed and loose without pre-pitch movement. That's why a lot of hitters use a bat waggle, to both keep the muscles free of tension and trigger the swing. Kipnis obviously doesn't need any movement to hit. As for Dunn, I'd rather see him start in a Kipnis like position.

Anyway, that's the end of my ruminations on Dunn, he's on his own now, but the stillness of Kipnis and the dichotomy between the two approaches was striking enough to inspire me to write about it. Turning back to Kipnis, seeing the clip made me reflect on my shadow draft for that year.

I was pretty pleased with my shadow picks and thought I had outdone the Reds...until I saw what the Reds managed to do in comparison.

In my 2009 shadow draft, I selected rhp Shelby Miller in round 1, 2b/of Jason Kipnis in Supplemental Round 1, lhp David Holmberg in round 2, and lhp Josh Spence in round 3.

Outside of a team issued suspension for alleged underage drinking, Miller had a tremendous 2011 season and is establishing a #1 starter ceiling. Jason Kipnis took the world by storm with the Indians and is looking like an impact bat at second base. David Holmberg is the only one of my picks who hasn't reached the majors yet, but that's much more of a testimony to the talent and polish of the other three than an indictment of Holmberg, who is following a traditional development path. Finally, Josh Spence made his debut with the Padres this year and pitched very effectively out of the bullpen to the tune of a 2.73 ERA in 29.2 innings. He has underwhelming velocity, but a plus change up and a very good feel for pitching.

Overall, I'm very pleased with my shadow draft, but it's difficult to find fault with what the Reds did with their first 4 picks of the draft. The Reds landed Mike Leake in the first round, Brad Boxberger in the Supplemental Round, Billy Hamilton in round 2, and Donnie Joseph in round 3.

It's up in the air which set of four, shadow or actual, will ultimately prove to be the better value, but the Reds reeled in four quality prospects and Hamilton in round 2 was a steal. Mike Leake has already arrived, Boxberger and Joseph are good bets to work high leverage innings at the MLB level, and Hamilton has a very high ceiling with some development risk.

It's remarkable just how much the Reds have improved in the draft. Their draft effectiveness is leaps and bounds ahead of where it used to be, which is a testament to both the scouting department and the player development staff that knocks the rough edges off those picks. It always bears mentioning just how far the Reds have come since the dark old days of Jim Bowden, Ty Howington, Chris Gruler, Jeremy Sowers, and company.

Actual Draft vs. "Shadow Draft": A Retrospective

2011-09-08T21:29:00.000-07:00

After spending my last post lamenting a very large missed opportunity, I decided to think positively to finish out the year. As a result, I returned to thinking about what the Reds have done right this offseason. And, basically, that consists of signing Jay Bruce to a contract extension. Obviously, that was a great move for the organization, as Bruce should be a building block for this team for years to come.

Of course, I can't help but think that, given the chance, I was ready to go in a completely different direction on draft day 2005. Whoops!

One of the fun parts of the baseball offseason is that we get a break from the day-to-day grind of the season, which affords us some time to reflect, clean out the closet, and dust off old thoughts for re-examination. So, it's probably a good time to revisit my "shadow draft picks" of the past.

Starting in 2005, when draft time rolled around, I began to analyze the draft eligible prospects and determine which one I would select if I was in charge of the Reds draft. So, in short, these picks are what I would have done at the time of each draft, not what I would have done with the benefit of perfect hindsight. So, not surprisingly, there are both significant hits and misses, but the picks are what they are. No sense trying to sweep the bad ones under the rug, rather I've tried to learn from my missteps and apply them in the future.

Of course, I didn't start this blog until 2007, so my draft thoughts existed only on message boards until the 2008 draft rolled around, but I'm including those early message board picks anyway for posterity sake. Besides, it makes the post that much more fun. Anyway, the Reds' picks are in red, while my picks are in orange. And, off we go.....

2005: Jay Bruce vs. Ricky Romero

This was the first time I really looked into the draft and picked out the player I wanted the Reds to select. Of course, those with a sharp eye and a keen memory will recall that Ricky Romero was selected 6th by the Blue Jays, while the Reds didn't select Jay Bruce until their 12th overall pick rolled around. So, in my first effort, there were clearly a few kinks to be worked out, as I selected a player the Reds couldn't possibly have drafted. In future go-arounds, I only selected a player that was actually available to the Reds with their first pick, but I'm including this one anyway.

The 2005 draft was an epic one, filled with potential impact talent from the top of the first round all the way down to the bottom. You couldn't swing a dead cat without hitting at least a couple of legitimate first round prospects. But, my pick, until just recently, was one of the few flame-outs in the first round.

I followed Ricky Romero at Cal State Fullerton and loved his bulldog mentality and offspeed offerings. He had a nice curveball and a quality changeup. He also had a good understanding of how to pitch. He was the guy I wanted the perennially pitching-starved Reds to land. Of course, Romero was already off the board by the time the Reds went in another direction. And, that's probably a good thing, as even with Romero's recent breakthrough at the MLB level, I have a hard time arguing with the Reds' choice of Jay Bruce, who seems a quality player on the field and a quality person off of it.

Romero is becoming the pitcher I thought he could be, but Bruce has the potential to be a superstar talent.

2006: Drew Stubbs vs. Tim Lincecum

In the 2006 draft class, there was only one player I wanted the Reds to land and I flooded the ESPN Reds message board saying just that. Unfortunately, the Reds evidently didn't read it, as that was one time where I was actually right.

For me, despite his short stature, Tim Lincecum was head-and-shoulders above the rest. Baseball America rated him as having the best fastball and the best offspeed pitch among all the draft eligible college pitchers. Additionally, he struck out everybody at the University of Washington, posting strike out rates of 12.9, 11.3, and 14.3 respectively in his three years there. He was clearly the most electric pitcher in the draft and had a massive upside.

There were two main knocks against Lincecum heading into that draft: his mechanics and his height. Personally, I've always loved his mechanics. They're complicated, but he throws with his body better than the vast majority of pitchers. And, as for height, I hate the scouting bias against short righthanded pitchers. If you can pitch, then you can pitch, regardless of height. Lincecum is the guy I wanted and he was on the board when the Reds picked. Unfortunately, the Reds went in another direction, reeling in Drew Stubbs.

Stubbs has a lot of tools and could develop into a dual threat, as he has impact ability on both offense and defense. If Stubbs can perform as he did in the final two months of 2010, then he'll begin to reward the Reds for passing on a two-time Cy Young award winner and start making the fan base forget the massive opportunity cost that came along with his selection.

2007: Devin Mesoraco vs. Pete Kozma

Unfortunately, I couldn't carry the success of my 2006 pick into the 2007 draft. Additionally, while Ricky Romero's recent emergence makes my 2005 pick look more defensible, Mesoraco's recent explosion makes this 2007 pick look even worse.

The Reds had the 15th overall pick and went with Devin Mesoraco, while shortstop Pete Kozma went off the board with the Cardinals 18th overall pick.

Heading into the draft, few prospects had as much helium as Devin. Coming from a cold weather school and off a TJ surgery, Mesoraco wasn't projected to be a first rounder, but a strong season propelled him up the ranks.

Kozma was more of a high floor, low ceiling type player. He lacked any real plus tools, but had some nice skills and a feel for the game, which in a somewhat less than inspiring draft class seemed to be a decent option. Unfortunately, as of now, both the Cardinals and I have whiffed on this pick, as his bat hasn't developed and he's a long shot to emerge as a legitimate big league shortstop. So, obviously, his floor no longer seems quite as high as it once did, while his ceiling has remained largely the same.

On the other hand, Mesoraco finally broke out in 2010 and looks ready to emerge as an impact bat at a premier defensive position. Finding a catcher that can actually hit is a tremendous value, so the Reds certainly made the right decision here. In the final analysis, Mesoraco might prove to be the best offensive catcher the Reds have had since Johnny Bench.

Having learned my lesson, Kozma was the last time I went with the safe, high-floor type player in the first round. The first round is where you have the best chance to land the impact talent, so limiting yourself to a lower-ceiling player hardly seems like the right strategy in most draft classes. Lesson learned.

2008: Yonder Alonso vs. Casey Kelly

Well, here's the first pick of the blog era and I went with Casey Kelly here and here. In hindsight the pick looks pretty good, but in the interests of full disclosure I must say that I liked Kelly more as a shortstop and wanted to see what he could do with a couple of years as a full-time position player. He had good baseball bloodlines, very good athleticism, played plus defense at short, and had good pop in his bat. However, there were questions about his bat, so I viewed his pitching ability as a nice way to manage the performance risk that came with his hit tool. There is an old scouting adage that you don't gamble on a questionable "hit tool" in the first round. So, maybe that rang true in this case, but I still would have liked to see what Kelly could do as a shortstop before switching him to pitching full time. It's not easy to find a potentially plus defensive shortstop who can be an impact hitter on offense. He already had solid power, so it doesn't seem out of the realm of possibilities that he could develop into a capable hitter at the professional level.

The BoSox were able to grab Kelly with the 30th overall pick (due in part to signability concerns) and successfully convert him into a full-time pitcher, while the Reds grabbed Yonder Alonso with the 7th overall pick.

The Reds clearly went with the player they deemed to be the best available, which is usually a sound draft philosophy, but in hindsight I wonder if it was the right decision. Obviously, Joey Votto had already emerged as a good, young first baseman with a strong offensive profile. So, it clearly wasn't an area of need and Yonder was never a realistic option to switch defensive positions, which meant he was blocked as soon as he stepped into the organization. And, if the Reds don't do something with Yonder in 2011 to extract some value from the pick (trade or play), then the organization's questionable ability to extract value from a blocked prospect may make this less than the ideal pick.

As it stands, Yonder looks like a nice, well-rounded hitter with good on-base skills and solid power potential. Not a bad pick, but even a couple of years after he was drafted, it remains unclear how exactly he fits into the organizational plans.

2009: Mike Leake vs. Shelby Miller

This pick is one that I have pondered quite a bit since it happened. At the time, I locked in on Shelby Miller as the pitcher with the best combination of stuff and mechanics. I loved the velocity and how cleanly he generated it. There was no doubt that he was the guy I wanted the Reds to take. In fact, I had him pegged as the third best prospect in the draft behind Stephen Strasburg and Dustin Ackley. At draft time, there were other high school pitchers who were rated higher and ultimately were drafted higher, including Zach Wheeler (6th to the Giants) Jacob Turner (9th to the Tigers), Tyler Matzek (11th to the Rockies), and Matt Purke (14th to the Rangers), but I preferred Miller to all of them. His upside was just too massive for me to see anyone else as a legitimate option.

Miller ultimately went off the board with the Cardinals 17th overall pick, which was a while after the Reds selected Mike Leake with the 8th overall pick. Realistically speaking, Miller's first full season couldn't possibly have gone better. The Cards kept him in low-A all season long and he posted a 3.62 ERA, 1.25 WHIP, 2.8 BB/9, and a 12.1 K/9 in 104.1 innings. It was a dominating performance and one that has him on the #1 starter development path.

Obviously, Leake has been a great success story and after the draft the pick started to grow on me. I still would have gone with Miller, but Leake was becoming more intriguing. I never suspected that he'd be able to jump over the minors entirely, but I loved the polish and the understanding of how to pitch.

Of course, the question then was whether Leake's higher floor/lower ceiling were the better pick over Miller's lower floor/higher ceiling. And, that's a question with which I still wrestle.

Just how valuable is a pitcher who can bypass the minors entirely? What exactly are the advantages? Is it worth selecting a #2/3 starter who can jump straight to the majors over a potential #1 starter who will need significant time in the minors?

Well, obviously, there has to be some kind of "time value" of prospects at work. When you are talking about money, a dollar today is worth much more than a dollar a year from now for two reasons. First, the devaluing caused by inflation. Second, you can invest the dollar and earn interest on it. But, what's the advantage in pitching prospects?

Obviously, the value doesn't change at the MLB level, as regardless when each player arrives, you'll control their rights for 6 seasons. However, the value lies in the reduced injury risk and the non-existent performance risk. If a pitcher is good enough to jump right to the majors, then there really is no performance risk to the pick. Additionally, and here is the real difference, if the pitcher can jump right to the majors, then you eliminate a substantial amount of injury risk. A pitcher that has to develop in the minors is still subject to injury risk, but his minor league performance simply doesn't directly benefit the organization. Production at the MLB level is all that really matters, so getting an immediate return on your pick substantially cuts the chances of injury in the minors ruining a draft pick's future MLB production. If the pitcher is going to pitch and be exposed to injury risk, then it's preferable that he do it at the MLB level where the production actually counts.

At this point, I'm still not sure how to properly determine the value of a draft pick who jumps right to the Majors like Mike Leake against a prospect who must spend several years in the minors like Shelby Miller.

I guess, in the end, it still comes down to the likelihood that Miller will reach his ceiling and be significantly better than Mike Leake at the MLB level. If he can, then he is clearly the better pick. And, every year of development that passes with Miller still on track cuts the risk that he'll get injured or fail to develop. As it was at the time of the draft, Miller has more risk and more reward, while Leake is the sure thing. It's still too close to call at this point, but I'm sticking with Miller and his #1 starter upside.

2010: Yasmani Grandal vs. Chris Sale

In the 2010 draft, Chris Sale was actually the first prospect on whom I did in-depth research and a full write-up, and he was ultimately the guy I wanted the Reds to land. His fastball and changeup were both rated among the very best of the draft eligible college pitchers and he had very good polish to go with them. His strikeout and walk rates were among the very best in the country, so you had both upside and polish. There were/are some questions about his arm action, but I never saw anything about which to worry. Some thought there was too much snap in his arm action, but I don't really see it. I would like to see him incorporate more leg drive, but overall I liked his mechanics. After I was done looking into the draft crop, Sale was still sitting atop my list.

In that draft, Sale was selected by the Chicago White Sox with the 13th overall pick. Somewhat surprisingly, the Sox moved Sale all the way up to the majors after only 10.1 minor league innings. The Sox fast-tracked him as a reliever and he performed very well, posting a 32/10 K/BB ratio in his 23.1 Major League innings. Once again, the question emerges about the value of a player skipping the minors almost entirely, though in this case my pick would get whatever boost comes along with it. The Sox used Sale in their push for the playoffs and it's hard not to wonder how much the Reds would have benefited from having two hard throwing southpaws (Aroldis and Sale) in the postseason. Obviously, for a team in the hunt for the playoffs, getting an immediate return on a draft pick is of even greater value.

Regardless, the Reds had the 12th overall pick, which they used to select Yasmani Grandal. Grandal was the second Miami Hurricane that the team had selected with its first pick in the last three drafts. Obviously, they feel they have good scouting coverage down there. Thus far, Grandal has played only in the Arizona rookie league, where he posted a slash line of .286/.394/.321 in 33 plate appearances. Obviously, the on-base skill is impressive, but the sample size is too small to reveal anything of value. The selection of Grandal gives the Reds some of the best catching depth in all of the minor leagues, as he could develop into a solid defensive catcher with an impact bat. It'll be interesting to see how he performs in full season ball and how he'll fit into an organization where Mesoraco is making a big splash much farther up the ladder. Given Grandal's polish, his career is very likely to overlap with Mesoraco's at the Major League Level. So, once again, the Reds could have a blocked Hurricane in the system.

As for Sale, the White Sox are now wrestling with the question of whether to develop him as a starting pitcher or to continue to ride him at the MLB level as a reliever. Obviously, he has more value as a starter, but the Sox may not see it that way. If the Reds had grabbed him, I would have wanted him developed as a starter and see nothing to prevent him from successfully doing so.

As with almost all of the aforementioned players, it's too soon to tell which player will prove to be the more valuable pick, but I still prefer Sale to Grandal. Hopefully, Yasmani proves me wrong.

2011: Robert Stephenson vs. Jason Esposito

Well, for the first time since I've started doing these draft write-ups the Reds had a pick outside the top 15. In fact, they had number 27 overall, which makes it more challenging to find an impact talent. However, given the impressive depth of talent in the 2011 draft class, the Reds were able to land a high upside arm that undoubtedly would have gone higher in the typical draft class.

Stephenson stands 6-2 and tips the scale at 190 lbs with a wiry frame. He features a big time fastball that tickles 97 mph on the radar gun and a biting, 12-to-6 curveball that is inconsistent. And, like seemingly all power arms coming out of high school, he has a mediocre change-up. Power pitchers in high school typically dominate with the hard stuff and rarely need to develop that third pitch, typically the change-up, because they can simply overpower high school hitters. Additionally, the change-up is materially different from the power stuff, as it requires touch and feel, while power stuff does not. So, the change-up frequently gets neglected.

Another big plus on Stephenson is his makeup and intelligence. He had a solid commitment to the University of Washington and a strong academic background in high school to go along with his back-to-back no-hitters. So, his high school resume was certainly an abundance of riches.

As for his pitching mechanics, I can't say that I'm wild about them. For a pitcher with a tall, lanky frame, Stephenson uses a short, underwhelming stride and a less than impressive push off the rubber. The trend in power pitchers these days seems to be a very long stride and an explosive drive off the rubber. You see it in Tim Lincecum and Aroldis Chapman, as they both feature strides that are so long and aggressive that they seem to jump off the rubber towards the hitter. Even in this draft class, Lincecum disciple Trevor Bauer features the torque based delivery with the long stride. The obvious benefit of a strong leg drive and aggressive push off the rubber is that every bit of velocity you can generate with the lower body is velocity you don't have to generate with your arm. And, the less stress you have to put on the arm, the lower your injury risk.

Due in part to the shorter stride, Stephenson's delivery is upright. Additionally, he doesn't really finish with his upper body in a forward lean over his plant leg, rather his upper body stays fairly upright from the apex of the leg kick all the way through the follow-through. Finally, the upright delivery seems to preclude his pitching arm from finishing naturally, instead its momentum seems to be cut a bit short. Overall, the short stride and upright delivery rob his mechanics of fluidity, leaving a measure of stiffness to his mechanics, which could lead to inconsistency, difficulties in effectively working down in the strike zone, and additional stress on the arm.

That said, Stephenson has a great deal of positives going for him and the Reds probably did very well, as you don't frequently get this type of upside so late in the draft. The stuff and makeup are there, but he'll need to refine his mechanics and continue to polish his secondary offerings as he climbs the ladder. Still, hard to argue with, or be disappointed by, this pick by the Reds.

As for my pick, after looking back at my previous selections, this is the first time I haven't gone with a starting pitcher or a shortstop. So, I'm breaking new ground here. Evidently, in the first round I favor high ceiling, impact pitchers and players who handle the premier defensive positions. It wasn't an intentional, preconceived strategy that I knowingly employed, but given the value of top flight starting pitching and the scarcity of legitimate hitters at the premier defensive positions it seems a more than defensible strategy.

Of course, my top choice and the guy I was highest on actually was a pitcher, namely RHP Tyler Beede. I love Beede's blend of stuff, command, pitching IQ, and clean mechanics. Beede wasn't really projected by anyone to be selected in the first round, much less before the Reds picked, but the Blue Jays popped him before the Reds had a shot at him. Ultimately, his early departure from the draft board may have worked out for the best, as Beede elected to attend the University of Vanderbilt rather than sign with the Jays. Still, I'm a big fan and would love to have him in Cincinnati. That said, my shadow pick of Jason Esposito will be seen as a stretch by many and admittedly it may well be, but sometimes you just have to go with your gut. I have always liked what I have seen in Esposito and remain bullish on his future.

Esposito was a draft eligible junior out of Vanderbilt who primarily played third base. Playing at one of the elite collegiate programs in the country may work both for and against him. On the plus side, he regularly faced the best the collegiate game had to offer, which should have forced him to refine and elevate his game. On the negative side, he had a great deal more exposure than many prospects, which may have given scouts significantly more opportunities to search for and identify potential flaws to his game. At some point, exposure becomes overexposure. Whether that happened with Esposito, I don't know, but he certainly was more heavily scouted than a prospect like Brandon Nimmo, who was drafted 13th overall out of Wyoming, a state that doesn't even offer high school baseball, and is less of a known commodity.

Esposito's offensive performance all three years has been impressive, as he can hit for average, get on base, and hit for power. As a freshman, Esposito hit a respectable .287/.351/.401 with 4 homeruns and 20 steals in 25 attempts. As a sophomore, he hit a robust .359/.455/.599 with 12 homeruns and 31 steals in 35 attempts. He hit .340/.403/.530 with 9 homers and 15 steals in 25 attempts as a junior.

I first saw him play as a sophomore and was impressed right from the get go. In fact, I was convinced at the time that he was a lock to a top 15 pick when draft eligible. Unfortunately, his junior season was a bit of step backward and he slipped down the draft board, which is a cautionary tale that you can't necessarily expect linear improvement/development from college players. The knocks on Esposito were two fold: 1) his swing was mechanical and 2) he added weight to the lower half.

Admittedly, I can see the reason for concern on both issues. He did look slightly stockier in his junior season than he did as a sophomore and it could be the reason for his struggles on the base paths. Even so, the added weight to the lower half doesn't diminish his potential to be a plus defender at third with a very good arm. So, right there, he's somewhat ahead of the game, as his bat won't need to carry his glove like many offensive-first third sackers. The concerns about his offense are lessened somewhat by the fact that his glove will be an asset, not a liability.

As for his swing mechanics, overall I like them and think the concern is somewhat overstated. I have seen a swing or two that looked a bit too mechanical, but overall Esposito has a well balanced and fundamentally sound swing. He uses a high stride as a timing mechanism, uses a fairly level swing plain, and fires the hips effectively to power the swing. He also maintains good balance throughout the swing and generates good bat speed.

Overall, I'm happy with my Esposito pick, as he has a well rounded game and I think the bat will play in the professional ranks. As for Stephenson, there are plenty of positives to his game and it's easy to see why the Reds landed him, as he has significant upside. At the same time, the reasons he was still available at pick 27 are also visible, as he'll have to refine his mechanics to maximize his potential and reach his considerable ceiling.

Complacency Kills the Season

2011-09-04T20:27:00.000-07:00

Complacency is the silent killer, as evidenced by the 2011 Reds' season. The Reds are where they are because they were complacent.

When a team breaks through to a new performance plateau, the following season is frequently a step backwards. The simple fact is that the break through likely occurred because a lot of things went right. More things than can reasonably expected to go right again. So, in order to offset the likelihood of a regression, it's important to take substantial steps to improve the team.

Unfortunately, the Reds failed to do so. To justify the complete lack of effort to improve, financial constraints are frequently cited. However, even if true, there are a number of payroll neutral moves that could have been made. There are two types of currency in the MLB world: 1) cash and 2) prospects. If the Reds were limited by payroll constraints, then they could have cracked open the farm system and dealt away prospects to improve the MLB roster.

Unfortunately, the Reds stood pat. Unbelievably, they stood pat. Inconceivably, they stood pat. They stood pat all offseason, hoping to avoid the almost inevitable backslide. They stood pat at the trade deadline, hoping that the status quo would get them back in the hunt. They did nothing except wait and watch the standings as the season slipped away.

If you step back and take a look at what the Reds have actually done this season, then it becomes rather difficult not to get frustrated... REALLY frustrated. As a fan, I invested a decent amount of time, money, and energy into the Reds this year. In exchange, I don't expect championships or even wins. I don't expect sunshine and rainbows. I DO, however, expect effort. I expect it both between the lines AND in the front office. If I'm going to make this type of investment on an annual basis, then I expect the organization to be at least as invested, if not more so. In hindsight, it's difficult to even conceive of what Walt Jocketty did all season. He constantly lets Dusty speak for the organization, he lets Chris Buckley handle the draft, and he didn't trade anyone. How exactly did he earn his money? By signing Bronson Arroyo to an absurd contract extension and a bunch of replacement level players to low cost contracts? Or, are we paying him to play internet hearts and sleep on the job?

Now, I don't think I'm unreasonable or irrational. I understand that trades require two willing partners. Just because we think up a deal, doesn't mean it can get done. Still, the utter lack of activity by the organization this year is...well...stunning. And, frankly, the lack of activity stands in stark contrast to that of the organization that is currently running away with the division.

If you take a quick look at what the Brewers have done, then it's not difficult to see why they are going to win the division.

1. On December 6, 2010, the Brewers traded Brett Lawrie to the Toronto Blue Jays for Shawn Marcum.

2. On December 19, 2010, the Brewers traded Jake Odorizzi, Lorenzo Cain, Alcides Escobar, and Jeremy Jeffress for Zack Greinke and Yuniesky Betancourt.

3. On March 27, 2011, the Brewers traded Cutter Dykstra and cash to the Washington Nationals for Nyjer Morgan.

4. On July 12, 2011, the Brewers traded Adrian Rosario and Danny Herrera to the New York Mets for Francisco Rodriguez and cash.

In short, the Brewers added two top of the rotation starters, a high-motor leadoff hitter, and a high-leverage reliever.

Now, let's compare those moves to what the Reds did this season:

1. On July 26, 2011, the Reds traded Jonny Gomes and cash to the Washington Nationals for Bill Rhinehart and Christopher Manno.

That's it. That's the sum total of the Reds efforts to improve the team for the 2011 season. One trade. A single addition-by-subtraction trade.

As I write this, the Reds are currently 14 games back of the Milwaukee Brewers. If you add up the relevant WAR figures for those 4 players, Zack Greinke (3.4), Nyjer Morgan (3.4), Shawn Marcum (2.4), and Francisco Rodriguez (0.5), then you get 9.7 Wins. While the Reds did nothing, the Brewers went out and purchased 10 wins with a month of the season still to play.

I don't think it's much of a stretch to say that those four players are the primary difference makers in the NL Central race. In the final analysis, the Brewers obviously wanted it more. That's it and that's all. When the history of the 2011 NL Central is written, it'll read that while one organization made excuses, another made moves to improve. Given those two realities, it's not much of a surprise who came out on top.

Little did we know, the Reds season was over before it even began, as the Reds simply weren't going to make the moves necessary to put us over the top. The sad part about the 2011 season isn't really the fact that the Reds failed to build off 2010. The truly sad part is that they didn't even bother suiting up. It's not the battles that you lose that rankle and fester, it's the battles for which you didn't even bother showing up. That's how it feels to be a Reds fan right now. The front office didn't bother to show up for the season, which will now undoubtedly go down as a missed opportunity. Instead of recognizing and seizing the opportunity to better last season's postseason performance, the Reds waited and hoped, demonstrating the kind of faith found only in the most pious and zealous of believers. Unfortunately, the only reward for such a display of faith was a missed opportunity and a hearty "wait 'til next year."

Albert Camus once wrote "I sometimes think of what future historians will say of us. A single sentence will suffice for modern man: He fornicated and read the papers." I wonder if future historians will look back at the 2011 Reds and find that once again a single sentence will suffice: "They did nothing and read the standings."

Fixing the Big Donkey

2011-08-15T21:54:00.000-07:00

Ok, the Reds season has gone down the tubes, so it's time to revisit our old friend Adam Dunn. During his time in Cincinnati, The Big Donkey was the biggest lightning rod in all of baseball for the simple reason that he personified the divide between traditional scouting and statistical analysis views of the game. Traditional scouting types hated him, statistical analysis fans loved him.

And, one of the first things I posted on this blog was a blurb about the likelihood that Adam Dunn would suffer an early decline. Dunn's game has always been predicated on the old-player skills of power and patience. And, Bill James first postulated that old-player skills were more susceptible to aging than the young-player skills of speed and batting average. The theory being that the loss of a step or the slowing of the bat would cause a player lacking young-player skills to fall off the cliff. For example, which player is better suited to survive a slowing bat and the loss of a step, Adam Dunn or Ichiro? Dunn is at the bottom of the acceptable spectrum in both outfield range and contact rate, while Ichiro is at the top. So, a slowing bat or loss of a step could be devastating for Dunn's production, while easily manageable for Ichiro. Anyway, I bought into that philosophy, which was a big reason why I was opposed to locking Dunn into a multi-year extension that would take him well into his 30s.

Now, that said, this year has been an utter nightmare for Adam Dunn. It's been so bad that it almost defies description. I still buy into the old player skills argument, but it's difficult to imagine the wheels completely and utterly coming off the wagon like this. Is it possible? Sure, in fact the old player argument expects an earlier and faster decline, but I would have thought he would have gone from ultra productive to mediocre to massive struggles. Instead, he skipped the intermediate step and went right to the massive struggles. Regardless, I'm going to take a swing at helping the Donkey out. Once a Red, always a Red.

There are countless possible reasons for Dunn's struggles. The change in leagues and resulting unfamiliarity with the pitchers, the change from playing in the field to being largely a DH, potential injuries, the weight of the contract and the corresponding expectations. It could be one or all of those factors. The more potential variables that exist, the harder it is to pinpoint the specific cause of the struggles.

But, to me, the first thing that I see is a subtle change in his swing mechanics.

Below are two At Bats against one of the toughest pitchers in all of baseball: Justin Verlander. The games are 11 days apart in 2011, but Dunn does the same exact thing in each of them. It looks to me like Dunn has simply fallen into a bad habit in his swing. It's easy to do and occasionally difficult to both identify and fix. But, Dunn utilizes a much more extreme bat waggle/hand position with the ChiSox than he did during his time in Cincinnati and Arizona.

If you watch this video (I suggest pausing it at the 2 second mark and again at the 26 second mark), look at how long it takes Adam Dunn to get his bat up into hitting position. He lays the bat on his shoulder, actually past horizontal and somewhat pointing to the ground. And, he maintains that position for a LONG time. In fact, Justin Verlander gets past the apex of his leg kick before Dunn begins to bring the bat up into a more vertical position. Verlander is probably the hardest throwing starting pitcher in baseball, but Dunn waits until Verlander is unpacking his leg kick and beginning to drive to the plate before bringing his bat up.

If you are slow to get the bat up into hitting position, then you are going to be slow to the ball. And, against MLB pitching, you can't afford to be even a fraction of a second late. In this instance, Dunn makes it work (in part because he gets an 89 mph offspeed pitch), but I really don't think that bat position is a recipe for success.

And, below, here's another At Bat against Verlander, this time almost 2 weeks later, but the same bat waggle and delay in getting into hitting position. This time, Verlander gets the better of him. Stop the video at the 32 second mark and look at how far into the windup Verlander has gotten compared to the bat position of Dunn. How can Verlander be unpacking the leg kick and Dunn still have the bat parallel to the ground??? How can you hit like that??? Being slow to get the bat up into proper hitting position will very likely make him slow to the ball, but it also likely means that he is now moving his hands into hitting position at the very same time he is moving other parts of his body to trigger the swing. At times, it almost seems as if the barrel of the bat is still moving up and in towards the plate when the body begins moving forward to meet the pitch. The simultaneously moving parts to his swing could also help explain his struggles.

Now, let's take a look at a few of Dunn's At Bats while he was with the Reds.

First, here's a battle with one of the best starting pitchers in baseball, C.C. Sabathia. Look at Dunn's bat position against C.C. You can see that he doesn't rest the bat on his shoulder and he never gets past parallel. Also, he brings the bat up to a vertical hitting position before Sabathia begins to unpack his leg kick. So, he's a hair quicker in making his move to bring the bat up into hitting position and he has a shorter distance to travel to get into that position.

(For whatever reason, MLB.com isn't properly embedding the older Reds video clips, but if you click on the black box it'll open up the videos in a new window)

And, finally, here's a look at Dunn against Wandy Rodriguez. If I was Dunn, I'd use this video as an example of what my swing mechanics should be. The bat position is much higher and only occasionally is it horizontal to the ground. And, when Wandy is at the apex of his leg kick, you can see Dunn's bat is in ideal position. In this At Bat, he hasn't rested his hands on his shoulder and is never past parallel or pointing the bat at the ground. To me, this hand position makes him significantly quicker to the ball and puts him in better position to drive the ball.

Maybe Dunn has succumbed to the curse of Old Player Skills and an early career decline. Maybe he was right all these years when he told everyone that he didn't want to play 1b or be a DH, but rather was a leftfielder. Maybe he's just scuffling with the change in leagues.

But, if there was one thing I'd like to see Adam Dunn do over the final month-and-a-half it would be to stop resting the bat on the shoulder and pointing the barrel at the ground. Dunn isn't Rod Carew. He's not a handsy singles hitter who is going to slap and slash singles to all fields. Carew could afford to hit with a horizontal bat wrapped around his body. Dunn is a power hitter and needs to take a big swing to get his money's worth.

It's possible that Dunn has lost a bit of bat speed, but at the very least he hasn't gotten any faster. And, as he gets older, he should be trying to get quicker and use a more direct path to the ball, but instead Dunn has gone the other way. He has dropped his hand position, forcing him to travel farther to get into proper hitting position and meet the ball. Dunn needs to go back to the hitting position he used in the Wandy Rodriguez and CC Sabathia At Bats. Stop holding the bat horizontal to the ground and get it up into hitting position earlier. When a pitcher is running it up there at 95+, you simply can't wait to get your hands into hitting position until after the apex of the leg kick: that's just too late. Get quicker to the ball. Maybe that will get him back on track this year and it will certainly become more important as he ages and loses a bit of bat speed, as he doesn't have all that much margin for error at the plate.

This change might be part or all of what's ailing Adam Dunn. At the very least, if he went back to what worked in Cincinnati and Arizona, then he could cross the new hand position off the list of potential explanations for his struggles. Whatever the reason, the baseball world is just a bit more enjoyable when the Big Donkey is launching the ball into the stratosphere, so let's hope he gets back to doing just that...and soon.

Kyle Lotzkar: Change the Mechanics, Save the Career?

2011-08-13T23:42:00.000-07:00

The recent injury to Kyle Lotzkar, which thankfully turned out to be a hamstring injury rather than another arm injury, got me to thinking about the best way to minimize his injury risk going forward. Now, in the interests of full disclosure, I'm not a physiologist, kinesiologist, or biologist. When you add in the fact that there is still a measure of fog clouding the relationship between pitcher injuries and pitching mechanics and this post necessarily becomes equal parts speculation and educated guessing. With that out of the way, let's get back to Lotzkar.

Now, obviously, the 800 lb gorilla sitting in the room with Kyle Lotzkar is the high back elbow in his arm action. I've written about it in each and every one of my Kyle Lotzkar prospect profiles, as have many others in the blogosphere. And, unfortunately, Lotzkar has already suffered a significant arm injury early in his professional career. So, the issue becomes whether the Reds should consider tweaking Lotzkar's mechanics. Obviously, the goal would be to reduce the injury risk, but the downside is a potential decline in performance. It's not an easy decision for the Reds front office, so let's try to help them out.

Before we come to any conclusions, let's take a quick, cursory look at the problem. After breaking his hands, Lotzkar utilizes an arm swing that includes bringing his elbow above the the shoulder. When you use the high back elbow, it makes it very difficult to get the arm up into an over-the-top throwing position. To drop the elbow from the high position and bring the ball up into an over-the-top throwing position requires an almost lasso-type arm action. And, I think it's important to understand that it is this lasso-type arm action that is the real cause for concern and the real creator of heightened injury risk for pitchers.

Even just sitting at your computer, if you take a break from reading this to mimic the arm action, then you can feel the unnatural motion required to throw with the high back elbow and over-the-top arm slot. Throwing a baseball is unnatural enough as it is, but adding in this type of arm action makes it even more so. But, whenever a kid picks up a baseball for the first time he automatically throws it a certain way. And, the repetition of each throw over the course of his baseball development reinforces the muscle memory. Muscle memory is "a form of procedural memory that involves consolidating a specific motor task into memory through repetition, eventually allowing it to be performed without conscious effort."

So, if you naturally use a high back elbow, then you'll constantly reinforce it with each throw in your career. Not surprisingly, that's what makes attempting to change a pitcher's mechanics when they join an MLB organization so challenging, as you are working against years and years of muscle memory. For whatever reason, as difficult as it is to change the arm swing, anyone can pick up a baseball and throw without difficulty from an over-the-top, side-arm, or submarine arm slot. So, the release point is easily changeable, but the arm action up to that point is not.

As a result, I would avoid working against well over a decade of ingrained muscle memory by trying to alter the high back elbow. If the Reds forced him to do that, then they would risk a decline in performance to such an extent that he wouldn't be productive enough to pitch at the highest level. So, they *might* effectively reduce his injury risk, but end up with a healthier pitcher who simply isn't effective enough to maintain his prospect status.

However, I really think it's worthwhile to drop Lotzkar's arm slot. To me, that would seem to be the best way to manage the twin risks: injury and performance. The lower arm slot will eliminate the problematic lasso arm action, reducing the strain on the arm, but minimize the performance risk by not forcing him to completely retrain the muscle memory in his arm action.

But, Will it Work???

It's easy to think of MLB pitchers who featured the high back elbow and have suffered significant arm problems. For example, Mark Prior, Anthony Reyes, and Joel Zumaya all leap to mind. It's not as easy to think of pitchers who feature the high back elbow and who have not had significant arm injuries.

However, two current pitchers do come to mind, one with a significant track record of durability and another with a limited track record but who strikes me as having a manageable injury risk. The former is Phillies pitcher Aaron Heilman and the latter is White Sox pitcher Chris Sale. But, what do they have in common?

Both pitchers undoubtedly feature the high back elbow that plagues Lotzkar, but also feature something that may help them avoid the injury risk typically associated with that arm action: namely, a lower arm slot.

Here's a look at their high back elbows and their respective arm slots:

Aaron Heilman

In the first photo, you can see the high back elbow. In the second photo, you can see the lower arm slot. Even though Heilman has the higher back elbow, he doesn't have to bring his arm up into the over the top arm slot, which forecloses the need for the lasso-action. The lower arm slot largely eliminates the added strain from the higher elbow.

Since 2003, Heilman has thrown 65.0 or more innings 7 different times and 630.0 total innings. Additionally, he's thrown 437.2 minor league innings. And, despite all the innings, he has largely avoided significant arm injuries. He has the repertoire to start and spent most of his time in the minors in the starting rotation, but has spent most of his MLB career in the bullpen.

Obviously, Heilman is just one player and accordingly can't be definitive evidence of anything, but he is something of a rarity as a high-back elbow pitcher who has logged a significant number of innings without major arm problems.

Chris Sale

And, you see a similar story with Chris Sale. In photo 1, you can see the high back elbow. In photo 2, you can see the lower arm slot.

Sale is the pitcher I wanted the Reds to draft, which is surprising because I usually blanch at the mere sight of a high-elbow pitcher. But, with Sale, I just didn't see it as a red flag in part because of the lower arm slot, as that should offset some of the strain on the arm. Obviously, Sale is still young and in the early stages of his career, but so far the results are good and the injuries are non-existent. Of course, as with any pitcher, that could change on any given pitch, but so far the results are positive.

At this point, it's worth mentioning one of the alleged drawbacks of a lower arm slot. There is a school of thought out there, most visibly preached by Keith Law, that a lower arm slot frequently leads to struggles against opposite side hitters. And, to an extent, I agree with Law. Opposite side hitters get a longer look at the ball coming out of the pitcher's hand, so a pitcher will need to find a weapon to effectively nullify that advantage or else be relegated to a bullpen role. However, there are examples of lower arm slot pitchers who find success in the rotation, with Justin Masterson being the latest example. Still, it's definitely something that would need to be taken into account in dropping Lotzkar's arm slot.

One Final (and Perhaps Telling) Example

Now, I think discussing one more pitcher is instructive. Ordinarily, I would hesitate to cite this pitcher as an example of...well...just about anything, as he defies just about all the rules and is about as unorthodox as they come. Even so, for our present purposes, Dan Quisenberry is an interesting and relevant case study.

To me, Quisenberry effectively drives home the point that it's not the high back elbow alone that is cause for concern in a pitcher's mechanics, but rather the lasso-type arm action that comes from the combination of the high back elbow and an over-the-top release point.

Here are three photos that tell the story better than I ever could. First, the obvious use of the high-back elbow:

If you look at those photos, you can imagine the type of lasso action that he would have to use to get from this position to an over-the-top arm slot. Fortunately for his arm, he didn't have to use such an arm action.

In this third photo, you can see the lower arm slot that precludes the typical added stress on the arm that the lasso-action necessitates:

In fact, if you look at Quiz's arm slot, then I don't think it's a stretch to say that the use of the submarine arm slot almost REQUIRES the high back elbow. If it doesn't necessarily require it, then it certainly is a natural extension of the decision to use the submarine arm slot. But again, the real enemy here is not just the high back elbow, but the lasso arm action created by the combined usage of the high back elbow and the over-the-top arm slot. By using a submarine arm slot, Quiz didn't have to use the lasso arm action that creates a significantly higher risk of injury.

Final Thoughts

It's a difficult issue without a clear cut answer. Do the Reds go for maximum performance and live with the potentially heightened injury risk? Or, do they drop the arm slot to reduce the injury risk and possibly the performance level? Or, do they try to alter his arm action completely to remove the high back elbow to reduce the injury risk as much as possible but at the cost of a heightened performance risk?

Personally, I'll go with the lower arm slot. There are no hard and fast rules with pitching mechanics and injury risk. Pitchers are have different physiologies and abilities to handle stress on the arm. But, I do think there is enough data out there to support the notion that the high-back elbow leads to heightened injury risk.

Given that Lotzkar is still in low-A and has a lot of development left before he reaches the majors, I don't think rolling with the status quo is the best option. If he was knocking on the door, then maybe it would make more sense to run him out there "as is" to try to get some years of production before injury (potentially) strikes. But, it seems like we are just waiting on the other shoe to drop on the injury front.

To me, the best option is the middle course. Lower the arm slot, reduce the injury risk, and work to combat any potential decrease in performance level. You have to wonder if Lotzkar's career can survive another significant arm injury, which would be a shame because he has a lot of talent and a seemingly strong work ethic. Fortunately, the injury isn't a certainty, but it would be a shame to see his career end before it begins.

Rebuilding the Big Red Machine: Step 3 (Part 2)

2011-08-01T10:57:00.000-07:00

Go Back to Step 3 (Part 1)

1. Converting a player's total on-field contributions into a single Run value

In order to properly value a player, you have to be able to accurately quantify his on-field production. I believe it was Bill James who originally determined that "Runs" were the currency of baseball. This brought about a statistical effort to more accurately value the contributions of players, which led to statistics like WAR (Wins Above Replacement). There are three layers to this wave of player valuation.

The first layer is converting the contributions of a player into a single run statistic. This has been done for both their total offensive production and their total defensive production.

The offensive component of WAR is based on wOBA. So, we have to talk just a bit about wOBA. To start, wOBA isn't based on any other statistics, but rather is based on each and every outcome of a hitter's plate appearances. It uses linear weights to value all the different outcomes relative to each other. So, every outcome has a run value that is proportional to the other outcomes. So, a homer is worth more than a triple, which is worth more than a double, etc etc etc. So, every outcome is weighted and rolled into a single number.

Additionally, once all the contributions are compiled, the wOBA can be converted into a single run value. Basically, you take the difference of the wOBA from league average and extrapolate it out over their number of plate appearances to get their offensive run value above/below league average.

As to defense, fangraphs.com uses Ultimate Zone Rating (UZR), which is the number of runs above or below average (includes range and errors), for it's fielding component.

As with some other advanced defensive metrics, the field is divided into different zones which are assigned to the relevant fielders. And, of course, the balls hit into the zones are tracked. UZR is largely based on hits in the zones, outs in the zone, and the run value of the hits. The player's performance is compared to the league average for all balls converted in the zone. Obviously, he gets credit for plays he makes above the average and deductions for the plays below the average. A run value is applied to his performance on these plays and a total run value is determined. That run value is the defensive run component to WAR.

So, roughly speaking, that's how you get your offensive and defensive run totals.

2. Converting a player's single Run value into a Win Contribution Value
The second layer is converting a player's total run contribution into wins.

At this stage, the offensive run values are adjusted for park effects and a positional adjustment is added. Now, conceptually, the idea of positional adjustment is one that sometimes eludes me, so I'm not going to try to explain it. In essence, a player's performance is more valuable at the premier defensive positions, so an adjustment is made to give those players a boost. Hence, Hanley Ramirez's performance gets a boost, while Albert Pujols gets a deduction.

Now, converting runs to a win number is the simple part. A lot of statistical analysis has been performed to determine that generally speaking: 10 runs = 1 win. So, if a player generates +20 runs, than he's a +2 win player.

Additionally, WAR is tied to replacement level. So, the benchmark is wins a player would provide over a replacement level player. Here, replacement level is an AAAA type player, which includes the type of players available as minor league free agents, the Rule V draft, and MLB bench players.

3. Converting a player's Win Value into a Dollar Figure
Heading into the home stretch, the third layer is converting a player's win total into a dollar figure. Just how much was the player's contribution worth?

As for the value of a single Win, it's once again complicated. Different sources rely on different methods, but fangraphs.com uses something along the lines of the following:

First, there are 162 games per season and 30 teams, which works out to 4,860 total games. Of course, there must be a winner and a loser, so half those games will be wins and half will be loses. So, there are a grand total of 2,430 wins at play in the regular season. Now, due to the fact that every team will field at least replacement level players, who will perform at a .300 win percentage clip, every team is assigned 48 wins. So, 48 wins for each of 30 teams means that 1440 wins are not in play. That means that there are only roughly 990 wins in contention among the 30 teams.

So, if you took the total salary committed to all the players in baseball and divided it by the 990 wins in contention, then you'd get the cost of a win. However, it's not that simple, as many players are cost controlled under the MLB financial structure. So, such a calculation would not reflect the market rate of a win, as players who are in their first 6 seasons or who have forgone free agency for contract security drag down the market cost of a win. You have to exclude players who are not available and focus on those who are. The price of a win is determined by market forces.

As a result, you look at the free agents who signed in any given year, determine their market driven salary, and then determine how many wins above replacement they created. Once that's done, you can determine the market price of a win by (basically) dividing the total salary of all free agents by the wins generated by those free agents.

Fangraphs has calculated the dollars per win as follows:

2002: $2.6M
2003: $2.8M
2004: $3.1M
2005: $3.4M
2006: $3.7M
2007: $4.1M
2008: $4.5M

So, if you had a 4-win player in 2008, he was worth $18M, which gives a more objective valuation that is not driven exclusively by the irrational decision of one or more teams. While this methodology provides a more objective player valuation, we need to take one more step. We need to make this general, league-wide valuation more specific and applicable to a specific organization. In order to do that, we need to examine the layers of revenue and how that impacts a player's unique value to an organization. Suffice it to say, a 4-win player may have a different value to the Yankees than he does to the Royals. But, we'll leave that for Part 3.

Rebuilding the Big Red Machine: Step 3 (Part 1)

2011-08-01T10:16:00.000-07:00

Go Back to: Step 2

What is a player worth?

It's a simple, straightforward question, but one that has a surprisingly complicated and elusive answer. And, even determining the answer will require some heavy lifting on our part, but player valuation is a key part of effectively and efficiently operating an MLB franchise, so it's probably worth a bit of our time. So, let's get to it.

If you've been around the block once or twice, you've probably heard the old axiom that something is worth "whatever someone will pay for it." And, of course, on a certain level that is true. However, baseball economics do not precisely reflect the realities of markets driven by pure market forces.

Baseball is not a purely competitive market, as each team is a member of a league. As a result, there is an inherent element of cooperation in the baseball marketplace. Unlike a pure competitive market, the Yankees are prevented from running the Kansas City Royals out of business. Not to mention, they would not benefit from doing so. In a non-cooperative market, competitors benefit from running their competition out of business, as it creates an opportunity for the surviving business to increase its marketshare and customer base, which bring a corresponding increase in revenue streams. But, in baseball, not many fans are going to pay the going rate for tickets to watch the Yankees play an intrasquad game. So, on a fundamental level, the Yankees need the Royals.

The fact that the Yankees can't run the Royals out of business brings about a practical reality that must be recognized in a discussion of player valuation. Namely, bad decisions aren't penalized the same way they are in a true market place. The penalty for foolishness is the loss of business. In MLB, the penalty for foolishness is a last place finish due to a pathetic Win/Loss record. Decisions in life and business are based largely on incentives and disincentives. Here, a last place finish simply isn't a strong enough deterrent to prevent organizations from making similar bad decisions in the future. So, team after team continues to throw out massive contracts driven largely by the market, rather than the value of the player to the team.

So, the obvious consequence is that bad teams are free to make bad decisions regarding free agents. And, of course, that sets the market and drives up the cost of players for rational decision making teams. Or, to put it more succinctly, the dumbest teams in the league can set the value of the players based on what they are willing to pay for them.

So, if that's how the value of a player is frequently determined, then how do rational decision makers place a more accurate, proper value on players?

Proper Valuation Strategy

Now that we've laid out the problem, we are going to attempt to address it. For a mid-market organization like the Reds to hold its own against the big market clubs, it needs to embrace efficiency. It needs to leaner and meaner. Basically, the Reds need to get significantly more units of production per dollar spent than the big market clubs. If it fails to do so, then the big market clubs will win based purely on their wealth of resources. If the Reds aren't more efficient than the competition, then the big clubs will win simply by outspending them.

So, how do the Reds get more "bang for the buck"? How do they embrace efficiency? A proper player valuation system is a key first step. In general, we are going to look to directly tie a player's on-field contributions to the revenue generated by the organization. Linking "monetary expense" to "monetary benefit" to determine the value of an asset is hardly revolutionary, but it does allow us to place a more rational value on players than we would get from relying on what the Pittsburgh Pirates are willing to pay for players. So, that's our goal in our valuation efforts. Detach the impact and influence of outside organizations on our valuations and make the determination of a player's value based on what he is worth to OUR organization. In short, a player's value to the team will be driven by the revenue and value he creates for the organization.

As difficult as it may be, the Reds need to form their own independent valuation of players and stick to it, rather than letting the market dictate player valuations to them.

To establish their own valuations of players, the Reds will need to follow certain steps, which will involve some heavy lifting on our part, but that can't really be helped. Basically, proper valuation requires the following steps:

1. Use statistical analysis to convert a player's total on-field contributions (offense, defense, positional value, etc) into a single Run value,

2. Convert that player's Run contribution into a Win value,

3. Determine a player's objective monetary value on the basis of his Win contributions, and

4. Convert a player's objective monetary value into a subjective, organization specific value based on a team's position on the Win Curve and an understanding of the various layers of revenue that exist under MLB's economic structure.

Basically, to have a proper valuation, you need to know what a player is, how what he is impacts the team's W/L record, and how his Win value impacts the specific fortunes of the organization's revenue stream.

So, that sets the table for what we'll be doing over the next few days, but we'll break it down into several parts in order to make it a bit more manageable.

Go to Step 3 (Part 2)

Trade Deadline is...well...dead

2011-07-31T17:56:00.000-07:00

Well, I'm back in the saddle, a bit wearier and perhaps even a bit saltier, but back nonetheless. I've had a couple of professional and family issues with which to deal, so finding time to do justice to this blog has been difficult, but such is life. I can't guarantee that there will be no further interruptions, but things are trending in the right direction, so it's time for some new content. My apologies to the loyal readers and thanks to those who sent inquiries. Now, without further adieu, let's get back to baseball.

In the near future, I'm planning on touching on my remaining prospect write-ups in some manner (based on the rankings of last offseason), as my obsessive compulsive side won't let those go unfinished. Besides, better late than never, right? In addition, I'm going to take a stab at saving a prospect's professional career, take the next step in rebuilding the Big Red Machine, and maybe slay a sacred cow or sling a stone at a giant. But, for now, let's just revisit the Reds' current position in relation to the 3 pressing questions I posed this past offseason.

2011 Reds

Frustrating. That's the one word I would use to describe the 2011 Reds. Unfortunately, that's as close as we can come to pinning an identity on this squad. Fans, in seemingly equal measure, are frustrated with Walt Jocketty for either (1) refusing to add talent to make a postseason push or (2) failing to sell off talent to build for the future. Obviously, Jocketty finds himself in an untenable position vis-a-vis the fan base.

Billy Beane once put forth the philosophy that a General Manager needs to divide the season into thirds. The first 2 months are to be spent evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the team. The second 2 months are when the weaknesses should be addressed through player personnel moves. And, of course, the final 2 months are for letting those changes play out.

Here, however, it seems that the first 2 months and more have done little to establish the identity of this team. As a result, it's very difficult for anyone, Jocketty included, to determine whether we should be buyers or sellers, play for the present or the future. In the end, Jocketty ended up doing nothing at all. It's difficult to defend the decision to stand pat with a team that is in desperate need of a jolt. A shakeup of some sort to crush the complacency. If the team has any hopes of making a playoff push, then it likely needed a tweak of some sort. By doing nothing, Jocketty may have ensured that he should have been a seller.

So far this season, the Reds have a very strong Run Differential of +40, which should translate into a better win/loss record than 53-55. And yet, it hasn't. The season has been characterized by inconsistency and volatility in both offense and pitching. In fact, the team has been so up and down that they an almost impossibly long stretch of games wherein they simply couldn't string together back to back wins.

In the offseason, I identified three issues that I thought would go a long way towards determining the organization's success this year. So, here's a quick look at how those issues have played out thus far.

#1 The Aroldis Question

Aroldis exploded on the scene with a lot of hype and a Steve Nebraska fastball. He immediately set the baseball world on fire with his record setting heat. His arrival put the Reds front and center in the minds of baseball fans and in the coverage of the national media. However, he remained more side-show curiosity than impactful big league pitcher. He has all the tools to be a big time success, but he worked only 13.1 innings and his role for 2011 was unclear.

Given his abilities, the Reds had a potentially dominating weapon to unleash on the league in 2011, if only they could harness him properly. So far, they have failed to do so, which is in part due to usage problems, but also because of his struggles with command.

Given the inconsistency in the rotation, having a weapon like Aroldis would have been invaluable. In the bullpen, he needs to be used in high leverage situations (i.e. situations where the value of a run is the highest) in order to maximize his impact. In 2011, Dusty has turned to Coco Cordero, Billy Bray, Logan Ondrusek, and Nick Masset more frequently in high leverage situations than Aroldis Chapman.

Granted Aroldis has struggled with his performance in 2011, but the organization has failed to turn his freakish abilities into tangible production. For a team with a very strong run differential that has consistently struggled in 1-run games, it's inconceivable that an almost unparalleled weapon isn't leaned on more heavily in these situations.

#2 The Scott Rolen Situation

Scott Rolen was a very good acquisition for the Reds and was a big part of the team's success in 2010. He solidified the hot corner on offense and provided surprisingly strong offensive production. However, given his age and degenerative shoulder condition, it was unwise to expect a repeat performance. As a result, I suggested that a key to the season would be finding a fallback option at the hot corner, as Rolen was only likely to be good for ~120 games. So, at a bare minimum, the team needed to find ~42 games of quality play at third.

In an effort to pick up the Rolen slack, the Reds have leaned largely on Miguel Cairo, who has posted a respectable, though hardly impactful, slash line of .277/.351/.422. Cairo is a pro's pro and he's a nice utility player, but he's simply not going to be able to offer up the type of hitting that the team needs to help replicate Rolen's 2010 level of production.

The Reds needed to add a better fallback option at the hot corner. The failure to do so has hamstrung the offense in 2011.

#3 The Zack Greinke Quandry

The Greinke question was largely about Zack Greinke, but also about organizational complacency. The worst part about the offseason was the organization's decision to rest on its laurels under the pretext of "payroll restrictions." When a team takes a significant step forward, as the Reds did in 2010, it is frequently followed by a step backward. And, not surprisingly, that appears to be happening to the Reds this year.

When a team breakthrough to another level, like the postseason, it frequently happens because a lot of things go right. And, frankly, banking on all those things to go right again in the following season is a sucker's bet.

The Reds had an opportunity to reel in a legitimate Ace to bolster the pitching staff, but instead allowed him to go to a division rival. Naysayers will point to Greinke's ERA, which sits at a mediocre 4.50, while believers will point to the fact that his peripherals are ridiculously good (11.8 K/9 and 2.0 BB/9) and his ERA will regress to a mark more reflective of his true level of performance.

But, the bottom line is that Greinke, despite missing over a month of the season, has a 2.2 WAR (Wins Above Replacement) for the Brewers, which would be the best mark on the Reds staff (Cueto 1.8, Leake 1.6, no one else over 1.0). Given the inconsistency and overall ineptitude of our rotation, adding a pitcher of Greinke's caliber would have gone a long ways towards adding stability in the team's performance. Even if the other three rotations spots are shaky, having Greinke and Cueto in the 1st and 2nd slots would have ensured that the Reds could at least have strung together a few back-to-back wins. By making starting pitching a strength, the team could have more easily addressed any offensive deficiencies. Instead, they gave that advantage to a division rival.

Draft: Amir Garrett Thoughts

2011-06-14T22:34:00.001-07:00

Time for some quick Amir Garrett thoughts.

Obviously, Robert Stephenson was the first round pick, but in certain respects Garrett is the pick that has everyone buzzing. Not bad for a 22nd round pick. Given his multi-sport background, Garrett is certainly the most intriguing pick.

First impression of Garrett? He looks better on the basketball court than on the mound. Judge for yourself:

And, here he is on the bump:

On the court, he's explosive and smooth in equal measure. Obviously, he possesses great athleticism, which could bode well for his pitching career. However, on the mound, he looks rough and unpolished. He obviously needs to refine a few things, but his less than polished mechanics are far from surprising given his divided focus. Even so, he does possess a live arm and generates very good velocity from his athletic frame. When watching him work, the first thing that caught my eye and what appears to be the defining feature of his delivery is that he seems to throw up hill.

If you watch him when he is at the apex of his leg kick, he breaks down his back leg before driving to the plate. When he does that, you can see the level of his shoulders change as well. His back shoulder necessarily drops, which results in him appearing to throw up hill. From that position, it will be a bit more difficult for him to work on a downward plane, which is surprising given that he stands 6-6. Basically, he gives away some of the advantage of his height.

Additionally, his plant foot has a tendency to land too far to the first base side, which leaves him in something of a closed off position. As a result, his momentum is forced to work over or around his body a bit, which could lead to inconsistency in his command and control and rob his delivery of efficiency. However, he does have good deception, as it's difficult to pick up the ball early in his delivery.

But, in the grand scheme of things, these problems aren't insurmountable and his off the charts athleticism would be a big advantage if he were to commit to baseball full-time. His body control is strong, which can only help him repeat his delivery and maximize his power without having to sacrifice balance. Garrett has a long way to go and simply needs to get more innings under his belt, but it's easy to see reasons for optimism. These aren't problems that can't be corrected and players with that type of athleticism simply don't come around very often.

As for the Reds, the risk/reward balance on this pick tips heavily in favor of the reward side of the scale. Garrett is an intriguing pick who has good upside. He has some development risk, but he came at such a low price that it's basically all upside for the Reds.

2011 Draft: Final List of Reds Draft Picks

2011-06-08T21:36:00.000-07:00

Well, here's the final tally for the Reds in the 2011 draft courtesy of Baseball America:

1	27	Robert Stephenson	RHP	Alhambra HS, Martinez, Calif.	Calif.
2	84	Gabriel Rosa	OF	Colegio Hector Urdaneta, Rio Grande, P.R.
3	114	Tony Cingrani	LHP	Rice	Texas
4	145	Kyle McMyne	RHP	Villanova	Pa.
5	175	Ryan Wright	2B	Louisville	Ky.
6	205	Sean Buckley	3B	St. Petersburg (Fla.) JC	Fla.
7	235	James Allen	RHP	Kansas State	Kan.
8	265	Jon Matthews	RHP	St. Petersburg (Fla.) JC	Fla.
9	295	Cole Green	RHP	Texas	Texas
10	325	Brooks Pinckard	RHP	Baylor	Texas
11	355	Vaughn Covington	RHP	Killarney SS, Vancouver, B.C.	B.C.
12	385	Joe Serrano	SS	Salpointe HS, Tucson, Ariz.	Ariz.
13	415	Nick Fleece	RHP	Texas A&M	Texas
14	445	Leo Kemp	RHP	St. Joseph's	Pa.
15	475	Joseph Dorton	RHP	Lugoff-Elgin HS, Lugoff, S.C.	S.C.
16	505	Conor Costello	OF	Santa Fe HS, Edmond, Okla.	Okla.
17	535	Morgan Phillips	SS	Douglas Academy, New York	NY
18	565	James Moran	RHP	South Florida	Fla.
19	595	Chris Joyce	LHP	Santa Barbara (Calif.) CC	Calif.
20	625	Dan Jensen	RHP	Cincinnati	Ohio
21	655	Carlos Gonzalez	RHP	Cal State Northridge	Calif.
22	685	Amir Garrett	LHP	Henderson (Nev.) International School	Nev.
23	715	Salvatore Romano	RHP	Southington (Conn.) HS	Conn.
24	745	Nicholas O'Shea	1B	Minnesota	Minn.
25	775	Justice French	RHP	Mercer	Ga.
26	805	Juan Perez	2B	JC of the Canyons (Calif.)	Calif.
27	835	Taylor Wrenn	2B	Tampa	Fla.
28	865	Vordanys Perez	OF	Calabasas, Calif. (No school)	Calif.
29	895	Dariel Delgado	RHP	Miami (No school)	Fla.
30	925	Josef Terry	3B	Cal State Fullerton	Calif.
31	955	Erik Miller	RHP	Texas Christian	Texas
32	985	Mike Dennhardt	RHP	Boston College	Mass.
33	1015	Steve Selsky	OF	Arizona	Ariz.
34	1045	Bryson Smith	OF	Florida	Fla.
35	1075	Sammy Kimmell	2B	Indian River State (Fla.) JC	Fla.
36	1105	Randy Yard	RHP	Hawaii	Hawaii
37	1135	Michael Suiter	OF	Punahou HS, Honolulu	Hawaii
38	1165	Daniel Bowman	OF	Coastal Carolina	S.C.
39	1195	Justin Amlung	RHP	Louisville	Ky.
40	1225	Sam Travis	3B	Providence Catholic HS, New Lenox, Ill.	Ill.
41	1255	Carson Baranik	RHP	Parkway HS, Bossier City, La.	La.
42	1285	Jacob Stallings	C	North Carolina	N.C.
43	1315	Ty Washington	2B	Plano (Texas) East HS	Texas
44	1345	Shon Carson	OF	Lake City (S.C.) HS	S.C.
45	1375	Travis Radke	LHP	Oaks Christian HS, Westlake, Calif.	HS
46	1405	Jose Brizuela	3B	Archbishop McCarthy HS, Southwest Ranches, Fla.	Fla.
47	1435	Kirby Pellant	2B	Chandler Gilbert (Ariz.) CC	Ariz.
48	1465	Jon Webb	LHP	South Carolina	S.C.
49	1495	Eric Alessio	RHP	Marist	N.Y.
50	1524	Austin Robichaux	RHP	Notre Dame HS, Crowley, La.	La.

2011 Draft: Players the Reds Should Target

2011-06-06T13:32:00.000-07:00

Well, now that we've kicked around the top prospects and a few prospects that might be in the mix for the Reds, it's time to look at players I'd like to see the Reds land with the 27th pick. The Reds farm system is in decent shape, but could use just about everything but additional catching prospects. And, given that a catcher is unlikely to be the consensus best player available, that shouldn't pose a problem.

So, here are a few guys that I'd like to see the Reds target. Anyway, away we go...

Chris Reed - LHP Stanford

Reed stands 6'4" and weighs 195 pounds. He both throws and hits from the left side. He's a junior and served as the closer for the Stanford Cardinal.

Reed's fastball sits in 91-94 range, which he compliments with a power slider and an above average change-up. His three pitches all have plus potential, but remain inconsistent likely due in no small part to his limited experience. Reed worked only a grand total of 60 collegiate innings at Stanford. In fact, during his collegiate career, Reed worked almost exclusively as a reliever, but his arsenal certainly should translate to the starting rotation. He provides the type of power stuff that you don't often see from the left side.

As for mechanics, Reed has very clean, efficient mechanics. Here's a look at him in action courtesy of BaseballAmerica:

Reed has simple, compact mechanics, but still generates good velocity and incorporates his body into his delivery. He has a nice high leg kick and coils his body to generate potential energy. He gets a good push off the mound and incorporates his legs effectively into the delivery, which should reduce some of the stress on his arm. He works from a high three-quarter arm slot and has a quick arm and a clean throwing action.

The obvious red flag on Reed is his limited workload. Will he be able to hold up under a professional starting pitcher workload? Will his repertoire translate into success the second and third time through the batting order? That's the great unknown. If not, then he'll be developed as a high leverage reliever, but you hate to burn 1st round picks on relief pitchers. So, there is some uncertainty and development risk at work with Reed, but he's one of my very favorite southpaws in the entire draft and certainly among those southpaws who should be available in the second half of the first round. The Reds have had good success in developing pitching prospects as of late, but as the continuing struggles of their MLB rotation attest, you can simply never have too much pitching.

Tyler Beede - RHP H.S.

Tyler Beede stands 6'4" inches tall and weighs in at 200 pounds. He throws from a high three-quarter arm slot with a clean arm action.

Beede catches the eye because of very clean, efficient pitching mechanics. Clean mechanics, at least in theory, should reduce his risk of injury and allow him to more efficiently transfer all the energy he generates to the baseball. And, the ability to efficiently transfer all the energy generated by the windup to the baseball should have performance benefits.

Here is a look at Beede in action, courtesy of dbtung:

As you can see, Beede has a very fluid windup and one move flows naturally into the next. He steps towards first with his left foot and then shifts his right foot down onto the rubber. He then brings his leg up into a high, strong leg kick with his knee up by his chest. He generates good potential energy by taking a high leg kick with some body coil from hip rotation. He then begins to unpack his leg kick as he drives to the plate. He has a quick arm and very smooth throwing motion. His push off the mound is strong and he utilizes a good stride to the plate. Overall, Beede both generates good potential energy and effectively transfers it to the baseball. One thing I like to see in pitching prospects is the ability to generate good velocity without sacrificing balance. The combination of power and body control portends well for the future and I think that's apparent in Beede's mechanics.

As for his repertoire, Beede works with a 89 to 93 mph fastball, a sharp biting curveball, and an emerging change-up. Additionally, probably due in no small part to his clean mechanics, he has good command and control over all three pitches. Beede also has a good feel and understanding of pitching, which helps his stuff play up a tick.

To me, the real question on Beede, and the one that will likely define his professional career trajectory, is whether he'll be able to add velocity as he gains strength and adjusts to the rigors of the professional workload. If he can improve his velocity a tick or two, then he could become a legitimate top of the rotation pitcher. Given his age and ideal pitching frame, it seems a reasonable possibility that he will. At the very least, he looks like a polished high school arm with a nice ceiling. Of course, the remaining consideration is signability, as Beede has committed to Vanderbilt. So, the Reds might have to go over slot to convince him to sign a professional contract, but the more I see of Beede the more I really like what he brings to the table.

Jason Esposito - 3b Vanderbilt

Esposito caught my eye in a Vanderbilt game in 2010. At that point, I thought he was the guy for the Reds to grab in 2011. Something similar happened when I saw Brandon Crawford play shortstop for the UCLA Bruins. However, instead of building on their respective sophomore season success, both players regressed somewhat in their junior years. Crawford regressed to the point where he would have been an overdraft by the Reds and the same might be true of Esposito. The lesson I've learned from these two players is that you can't count on an impressive sophomore to continue to improve as a junior. Instead of linear progression of elite college players, there can be regression.

In 2011, Esposito hit .362/.429/.560 with 8 homeruns and 15 steals in 25 attempts. He started out the season slowly, but got hot later in the season to bring his numbers up to a very respectable level. The final numbers look very good, but his production was erratic, happening in fits and spurts. He had a few significant slumps that raise a bit of a red flag.

In his swing, Esposito uses a high leg kick as a timing mechanism, which caused the timing of his swing to get out of whack at times. He stands very upright and can seem a bit stiff and mechanical at the plate. There are also questions of whether he can handle elite velocity.

Here's a look at Esposito at the plate:

On defense, Esposito plays a very nice thirdbase. He has good range, soft hands, and a strong arm. In fact, his defensive game is so strong that he spent some time manning shortstop for Vandy, but he projects as a third baseman in the professional game.

I'm still a fan of Esposito, but the questions about his hit tool have increased to the point that I no longer view him as a lock for the Reds if he's available. Another lesson I've learned over the years of doing this is that it's not wise to gamble on a questionable hit tool in the 1st round. I still think Esposito has a nice, well rounded game and could develop into a very good MLB player. He has good defensive skills and a nice power/speed combo.

I'd love for the Reds to get Esposito, but whether he's worthy of a first round pick or should more realistically be a second round guy remains an open question in my mind. If we were to pass, then I'd hope he slips to the Reds in round 2, which would be similar to Ryan LaMarre in 2010. As a result, I wouldn't mind seeing the Reds land him at 27, but I don't have the same concrete opinion on it that I did before his 2011 season.

Jose Fernandez

Jose Fernandez is an interesting story. He fled Cuba, twice, to make it to the U.S. As a result of that hardship, he takes nothing for granted and is driven to succeed. Additionally, he is a mentally tough pitcher, which should be an asset as he endures the rigors of professional baseball and climbs the ladder. His work ethic and (over?) confidence rival any pitcher in the draft class.

Fernandez features a power repertoire. He throws his fastball in the mid 90s with very heavy sink. He features a true 12-to-6 curveball and a biting slider. By all reports, his arsenal is big league ready right now and all three pitches are swing-and-miss offerings. He needs to continue to refine his secondary offerings, but his control of the fastball is already quite good. And, not many power pitchers are also ground balls pitchers, but Fernandez might fit that bill. The ability to avoid contact and get ground balls would be intriguing for the Reds in Great American Ballpark.

In addition to a power repertoire, Fernandez also has clean mechanics. Here is a look at him in action:

All in all, his mechanics are sound. There is some effort to the delivery, which could add stress to his arm. He also has a slightly different coil than is typical, as he reaches apex before he coils inward, but it effectively generates potential energy. Despite the effort in the delivery, his arm action remains fairly clean.

His build reminds me quite a bit of Chad Billingsley, as he's a stockier type pitcher and has a thick lower half. Some view that build as being ideal for power pitchers and workhorse starters, while others feel he'll have to work hard to keep his body in shape and avoid adding bad weight to his lower half.

One possible red flag is that some question his age. According to his listed age, he'll be 19 before the end of the season, but some question whether he's even older than that. A belief driven perhaps in part by his stockier build and thick legs. Even if he was found to be 21 or 22, then it wouldn't be the end of his prospect status, as even if his performance would be skewed by being more advanced than the competition his stuff and mechanics would remain. Obviously, age is a key factor in development, but pitchers are less beholden to the ticking clock of Father Time than position prospects. Still, his age is something to consider.

Overall, Fernandez is an interesting arm. He has big league stuff right now and is fairly polished for a high school pitcher. There are questions about his age, but he has a nice blend of stuff and mechanics. He might be off the board before the Reds select, but if not he should be in the conversation.

Final Thoughts

In the end, I'd slot these guys on my draft board as follows: 1) Tyler Beede, 2) Chris Reed, 3) Jose Fernandez, and 4) Jason Esposito.

Unfortunately, each comes with some measure of risk that you won't find in the more "sure thing" prospects taken in the first half of the draft. Beede has signability concerns, Reed has workload and positional issues, Fernandez has body type and age risk, and Esposito has performance risk with the hit tool. So, to a certain extent, you have to pick your poison and manage your subsequent risk.

For me, Tyler Beede is the guy to target. He has the best combination of ceiling, floor, and risk and could develop into a special talent. He's projected as a sandwich pick, but I like him just a tick better than that. After that, I'm really intrigued by Chris Reed and would be interested to see if he can make the successful transition to the rotation. If he can, then he could be a sneaky good value. As for Fernandez and Esposito, my gut tells me that Esposito is the better option, but my head is saying Fernandez. So, this time, I'll go with my head.

2011 Draft: Players of Interest

2011-06-06T13:21:00.000-07:00

Well, it's that time of year again. The Rule IV Amateur Draft is about to get underway.

The Reds are slated to pick 27th overall, the price of success, which makes it more challenging and slightly less fun to determine who they will pick. Still, this is a very deep draft and the Reds should be able to find value even late in the 1st round.

There are a number of impact players at the top of the draft that are really intriguing. Rice third baseman Anthony Rendon and UCLA RHP Trevor Bauer are the two that leap to mind. Rendon has been plagued by injuries this year, but he is an elite talent and should be a cornerstone at third base for a lucky franchise for a long time. As for Bauer, he's a Tim Lincecum-esq talent. He generates mid-90s velocity by throwing with his entire body and generating a great deal of torque. He patterns his game after Lincecum and certainly has gotten similar results. His mechanics don't seem quite as fluid as Lincecum's, but the collegiate performance level is similarly dominant. Personally, I like Bauer better than his teammate, Gerrit Cole, who is projected to go first overall. Bauer certainly had a significantly better season at UCLA than Cole. I also prefer Bauer's mechanics to those of Cole. However, Bauer's mechanics, height, and unusual training routine have him sliding down some teams' draft boards just a bit. That seems like a mistake to me. Bauer is a true student of pitching and has a very cerebral approach to go along with his nasty arsenal of pitches. But, in addition to Cole, some teams prefer the higher floor pitching prospects, even though they come with lower ceilings. For me, there isn't a better pitching prospect in the draft than Bauer, so he and Rendon would be my top 2 with Dylan Bundy a rather close third. But, I digress, let's turn our eyes to the bottom of the first round where the Reds will pick.

So, let's start by looking at some intriguing prospects, but not ones that I necessarily have at the top of my list for the Reds to reel in with their first round pick.

Jackie Bradley - Bradley is the centerfielder for the University of South Carolina Gamecocks. He stands 5'10" and weighs 180 pounds. He hits from the left side and throws from the right.

Bradley was one of the more electric collegiate players in 2010. He led the South Carolina Gamecocks to the College World Series championship and earned the Most Outstanding Player of the tournament award in the process. In the end, he hit .368/.473/.587 with 13 homers and 7 steals in 10 attempts. Additionally, he plays a very good defensive centerfield despite lacking plus speed. His instincts and ability to read the ball off the bat allow him to cover a great deal of ground. Suffice it to say, it was a very successful season and one that raised his prospect profile all the way up to the rafters.

Unfortunately, 2011 didn't go over quite as well. He suffered a wrist injury and ultimately needed to have surgery to repair ligament and tendon damage. His season never got back on track, as his average slipped to .259. Overall, he hit .259/.361/.468 with 6 home runs and 1 steal in two attempts.

Here's a look at Bradley at the dish courtesy of DiamondScapeBaseball:

When he's healthy, Bradley is a well rounded player with good baseball instincts. However, his offensive performance fell off the table in 2011, which is somewhat disconcerting. It's likely that the 2011 season was ruined by injury and he'll rebound going forward. However, the season was just enough of a red flag for me to drop Bradley down my list. That said, I wouldn't have a problem if Bradley was the pick for the Reds. He doesn't have the best tools, but he's has very good skills and knows how to get the most out of his gifts. He's a baseball player through-and-through and gambling on a return to form might not be a bad play for the Reds with pick 27.

Charlie Tilson - Tilson is an outfielder from New Trier High School in Illinois. He stands 5'11" and tips the scales at 175 lbs. He both bats and throws from the left side.

Here's a look at him at the dish courtesy of Baseball America:

As you can see, Tilson has a smooth, fluid swing with a short swing path to the ball, which is what caught my eye. He also maintains good balance throughout, which is due in part to the fact that he doesn't generate very good power. His offensive game is contact and speed based, so his swing is compact and well controlled. He doesn't sell out in his swing trying to maximize his power production. And, he doesn't cock and fire his hips all that effectively to generate power in the swing. In fact, the comparable MLB players you see tossed around for Tilson are Brett Gardner and Jacoby Ellsbury.

Obviously, a leadoff type hitter is the type of player the Reds could really use, but at this point I'm not convinced that Tilson is the right pick for the Reds. And, you should draft the best player available in the early rounds of the draft, not draft according to need, even though the player may project to perfectly address an organizational need.

Tilson's ability to stick in centerfield is in doubt, which would likely relegate him to leftfield due to underwhelming arm strength. Additionally, he has limited power upside. These two limitations could really work to drag down his prospect ceiling. As a result, you are left with the normal development risk for a high school prospect, but a lower upside payoff for that risk. A lower ceiling and the same level of development risk makes Tilson a less than ideal choice for the Reds at #27, but if he slips to the Reds in round 2 then he's worth considering.

Brandon Nimmo - Nimmo is a prospect that I like, but he lands on this list because he's unlikely to last until the Reds make their selection. Nimmo is an interesting case in that he comes out of Wyoming, which doesn't even offer high school baseball. As a result, he's had to work hard to prove himself in showcase events and on traveling teams.

Nimmo is an outfielder who runs well and currently plays center. He suffered a knee injury playing football as a junior in high school, but has largely recovered. He had a recent bout of tendinitis, but has no real lingering health issues to concern big league clubs. Ultimately, he could end up shifting to a corner slot, but for now projects as a centerfield. While he has good speed and solid defensive tools, his bat remains his calling card. Nimmo has a smooth lefthanded swing that has carried him up draft boards despite coming from a region that is the farthest thing you'll find from a baseball hotbed.

Here's a look at Nimmo in action:

That's the type of swing that should translate well to the professional ranks. He has good bat speed and maintains good balance throughout. His swing utilizes a short path to the ball, which enables him to handle good fastballs. Also, he controls the bat well and has a very good understanding of the strikezone, two factors which when found in the same player should result in consistently high batting averages. At this point, his power is still developing and he is more of a gap-to-gap hitter, but as he physically matures he could unlock his power potential.

For now, Nimmo looks like a pure hitter with good on-base skills, but he also has some power projection to his game. Unfortunately, he's likely to be off the board by the time the Reds draft, but he'd certainly be a good pick if he slides to the point that he's still available when pick 27 rolls around.

Thoughts on May 29th Game

2011-06-01T21:10:00.000-07:00

***Joey Votto looked less than inspiring. In the bottom of the 2nd, Rolen made a very nice play at third, timing his charge so he could step on third for the force and fire across the diamond to try to get the double play on the runner heading to first. For reasons unknown, Votto didn't even have his foot on the bag, so what would have been a bang-bang play wasn't even a play because Votto wasn't on the base.

Secondly, in the top of the 9th, Votto was on first with 2 outs and Fred Lewis hits a single to right. For some odd reason, Votto didn't make it over to third base despite the fact that the outfield was deep in a no-doubles defense. If you're running on contact with two outs, then you should easily make it over to third on that play.

***Obviously, he needs to get the bat going a bit more and getting picked off first base isn't helping his cause, but it's fun to watch Janish and Phillips play defense.

***Jay Bruce is seriously locked in. Bomb to right and an opposite field single. Looks very, very comfortable at the dish.

***I wouldn't mind having Jordan Schafer playing leftfield and leading off for us. I really like his game. A lot. That throw from the warning track to second base on the fly without any momentum was impressive and he made something like 8 putouts last night. He even chokes up more with 2 strikes. Almost laced a double off Cueto, instead had a great AB and worked a walk. A defensive outfield of Schafer/Stubbs/Bruce would be ridiculous and if Schafer can keep his average up then he'd be a legitimate leadoff hitter.

***Johnny Cueto gets high marks in my book for going the distance. We needed a deep outing by the starter and Cueto rose to the occasion to give the bullpen some much needed rest. The one and only certainty in the rotation.

***Do Barry Larkin and John Kruk really travel to the city of the home team for every Sunday night game so that they can sit outside the ballpark at a desk? Seems like a job that could be done from a studio, but I suppose if heading to Bristol is the alternative, then maybe they don't mind.

***I miss having a true speedster in the lineup. Someone to make the other team nervous the moment he steps on first base.

***I still like what Fred Lewis is doing out there. Seems like he's taking good ABs and putting good swings on the ball.

***I like Dan Shulman and Orel Hershiser, but I'm not sure Bobby V. is a good fit on Sunday night baseball. Johnny Cueto is going to take strike 3 to avoid getting on base and tiring out his legs?? Seems rather unlikely to me, Bobby V. There should be a rule suspending pitchers who unintentionally hit a batter in the head with a pitch? Really Bobby V.? Barry Larkin would have been a better fit. On the other hand, I love Orel's insight into pitching.

***Rolen is so damn solid at third, it's a pleasure to watch and a comfort from a fan's point of view.

***Looks like Brandon Phillips has a better stretch at first base than Joey Votto.

***Rolen really has a top hand heavy swing these days. Is that how he has always swung the bat or a concession to his chronic left shoulder problems?

***I don't know why, but I think I'd feel more comfortable with Freddie Gonzalez at the helm than Dusty. Maybe it was the pick off call to get Paul Janish at first after Cueto pulled the bat back on the bunt attempt. I'd imagine that's a call made by the manager.

***Janish has limited tools, but he has a lot of skills. That slide was great.

***It always surprises me that Brandon Phillips is so comfortable dropping his right knee down on routine groundballs hit right at him. Obviously he knows what he's doing, but seems like a strange choice.

***Am I the only one who looks at Drew Stubbs and thinks of Fred Lynn?

2011 Top Prospect List:: #23 Daniel Corcino, rhp

2011-04-05T23:05:00.000-07:00

Daniel Corcino
Height 5-11, Weight 165, B/T: R/R, DOB: 8/26/1990
2010 Redlegs Baseball Prospect Ranking: N/A

The Reds undoubtedly have one of the best farm systems of any organization in baseball, but due to promotions (Mike Leake), injuries (Kyle Lotzkar), and trades (Zach Stewart) impact righthanded pitching is in short supply. Fortunately, the Reds have focused on international free agency as well as the amateur draft in order to rebuild the farm system, a decision which has resulted in a wealth of prospects, including Daniel Corcino.

The Reds signed Corcino as an international free agent out of the Dominican Republic in 2008 and he made his debut in American professional baseball with 29 solid rookie league innings in 2009.

2010 Season

In 2010, Corcino split time between rookie Pioneer League Billings Mustangs and low-A Dayton Dragons.

Corcino spent time with Billings in 2009, so 2010 was a return engagement for him. For the Mustangs, Corcino tossed 39.2 innings in which he posted a 3.40 ERA, 1.39 WHIP, and a 31/17 K/BB ratio. That ratio is good for a 3.86 BB/9 and 7.03 K/9. He also managed to induce a significant amount of groundballs to the tune of 1.37 GB/FB ratio. His peripheral stats support his overall level of performance, as evidenced by a .303 BABIP, 72.5% strand rate, and 3.81 FIP.

For Dayton, Corcino logged 31.1 innings of 4.31 ERA, 1.47 WHIP, and a 39/15 K/BB ratio. This time, his peripheral stats indicate he was better than his overall level of performance. His 3.49 FIP was almost a run lower than his ERA. He also posted a .319 BABIP and a 69.3% strand rate, so he was perhaps a skosh unlucky. Regardless, he once again piled up the groundballs, this time at an even more impressive 1.72 GB/FB rate.

While the strikeout and walk ratios are solid, they aren't eye-popping. At the same time, Corcino does get a bump in value for age-vs.-level, as he spent almost the entire 2010 season pitching at the age of 19. So, there weren't many players who were younger than Corcino, including the opposing hitters that he faced. The fact that a high proportion of hitters he faced had more experience and development time under their belts than Corcino makes his performance more impressive.

Repertoire and Pitching Mechanics

Corcino features a fastball that sits in the 91-93 range and touches 96 at its peak. He also has a sharp slider that sits at 75-78 mph and has legitimate plus potential. He also mixes in a changeup that remains a work in progress. If he is going to stick in the rotation as he climbs the ladder, then he'll need to refine his secondary offerings. Right now, he leans heavily on his fastball/slider combo for his success, but he'll need a third pitch to avoid a switch to the bullpen down the road.

As for the pitching mechanics, he grades out pretty well. To start, he peers in over the top of his glove, which he holds up high in front of his face, to get his sign from the catcher. His first move is a step towards first base with his stride foot, which unweights his right foot, enabling him to rotate it down and onto the rubber. While rotating his lower body to drop down onto the rubber, he drops his hand position from in front of his face down to almost belt level.

After rotating his body position on the rubber, Corcino brings his left leg up into his leg kick and correspondingly raises his hands back up in front of his chest. His leg kick is strong, as it incorporates some hip rotation and brings his knee up past parallel. The hip rotation builds up tension and rotational energy, while the high knee position generates significant potential energy. At the apex of his windup, Corcino is in a strong position and has built up significant energy to impart on the baseball, which is the primary goal of the first half of the windup.

Next, to translate that stored energy to the baseball, Corcino drives to the plate with a strong push off the rubber. His arm action is clean and loose, as his elbow maintains good position in relation to his shoulder and his arm is up in proper throwing position when his plant foot lands. He throws from a high three-quarter arm slot and generates good arm speed without maximum effort. Additionally, his mechanics are such that he can effectively throw with his entire body. By incorporating significant leg drive and hip rotation, Corcino should be able to reduce the stress on his arm, which gives him a slightly lower level of injury risk. Of course, clean mechanics are no guarantee of good health, but they should increase the chances of a pitcher staying healthy.

One potential problem of Corcino's mechanics is his inconsistent stride length, as his plant foot seems to be inconsistent in its landing spot. At times, he has such a long stride that he throws against a stiff plant leg, never getting out over the top of his plant foot. Instead of finishing with his momentum heading towards homeplate, he has to spin off towards first base as his checked momentum works around his plant leg. Other times, he uses a shorter stride and does get out over the top of his plant foot which results in a more direct-to-the-plate finishing position. The inconsistency in the landing of his plant foot could lead to inconsistency in command.

Corcino's shorter stature may work against him, as it will more difficult to throw on a downward plane. To me, however, the potentially bigger downside of being short in stature is that you release the ball farther away from the plate than tall pitchers. Taller pitchers have longer limbs, which mean a longer stride to the plate and longer arms, both of which place taller pitchers closer to the plate when they release the pitch. The closer to the plate you are when you release the pitch, the less distance the ball has to travel and the quicker the pitch gets on the hitters.

Here is a look at Daniel Corcino in action (starting at roughly the 5:18 mark), courtesy of pileatedparadise on YouTube:

Due largely to his physical stature, nationality, and repertoire, people have taken to comparing Corcino to Johnny Cueto, but at similar points in their development Corcino is a clear tick behind Cueto in both command and stuff. Corcino has nice upside and a decent amount of polish, but as a 20-year old prospect he still has a long way to go in his development.

Final Thoughts

Corcino is a solid prospect who, almost by default, has become one of the top righthanded pitching prospects in the system. He has a nice blend of polish, stuff, and mechanics that could see him develop into an impact pitcher, but there are a lot of wrong turns on the development path to the majors and I'll need to see more against more advanced competition before I'm sold.

For now, he has flashed enough upside to land at #23 on the list.

2011 Top Prospect List: #9 Juan Francisco, 3b

2011-03-30T23:11:00.000-07:00

Juan Francisco
Height 6-2, Weight 240, B/T: L/R, DOB: 6/24/1987
2010 Redlegs Baseball Prospect Ranking: #6

Juan Francisco has power that stacks up favorable with almost any prospect in the game. A select number could certainly out-power him, including recent #1 overall pick Bryce Harper, but Francisco can really lay the lumber when he gets a hold of one. Of course, his struggle to make consistent contact means that it doesn't happen as often as we would like.

Additionally, Francisco's offensive game lacks secondary skills (i.e. speed, on-base skills, etc), so his game will be driven largely by his power production. Fortunately, his home park accentuates his strongest attribute, so if he can stick in the majors for an appreciable amount of time, then he might be able to make some noise. Of course, while the power would be nice, his lack of both defensive ability and on-base skill will always serve as significant drags on his overall value as a player.

2010 Season

Francisco spent most of the 2010 season at triple-A Louisville doing what he does, namely hitting homers and avoiding walks like the plague. In 77 games, Juan hit .286/.325/.565/.890 with 18 homers and a 81/16 K/BB ratio in 308 ABs. He had a line-drive rate of 19% and a BABIP of .335, but what stands out are his 4.9% walk rate and 24.6% strikeout rate.

His season was hampered by an appendectomy, which cost him roughly two-months of the season. Despite this bump in the road, Francisco managed to log 59 PAs at the MLB level. In those plate appearances, he hit .273/.322/.382 with 1 homerun and a 20/4 K/BB ratio. His BABIP was an unsustainable .412, which was mildly alarming when paired with his lackluster 14% line-drive rate. In short, his batting average, which was the only acceptable part of his slash line, was driven largely by luck.

On the plus side, Francisco did show some capacity to work counts. As an aggressive hitter, you don't expect to see him in many 4+ pitch At Bats. Nevertheless, Francisco worked the count to 3-0 in 7% of his plate appearances, which is quite strong when compared to the league average mark of 5%. Obviously, it's a small sample size and the deeper counts still didn't translate into walks, so the ability to work counts may not have much tangible value and may not even be sustainable. Still, it's mildly interesting and certainly worth of note. However, his contact rate in two MLB seasons remains a disturbing 65%, which falls substantially below the MLB average of 79% over those two seasons. In fact, Francisco's contact rate falls well below Adam Dunn's career 71% contact rate, which is obviously cause for concern. The lower the contact rate, the higher the strikeout totals and the lower the batting average. Adam Dunn's contact rate has always hovered around the lowest acceptable rate for a productive hitter, so Francisco's inability to surpass Dunn's mark is disconcerting. Additionally, Dunn manages to offset his struggles to make contact by drawing a massive amount of walks, which Francisco simply does not do.

Swing Mechanics and Offensive Profile

Francisco has an unorthodox pre-pitch setup. He uses a wide-spread, open stance and a significant bat waggle. He stands tall and holds his hands up next to his left ear. While waiting on the pitcher, Francisco moves his bat in a circle and also from vertical to down past parallel to the ground. He has a very loose, active pre-pitch stance.

Francisco relies on a two-step stride to generate load and transfer his weight to meet the oncoming pitch. His first stride moves his foot in towards homeplate to close up his stance and cock his hips. A wide-open stance prevents a hitter from utilizing the hips to generate power, as you can't fire the hips if you are already in an open position. So, open-stance hitters who want to generate power need to develop a mechanism to cock the hips and generate load for the swing. The interesting aspect of Francisco's stride is that once his first step closes up his hips, he taps his toe and then immediately opens up again. The second step in his stride is a move to open right back up to the pitch again.

In short, he closes up his stance by striding towards the plate, then taps his toe and immediately opens his stance up again. In fact, if you look carefully, when his stride foot lands Francisco completely opens up his foot by pointing his toe directly at the pitcher. He isn't rolling over on the foot when he fires the swing like some hitters, but rather opens up before he fires the swing.

Given his light-tower power, it's undeniable that his stride effectively cocks his hips and allows him to generate substantial power. But, his open stride and early firing of the hips makes me question his ability to cover the outer-half and handle offspeed pitches that upset his timing.

As for his swing, he drops his hands into proper hitting position and gets a very strong bat-throw through the zone. He generates good bat speed and does a nice job of squaring the bat on the ball. He still has length in his swing, which explains his difficulties in making consistent contact. He uses a slight uppercut in his swing, which generates good loft on the ball.

After whipping the bat through the zone, Francisco uses an abbreviated follow-through during which he never really releases the bat, rather cuts it short a la Fred McGriff.

A couple of years ago I thought the most comparable MLB player to Juan Francisco was Mike Jacobs. Basically, a defensively challenged player relegated to the low end of the defensive spectrum who possesses good pop but very little on-base ability. And, even now after Jacobs has really started to slip, it still feels about right. Francisco probably hits for a higher average than Jacobs, but flashes even less on-base ability.

If Francisco manages to stick at the hot corner, then his best comparisons are probably Kevin Kouzmanoff or Pablo Sandoval. Both have an early-count, low-walk approach, but Kouzmanoff is the superior defensive player while Sandoval is the more pure hitter. There really is no perfect comp for Francisco, because he strikes out like a late-count hitter but walks like an early-count hitter. It's an unusual combination and one that really drags down his value. In short, his approach generates the worst outcome of each of the two different plate approaches.

Defensive Skills

On the defensive side, the Reds are convinced that Francisco can hold down the hot corner. In fact, they have arguably alter the development path of Todd Frazier to accommodate Francisco. Frazier profiles best at third base, but the Reds have used him in a super utility role in part because Francisco is on a similar development time-line and has always been locked in a third base.

So, the Reds have actually gambled a decent amount on Francisco's ability to handle third base. His biggest problem continues to be his range, as he simply doesn't move all that well laterally. Unfortunately, he also struggles to convert those balls he reaches into outs, as his fielding percentage is a cause for concern. When he does get his hands on the ball, his plus arm allows him to make more plays than might be expected.

The Reds got a huge boost from Scott Rolen in 2010, but he is aging and will lug around significant injury risk for the rest of his career. As a result, Francisco possesses one of the most important things a prospect can have: opportunity. The Reds will need to have someone spell Rolen at times this year and will need to have someone lined up to replace him in the future. Francisco will likely get first crack.

Final Thoughts

Thus far, Francisco's career serves best as a cautionary tale about the difficulties of both reaching the Majors and thriving when you get there. It is not easy. Even though Francisco has been labeled one of the Reds top prospects for a couple of seasons, that's not a guarantee that Major League success will necessarily follow. Even among the very best prospects in baseball, there is still a significant risk of flaming out. It's easy to dream on prospects, but there is something to be said for established MLB talent.

Francisco's power will always be his calling card and his main value driver. If Francisco can earn the job of Scott Rolen's caddy this year, then he could surprise. In fact, if he can get an extended bit of playing time, then I wouldn't be surprised to see him have the type of small-sample size power surge in Great American Ballpark that really excites the fan base. Actually, for whatever reason, I'm somewhat expecting it. In addition to his power and friendly home park, I suspect Francisco would get some early count fastballs (which, we know he'll jump on) before pitchers develop a proper "book" on his weaknesses. At that point, he'll need to make adjustments and demonstrate the ability to cover up the weaknesses in both his approach and swing, which will be a difficult challenge.

For now, Francisco's plus-power when coupled with the Reds continued faith in him are enough to land him at #9 on the list. I remain wholly unconvinced about his ability to handle the hot corner, but Francisco will always be an offensive-first prospect, so he needs to hit (and hit a lot) to justify a spot on the 25-man roster.

2011 Pressing Question #3: Zack Greinke Remorse

2011-03-19T22:58:00.000-07:00

Pressing Question #3: Will the Reds regret not acquiring the services Zack Greinke?

For the first time in forever, the Reds are in position where they have a surplus of starting pitching. However, the rotation lacks a legitimate number 1 starter. That makes it a rotation ideally suited for the grind of a 162-game season, but perhaps not for a short postseason series where Aces rule. Whether it's a 5 or 7 game series, chances are good that an Ace will get two or more starts. In such an environment, the Reds are at a distinct disadvantage in two games before the first pitch is even fired. So, the obvious question is should they have gone after the services of a young, former Cy Young award winner who actively sought out smaller market organizations in his quest for a new home?

Asking this question now as opposed to a couple weeks ago brings different considerations into play. Over the past couple of weeks, Greinke has been shutdown because of a rib fracture, Mike Leake has looked shaky at best in spring training, and Johnny Cueto has been hampered by forearm tightness. Obviously, that may change the equation to a certain extent.

Greinke was shutdown with a rib fracture which will linger into the beginning of the season and cost him a few starts. However, all he'll need to do is rest and then rebuild his arm strength, so the injury should be a once-and-done type problem, not a lingering issue.

As for Leake, he hit the ground running last year and looked like a legitimate #2 type starter. However, he faded in the middle months and was shutdown early with shoulder fatigue. Leake's Spring Training struggles may be nothing more than adjusting to the strength he added over the offseason, but it could also be lingering effects from the shoulder fatigue. At this point, it's questionable whether he is ready for the majors from an endurance and performance level standpoint.

Perhaps most disconcerting is Johnny Cueto's struggles with arm soreness. He was originally shut down for 8 days due to forearm tightness. At first glance, it seems a minor problem, but forearm tightness is frequently a precursor to Tommy John surgery. However, the Reds medical staff gave him a clean bill of health and ran him back out to the mound today. The results were not promising, as Cueto departed after throwing just one inning, this time complaining of bicep soreness. Obviously, not good. Not. Good. Hopefully, it ACTUALLY is nothing more than soreness, but it could ultimately be something much more serious.

Greinke suffers from social anxiety and is uncomfortable in many social situations, but he comfortably wears the label of #1 Starter. He has legitimate ace potential and in the past 3 seasons he has posted WARs of 4.9, 9.4, and 5.2. The 9.4 WAR season justifiably earned him a Cy Young award and may represent the high point of Greinke's career. Even so, last year only two Reds starters had WARs over 2.0, including Johnny Cueto at 2.8 and Travis Wood at 2.2.

It's looking like the Reds are in danger of losing their best pitcher from 2010 for a significant period of time. Even if Greinke never again approaches his Hall of Fame caliber season of 9.4 WAR, he still represents a 2.5 to 3.0 win improvement over everyone on the Reds staff unless they take a step forward. Given a larger sample size, it's likely that Travis Wood posts an improved WAR, but the Reds have more depth than high performance arms.

When you factor in that the improving NL Central has tightened up and gotten even more competitive, then you have to consider this something of a zero-sum game. If the Reds had acquired Greinke, then they would also have kept him away from a division rival. So, any gain by the Reds is essentially a corresponding loss for the Brewers. If Greinke returns to 9 wins above replacement, then that's a plus 9 for the Reds and a minus 9 wins in missed opportunity for the Brewers.

Obviously, only time will provide the answer to this question, but I think it was a mistake for the organization not to be an aggressive suitor on Greinke.

2011 Top Prospect List: #10 Dave Sappelt, of

2011-03-12T17:12:00.000-08:00

Dave Sappelt
Height 5-9, Weight 195, B/T: R/R, DOB: 1/2/1987
2010 Redlegs Baseball Prospect Ranking: NA

Dave Sappelt stands 5-9 inches tall. That fact has worked against him in his baseball career, as scouts were either confused as to how to grade him or held his smaller frame against him. Initial impressions are difficult to shake in professional baseball. As a result, Sappelt is the type of guy who has constantly had to prove his detractors wrong. Fortunately, he packs a lot of talent into his smaller frame, because he has continued to climb the ladder towards the major leagues and looks poised to arrive on the scene at some point in 2011.

Amateur Career and Draft Position

Sappelt attended Coastal Carolina University where he hit .315/.344/.461/.805 in 178 ABs as a freshman. He posted a 29/8 K/BB ratio, cranked 5 homeruns, and swiped 5 bases in 7 attempts. As a sophomore, he took it up a notch, posting a .359/.410/.580/.990 in 276 ABs. He hit 10 homeruns, swiped 7 bases in 13 attempts, and put up a 40/26 K/BB ratio. As a draft eligible junior, he found yet another gear, kicking it up to .349/.415/.636/1.051 in 275 ABs with 18 homers, a 27/33 K/BB ratio, and 7 steals in 10 attempts. Sappelt's diminutive stature inspired his teammates to nickname him "Gary Coleman."

Even in the collegiate ranks he was already establishing his offensive profile as a player who swings early-and-often, struggles to effectively harness his speed on the bases, and yet features a bit of electricity to his game. In his three seasons at Coastal Carolina, Sappelt's game continued to progress and develop until he emerged on the radar of MLB baseball scouts.

The Reds ultimately reeled him in with the 269th overall pick in the 9th round of the 2008 draft and signed him to a contract with a $75,000 signing bonus.

2010 Season

Sappelt made three stops in 2010, rocketing up the minor league system and prospect rankings in equal measure.

His first stop was high-A Lynchburg, which holds the unusual distinction as being both the lowest level of competition faced by Sappelt and also his worst level of performance. For the Hillcats, Sappelt hit .282/.338/.352/.690 in 19 games and 71 ABs. He hit line drives at the rate of 19% and had a BABIP of .357. While his overall performance is somewhat uninspiring, his component stats are strong. On the bases, he only swiped 6 bases in 10 attempts. Nevertheless, he was a short-timer in high-A, as he was quickly bumped up the ladder to double-A Carolina.

For the Mudcats, Sappelt quickly caught fire. In 89 games and 330 ABs, he posted a robust .361/.416/.548/.964 slash line. He added a more than respectable 46/31 K/BB ratio, but continued to struggle on the bases where he was caught stealing (13) almost as many times as he was successful (15). So, his struggles to turn his good speed into offensive production obviously continue. Once again, Sappelt hit line drives at a very good clip (22%), which helps justify his extreme .400 BABIP. His performance was stellar and earned him a finally promotion to triple-A Louisville.

Sappelt finished up the season at triple-A Louisville where he hit to the tune of .324/.365/.481/.847 in 25 games and 108 ABs. He swiped 4 bases in 5 attempts and posted a 13/6 K/BB ratio. His power numbers dipped, but his line drive rate improved to 24%. In light of such a high line drive rate, Sappelt's BABIP was a reasonable .351.

Swing Mechanics

When I first saw Sappelt at the plate, I was admittedly less than impressed. His swing was unconventional and flawed to an extent unlikely to play at the MLB level. He spun off the ball by stepping in the bucket and opening up his shoulders too soon, which resulted in a very flat swing plane and a very low finishing position for his hands. That swing limited his ability to cover the outer half and his ability to generate loft and playable power.

Fortunately, Sappelt has made a few changes to improve the effectiveness of his swing. The changes have made him a better hitter and a more intriguing prospect. Even now, he still seems to be evolving at the plate, as his spring training swing seems different from his end-of-2010 swing which seems different from his 2009-swing. So, I'll dive into his swing mechanics, but they probably still aren't set in stone.

At the plate, Sappelt stands tall, roughly shoulder-width stance. He holds his hands up high by his right ear, which results in a bat position that is almost parallel to the ground. He also uses a bat waggle in his pre-pitch routine. Sappelt uses a slight hitch to drop his hands down into proper hitting position.

In the video below, courtesy of RedsMinorLeagues on YouTube, Sappelt's stride entails two parts. He begins with a toe-tap that includes a slight move forward, which is followed by a stride that basically lands in the bucket. As a result, he still opens up a bit too early, but it's less extreme than when I first saw him and so far it's been effective for him. Obviously, by using an open stride, he should have little trouble handling pitches on the inner half, as his hips and shoulders are already opening to the thirdbase side. But, despite the fact that he hits a double off the rightfield wall in this clip, Sappelt may struggle to drive the ball with power to the opposite field against more advanced pitching. By opening up early, he leaves himself susceptible to offspeed pitches on the outer half. If pitchers can get out on the front foot, then he will be in a poor position to cover the outside corner, as his swing path cuts across the inner half of the plate.

The early opening of his body and stride into the bucket results in a flatter swing path, as evidenced by the lower finishing position of the hands. At times, his hands almost seem to finish just above belt high, which means that his swing is rotational and flat.

As you can see in the above video, Sappelt runs well. He's small in stature, but has good quickness and speed and seems like a fast-twitch player. He takes a full cut and his follow-through makes him a bit slow out of the box, but it doesn't take him long to get up to full speed.

In this next video, also courtesy of RedsMinorLeagues on YouTube, which was taken about a month after the first video, Sappelt has gone with a completely different stride. The toe tap is gone in favor of a single move stride. As the pitch is delivered, he draws his stride foot back towards his back foot to help him load up for the pitch. He then strides forward to transfer his weight to meet the pitch. As you can see, his stride is much higher than the previous incarnation. Additionally, his stride is directed more towards the pitcher rather than opening up towards the third baseman. This stride leads to better balance and more power.

This different stride also brings about a different swing path. Instead of swinging around his body as he did previously, this new stride better enables him to stay down and through the ball, which allows him to drive it with authority. Also, his swing plane is no longer flat, but rather has more uppercut action to it. As a result, he finishes with his hands up above his right shoulder, rather than in the lower position from the above video. This second swing should enable him to generate more loft and better cover the outer half of the plate, as his swing path is no longer flat and won't cut across the inner half of the plate. He also seems to be in better control of his body and the bat head, as his momentum is heading towards the pitcher rather than off to the third base side.

The downside could be that the higher leg kick serves as a timing mechanism in the swing, which is fine until a pitcher is able to upset that timing. When that happens, he'll be out on the front foot too soon, which would leave him with nothing but an arm swing to protect the plate.

This second swing is much preferable and, in my mind at least, better supports the spike in power that Sappelt generated in 2010. In 2010, Sappelt managed to slug over .500 for the first time in his professional career and the second version of his swing makes me more of a believer in that number's legitimacy. However, early in spring training Sappelt seems to have altered his swing once again.

In Spring Training, Sappelt has been ripping the cover off the ball and has been doing it with a slightly different swing than the previous two. In Spring Training, he seems to have abandoned the two-step stride and the higher leg kick stride in favor of a simply lifting of the foot and putting it back down. There is little forward motion, but he opens up the toe of his stride foot early, which again enables him to clear and fire the hips. This swing again opens Sappelt up a bit early, but it has been hard to argue with the results.

Obviously, Sappelt is still refining his mechanics as a hitter and getting comfortable at the plate. However, despite the fluctuations in swing mechanics, he has maintained good success. The key to his success as a hitter is very good hand-eye coordination, which enables him to make consistent, hard contact even on pitches outside the zone. His ability to square up the pitch on the barrel of the bat dovetails nicely with his aggressive, early-count hitting philosophy. It's tough to succeed with a swing-early, swing-often approach if you can't make consistently hard contact.

So far, Sappelt has been crushing the ball in Spring Training, which can only help his cause. However, given that Dusty Baker has already committed to rolling Jonny Gomes out as his full-time leftfielder, Sappelt is likely to head back to the minors and await an opportunity. At the very least, he has seized the opportunity to open a few eyes and improve his standing in the organization.

Defense and Positional Value

While Sappelt has taken his offensive game to the point where it may now be a tick or two above replacement level in the majors, it's still his defensive ability that will ultimately drive his MLB career. If he can play an elite centerfield, then he could lay claim to a starting centerfield gig at the MLB level.

Scouting reports on Sappelt's defense rate him as a tick above average, but his Total Zone Fielding Runs Above Average for his 304 minor league games in centerfield is a plus 50. Obviously, the statistics indicate a true plus defensive player, but scouting reports aren't quite as complimentary. The difference between the statistics and the traditional scouting viewpoint on Sappelt may represent the difference between a starting job and 4th outfielder duty. To establish himself as an everyday player, Sappelt will need to be a legitimate impact player with the leather.

Given that Drew Stubbs and Jay Bruce are well entrenched in centerfield and rightfield, respectively, a starting gig with the Reds will only happen in leftfield. Obviously, leftfield is traditionally an offense-first position, which works against Sappelt, but his arm will play in any of the three positions, which increases his versatility and makes him a more intriguing 4th outfielder. Jonny Gomes was not impressive in 2010, which when coupled with the lack of a true leadoff hitter may open the door a crack for Sappelt to lay claim to the job in 2011.

Final Thoughts

It's hard not to be impressed with how effectively the Reds have rebuilt their farm system. Their success in the draft over the past decade undoubtedly rivals its performance at any other time in the draft era. The Reds are not only having success with their top picks, but they are also finding good value with their later round selections, of which Dave Sappelt and Chris Heisey are prime examples. Heisey slipped because he went to a small college, while Sappelt slipped because he himself is small. Ultimately, both players may end up as 4th or 5th outfielders, but if things break right, then they might crack the starting lineup.

In Sappelt's case, his power is likely to be below average, but his batting average should be solid. He is a high contact guy and can drive the ball. His swing should ensure that he'll have solid pull power, but he's unlikely to ever post impressive home run totals, even with Great American Ballpark working in his favor. Regardless, if he can play impact defense and post respectable batting averages at the MLB level, then he might work his way into a starting job. If not, then he is likely to be a valuable and versatile 4th outfielder. That combination of ceiling and floor is enough to land him at #10 on the list.

2011 Season Pressing Question #2: Scott Rolen

2011-02-24T23:10:00.000-08:00

Pressing Question #2: How can the Reds extract maximum value from Scott Rolen and the hot corner?

Dusty Baker must be reading my mind, because today he came out with his plan to get 120 games from Scott Rolen. On first glance, that doesn't seem like much in light of Rolen's stature, but it's probably a fairly realistic goal.

Rolen played in 112 games in 2007, 115 games in 2008, 128 games in 2009, and 133 games in 2010. So, the past two years, he has played in more than 120 games, but he consistently wears down and declines in the second half. Over the past three seasons, he has a .293 batting average with a .850 OPS in the first half, but a .272 batting average and .774 OPS in the second half.

A more limited and better managed workload might enable Rolen to better maintain his performance level over an entire season. Rolen carried the team at times last year and was a key reason for the team's success. However, he'll be 36 this year and relying on him to carry the team is likely a losing strategy, as Rolen will have to fight off Father Time and the injury bug to repeat his success in 2010.

This offseason, I wanted the Reds to find a legitimate cleanup hitter to bump Rolen down to the 6th spot in the order. Such a move would have enabled us to not rely so heavily on Rolen, instead using him in a more complimentary role. Unfortunately, budgetary constraints prevented them from bringing in a cleanup hitter, so Rolen will again be leaned on to produce.

In 2010, Rolen was a 5.0 win player for the Reds, his best mark since his 2006 season with the Cardinals. But, given his age, a repeat performance might not be in the cards. As a result, it will be very important to get quality production from the other 42 games at third base. Who will step up to fill that roll?

It will likely be some unholy combination of Juan Francisco, Miguel Cairo, and Edgar Renteria. In the best case scenario, Juan Francisco justifies the organization's faith in him and becomes an impact hitter at the hot corner. If not, then the organization will be left with two players who join Rolen on the down slope of their careers. The organization's faith in and handling of Francisco has arguably prevented Todd Frazier from being a legitimate option at the hot corner, as he has been used in more of a utility role because Francisco has blocked him at third. So, the team does have quite a bit invested in Francisco. If Rolen back slides and Francisco fails to step up, then the hot corner could be a problem for the Reds in 2011.

Ultimately, the type of production the Reds get out of the hot corner will be a determining factor in the team's performance in 2011.

Joey Votto Contract Extension Revisited

2011-02-18T21:41:00.000-08:00

I came across an interesting blurb on the Providence Journal website describing a statement made by Theo Epstein on a sports radio interview. The statement is rather applicable to a Reds offseason that was notable solely for its contract extensions.

Previously, I expressed my disapproval of the Joey Votto's contract extension. I just failed to see any appreciable value in it for the Reds. It makes a lot of sense for Joey Votto, but the Reds failure to buy out even a single free agent year makes it a poor one for the organization. And, interestingly enough, Theo Epstein would seem to agree:

"Our philosophy, which is actually a policy in writing, is if we're going to sign arbitration-eligible players long term, we have to get one free agent year and we have to get an option for the club. Because we're giving the player certainty. We need to be able get some of those prime years back in exchange. That makes it a fair bargain. We got that with (Kevin) Youkilis. We got that with (Dustin) Pedroia. We got that with (Jon) Lester. Those players decided to give us that flexibility in exchange for security. If players don't want to do that, that's fine with us. We'll just treat them accordingly, year to year."

Epstein's opinion is more in line with my feelings on the extension. It's interesting to note that they believe so strongly in the policy that they actually put it in writing. Not sure what type of writing that would be, but I'd love to read it. Now, there are many ways to run an organization and it must be pointed out that the Reds and Red Sox aren't identically situated. Maybe the revenue disparity between Boston and Cincinnati means that the Reds need to use different policies in regard to contract extensions. Maybe there is a rational financial basis for the Reds more heavily weighing the value of payroll savings than do the high revenue Red Sox. Personally, I tend to doubt it. I still don't see the potential cost savings as outweighing the injury/performance risk that the organization incurred.

Any discussion of the best run MLB franchises necessarily includes the Red Sox along with the Twins, Braves, Phillies, and Rays. So, when one of those franchises does something, it's worth taking note. Walt Jocketty has undoubtedly done some real nice things during his tenure as the Cincinnati GM, but I still struggle to see the value to the organization of the Votto extension. The Jay Bruce extension was a very strong move for the organization, but it might have been better for them to go year-to-year with Votto.

2011 Season Pressing Question #1: The Aroldis Decision

2011-02-18T10:49:00.000-08:00

Well, time to start looking ahead to the 2011 season. The 2010 season met or exceeded all reasonable expectations and served as a good first step on the road to the promise land. The Reds have enough young talent to take another sizable step on their journey, but most teams that take a significant step forward in one year frequently slide back the next.

To me, it seems that the two World Series contestants, Texas and San Francisco, are ripe for a regression. The Giants did little to nothing this offseason and had a few too many overperformers last year to bank on a repeat performance. And, they simply don't have many young players that they can count on improving in 2011. They are going to need a bounce back from Pablo Sandoval or a Posey-like debut for Brandon Belt. Outside of that, they seem a candidate to slide backwards. As for the Rangers, they landed Adrian Beltre, but lost Cliff Lee. As a result, I'm not convinced that they have the pitching to get back to October. As for Beltre, he might be an upgrade, but they also completely undercut the standing of their team leader, Michael Young, to do so. Who knows how that will impact the chemistry and clubhouse. There are significant questions surrounding both teams.

As for the Reds, what do we make of them after seeing them stand pat? Well, their emerging young talent makes standing pat less detrimental, as several young players are in line for a step forward. Even so, there are a handful of questions that will likely determine the level of success that the Reds are able to achieve this season. And, first on the list is:

1. Whether the Reds can help Aroldis Chapman make the transition from "unbelievable spectacle" to "massively productive" baseball player.

In short, spectacles sell tickets, but production wins ballgames. Aroldis is currently long on the former and short on the latter.

Chapman exploded on the scene with a blazing fastball and a Bugs Bunny slider, which put the Reds on the national radar in a way not seen since the days of Josh Hamilton. The Reds haven't had the kind of sustained success necessary to be consistently relevant to the national discussion, but when a story that transcends the game lands in the Queen city the Reds once again resurface in the national consciousness. Hamilton was just such a story and upon his departure I lamented the loss of both the player and the story, which were inseparable and equally valuable to the organization.

Now, the Reds have another chance, but to fully reap the rewards from the marriage of story and production, they'll have to determine how to properly utilize Chapman. How do they get more from him than the spectacle? How do they get production that effectively advances the team towards the postseason? Aye, there's the rub.

To start, the Reds have decided to use Chapman out of the bullpen in 2011, rather than letting him develop as a starter. Just like everyone else, I find that decision to be a questionable one. I understand that the Reds are closer now to a championship than they have been in decades. So, the desire to have all hands on deck is understandable. At the same time, I think if you have any confidence in Chapman's ability to start, then you have to send him down. Once he becomes entrenched as a reliever, it will become increasingly difficult to shift him back to the starting rotation. A similar situation is happening in Texas with Neftali Feliz, who thus far has been deemed too valuable as a reliever to be switched back to the rotation.

Personally, I am beginning to question whether Chapman can smoothly make the transition to the rotation, so I'm not as opposed to the notion of him as a reliever as I was previously. Still, given the disparity in workload between starting (200 IP) and relieving (60 IP), there is no doubt that starters have a greater ability to make an impact. As a result, Chapman should be given every opportunity to start. Regardless, the Reds have decided that the best way to extract production from Chapman is to use him as a reliever.

To be a productive reliever, Chapman will need to work high leverage innings. He already has the stuff to thrive in such a role, as evidenced by his stellar 12.8 K/9 and his paltry 66.7% contact rate. However, he'll have to continue refining his command, as evidenced by his 3.4 BB/9, First Pitch Strike % of only 57%, and 16.6 pitches per inning. As a pitcher who avoids contact, he'll always be less efficient with his pitches, but a first pitch strike would make him that much tougher, simply by tipping the probability of success in his favor. And, as the Phillies demonstrated in the playoffs, his pitches aren't completely untouchable, so a bit of refinement would serve him well.

Overall, Chapman has the type of stuff to be as effective as Neftali Feliz was last year for the Rangers. And, once he establishes himself, the Reds will have just as much difficulty in switching him back to the rotation. Regardless, the Reds ability to extract production from Chapman will go a long way to determining their success in 2011.

2011 Top Prospect List: #12 Donnie Joseph, lhp

2011-02-17T23:01:00.000-08:00

Donnie Joseph
Height 6-3, Weight 185, B/T: L/L, DOB: 11/1/1987
2010 Redlegs Baseball Prospect Ranking: #19

The Reds have done a really nice job in the amateur draft over the past few years, which is remarkable considering how awful they used to be in that department. Donnie Joseph was selected with the 88th overall pick in the 2009 draft as a draft eligible junior out of the University of Houston. He has quickly justified the faith of the organization and emerged as a potential impact reliever who can contribute as soon as the 2011 season. Previous incarnations of the front office had a hard enough time finding this type of talent with their first round picks, so the fact that the current front office is landing such talent in the 3rd round is encouraging and the prime reason why the organization has returned to prominence.

2010 Season

Joseph made three stops in 2010. He started out with low-A Dayton, where he made brutally quick work of the competition. He tossed 23.0 truly dominant innings in which he posted a 0.78 ERA, 0.87 WHIP, and a 40/7 K/BB ratio to go along with a 1.42 GB/FB ratio. It was a type of dominance not usually seen outside of the video game world. And, it was a legitimate level of dominance, as he posted a 1.08 FIP and a .317 BABIP, so it wasn't a luck driven performance. He gave up a grand total of 2 earned runs before management finally decided he was ready to be promoted.

His next stop was high-A Lynchburg where he tossed 35.0 equally dominant innings in which he posted a 2.31 ERA, 1.11 WHIP, and a 56/16 K/BB ratio to go with a 1.40 GB/FB ratio. Once again, his performance was supported by the peripherals, as he posted a 2.42 FIP and a .309 BABIP. Surprisingly, he somehow managed to record an 0-4 record despite his dominant numbers.

His final stop was double-A Carolina where he worked in 7.0 innings and posted a 5.14 ERA, 1.29 WHIP, and 7/2 K/BB ratio to go with a 6.00 GB/FB ratio. Here, his overall numbers spiked, but his peripherals remained strong. His FIP was 2.22, which was nearly 3 runs lower than his ERA. Clearly, he was a bit unlucky, as his BABIP jumped to .333, so a few more balls in play fell in for hits than was to be expected.

Just to sum it up, Joseph posted a 15.7 K/9 at low-A, a 14.4 K/9 at high-A, and a 9.0 K/9 at double-A. Obviously, that's an extreme level of dominance, but the more advanced double-A hitters managed to slow him down just a bit.

It's worth noting that, as a 22-year old, he had the age versus level advantage against A-ball competition, but his plus slider will likely play just fine against the more advanced competition.

Repertoire and Pitching Mechanics

Joseph features a nice fastball that sits in the 91-93 range with good movement and a plus slider that's a legitimate knockout pitch. In fact, Joseph's slider can hold its own against any pitch in the entire system this side of Aroldis Chapman's fastball. It has such a sharp, nasty bite that it's an effective pitch against both lefties and righties. An impressive fastball/slider combination has been sufficient to carry many a reliever to a job working high leverage MLB innings. And, that should be the case with Joseph in the very near future.

Here's a look at Joseph courtesy of CoreyBrinn on youtube:

As for mechanics, Joseph is the very definition of high effort. From the windup, he holds his hands just below eye level as he peers over the glove to get the sign from the catcher. After he gets his sign, he steps directly towards thirdbase with his right foot, then shifts his left foot down on the rubber. He then brings his leg kick up past parallel while keeping his hands below his chin. His leg kick incorporates some body coil, as he rotates his hips to wrap his leg around his body and build up energy.

Once he hits the apex of his pitching motion, which is a high, strong energy position, Joseph gathers himself to drive towards the plate. Not surprisingly, given his power pitcher profile, Joseph takes a rather long stride. In fact, his stride is so long that he never really gets his body out over his stride leg. Unlike fellow long striders Tim Lincecum and Aroldis Chapman, who seem to jump off the rubber to get out over their long strides, Joseph struggles to get out over his stride leg. Instead of finishing out over the top of his stride leg, his momentum rolls over his stride leg and causes him to fall off to the third base side. His momentum causes his left leg to cross over his plant leg on his follow-through. Ordinarily, when a lefthander falls off to the third base side it's because his stride foot lands in a closed off position, which forces a pitcher to throw across his body. However, Joseph doesn't fall off to the third base side because he throws from a closed off position, but rather because of the length of his stride.

Here's a look at Joseph courtesy of RedsMinorLeagues on youtube:

Given that Joseph's momentum works around his body and towards third base, it's not surprising that his delivery seems to have a bit of a lean to it. The lean in his delivery gives his arm action the appearance of pulling his pitching arm down and across his body, especially since he throws from a three-quarter arm slot. Given Joseph's arm action, it's easy to see how he gets good movement on his fastball, as it should impart some arm-side run on the ball.

Overall, Joseph has high effort delivery, but produces good results with it. He generates good power for his two pitch mix, which should enable him to work high leverage innings at the highest level.

Final Thoughts

Joseph is a prime example of how plus attributes can drive you up the ladder in a hurry. He may not have a diversified set of skills, but his plus attributes are value drivers. Prospects who have a more well rounded game, but lack plus attributes can frequently wither on the vine. Joseph, on the other hand, is one of the most electric pitchers in the system despite relying solely on a two pitch mix.

Relievers are almost always volatile and Joseph's mechanics may lead to inconsistency at times, but he has an electric arm and could be a factor as soon as 2011. In a season where the Reds are once again seeking the postseason, Joseph could provide a significant boost in the dog days of summer, which is yet another example of the benefits of a strong player development system. For now, Joseph checks in at #12, but he's unlikely to be down on the farm for long.

2011 Top Prospect List: #21 Junior Arias, ss

2011-02-13T17:44:00.000-08:00

Junior Arias
Height 6-2, Weight 187, B/T: R/R, DOB: 1/9/1992
2010 Redlegs Baseball Prospect Ranking: NA

The Reds signed Junior Arias as an international free agent out of the Dominican Republic in 2009. He joins a collection of young, Latin American prospects with good upside. The Reds have added significant quality and quantity to the system by improving their international scouting efforts.

Unfortunately, like Ismael Guillon, there really isn't much of a track record to analyze, but the scouting reports on him are simply too strong to justify leaving him off the list entirely. So, this write up will, out of necessity, be a bit shorter and shallower.

2010 Season

Arias made his first appearance in American professional baseball in the Arizona Rookie League. He played in 47 games and garnered 195 ABs. In that time, Arias posted a .287/.336/.482/.819 slash line to go along with 10 doubles, 5 triples, 6 homers, and a 58/12 K/BB ratio. He crushed lefties to the tune of .357/.438/.607/1.045, albeit in a limited sample size of 28 ABs. He also held his own against righties, posting a line of .275/.318/.461/.780 in 167 ABs.

He still has a bit of work to do in his situational hitting, as he OPS'd .958 in 97 ABs with the bases empty, .680 in 98 ABs with runners on base, and .514 in 60 ABs with runners in scoring position. Additionally, there are significant questions about his ability to control the zone, but his power potential is intriguing for a middle infield prospect.

There are a few photos of Junior Arias available on FourSeamImages.com that are definitely worth your time. He has loose, long, athletic build that on first impression reminds me a bit of Alfonso Soriano. The length and follow-through of his swing also bear a resemblance to Soriano.

On the defensive side, early scouting reports are mixed. Generally, his athleticism is promising, but there are questions as to whether he'll be able to stick at shortstop. In the Arizona Rookie League, he made 25 errors in a 180 total chances as a shortstop, which was good for a meager .861 fielding percentage. High error totals are not uncommon at the lower levels, so that in and of itself is not damning, but he'll still need to polish his glove work to avoid a move off the position.

Final Thoughts

The available information on Arias is sparse and the track record is minimal, but the early signs are positive. The biggest question on Arias, as with most of the other Latin American prospects in the system, involves his ability to control the strike zone. For now, his upside is enough to land him at #21 on the list, but he'll need to establish a solid baseline of performance over a larger sample size to remain there for 2012.

2011 Top Prospect List: #13 Brad Boxberger, rhp

2011-02-11T23:44:00.000-08:00

Brad Boxberger
Height 6-2, Weight 200, B/T: R/R, DOB: 5/27/1988
2010 Redlegs Baseball Prospect Ranking: #13

In a system suddenly running a bit thin in the pitching department, Brad Boxberger grades out as one of the best. He is a polished college pitcher out of a legendary college program (USC). He comes from a baseball bloodlines, as his father Rod went 12-1 with a 2.00 ERA and earned College World Series MVP award for the 1978 national championship USC team. Add in an impressive, albeit inconsistent, repertoire of pitches and all the ingredients needed for an impressive career are present.

Boxberger didn't pitch professionally in 2009, so the 2010 season represented his first taste of full season ball. The Reds sent him to high-A Lynchburg to start off the 2010 season.

2010 Season

In 2010, Boxberger broke quickly out of the gates at high-A Lynchburg. Working almost exclusively as a starter, he tossed 62.0 innings in which he posted a 3.19 ERA, 1.24 WHIP, 2.9 BB/9, 10.2 K/9, and a 1.63 GB/FB. Obviously, it was a stellar performance, as he piled up the strikeouts, limited the walks, and induced ground balls at a high rate. Given his impressive strikeout and walk rates, his WHIP looks surprisingly high, so it's not all that surprising that his hit luck was poor, as evidenced by his .346 BABIP.

As a polished college prospect, it wasn't unexpected that Boxberger would thrive in high-A ball, but it was nonetheless reassuring. Even if a prospect is reasonably expected to perform at a certain level, we shouldn't withhold credit from him when he actually does it. Living up to expectations isn't always the easiest thing to do, but Boxberger managed to do just that. Iin the process, he earned a promotion to double-A ball to finish out the year. College pitcher or not, advancing all the way to double-A ball in your first professional season is an accomplishment.

Unfortunately, the wheels completely came off the wagon at double-A. For Carolina, Boxberger switched into a relief role and worked 29.2 innings, posting an alarming 8.49 ERA, 1.92 WHIP, 6.7 BB/9, 12.2 K/9, and 1.05 GB/FB ratio. Even though the sample size is small, the loss of control is somewhat troubling. His walk rate jumped by roughly 4 batters per nine innings. Obviously, double-A hitters are much more advanced, which when coupled with a heavier workload may explain the decline in command. If so, then more experience should largely resolve the problem. On the plus side, his strikeout rate remained gaudy even against more experienced hitters.

Repertoire and Mechanics

Boxberger works with four solid pitches. He throws a 91-93 mph four seam fastball with good movement that touches 94 on occasion, a 78-80 mph curveball, an 82-84 mph slider, and a circle changeup with good late sink. His fastball velocity goes up a tick when he works out of the bullpen, which makes him an intriguing possibility in high leverage innings.

Here is a great look at Boxberger in action during the AFL courtesy of David Pratt on Vimeo:

Bradley Boxberger - Arizona Fall League - 2009 from David Pratt on Vimeo.

As you can see, Boxberger grades out pretty well in pitching mechanics. He is fundamentally sound and fairly conventional, which is never a bad thing in a pitching prospect. To start his delivery, he moves his left foot forward and somewhat towards first base, which operates to unweight his right leg allowing him to rotate his right foot down on the rubber. I'm not entirely sure when pitchers started to forgo an actual step back towards second base with their glove side foot to begin the motion, but I don't see the new trend as being an improvement. I suppose it was done with an eye towards reducing extraneous movement to conserve a pitcher's stamina, but I think the step back makes the motion more fluid and may possibly generate more momentum for the pitch. But, I suppose pitching coaches these days prefer an economy of movement, as the fewer moving parts the fewer chances for the motion to get out of sync.

The defining characteristic of Boxberger's delivery remains his leg kick. He brings his knee up well passed parallel, essentially all the way up to his chest, which helps creates substantial potential energy to impart on the baseball. Additionally, he incorporates significant coil by utilizing a sizable hip rotation. At the apex of his leg kick, the line of his hips almost runs on a line from 3rd to 1st. This high leg kick and significant coil are usually pure positives, as they generate, respectively, potential energy and tension at apex of the delivery. The energy that they generate can then be transferred to the baseball. However, in Boxberger's case, their severity might actually be creating a problem.

The severity of his coil and the height of his leg kick may ultimately help explain his inconsistent command. Due to the height of his leg kick and the severity of his coil, Boxberger is unable to unpack his leg kick quick enough to get into proper throwing position. Simply put, at the apex of his motion, Boxberger has his knee near his chest and such a significant coil that he shows his back to the hitter, which means that he has farther to go to get back into proper throwing position. Since his coil is more significant than typically seen, he has much farther to go to get back in position. Unfortunately, he doesn't quite make it all the way back into good throwing position.

Boxberger's stride foot lands too far to the third base side of the mound, which results in a closed-off throwing position. As a result, Boxberger is forced to throw across his body. This type of issue can frequently cause inconsistency in command. In addition, the closed off throwing position leads to inefficiency in transferring the stored up potential energy to the baseball. His momentum is somewhat checked by the need to throw around his body. Instead of his momentum going straight back and straight through, it instead has to somewhat work around his body. This inefficiency not only leads to inconsistent command, but also less than peak velocity and requires more work to generate the velocity that is created.

Another potential reason for the inconsistent command is his arm slot. Boxberger throws from a high three-quarter arm slot, which when coupled with the need to throw across his body gives him something of a cross-fire delivery. It's difficult to maintain a consistent arm slot and work effectively to both sides of the plate with a cross-fire delivery. Boxberger also has an overall looseness to his arm action, which, at times, can make his cross-fire delivery look like he is slinging the ball.

Odd as it sounds, I wouldn't mind seeing Boxberger reduce his coil. Everything a pitcher does before the apex of his delivery is done with an eye towards building up energy, while everything done after apex is done with an eye towards imparting that stored energy to the baseball. I don't usually advocate that a player reduce the energy he creates before the apex, but Boxberger currently cannot get around fast enough from his coiled position to get back into proper throwing position. If he lessens his coil, then he will have more time for his body to come around and his plant foot to land in proper position. And, if he eliminated his closed off throwing position, then he might see an improvement in control. Additionally, he might also be able to maintain his current velocity, as whatever the new motion would lose in potential energy might be offset by a more efficient transfer of that energy to the baseball. Less energy created, but more efficiently imparted.

One other issue that I see in Boxberger's delivery is the length of his stride. It just seems too short for a pitcher of his stature and stuff. The length of the stride is directly related to the pitcher's ability to accelerate towards homeplate. The forward acceleration of the lower half is transferred to the ball by the pitching arm. Given Boxberger's height and repertoire, he should be more of a power pitcher than he seems to be. Part of that stems from his less than ideal acceleration to the plate. If he lengthened his stride, then he would get a stronger, more aggressive push off the rubber and generate better velocity. Pitchers who fit the "power pitcher" profile traditionally have longer strides. They typically generate velocity with strong lower-half drive. Here is a look at two players who generate very good velocity with strong, aggressive strides:

When you compare the stride angles of Aroldis Chapman and Tim Lincecum with that of Brad Boxberger, you can see how much longer and more aggressive they are with their strides. In fact, they seem to almost jump off the rubber towards the plate, which is part of how they are able to generate upper 90s (or, in Chapman's case, 100s) velocity.

While Boxberger might benefit from a longer stride, he likely wouldn't be able to simply lengthen his stride, as the closed off throwing position prohibits it. As a result, he'd have to open up his throwing position before he could appreciably lengthen his stride. It is much more difficult to throw across/around your body if you are fully extended, so many pitchers who work from a closed off position utilize shorter strides. Boxberger fits the bill. He uses a shorter stride in response to his closed off throwing position, which ultimately gives his delivery a more upright look.

Here is another look at Boxberger, courtesy of RedsMinorLeagues on youtube:

Random Thoughts and Additional Considerations

I'll admit that I don't quite know what to make of Boxberger yet. Is he a starter or a reliever? Does he fit the "power pitcher" profile? Can he be a power pitcher with those mechanics? If not, does his command preclude him from being more of a finesse pitcher? Or, will he be best utilized in short bursts in high leverage innings?

Overall, Boxberger has a lot of what you look for in a pitching prospect. In fact, going down the list, you can tick off the majority of the boxes. So, a lot of the individual pieces are there, he just needs to pull them together and refine them. It'll be interesting to follow his development and see how the Reds minor league staff handle him. In the end, I suspect he has #3 starter ceiling in the rotation or high-leverage inning potential out of the pen.

Final Thoughts

Ultimately, the 2010 season provided more questions than answers on Brad Boxberger. I knew heading into the season that he was a solid pitching prospect, but the circumstances surrounding his season foreclosed the possibility that it would serve as a meaningful data point. He thrived at a lower level and struggled at a higher one, but he also changed roles in the jump from one level to the next. So, were the struggles the result of the advanced competition, the change in roles, the heavier workload resulting from his first full season in professional ball, or some combination thereof? Unfortunately, the sample size is simply too small for us to draw any definitive conclusions. As a result, the 2011 season will be a return engagement for us to figure out exactly what we have in Brad Boxberger and how he should be properly used.

For now, Boxberger has done enough to warrant his return to the 13th spot on the list. If, in the 2011 season, he performs like he did in the first part of 2010, then he'll likely move up the list. On the other hand, he could easily slid well down the list if he once again pitches like he did in the latter portion of 2010.

2011 Top Prospect List: #14 Henry Rodriguez, 2b

2011-02-01T23:12:00.000-08:00

Henry Rodriguez
Height 5-10, Weight 150, B/T: S/R, DOB: 2/9/1990
2010 Redlegs Baseball Prospect Ranking: N/A

Henry Rodriguez is one of many intriguing prospects that the organization has begun to stockpile out of Latin America. The Reds signed Henry as an international free agent out of Venezuela on March 27, 2007. Building a top flight farm system requires an organization to both draft well and sign international talent. The renewed efforts in international scouting have already begun to pay off with the emergence of Johnny Cueto, but the next wave of talent is in the pipeline. Henry Rodriguez is one of the more interesting international signings the organization has made in the past few years.

2010 Season

In 2010, Rodriguez made his first appearance in full season professional ball at the age of 20. He spent almost the entire season at low-A Dayton, where he logged 514 ABs in which he compiled a .307/.337/.473/.810 to go along with 37 doubles, 3 triples, and 14 homeruns. He also posted a 70/22 K/BB ratio and was a legitimate threat on the bases, as evidenced by his 33 stolen bases in 46 attempts. His component stats largely support his production, as he hit line drives at a 19% clip and had a fairly reasonable BABIP of .333. So, he might have been a touch lucky, but by and large he earned what he produced in 2010.

The Reds saw enough to bump Henry up to high-A Lynchburg to finish out the season. For the Hillcats, Rodriguez played in 6 games and logged 24 ABs. A very small sample size, but for the record he hit .250/.250/.250 with 6 singles and 4 strikeouts.

Henry should be heading back to high-A for a return engagement in 2011.

Swing Mechanics

After a bit of a dry-spell, the Reds have found a few switch-hitters of note, including Tucker Barnhart, Yasmani Grandal, and Henry Rodriguez. All three are looking like legitimate MLB prospects and their ability to hit from both sides will add a nice bit of versatility to the lineup.

So, we have to do double-duty on his mechanics, so let's start with Henry's righthanded swing. Despite being a player who is smaller in stature, Henry generates surprisingly good pop. To do so, he uses a lot of lower body action. He starts with a slightly narrower than shoulder-width stance, which gives him a very upright look to his pre-pitch stance. He holds his hands next to his right ear with a high back elbow. As the pitcher gets ready to deliver, Henry picks his foot well up off the ground and uses a long stride towards the mound.

His stride effectively cocks his hips by rotating them inward during his stride. In fact, he almost seems to slightly wrap his front leg around his body when he strides, which really helps him generate power with his hip rotation. In tandem with his stride, he begins to draw his hands back into proper hitting position.

The higher leg kick operates as a timing mechanism, but one of the drawbacks of it is that crafty pitchers can successfully upset his timing with offspeed pitches by getting him out on the front foot too early. When that happens, his bat-speed necessarily slows down, typically resulting in an arm-swing and a weak ground out. Ideally, Henry would be able to generate good power without having to resort to such an active lower half, but in this case the impressive power production may be a fair trade off for a bit of inconsistency. When the timing is right, Henry has a quick bat and a fairly direct path to the ball. He gets good extension out through the ball and generates surprising power for his size.

Here's a look at Rodriguez hitting from the right side, courtesy of coreybrinn on youtube:

From the left side, Henry uses a very different stance. Interestingly enough, very few switch-hitters actually use an identical swing from both sides of the plate. Henry uses a wider than shoulder width stance that is somewhat open before the pitch is delivered. He holds his hands up high, almost over his head, with the barrel of the bat pointed down at the ground.

As the pitcher gets ready to deliver the pitch, Henry starts his two part stride. First, he brings his foot in towards the plate to close up his stance, but then moves it forward towards the mound. The first part of the stride looks like a toe-tap before he strides toward the pitcher to effectuate the weight transfer. As his stride is in motion, Henry brings his hands down into hitting position, which necessarily results in the barrel of the bat moving up into a 45-degree angle.

As with his righthanded swing, his stride from the left-side allows him to cock his hips. The first part of his stride closes up his stance and rotates his hips inward, which again allows him to generate power. His swing has a slight uppercut to it, which helps him generate loft on the ball.

Not surprisingly, Henry's swing seems a bit more fluid and natural from the left-side of the plate, but his swing is solid from both sides of the plate. Given his swing mechanics, he should avoid a significant platoon split and remain a viable option from both sides of the plate as he climbs the ladder.

Here's a look at Rodriguez hitting from the left side, again courtesy of coreybrinn on youtube:

Speed, Defense, and Positional Value

In addition to his solid power, Rodriguez also runs well, as evidenced by his 33 stolen bases. He needs to continue to work on reading the pitcher and getting good jumps, but that typically comes with experience and maturity. When that happens, his success rate should improve and make him a more valuable asset on the basepaths. Recent statistical studies reveal that a player needs to be successful around 75% of the time for the extra bases to outweigh the cost of the times he is caught stealing. If the player's success rate falls below that threshold, then he's doing his team more harm than good by trying to steal bases.

Rodriguez's good speed also serves him well in the field, as he possesses good range. He also has solid defensive fundamentals. In 552 chances at Dayton, Henry made 14 errors, which was good for a .975 fielding percentage. Ideally, he can cut down on that number as he climbs the ladder, but it's not too shabby for a young player in his first full season of professional baseball.

All in all, there is good reason to be optimistic about his defensive play, which will only help drive up his prospect value. If you are an above average defensive player at a premier defensive position, then you don't have to provide all that much with the bat to justify your spot on the 25-man roster. And, his early work in the professional ranks support the notion that Rodriguez is already on his way to being an above average defensive second baseman. In fact, if the Reds didn't have so many legitimate options at shortstop, then Rodriguez might have gotten a legitimate look at the 6 position. However, as it stands, he's settling in rather nicely on the other side of the bag.

Final Thoughts

Rodriguez is an interesting prospect with a nice set of tools. His ceiling is somewhat limited by his smaller stature, but he still manages to generate good power. Rodriguez does have one significant drawback that has derailed many a career. The big red flag on Henry is his inability to effectively control the strike zone. That's usually a big minus in my ledger, but for now Rodriguez is showing enough positional value, power potential, speed, and defensive skill to land at #14 on the list. I'd love to see him develop his ability to control the strike zone, but more realistically he should probably focus on becoming an impact early-count hitter with limited strikeouts and walks.

Long, Disturbing Tradition Continues

2011-02-01T23:00:00.000-08:00

Recently, there was an article written by Ken Rosenthal that bothered me. And, since it continues to bother me, I now feel the need to get it out of my system. But, if you have no interest in non-Reds issues or those issues that take place outside the chalk lines, then you may want to skip this one and move on to read about Henry Rodriguez. But, now that you have been sufficiently warned, let's sally forth.

First, a little context is required, so we need to take a quick stroll down memory lane. Major League Baseball has a very long history. Almost as long is the history of the baseball media acting as the propaganda arm of the owners.

Back in the good old days of the game, baseball writers almost invariably sided with the owners. There are numerous reasons for the coziness of owners and writers, here are a few that leap to mind:

First, baseball writers were somewhat dependent on owners for access, as technology had not yet opened up the game to the extent it has today.

Second, owners frequently treated baseball writers better than their own players. Baseball owners understand the importance of good press in keeping both the turnstiles spinning and the players under their thumb.

Third, the fact that the origins of baseball largely predated the rise of organized labor meant that the power of the owners vastly outweighed that of the players. So, perhaps it's not surprising that the media naturally favored the owners.

All of this is simply the long way of saying that baseball writers have long been biased towards the owners. If you've been a fan of baseball during any of the collective bargaining sessions, then you are familiar with the old saying that "baseball players are lucky to be making so much money for playing a game." That has long been the talking point used by owners to drive down player salaries. It's a line they have consistently fed to the media, which was only too willing to disseminate it to the fans. And, frankly, it has been very effective for the owners. Ever wonder why fans complain about baseball player salaries, but no one complains about actor or musician salaries? Why do people complain about Jayson Werth's contract, but not about Tom Cruise earning $20M a picture or Barbara Streisand earning millions for performing a mere handful of concerts in Las Vegas?

I would argue that the disparity is largely due to baseball fans having been conditioned by the owners via the media. Fans have been conditioned to view the players as being fortunate to be paid for playing a mere game, rather than as individuals who should be compensated in accordance with the revenue they generate for their employers. In short, throughout the history of the game the owners have consistently and effectively utilized the media to frame the issue for their own benefit.

Even today, after all the gains made by the MLBPA, the media still favors the owners. Perhaps not surprising, given the financial disparity between the two sides. Baseball players may be rich, but owners are wealthy. In the end, MLB owners are still capital, while the MLBPA is still labor. And, in today's day and age, it's not surprising to see the media favor the deeper, frequently corporate, pockets belonging to the owners.

In this article by Ken Rosenthal, the issue isn't between owners and players, but rather between an owner and a fan base. Regardless, Rosenthal wastes little time in writing a one-sided argument in support of the desires of the Oakland A's ownership group.

Here is the complete article:

"A's need to get moving, or else

Free-agent third baseman Adrian Beltre was the player the A’s wanted most this offseason. They made him an initial offer of five years, $64 million and later raised their bid to six years, $78.6 million, according to major league sources.

Yet, they never stood a chance.
Beltre, like most star players, wanted no part of Oakland. No part of the Coliseum. No part of a franchise that has ranked in the bottom five in home attendance in each of the past five seasons.

The solution for the A’s is simple — in fact, the simplest of any struggling franchise in the game today. The team needs to move to San Jose, a more populous, prosperous city 40 miles south of Oakland.

“If we want to be successful in the game, we’ve got to take advantage of situations that are right in front of us,” says Scott Boras, the agent for Beltre and several other top players. “And this is one of them.”

Yes, Boras is speaking partly out of self-interest; a stronger A’s franchise would possess greater spending power and help drive the market for his players. But a stronger A’s franchise is in the game’s best interests, too.

No longer would the team be a revenue-sharing recipient. Franchise values would increase as the industry grew more robust. Baseball could move on to other problems.

So, what’s the holdup?

The Giants, of course.

The Giants, who hold territorial rights to San Jose’s home county, Santa Clara, only because the A’s were kind enough to surrender them in the early 1990s, when the San Francisco team was exploring a move to the area.

Appeasing the Giants will not be easy — their owner, Bill Neukom, took over the club in 2008 with the knowledge that San Jose was part of the team’s territory. He understandably does not want to lose sponsorship opportunities or diminish the value of his club in any way.

Well, baseball developed a blueprint for solving such a problem in March 2005, when it reached an agreement to move the Montreal Expos into the Orioles’ territory in Washington, DC. The deal created the Nationals and guaranteed the Orioles at least $130 million a year in revenues and a sale price of at least $360 million.

The A’s/Giants conflict, in some ways, should be easier to resolve — the A’s already exist in the Bay Area, while the Nationals did not exist in Washington. The Orioles/Nationals arrangement also included the formation of a new regional television network. The Giants and A’s already maintain deals with separate Comcast entities.

“The idea that we’re here, sitting on our hands and not letting this franchise get going is detrimental to the game,” says Boras, who grew up in Elk Grove, Calif., near Sacramento.
“A few franchises need to be evaluated and examined. Oakland can immediately improve and become a success if moved to San Jose. You would then have two well-run and successful franchises in the Bay Area.”

Neukom, like Orioles owner Peter Angelos, is an accomplished attorney. Baseball surely would not relish a prolonged, contentious negotiation with the Giants, but if that’s what it takes to fix the A’s, so be it.

Other low-revenue clubs are much more challenged.

Teams such as the Pirates, Royals, Padres and Reds believe that winning will solve their problems. Well, winning didn’t work for the Rays and Indians, who failed to generate appreciable revenue increases during periods of recent success.

Now both clubs are stuck: The Rays can’t get financing for a new ballpark, and the Indians are trapped in a city with a diminishing population and corporate base.

An NBA team can relocate to a city as small as Oklahoma City, but a major league franchise must be in a market strong enough to support 81 home dates.

Name a better possibility in North America than San Jose, where a 32,000-seat park for the A’s is all but ready to go.

“If we had approval from baseball, it would take six to nine months to finish our drawings, then a maximum of two years to build,” A’s owner Lew Wolff says. “So, I would say 30 to 36 months.

“The city has purchased most of the land. We are willing to give the money to buy the rest of it if they don’t happen to have it. As far as financing, it will be done through debt and equity. We’re not waiting for any kind of bond issues or government help, which we can’t get anyway.

“In some ways, that makes it more difficult. But in some ways, it’s simpler. We don’t have to go to anyone.”

Absent public financing, the A’s are confident the ballpark would pass a citywide ballot measure. The team in 2006 struck a 30-year naming-rights deal with Cisco that would provide $4 million annually. Its new multi-year agreement with Comcast SportsNet California also will help with financing, Wolff says.

Commissioner Bud Selig formed a committee in March 2009 to study the A’s ballpark options. Wolff says it is his understanding that the committee’s work is now done. Selig, through a spokesman, declined comment.
Meanwhile, the A’s remain in limbo, plodding along in Oakland. Franchises in baseball’s other two-team markets — New York, Chicago and Los Angeles — share the same geographic territory. The Bay Area is different. The population in the Giants’ territory, Wolff says, is twice as large as that in the A’s territory.

“The whole thing is really ludicrous,” Wolff says.

For all their obstacles, the A’s have built an intriguing club, one that might very well contend in 2011.

Their young pitching staff last season led the American League in ERA, and general manager Billy Beane has spent the winter making improvements through trades and modest free-agent signings.

The A’s failure to sign Beltre for the second straight offseason, however, illustrates the difficulty the team faces in landing premier free-agent talent.

A year ago, Beltre spurned a three-year, $24 million offer from the A’s to sign a one-year, $10 million deal with the Red Sox. This time, he went to the Rangers for more money than the A’s offered — five years, $80 million.

His decision could help determine the outcome of the AL West race.

“You talk to players,” Boras says, without referring specifically to Beltre. “It’s not the city. It’s not the team. It’s the ballpark. And there are no fans there.

“When teams recruit against the Oakland A’s, they say, ‘Why do you want to play in an empty park?’ It’s not about the organization. It’s not about ownership. It’s about locale.”

Earlier this offseason, Lance Berkman rejected a two-year offer from the A’s to sign a one-year deal with the Cardinals. When the A’s do land free agents, it’s usually because the players want to be in northern California or lack better options.

True, the A’s signed designated hitter Hideki Matsui and relievers Grant Balfour and Brian Fuentes this offseason, but none is an elite talent. The team’s outlay for the three in 2011 will be about $13 million combined.

For Beltre, the A’s were willing to guarantee six years, but at $12.8 million per season, not $16 million. After Beltre signed for that price with the Rangers, the A’s added Balfour and Fuentes, bringing their 2011 payroll to nearly $70 million.
Imagine how much stronger they would be in San Jose.

The three other AL West clubs — the Rangers, Angels and Mariners — play in terrific markets with terrific parks. The proposed 32,000-seat stadium in San Jose would be the smallest in the majors. But the A’s average home attendance would almost double if they filled the park, and premium seating and luxury suites would provide additional revenue.

It’s time. It’s past time.

“In the end, this is hurting baseball,” Boras says. “It’s depriving baseball players and baseball fans of a successful franchise. That’s wrong. We need to correct that.”

The solution is within reach."

In this article, Rosenthal basically frames the issue as follows: "The A's need to move to San Jose in order to survive." A better, more fair statement of the issue would be that "the A's need a new ballpark in order to thrive."

Of course, the restated issue would not operate to completely exonerate the ownership group of their responsibility for the A's financial situation, which seems to be the primary goal of the article. And, to achieve this goal, Rosenthal relies on a number of questionable statements to support his already shaky premise.

I have more than a few problems with his article, but here are a few of the issues that bother me the most:

Issue #1: For some odd reason, Rosenthal goes to player agent Scott Boras for a quote on the Oakland A's situation, even though he readily admits that Boras speaks solely out of self interest.

What insight could Scott Boras possibly have on the viability of baseball markets or the tricky topic of financing a baseball ballpark? None whatsoever. Boras has a significant interest in seeing the construction a new revenue generating ballpark for a previously revenue challenged organization. Of course, Boras doesn't care where that park is constructed, only that it gets done. He simply wants more money for his clients and himself. For him, it doesn't matter if the ballpark is in Oakland, San Jose, or Jupiter, just so long as it increases the revenue of the organization, because both he and his clients will ultimately get a cut of that new and improved revenue stream. However, Rosenthal attempts to use Boras' comments as some type of support for the premise that the A's need to move to San Jose.

Issue #2: Rosenthal includes Lew Wolfe's argument that "the population in the Giants' territory is twice as large as that in the A's territory." This is a completely and intentionally disingenuous statement. Let's get real here, both the Giants and A's draw fans from the same exact area. The extent of the Giants' territorial rights is that the A's cannot construct a ballpark in San Jose. However, while the A's are forbidden from constructing a ballpark in San Jose, there is NOTHING to prevent the A's from drawing fans from all over the San Francisco Bay Area, just as they always have. This is a market that has long supported two MLB franchises and can continue to do so without difficulty in the future.

Here is a look at the attendance figures over the past few decades for A's and Giants:

Decade: Oakland__San Francisco__Difference
1980s:__15,812,748____13,292,023_____2,520,725
1990s:__17,639,449____17,935,020_____(295,571)
2000s:__20,824,961____34,703,654____(13,878,693)

In the 1980s, the A's outdrew the Giants by ~2.5M fans. In the 1990s, the Giants outdrew the A's by a paltry ~300K fans. And, of course, in the 2000s, the Giants attendance exploded and they outdrew the A's by ~14M fans. Of course, the discrepancy in the 2000s has nothing to do with Oakland's viability as a baseball marketplace. It has everything to do with the opening of Pac Bell Park in San Francisco prior to the 2000 season.

The only problem with the Oakland market is simply that the A's owners have refused to step up and privately finance a ballpark IN OAKLAND. The truth is that the A's were on the same exact footing as the Giants until the 2000s. At that point, the Giants reaped the benefits from stepping up and privately financing a ballpark. Since that point, the Giants have become the premier organization in the area, just in case last year's World Series championship failed to drive that point home. In short, the Giants demonstrated their loyalty to the fans and their commitment to their market by using their own funds to build a ballpark. The A's have not.

The real problem here is the A's ownership. Here's a fun fact, the A's majority owner, John Fisher, is one of 8 billionaire owners in Major League Baseball. Again, let's repeat that for emphasis, the A's are owned by a billionaire. They could easily finance their own ballpark, which seems to be about as risk-free an investment as an owner could hope to find. Lew Wolff is the face of the ownership group, but Fisher is the majority owner. Regardless, the A's have failed to invest in the community and fan base. Instead of being willing to privately fund a new ballpark in Oakland, the A's have dragged their feet, complained and bashed the Oakland market, and tried to get a ballpark in a location, San Jose, that they know to be off-limits.

I suspect that, if we were to pull back the curtain and see the true motivation of Lew Wolff, then his desire to build a ballpark in San Jose has more to do with the opportunity to develop the real estate surrounding the proposed ballpark site than any alleged weakness in the Oakland market. Given that history has conclusively established that a new ballpark in Oakland would enable the A's to compete on equal footing with the Giants, there must be some other reason for Lew Wolff to be desperately trying to move to an area that he knows is completely off-limits.

Issue #3: Rosenthal writes that "the A's remain in limbo, plodding along in Oakland" without mentioning how the ownership group has intentionally operated to keep itself in limbo. Major League Baseball ballparks are sound investments in their own right, but owners are always looking to extract the most public money, grants of land, and tax breaks from municipalities that they possibly can. Reds fans saw this firsthand with the construction of Great American Ballpark, which was done with significant public money extracted in part with a promise from the owners to increase payroll. Well, we all know how that panned out for the fans.

Even short of financing a new ballpark in Oakland, the ownership group could have invested more heavily in the team and the market. They have chosen not to do that to any appreciable degree and, not surprisingly, the result has been an alienated fan-base and declining attendance. One small example is that the organization has canceled FanFest in favor of a Fan Appreciation Tailgate to be held in the parking lot before an exhibition game on a weekday. The owners have completely scaled down their commitment to the Oakland market, seeming to prefer the use of a scorched earth campaign to ensure that they have no other alternative than to leave town.

Final Thoughts

Overall, I simply expect better out of Ken Rosenthal than this. A national writer should do more than just parrot the self-interested arguments of a baseball ownership group. Major League Baseball works in Oakland. It has for decades and there's no reason it can't continue into the future. For that to happen, the A's simply need to build their own ballpark in Oakland. If the A's actually committed to the market, rather than badmouthing it in an attempt to move to a different city, then baseball in Oakland could flourish again. It's not the market, it's the ballpark. And, the ballpark is something that is well within the control of the A's billionaire ownership group. Of course, you'd never know that from Rosenthal's article, which continues the long, disturbing baseball media tradition of swaying public support in favor of the owners.

2011 Top Prospect List: #11 Ryan LaMarre, of

2011-01-27T23:49:00.000-08:00

Ryan LaMarre
Height 6-2, Weight 185, B/T: R/L, DOB: 11/21/1988
2010 Redlegs Baseball Prospect Ranking: N/A

His career has barely begun, but Ryan LaMarre is already something of a rarity, as he's the unusual combination of righthanded hitter and lefthanded thrower, but he has an impressive blend of skills and tools that may soon make him noteworthy for his play.

While he hasn't been in the organization for long, LaMarre is already one of my favorite prospects. His natural athleticism and baseball specific skills could make him a very well-rounded player. And, if everything breaks right in his development and all the cosmic tumblers click into place, then he might be a special talent.

COLLEGIATE CAREER AND DRAFT POSITION

The Reds selected LaMarre with the 62nd overall pick in the 2nd round of the 2010 draft as a draft eligible junior out of the University of Michigan. Prior to the draft, he was projected as a late first round pick, so the fact that he was still available to the Reds in the 2nd round represents good value.

LaMarre wasn't drafted out of high school, but blossomed into one of the best amateur players in the country at the University of Michigan. In his collegiate career, LaMarre hit .356 with 20 home runs and drove in 125 runs in 140 games. He was a two-time winner of the Bill Freehan award as the the team's top hitter.

Freshman - .305/.376/.404/.780 with a 25/11 K/BB ratio.
Sophomore - .344/.468/.599/1.067 with a 36/33 K/BB ratio.
Junior - .419/.459/.649/1.108 with a 20/5 K/BB ratio.

As a junior, LaMarre missed some time when he broke his thumb diving for a ball in the outfield, but it wasn't enough to stop him from earning All Big Ten first team honors. In the final analysis, it was a stellar collegiate career.

As for high school days, it's worth noting that LaMarre earned 12 varsity letters for Lumen Christi, four each in football, hockey, and baseball. Maybe it's more common than I think, but I'm not sure I've ever actually heard of someone being a four-year varsity athlete in three separate sports. So, in a bit of understatement, I'll just say that he's a fairly good athlete.

2010 SEASON

LaMarre wasted little time in signing a professional contract with the Reds and quickly demonstrated the advantages of signing early.

The Reds sent LaMarre to low-A Dayton to start his professional career. For the Dragons, he played 60 games and collected 227 ABs in which he hit .282/.370/.396 with 5 homers, 18 steals in 25 attempts, and a 53/21 K/BB ratio. It wasn't an explosive debut, as his line drive rate was uninspiring at 14% and his stolen base success rate was only 72%. Even so, LaMarre demonstrated the ability to control the strike zone, which portends well for his future, especially with his strong set of tools. However, it is worth noting that his on-base percentage was boosted by a surprising 12 hit-by-pitches. Given his hockey/football background, it's not inconceivable that LaMarre is using the hit-by-pitch as an offensive weapon, a la Craig Biggio.

The Reds then bumped him up to high-A to finish out the season. For the Lynchburg Hillcats, LaMarre hit .222/.276/.407 with 1 homer, 1 steal in 2 attempts, and a 4/2 K/BB ratio. It's such a small sample size that it barely warrants mention, but he hit line drives at only a 9% clip. Even so, reaching high-A in the half season after he signed was a nice achievement for LaMarre and he'll likely return to high-A to start the 2011 season.

By signing early, LaMarre managed to get into 68 games and collect 254 professional At Bats, which is actually a fairly significant amount of experience, especially when compared to 1st round pick and late signer Yasmani Grandal, who only managed to get into 8 professional games in 2010. I'm all for players negotiating a contract number that they feel they deserve, but there is something to be said for signing early and getting your professional career started. If a player is confident in his abilities, then it may make sense to sign quickly and begin the climb to the majors. The quicker the player reaches the majors, the quicker they obtain their 6 seasons of service time and hit free agency.

Jason Varitek was originally drafted by the Seattle Mariners in the 1994 draft, but didn't sign until April 20th, 1995. So, he basically sat out a whole season and someone much smarter than I am calculated that his decision ultimately cost him millions. He may have gotten more money up front in his signing bonus, but he also likely cost himself an MLB season at free agency prices. Obviously, he couldn't have known that he would make it to the majors and have so much success, but holding out for a few hundred thousand more isn't always the best thing for the player.

That certainly won't be the case for LaMarre, who signed early and got the jump on his career. As a result, he put himself in a much better position to start out the 2011 season.

SWING MECHANICS

LaMarre starts with a slightly wider than shoulder-width stance, a low back elbow, and a calm demeanor. His hand position is in close to his body and in front of his right shoulder. To transfer his weight to meet the pitch, he uses a fairly high leg kick and a legitimate stride to meet the pitch. As his stride moves his body forward to meet the pitch, he draws his hands back into proper hitting position. He has good hip rotation, which helps power his swing. After he clears his hips, he fires his swing. LaMarre generates good bat speed and gets good extension out and through the ball, but keeps both hands on the bat during his follow-through.

However, his stride and swing both have a bit of length to them. In the professional ranks, he will likely need to tighten up his swing and shorten his path to the ball to reach his ceiling. If he doesn't, then he may be susceptible to hard fastballs in on the hands. He also may need to work on keeping his hands inside the ball, which isn't a type of swing you see all that often in the metal bat college game where pulling the ball is frequently the name of the game.

Overall, LaMarre has good swing mechanics that could enable him to hit for both average and power. He may need a tweak or two, but he has a sound foundation on which to build his offensive game.

In this second clip, LaMarre doesn't exactly flash good swing mechanics, but it does show his good speed out of the batter's box.

DEFENSE, POSITIONAL VALUE, AND INTANGIBLES

Early reports on LaMarre's defensive abilities are positive. He moves well in the outfield and should have the necessary range for all three positions. He also gets good reads off the bat and good jumps on the ball, which when coupled with his speed enables him to cover a lot of ground. His arm strength is only average, but he has good accuracy.

In 2010, LaMarre split time almost equally between centerfield and rightfield. Obviously, his value will be higher if he can stick in center, but his versatility is a plus, especially with Drew Stubbs likely entrenched in center for the foreseeable future. Overall, LaMarre seems a good bet to be able to handle centerfield, which would make him an intriguing talent.

LaMarre has a nice blend of tools and skills, but he also has something else working in his favor: intangibles. His background in hockey and football gives him an invaluable gamer type mindset which should serve him well in professional baseball. Players with a football background typically have a blue-collar type game. Hockey is a sport that values humility, sacrifice, and putting the team first. These types of intangibles should help LaMarre with the challenges of professional baseball and help his total game be greater than the sum of the individual parts.

Intangibles are important. Whether it's Pete Rose yelling "bunch of losers" at his Big Red Machine teammates to drive them on to victory or Johnny Bench playing through injury to help the team, intangibles are a key part of all great teams. LaMarre may have a few to bring to the table.

CONCLUSION

The Reds have had a lot of success in drafting University of Michigan Wolverines, including such luminaries as Barry Larkin, Chris Sabo, Hal Morris, and others. Hopefully, LeMarre is the next in a long line of Wolverine talent to suit up for the Redlegs. He has an intriguing blend of tools and skills, upside and polish. The fact that he also plays a premier defensive position and plays it well gives him nice total value as a prospect.

LaMarre was actually a player I wanted the Reds to select in the 2010 draft and I was ecstatic to see that they did. I have high hopes for LaMarre and his combination of polish and upside lands him at #11 on the list.

2011 Top Prospect List: #15 Ismael Guillon, lhp

2011-01-26T22:00:00.000-08:00

Ismael Guillon
Height 6-3, Weight 185, B/T: L/L, DOB: 2/13/1992
2010 Redlegs Baseball Prospect Ranking: N/A

Well, prospects like Ismael Guillon are the toughest prospects to evaluate, as they don't really have an amateur track record and are so young that they haven't logged appreciable innings at the professional level. Even so, the scouting reports are so strong on him that I simply can't leave him off the list.

Guillon, a native Venezuelan, was one of the top international free agents in 2008. Scouts were split as to whether he profiled best on the mound or as a first baseman/outfielder. Perhaps because he throws from the left side, the Reds viewed him as a better option on the mound.

The Reds moved fast and signed the then 16-year old to a contract worth $600,000. However, the Reds subsequently voided the contract after they discovered an injury during a physical. The organization re-signed him for a lesser amount due to added injury risk and the need for Guillon to rehab the ailment.

2010 Season

Guillon has barely put a toe into the professional baseball waters, but, in 2010, at age 18, he made a solid professional debut in the Rookie Arizona League. He tossed 57.0 innings in which he put up a 3.32 ERA, 1.09 WHIP, 3.6 BB/9, 11.5 K/9, and .193 batting average against. Like most power pitchers, he was more of a fly ball pitcher, as evidenced by a 0.75 GB/FB ratio.

Obviously, a stellar performance, but it's against a very inexperienced level of competition and Guillon is considered to be pretty polished for his age. It'll be interesting to see what he can do as he climbs the ladder and faces better competition.

Pitching Mechanics and Arsenal

According to Tony Fossas, who served as a pitching instructor in Arizona, Guillon possesses an 88-92 fastball, a potentially plus change-up, and a work-in-progress curveball.

One of the red flags on Guillon has been his mechanics, including an unusual pitching wrist wrap. There are a few photos of Guillon on FourSeamImages.com that are definitely worth look.

In those photos, you can see a somewhat unusual wrist position, but on the plus side he's got a great stride. The longer the stride, the more power generated by the lower body. And, of course, when the power is generated by the lower body, the arm has to do less work to generate velocity. As a result, pitchers who throw with their entire body should have a reduced risk of injury. Time will tell if his arm action and unorthodox wrist wrap are cause for concern, but he has good size which enables him to throw on a downward plane, allows for additional physical projection, and may help increase his durability.

For now, Guillon is a bit of unknown, but early reports are promising so he lands at #15 on the list.

2011 Top Prospect List: #16 Neftali Soto, c/inf

2011-01-22T23:57:00.000-08:00

Neftali Soto
Height 6-2, Weight 180, B/T: R/R, DOB: 2/28/1989
2010 Redlegs Baseball Prospect Ranking: #9

Neftali Soto had one of the more interesting years of any Reds prospect, but ultimately it was another somewhat lackluster year from a development point of view. At this point, it is time for the Reds to focus on what Soto does well, rather than what he does poorly. It's clear that Soto isn't going to be an impact defensive player, but he has power that just about rivals anyone in the system and allow him to develop into an impact offensive talent.

Heading into 2011, it would seem wise for the Reds to settle on first base as his long-term position and would be advisable for Soto to start hitting like one.

2010 Season

It was an odd season for Soto, who repeated high-A. Fortunately for him, the Reds changed affiliates from the pitcher's paradise Sarasota to the more hitter friendly Lynchburg.

He flashed the impressive power and hit to the tune of .268/.319/.460/.778 in 522 ABs. He hit 33 doubles, 2 triples, and 21 homers to go along with a 105/32 K/BB ratio. In his second go-around at high-A, Soto boosted his OPS by .136 points. Unfortunately, his line drive rate plummeted from 23% in 2009 down to 12% in 2010.

Oddly enough, Soto was much more productive against righthanders (.827 OPS in 364 ABs) than he was against lefties (.666 OPS in 158 ABs), which is something that should tip back into his favor as his development continues. It's rather rare for hitters to have a reverse platoon split, but players in the lower minors simply don't have much experience against strong lefties. However, it seems likely that the uninspiring performance against southpaws will normalize as he gains more experience. If so, then his overall numbers will also improve.

Overall, it wasn't a bad performance for Soto, as it is 13% easier to hit a double and 9% harder to hit a homer in Lynchburg than the average park. So, Soto certainly earned each and everyone of the 12 homers he hit at home. Of course, power has never been in question for Soto, but the development of his on-base skill still lags dangerously behind.

Since his arrival in the organization, Soto's offensive profile has been that of an early-count type hitter, as both his walk and strikeout rates have been low. Walks and strikeouts both require a hitter to see a significant amount of pitches, so the more pitches a hitter sees the more likely those outcomes become. However, unlike Juan Francisco who piles up the negative late-count outcomes without reaping many of the positive late-count outcomes, Soto manages to avoid both in equal measure.

When he arrived on the scene, I thought Soto had the type of swing that would enable him to hit for both average and power. So, even though the on-base skill was lacking, he still seemed an interesting and potentially productive offensive prospect. However, he has yet to put it together over a long enough stretch to even come close to reaching his ceiling.

Donning the Tools of Ignorance and Defensive Value

In last year's write up, I was skeptical about the rumors circulating that Soto might be tried behind the plate. In 2010, those rumors were proven true. It was a curious decision, but the front office decided to give Soto some work at the catcher position. Given my view of Soto as an offense-first type prospect, it seemed odd to force him to focus on something other than developing his "hit tool."

The obvious rationale was that Reds were trying to drive up his player value by boosting his positional value. However, the real question is whether Soto is the type of player who can handle such a switch.

Catcher is not only the most difficult position on the defensive spectrum, but also the most unique, which raises the question of how the skills required to play the position compare with those required to play the other premier defensive positions. It's clear that the skills that make a player a good shortstop are equally applicable to second base. But, is the skill set of the catcher more comparable to a shortstop? Or, more comparable to skills found at the lower end of the spectrum?

C--SS--2b--CF--3b--RF--LF--1b

So, can a player like Soto, who is likely best suited for first base, jump from one extreme to another? Or, does catcher require those skills inherent in those positions closest to it on the spectrum?

When I think about players who have successfully transitioned both back behind the plate and away from it, there are three players that come to mind: Brandon Inge, Buster Posey, and Craig Biggio.

Brandon Inge attending Virginia Commonwealth University, where he excelled as both a shortstop and a relief pitcher. The Tigers selected him in the 2nd round of the 1998 draft and immediately shifted him to catcher. While the catching experiment didn't pan out, it wasn't because Inge was a defensive liability. Quite the contrary, Inge was a very strong defensive catcher, but the tools of ignorance simply sapped his offensive production to the point where he wasn't a viable everyday player. The physical demands of the position dragged down his production to the point where the Tigers were forced to move him off the position. When he was moved to the hot corner, his offensive production improved to the point where he was a viable starter.

Next up is Buster Posey. As a freshman at Florida State, Posey was the full-time starter at shortstop and a Louisville Slugger Freshman All-American. As a sophomore, he was moved behind the plate and the rest is pretty much history. After just one season at the position, Posey was a finalist for the Johnny Bench Award, which is awarded to the best catcher in college baseball. And, of course, he just took home the hardware for the Rookie of the Year Award.

Finally, we have Craig Biggio, who arrived on the scene as a catcher. The Astros were so fond of his bat that they quickly shifted him to second base to save the wear and tear on his body and prolong his career. They feared that they would lose the value of his speed on the bases and his production at the plate far too soon.

These players have several things in common. First, they are all good defensive catchers. Second, they are all good defensive players at premier defensive positions. Inge is not only an exceptional defensive third baseman, but has the athleticism to capably handle the defensive positions higher up on the defensive spectrum. Third, they have good athleticism with strong footwork.

In the end, it does seem like the catcher transition is best handled by those who are coming from the premier defensive positions. Unfortunately, that just isn't the scenario with Neftali Soto.

Overall, Soto played 10 games behind the plate and the results were predictably rather rough. His fielding percentage was a mere .971, he allowed 2 passed balls, and caught only 1 out of 16 basestealers. When he wasn't catching, he played primarily first base. He played 91 games at first, 7 at thirdbase, and 10 behind the plate. So, he spent time at both ends of the defensive spectrum in 2010 and ultimately performed much better at first base.

When all is said and done, Soto projects as an offense-first prospect who is best suited to first base. His footwork isn't impressive and his footspeed is poor. His overall game seems a bit lethargic at times. As a result, he is lacking the quickness needed to move laterally to block balls in the dirt and the footwork to explode out of the crouch and into proper throwing position. In total, his athleticism just isn't strong enough to handle the catcher position.

While the catcher experiment was undoubtedly the most interesting aspect of Soto's year, the more important note is that he went from a full-time third baseman in 2009 to a near full-time first baseman in 2010. Ultimately, that's where he belongs.

Swing Mechanics

Soto has a smooth swing that you don't often associate with righthanded hitters. His pre-pitch setup involves a slightly wider than shoulder-width stance and a high back elbow. Soto seems to tinker with his stride (more on that later), but after he strides he fires his hips, which creates significant rotational energy and generates the power in the swing. After he clears his hips, the bat comes around and through the zone. He does a nice job of controlling barrel of the bat and gets good extension in his swing. His slight uppercut creates good loft and carry on the ball.

Below you can see a few photos of Soto at the plate.

Despite the strong hip rotation, Soto maintains good balance throughout the swing. However, Soto seems to experiment with different strides and has yet to lock into a consistent lower body move.

In this first video, courtesy of RedsMinorLeagues, Soto uses a higher stride. He lifts his foot up high off the ground and brings it forward to transfer his weight and trigger the swing. These types of higher strides are typically used by hitters as timing mechanisms. The downside is that pitchers can upset that timing with good offspeed pitches, which work to get the hitter out on the front foot too early. Here, however, Soto uses it to great effect in hitting a long homerun.

In this next video, Soto is using an entirely different stride. I'm somewhat hopeful that he was just exaggerating this new stride to correct a perceived problem, because I fail to see how anyone can actually hit using this type of stride.

Anyway, take a quick look at Soto in this video clip courtesy of OPvideoNotOrioles on YouTube:

As you can see, his pre-pitch stance finds his weight significantly out over the front foot. In fact, it's so extreme that he even has a forward lean to his pre-pitch stance. As the pitcher winds and delivers, Soto shifts his weight back to his right foot and strides forward ever so slightly with his left foot. However, his stride is way too early. As a result, he ends up spread out well before the pitch enters the hitting box. You can actually see him waiting on the pitch from his spread out position.

This early stride creates two problems. First, spreading out too early saps the swing of power, as the hips simply cannot rotate effectively to power the swing. The wider the stance, the more difficult it is to get good hip rotation. And, when you factor in how early he spreads out, it is even more difficult to generate good hip action. Second, spreading out makes Soto very susceptible to offspeed pitches and pitches on the outer half. He simply cannot adjust to those pitches, as he has already committed towards the pitcher.

It's somewhat similar to the old axiom about playing first base. You stretch to meet the throw, not before the throw is made, because once you get spread out you simply cannot adjust to go get throws that arrive in an unexpected location.

The above clip is such an extreme example that I'd love to just write it off as some over-exaggerated coaching technique designed to rein in his high leg kick. However, it seems to me that he is doing something similar in the following clip courtesy of RedsMinorLeagues.

Below, he faces Johnny Cueto in a 2009 spring training game and again seems to be using a stride similar to what he used in the clip above. It's tougher to see because the video is taken from behind homeplate, but he again seems to have a forward lean in his pre-pitch stance and a very small, early stride towards the pitcher. Once again, he seems to be spread out way too soon, which robs him of good hip rotation in the swing.

Perhaps most tellingly in the two video clips in which he uses the early stride are the outcomes, as he grounds out weakly to the rightside in both at bats. He spread out too soon, which robbed the swing of the power generated by the lower half. By committing too soon, he is unable to adjust to pitches on the outer half. In the end, he is left with nothing but a weak arm swing that results in weak ground balls and easy outs for the pitcher.

When he hits with that type of stride, he may still be able to pull pitches with authority, but it's difficult to imagine him being able to effectively hit the ball to the opposite field. Obviously, more advanced competition will make it much more difficult for Soto to be a productive hitter while using only half the field. I'm not sure why or how often he is using such a stride, but I would encourage him to scrap it entirely, as it leaves him in poor hitting position and unable to properly adjust to offspeed pitches.

Final Thoughts

Ultimately, Soto's future will be determined by his hitting. And, as an offense-first prospect, he's got a lot of work to do as he ascends up the ladder. He's unlikely to ever develop a strong on-base skill, so he'll need to show the ability to hit for average and power if he's going to make it to the majors. If he can't demonstrate those abilities, then his career will likely fizzle out. You can't make a living at the bottom of the defensive spectrum without at least two of the three slash line components.

As his career unfolds, he seems to be following the Juan Francisco career path. Namely, he's sliding down the defensive spectrum and lacking the offensive game to justify a starting job at those positions. But, in fairness, Soto's production hasn't been in the same ballpark as Francisco's. The power is nice, but he simply must be more productive. Soto will need to elevate his offense in 2011, but for now he checks in at #16.

Reds Extend Votto. Good idea????

2011-01-16T10:45:00.000-08:00

The news of the day is that the Reds have extended the contract of Joey Votto. A cause for celebration? Eh.....I'm not so sure.

Early word is that the Reds signed Joey Votto to a three-year extension worth $38M.

In Major League Baseball, contracts are guaranteed. In essence, unless a player retires or kicks the bucket, he will be entitled to every last dollar under that contract. As a result, MLB contracts are, to a certain extent, risk shifting mechanisms. The longer the contract, the more risk incurred by the franchise. The shorter the contract, the more risk incurred by the player. And, in the case of Joey Votto, who was already under team control for the next three seasons, this contract is largely about managing the risk.

The problem with this contract is that the Reds incurred risk unnecessarily. Even if the Reds had decided to go year-to-year with Votto through the arbitration process, they still had the power to keep Votto in Cincinnati for the next three years. But, by going year-to-year, they would have forced Votto to incur the risk of injury or poor performance. Instead, the three-year extension operates to shift that risk to the organization.

So, what exactly did the Reds get for incurring the extra two seasons of risk? Typically, when an organization buys out the arbitration years of one of its young players, the player agrees to give up a season or two of free agency in exchange for the guaranteed financial security. Under that scenario, the organization agrees to incur the added risk, but receives the benefit of an extra season or two of control over that player. Both sides obtain something of value, as the player gets financial security for life by shifting the risk to the organization, while the organization gets a couple extra seasons of control over that player in exchange for incurring the risk.

So, the question remains, what exactly DID THE REDS GET for taking on the extra two seasons of risk?

Well, they clearly didn't secure any extra years of control over Votto, so the only thing they can hope to have achieved is cost savings. But, realistically, how much cost savings did they get?

John Fay recently reported that Votto was likely to ask for between $8.5-9.5M in arbitration this year with the Reds countering at around $7M.

If we break it down, I think there's a good chance that Votto would win his arbitration case. Let's assume that he asks for $9M. The MLB arbitration process is based in part on the market, which in this case is defined as players eligible for arbitration for the first time. The most obvious comparison for Votto's arbitration case would be Ryan Howard.

In 2008, Ryan Howard won his arbitration case after asking for $10M with the Phillies countering with $7M. While some will argue that Howard was coming off the better season, I think it's clear that Votto was the better player. And, coming off an MVP award, it would be difficult to come up with a compelling case AGAINST Votto's salary demand.

So, if it had gone to arbitration, Votto would likely have earned ~$9M in 2011. Taking that away from the total value of the three-year extension and you have $29M remaining. Basically, Votto would have had to get MORE than $14M in 2012 and $15M in 2013 for the Reds to reap any financial savings on the contract extension.

I just don't see a ton of cost savings here for the Reds. If Votto strings together two more seasons like he had last year, then he would probably receive more through arbitration than he is set to receive under the contract extension. If Votto won $9M in arbitration in 2011, then a repeat performance would reasonably get him a $5M raise. So, the estimated $14M in salary for 2012 under the extension seems pretty reasonable for Votto. And, if he puts together another strong season in 2012, then I could see him earning somewhere in the $17-20M range for his final season, which would be better than the estimated $15M he'll earn under the contract. Of course, that entire scenario comes with the rather large IF regarding Votto's ability to stay healthy and productive over the next two seasons. Forcing him to go through arbitration would have left that rather sizable IF (and the risk that comes with it) resting on Votto's shoulders.

For this deal to make sense, the Reds needed to get an extra season or two of control over Votto. Jocketty should have played hardball with Votto, informing him that if he wants the guaranteed financial security, then he'll have to surrender two years of free agency. In an offseason defined by the length of the contracts being thrown around, it's surprising the Reds couldn't do better here than a three-year extension.

Instead, the Reds took on the risk and got little in return for doing so. They may save a few million on the back end of the deal, but that's only true if Votto continues to be healthy and produce at near MVP levels.

Now, admittedly, there are other factors at work that militate towards signing Votto to an extension that buys out solely his arbitration eligible seasons. First, arbitration is an ugly process. The team is forced to bad mouth the player in order to drive down his cost. And, understandably, that can lead to bad blood between the player and organization. It's not a fun process for either side. Second, a player of Votto's caliber has the ability to establish record breaking awards in every arbitration cycle. If that happened, he would establish a new benchmark for every subsequent arbitration hearing, which is an undesirable result for the other owners as it would operate to drag player salaries higher. Still, while these other factors certainly bear mentioning, I don't see either as a reason not to force Votto to go year-to-year unless he is wiling to forfeit a year or two of free agency.

As for Votto, he did quite well here. He obtained his financial security without having to delay his free agency eligibility. And, judging by the length of the deal, it is now very clear that Votto either wants out of Cincinnati or wants to test the lucrative waters of free agency. Regardless of whether it's the former or the latter, it now seems increasingly unlikely that Votto will spend the bulk of his career in Cincinnati, as the next time his contract is negotiated the Reds will likely be competing with the Yankees, Red Sox, Blue Jays, and others.

Hot Stove Review: Edgar and Freddie

2011-01-11T21:14:00.000-08:00

Well, as we steam towards those magic words that all baseball fans long to hear, "Pitchers and catchers report", it's becoming increasingly likely that the Reds are done with their offseason improvement efforts.

Fortunately (or is it unfortunately?), this should be fairly short.

Edgar Renteria signed a one-year contract worth $2.1M in base salary and an additional $900,000 possible in incentives

I'm not an Edgar Renteria fan, so let's get that out of the way up front. If you asked me to write up a list of shortstop options that I would have pursued this offseason, Edgar wouldn't even have made the list. For the record, Jed Lowrie was the guy I wanted, but his late season offensive production means that the Reds probably waited too long to get him. And, given the Reds reticence to spend (either prospects or money) to acquire impact talent, they were left with their choice of the retreads and stopgaps. So, that constriction is the framework under which this signing must be measured.

Now, all that said and despite all efforts to the contrary, I am having a hard time working up much angst over this signing. Evidently, I've either been placated by the first taste of postseason baseball in years or just started going soft in my old age. Either way, it just doesn't seem like an acquisition to get too riled up over.

I value defense more highly than most, so I view Paul Janish as the clear cut choice to start at shortstop. Of course, that's what I wanted to see last year as well. Obviously, that didn't happen and because it didn't, the Reds really have no choice but to have a legitimate fallback plan for shortstop in place.

Part of the problem with the Reds gifting so much playing time to an underwhelming O-Cab was that Janish was arguably more productive when you factor in both offense and defense. However, the remaining part of the problem with giving so many innings to O-Cab was that it precluded the Reds from getting an extended look at Paul Janish. And, without an extended look, it's damn difficult to properly evaluate Paul Janish.

As I think I wrote in the year-end review of the infielders, Janish had solid overall numbers (.723 OPS), but his splits were volatile and occasionally illogical (.554 OPS at home vs. .858 OPS on the road, .824 OPS during the day vs. .648 OPS at night, etc). Unfortunately, the sample size is just too small to draw any definitive conclusions. If that weren't the case, then the signing of a veteran insurance policy would be much less defensible.

So, the Reds need a fallback option. You could (quite effectively) argue that Zack Cozart would be a sufficient fallback option, but the baseball industrial complex has always preferred its security blankets to have a lot of mileage on them.

Was Edgar the right fall back option? I think it's debatable. The type of production he will provide isn't exactly a mystery. It will be fairly minuscule. He should get a bit of a boost from Great American Ballpark, which is a real tonic for aging righthanded hitters (i.e. Rich Aurilia, Joe Randa, etc), but Edgar will be just a tick above replacement level. As for defense, Edgar will likely be a notch below O-Cab. So, the aggregate production will undoubtedly be uninspiring.

If they were willing to pay that kind of cash, why not just bring back Orlando Cabrera?

The Reds had a $4M mutual option on O-Cab, which cost them $1M to buy him out. So, the total cost of replacing O-Cab with Edgar will be between $3.1M and $4M ($1M buyout of O-Cab + $2.1M base salary with possible $900K in incentives). So, there are two possible outcomes to switching from O-Cab to Edgar.

First, Edgar won't perform well enough to justify enough playing time to reach the incentives, so the Reds will save $900K. Second, Edgar performs well enough to justify the playing time necessary to reach the incentives, so he'll cost exactly the same as O-Cab's $4M but probably provide better production. Either outcome represents an upgrade over O-Cab at his option price.

In essence, by switching from O-Cab to Edgar, the Reds ensured either better production or cost savings. Of course, it's entirely possible the Reds could have brought back O-Cab for less money or found a different veteran option. But, all in all, Edgar seems to fill the role that the Reds covet, that of the "veteran insurance policy", sufficiently, so maybe it IS worth the loss of continuity and intangibles to justify going from O-Cab to Edgar.

Of course, it's still not way I would have gone.

Freddie Lewis signed a one-year, $900,000 base salary with possible incentives

Now, here is a signing I can support, the second cousin of the perennially underrated Matt Lawton. I've been a fan of Fred Lewis for a number of years and I'm glad to see him get an opportunity with the Reds.

Lewis is a good athlete with a nice blend of skills. He has some pop and can swipe some bags. He covers a lot of ground in leftfield and has a patient approach at the plate. He also has a smooth lefthanded swing that should get a nice boost from the Great American Ballpark. All in all, Lewis has a lot of attributes that you look for in a ballplayer.

However, Lewis will likely split the fan base for one simple reason. He just doesn't seem to possess great baseball instincts. For example, despite his good range in the outfield, he is prone to making errors and his routes to the ball aren't always the best. As a result, people who watch him play frequently believe him to be a below average outfielder. Additionally, despite his good speed his stolen base success rate simply isn't that impressive. He gets nabbed more often than one would expect, as evidenced by his 74% career mark. In short, he's just not a very good percentage player.

Regardless, even with a few missteps and a bit of inefficiency in translating his tools into production, there is more than enough production left to justify his acquisition. In 2010, Lewis hit a respectable .262/.332/.414/.745 with 8 homers and 17 stolen bases for the Blue Jays. And, for his career, his line is .272/.348/.418/.766, so if anything he could do better in Cincinnati. Lewis could very easily become the best leadoff hitter the Reds have had in a number of years. And, the more ducks on the pond for Bruce and Votto, the better.

Overall, Lewis is a very good risk/reward acquisition and one that is MUCH more likely to pay off than Edgar Renteria. There should be very little to prevent Lewis from at least claiming the heavy half of a leftfield platoon with Jonny Gomes. And, it wouldn't surprise me at all to see him claim the job outright, though that seems unlikely with Dusty at the helm.

And, for those who want to get to know a little bit about Fred Lewis, I highly recommend this ESPN story about a tragic accident that has shaped his life. It's damn near impossible not to root for him to make good after reading the article.

2011 Top Prospect List: #24 Cody Puckett, 2b

2011-01-11T12:07:00.000-08:00

Cody Puckett
Height 5-10, Weight 175, B/T: R/R, DOB: 4/3/1987
2010 Redlegs Baseball Prospect Ranking: N/A

Cody Puckett is looking like a nice value acquisition for the Reds. He has good athleticism, which makes him intriguing. His blend of speed and power effectively lifts his prospect ceiling. Despite being a college prospect, he's still rather raw in some aspects of the game, which gives him a lower floor. Ultimately, his future as a prospect will be determined by a battle between his offensive upside and defensive downside.

Collegiate Career and Draft Position

Puckett played three seasons for Cal State Dominguez Hills, showing significant linear improvement with each passing year.

As a freshman, Puckett stepped right into the lineup, playing 47 games and logging 182 ABs. He handled the bat well, posting a .308/.332/.456 slash line with 11 doubles, 2 triples, 4 homeruns, and a 26/8 K/BB ratio. He also swiped 5 bases in 7 attempts. As a freshman, Puckett didn't flash any plus speed, power, or on-base skill, but he certainly held his own.

During his sophomore season, Puckett played in 52 games and collected 214 ABs. During that time, he posted a stellar slash line of .313/.346/.551 with 18 doubles, 0 triples, 11 homeruns, and a 31/11 K/BB ratio. He also swiped 6 bases in 6 attempts. In his second season, the biggest improvement in his game was in the power department.

As a junior, Puckett hit .337/.462/.644 with 11 doubles, 0 triples, 17 homeruns, and a 33/42 K/BB ratio. His production was impressive and another positive is that he avoided any significant platoon split, hitting righthanders at a .335 clip and southpaws at a .341 clip. He also began to effectively utilize his speed, as his stolen base total jumped up to 26 in 29 attempts. He followed up his power improvement as a sophomore with significant improvement in his ability to control the strike zone. As a junior, his walk rate jumped up substantially, which could have been partially attributable to pitchers fearing his more powerful bat, but hindsight reveals it to be legitimate improvement that he carried with him to the professional ranks. Ultimately, his junior year represented a big step forward and one that caught the eye of professional scouts.

At least a pair of those eyes were in the employ of the Reds organization, as they selected Puckett in the 8th round of the 2008 draft with the 239th overall pick. While Puckett played primarily shortstop in college, the Reds felt his range and glove were better suited for a less taxing position.

2010 Season

Puckett spent the 2010 season at two different stops in the minors. He started out and spent the vast majority of his time at high-A Lynchburg. For the Hillcats, the 23-year old Puckett hit to the tune of .277/.350/.493/.843 in 542 plate appearances. He posted a 124/45 K/BB ratio to go along with a robust 40 doubles, 4 triples, and 18 homers. Once again, he flashed good speed and good instincts on the bases, swiping 17 bases in 21 attempts (81% success rate). He lashed linedrives at a rate of 19%, which more than supports his .277 batting average. In fact, he probably deserved a few more hits than he got.

After a stellar season in high-A, the Reds promoted him to double-A for 12 plate appearances. In that short stint, he collected 6 hits and a slash line of .500/.500/.667/1.167. He ripped line drives to the impressive tune of 36%. Obviously, far too small of a sample size to mean much of anything, but it was a nice start that he'll have a chance to build on in 2011.

Overall, it was a nice season for Puckett, as he flashed a well-rounded offensive game defined by a solid blend of power and speed.

Swing Mechanics

Puckett hits from an open, slightly wider than shoulder-width stance with a high back elbow. He holds his hands in front of his right shoulder and fairly far away from his body. There is a school of thought that holds that the farther away from the body a hitter holds his hands, the less control over the bat he may have. So, Puckett's pre-pitch stance doesn't quite have him in proper hitting position, but before the pitch is delivered he gets into good position.

First, his stride operates to close up his stance, as it includes a move in towards homeplate. His stride closes and cocks his hips, which enables him to generate load in the swing. In tandem with his stride, Puckett draws his hands back and in closer to his body, which brings them into proper hitting position and gives him better control over the bat.

When Puckett fires the swing, he doesn't get cheated. He has a compact swing and a direct swing path with a slight uppercut that generates good loft on the ball. And, while he doesn't have a big frame, he generates impressive power for his size with good bat speed. However, the power he generates at times comes at a cost.

Puckett's swing involves strong hand action and upper body rotation. Occasionally, the effort he puts into the swing causes him to spin off the ball, as his shoulder rotation occasionally causes his front shoulder to fly open and his swing to flatten out. When that happens, his front foot also opens up to disperse the rotational momentum.

Due to his smaller size, Puckett lacks much physical projection to his game. However, that shouldn't serve as much of a detriment to his game, as he already generates plus power.

Overall, Puckett has a solid swing that generates plus power. Despite his power swing, he does a nice a job making consistent, hard contact. So far, strikeouts have not been a significant problem, but he'll need to continue making contact against more advanced pitching. Additionally, he controls the strike zone well, as his shorter stature gives him a smaller strike zone to protect.

Here is a look at Puckett in action, courtesy of DOAsaturn on youtube:

Defensive Skills and Positional Value

Puckett is a good athlete, but has struggled with his glove work at second base. However, his bat profiles much better at that position, so he'll be given every opportunity to prove his ability to handle the position or play his way off it.

In 2010, Puckett once again spent the vast majority of his time at second base, but did log some time in the outfield. However, during 239 games at second in his minor league career, Puckett grades out as -13 runs below average under the Total Zone fielding metric.

Additionally, he not only struggles to reach balls, but also has difficulty converting those balls he does reach into outs. The strength and bulk that effectively power his swing somewhat work against him in the field, as his actions and hands are stiff and unforgiving. If he can't smooth out his glove work, then he'll have to slide down the defensive spectrum to the hot corner or a corner outfield spot. If that happens, then his bat becomes much less interesting.

Final Thoughts

Puckett's nice collection of tools drive his offensive game, which ultimately drives his overall value as a prospect. He's an offense-first prospect, but ultimately he may have a middle infield bat and a corner position glove, a combination that rarely portends well for the future. Still, if he can make improvements on offense, his bat will play at the offense-first positions, while defensive improvements will make his stay at a premier defensive position much more viable. Regardless, some improvement must be made for him to become a legitimate option as an MLB starter.

If no such improvement is made, then Puckett's future may be that of an offensive minded utility player. A player who, in limited duty, can handle the corner outfield and infield spots. His blend of power and speed is intriguing and gives him a respectable ceiling. Ultimately, he'll go as far as his bat and athleticism will take him. For now, they take him up to #24 on the list.