Closing the Book on the "Rebuild" and the Jay Bruce era

The "rebuild" is over. Largely panned, underwhelming at times, the rebuild era came to a close with the Jay Bruce trade. The Reds still have a ways to go, but they are now entering a new phase improving the competitiveness of the organization. They can still improve through the draft and free agency, but that feels more like "building" than "rebuilding."

Let's cut right to the quick. This offseason I wanted the Reds to dump Jay Bruce. I was done watching him flail at offspeed pitches. Done watching him struggle to post batting averages over .230 and OBPs over .300. Done watching him struggle to track down balls hit over his head in right field.

The life of an Major Leaguer is tough. You are constantly judged against your draft position, the label slapped on you when you enter the game, and the expectations of the fans. Injuries can strike, even if they don't force you off the field, they can still drag down your performance level on it. To top it all off, you are always playing for your job, as there is a wave of players trying to take your job.

If you even make the big leagues, you are an elite talent. If you are a star, then you have achieved a measure of greatness. But, the truth is, "greatness" is anti-gravity. It's not the norm. Mediocrity is the norm. Average is the norm. There are always demons fighting to drag you down to average: age, injury, self-doubt, anxiety, and your competition, to name just a few. Great players fight off gravity for as long as they can, but it always wins out in the end.

Gravity had its way with Jay Bruce in 2014 and 2015. That was the reality heading into the 2016 offseason. Gravity dragged him down from his lofty perch, a perch that came with weighty expectations.

I still remember Jay Bruce first announcing his arrival in professional baseball with a rifle shot. It was in the 2007 MLB Futures Game in San Francisco and Bruce ripped a bullet off the brick wall in right field in Pac Bell Park. I can still hear the explosive sound of it coming off the bat. It was a sound that only a lightning quick bat making perfectly timed contact with a speeding sphere of horsehide can make.

Since that time, Bruce's career ascended, including some big moments and a three All Star games. But, the reality was very different prior to the 2016 season.

I was of the mind that the Reds should basically dump Jay this past offseason. He was unlikely to hit enough to raise his trade value beyond the corresponding drop that would result from a half season reduction in team control. Dump him and turn the page. The Red didn't. The Reds waited. The Reds were probably right.

The Trade

On August 1, 2016, the Reds traded Bruce to the New York Mets for Dilson Herrera and Max Wotell. There's no way to know what they could have gotten for Bruce if they dealt him prior to the 2016 season. It might have been less, it definitely wouldn't have been more.

Dilson Herrera is the key piece of the trade. He's only 22 days, 5 months, and 24 days old, but somehow it seems like he's been around for a while. Herrera isn't big in stature (5-10, 205 lbs) or long on explosive tools, but his production is that of a bigger, louder player. It always seems to outpace his tools.

The Mets did Herrrera's development, trade value, and reputation no favors by rushing him to the majors in 2014 as an injury replacement for Daniel Murphy. Since then, Herrera has been somewhat lost in the shuffle, but that might have reduced his trade value enough to make him available to the Reds. Silver lining!

Herrera is an interesting hitter. He doesn't have great size and he uses a very quiet lower half at the plate, but he still manages to generate solid power. He's not a punch-and-judy hitter. Let's take a look at exhibit A, courtesy of MLB.com on YouTube:






The modern trend in hitting is to embrace the idea of hitting as a movement pattern. Similar to the focus on the kinetic chain in pitching, hitters should sequence specific movements to generate and effectively sum the force they generate.

Herrera has a quiet lower half and his movements are smaller, but he still generates good force with a short, quick, simple swing. He does a nice job of loading up in his swing and syncing his arms with the rotational power of the hips. The real key to his hitting is in his ability to make consistent, hard contact. He has a good feel for hitting, driven by strong pitch recognition and hand-eye coordination, which allows him to consistently get the barrel of the bat on the ball.

Herrera isn't a burner or absurdly athletic, but it feels like there's some real explosiveness to his swing. Here's a look at Herrera legging out an inside the park home run, courtesy of MLB.com on YouTube:





The Reds are short of good, professional hitters and their rebuild did little to rectify that issue, but the last trade of their rebuild might have netted the best hitter of the bunch. Herrera should be spraying line drives to all fields of Great American Ballpark for the foreseeable future. Unfortunately, he doesn't fit the profile of a disciplined hitter, but his hit tool is strong. Overall, I'm excited about Dilson Herrera as a hitter and he's a nice return for Jay Bruce.

In a perfect world, Herrera and Jose Peraza will both reach their max projections and hold down the middle infield spots for years to come. Time will tell.


As for the other player in the trade, Max Wotell was drafted in the 3rd round of the 2015 draft out of Marvin Ridge High School in North Carolina.

He has some real funk to his mechanics. Intentionally or otherwise, deception might be his game.

He has one of the stranger wind-ups you'll see. He starts with his left foot in the middle of the rubber, but, to take his rocker step, he re-positions his foot on the rubber by moving it all the way to the third base side. It's a bizarre look and a large backward step towards third base with his plant foot.*

(*I'd have to wonder if his style is even legal, as he doesn't maintain consistent contact with the rubber, but pitchers get away with murder so we'll just move on.)

In massively re-positioning his back foot on the rubber, Wotell essentially closes himself off, all but ensuring a cross-fire delivery. So, it's not surprising that his stride foot lands closer to the first base side or that he falls off to the third base side on his follow-through. Unfortunately, while he closes himself off, I don't see a lot of coil or much differential between the lower and upper halves in his delivery. But, a video clip is worth ten thousand words, so here's a look at Wotell in action, courtesy of SkillshowVideos on YouTube:







A cross-fire delivery can add deception, but it can also reduce efficiency. If you consider motor sports, when a driver heads towards a curve he is trying to find the fastest way through it. Typically, the fast way through a curve is to take the straightest line. You try to "straighten out the curve." That is, you want to apply force in a straight line. The more you have to turn the steering wheel, the greater the loss of effective force. When you turn, the weight/balance of the car tips towards the front outside tire, where the stress, friction, and load are increased, resulting in less speed and less efficiency.

It's largely the same with pitching. You want to apply force in a straight line. The most efficient path for delivering the pitch is a straight line. If you are using a cross-fire delivery, then your momentum is not on a direct line to the plate. Rather you are working around or against your body, which creates inefficiency and results in a loss of force that would otherwise be applied to the ball. In addition, you are likely increasing the stress on your arm, which can increase your injury risk.

On the plus side, cross-fire deliveries can increase deception. If you want to see what it's like to hit against Wotell, then here's a look from the batter's point of view, courtesy of FanGraphs on YouTube, Good luck!:





That doesn't look like a comfortable At Bat for the hitter. Wotell is moving around on the rubber, working with a quick tempo, high effort delivery, and hides the ball pretty well. So, while his injury risk might be higher (minimal differential/lack of body coil, cross-fire delivery, high effort), he at least gains points in the deception department, which might help his performance level.

It's too early in his career to know much about his repertoire. He features a fastball, slider, and change-up combo. The fastball sits 89-91 and has touched 93. The hope is that 93 will become more of the norm when he fills out physically. He gets good marks for his slider and the change is a work in progress.

In short, Wotell seems like a lottery ticket. A very young, raw pitcher with some upside and a lot of risk. But, if you buy enough lottery tickets, one might pay off.

Final Thoughts

In my view, the Jay Bruce trade represents the end of the rebuild, as he was the final available trade piece. They simply don't have any expensive, aging veterans who no longer fit in with the organization's new position on the win-curve left to trade. From here on out, it's not a rebuild, but rather just a "build."

If the Bruce trade is the final move in the rebuild, it was a strong final move to what might otherwise have been a lackluster rebuild. Dilson Herrera can really hit. Wotell is a high risk, solid upside second piece that diversifies the risk and increases the number of avenues by which the Reds can "win" this trade. Given where Jay Bruce's value was prior to the season, that's a pretty nice return for the Reds.

The Future is Now!

On the eve of the Winter Meetings, it's clear that the Reds are about to blow up. Their phones, their 25-man roster, their future, it's all blowing up. There's going to be upheaval and things won't ever be the same. To say that the next few weeks are important is like saying Joey Votto's pants are just a bit snug. That is to say, understatement at its finest.

How the Reds proceed over the next few days and weeks will determine their future. It'll determine how successful the rebuild is and how long it takes. Baseball operations are a decision-making business and some key decisions are on rolling in over the horizon.

Given that the Reds are on the verge of overhauling their roster, it's important that they understand how their home ballpark impacts their players and overall performance.

Way back when the BoSox won their first World Series in the Theo Era, the writers of Baseball Prospectus came out with a book about it called Mind Game. One of the early points they made about Theo's construction of the roster was that they first had to understand the park effects of Fenway. They argued that previous regimes failed to understand the park, as a result they were always overvaluing hitting and undervaluing their pitching. So, when they should have been bolstering their hitting, they were instead adding pitching. The front office's misunderstanding of the way the park played created flawed roster construction.

The BoSox, before building the roster, had to understand the park and how it impacted production and performance level. If you don't understand how the park impacts performance, then you simply can't properly value your players.

I feel like the Reds are now in the same situation. Before the Reds begin the rebuild, they need to understand what they have and what plays well in their home park. We all know that GABP is a hitter friendly park. In fact, everyone knows. All that said, I still don't think we *fully* appreciate what the park does to our hitters. Basically, it makes our mediocre hitters look good. Put another way, our good hitters aren't actually that good (well, except for one!).

Here's a look at the park effects for 2012-2014:

GABP	AVG	Runs	Hits	Doubles	Triples	Home Runs	Walks	Strikeouts
Total	99	102	99	94	104	140	104	110
RHB	101					133
LHB	96					152

Just as a refresher, 100 is neutral. So, given that the index for Home Runs is 140, it is 40% easier to hit a home run in GABP than league average. Given an index of 94 for doubles, it's 6% harder to double in GABP than in the league average park.

That's all well and good, but how does it impact our hitters?

Below are the career splits for all of our main contributors, except for Eugenio Suarez, whose splits below are solely for the 2015 season:

 

		BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Jay Bruce	Home	.255	.330	.499	.829
	Away	.240	.308	.427	.735
Brandon Phillips	Home	.274	.323	.441	.764
	Away	.272	.317	.403	.720
Todd Frazier	Home	.270	.333	.501	.834
	Away	.244	.309	.426	.735
Devin Mesoraco	Home	.241	.317	.455	.772
	Away	.243	.309	.394	.703
Billy Hamilton	Home	.228	.287	.319	.606
	Away	.255	.288	.340	.628
Zach Cozart	Home	.246	.285	.381	.666
	Away	.243	.284	.369	.653
Joey Votto	Home	.301	.420	.532	.952
	Away	.320	.427	.536	.963
Eugenio Suarez	Home	.301	.333	.452	.785
	Away	.258	.296	.441	.737

To me, it's fairly shocking how mediocre our hitters actually are. You usually don't see this type of extreme home/road split outside of the Rockies organization. However, the troubling part is that the Reds don't play in Coors Field. Coors is plagued by atmospheric issues, not ballpark dimension issues. They are constantly adjusting from sea-level spin rates and breaking pitches to high-altitude spin rates and breaking pitches and back again. As a result, the "true" performance level of the Rockies hitters falls somewhere between their home and road splits. The splits of the Reds, however, are driven by ballpark dimensions, rather than atmospheric issues. That's troubling because the true performance level of our hitters is the road split.

If you want to know why I've always thought Todd Frazier should be dealt, you're looking at it. He's a GABP creation in the mold of Rich Aurilia and Joe Randa. He's too old, on the verge of getting expensive, and his production is massively inflated by Great American Ballpark.

I really don't know what happened to Jay Bruce, but he desperately needs to be dealt. He needs a change of scenery and it's very difficult to look at his game and see any projection remaining. He seems very much what he is and it's not good enough for what we are or where we're going.

It's probably too early to draw conclusions about Mesoraco or Hamilton, but there are some troubling signs about the former.   

All that said, seriously, how good is Joey Votto?????

If I'm the Reds heading into the Winter Meetings, I'm focused on adding disciplined hitters. Not only is OBP one of the basic statistics most closely correlated to scoring runs, but it's undoubtedly one that plays about as well on the road as it does at home. It would make the offense more consistent and the Reds a tougher team to play on the road. I want players with plus-pitch recognition and something resembling plus-hit tools. I want hitters who fit the same offensive profile as Joey Votto and Jesse Winker. 

As I've written before, Max Kepler is at the top of my list. I'd build my offseason around his acquisition. If you add Kepler to Winker and Votto, then you have a potential core of incredibly disciplined hitters who control the strike zone, grind ABs, and avoid giving away ABs. That's what the team will need to compete with Cubs and Cards and Bucs in the future.   

All that said, here are some names on my offseason wish list for the Reds:

1. Max Kepler - I would center my rebuild around Max Kepler. Kepler, Winker, and Votto is one helluva core of professional hitters. With the announcement that Sano is joining Buxton in the outfield and the signing of the Korean DH, Kepler might be a surplus asset for the Twins.
2. Kevin Gausman - The Orioles are purportedly looking for a lefthanded hitting outfielder. I still think there is some type of deal that could be built around Jay Bruce here.
3. Mac Williamson - This is the outfielder the Reds should have acquired from the Giants in the Mike Leake deal. He's a right handed hitter with a strong walk rate and good athleticism. He could be an ideal fit in leftfield/rightfield for us.
4. Forrest Wall - Second baseman with a pure hit tool and good speed.
5. Brendon Sanger - A second tier prospect that piques my interest for his hit tool and plus pitch recognition, maybe we could get him and a touch more from the Angels for Brandon Phillips or something.

Now that I've gotten my thoughts out, let's see what the Reds do. It seems like Aroldis Chapman to the Dodgers is on the verge of happening. 

Wandering "The Middle Path" with Mat Latos

After several years of wandering The Middle Path (never going all in to "WIN NOW!" and never tearing things down to reset for the future), the Reds seem poised to continue that journey this offseason. Word leaked out at the winter meetings that the Reds had to slash payroll ($15-17M), giving hope to the fans that the Reds might be forced to actually pick a path. Despite the need to shed payroll, the Reds are still trying to navigate the middle path, winning now and in the future.

Whether the Reds can now undergo a rebuild while continuing to compete, a trick more commonly undertaken in more forgiving sports (like the Detroit Red Wings in the NHL) or sports where one franchise player can have a disproportionate impact on the outcome of games (like Tom Brady and New England Patriots in the NFL), remains to be seen. It's a much, much tougher trick to pull in MLB. Whether the Reds can do it depends on the execution of these trades. They must outright win these trades in an era when it's increasingly difficult to do so, because much of the inefficiency has been hammered out of the baseball marketplace.


TRADE

Reds receive:

Anthony DeSclafani -- RHP
Chad Wallach -- catcher

Marlins receive:

Mat Latos -- RHP


ANALYSIS

The underlying theory of this trade is sound, so it comes down to the execution.

The Reds give up one expensive year of control of a 3-4 win righthanded starting pitcher and a possible compensatory draft pick in exchange for 12+ years of potential combined control over a righthanded pitching prospect and a catching prospect with MLB bloodlines and an above average approach at the plate.

There has been a surprising amount of talk about the decline in velocity on Latos' fastball in 2014, but all of Mat's injury problems last year makes it difficult for me to draw the types of conclusions that are being drawn. Is it unreasonable to think that a return to health will see a return of his velocity?

The answer to that question may well determine whether the Reds sold high or low on Latos in this trade.

In the end, Mat Latos' Cincinnati career has come full circle. A controversial trade brought him into the organization, a controversial trade takes him out of the organization. And, in both scenarios, the underlying theory is sound, it just comes down to execution.

So, how DID the Reds do this time? I'm afraid not quite as well as they did the first time.


"DISCO"

The key piece to the deal was Anthony DeSclafani. Right out of the chute, DeSclafani takes the title for worst name on the 40-man roster. A brutal blend of consonants and dissonance. Others in his life must have struggled with it, because someone bestowed upon him the nickname of "Disco."

When the trade went down, I went back and watched all five of Disco's starts for the Marlins in 2014. I watched those starts cold, without any prior research, because I wanted a clean first impression.

Disco's first start was both his MLB debut and his best effort. He faced the Dodgers on May 14 and tossed 6.0 innings of 2 run ball, allowing 7 hits and posting a 7/1 K/BB ratio. His debut was noteworthy for two reasons: (1) it included his best velocity as a starting pitcher, and (2) with the exception of a single changeup, he relied on only two pitches (fastball/slider).

I don't know if his veins were coursing with adrenaline as a result of making his Major League debut, but his fastball was popping the mitt, averaging 94.4 mph. That level of velocity, when coupled with an above-average slider, was enough to confound the Dodgers. The one changeup that he threw was not a good one, getting hammered by Yasiel Puig for a double. Not only was the outcome bad, but the arm action he used on the changeup looked materially different than the one he used on his fastball and slider. So, the deception was poor, which isn't a good sign going forward.

After his debut start, the results were decidedly poor and the fastball velocity a notch slower, sitting more 91/92/93 than 93/94/95. He gave up, respectively, 5, 4, 7, and finally 2 runs in an abbreviated 3.0 inning start that he had to depart after getting plunked by a comebacker. After those five starts, he returned later in the year to work out of the bullpen. So, what can we glean from those starts?

Well, first and foremost, his fastball is vastly more interesting and effective when it sits 93/94/95 than when it sits 91/92/93. Unfortunately, the latter is more common than the former.

As for pitching mechanics, Disco's are good without any obvious red flags. His balance and tempo remain strong throughout. His leg kick comes up well past parallel at the apex and he stays over the rubber to effectively gather himself before driving to the plate.

The defining characteristic of his mechanics is his stride. After he unpacks his leg from the apex and strides forward, he actually straightens out his front leg, leaving him in an unusual position.

Courtesy: Lynn Sladky/AP Photo

Courtesy: J Pat Carter/AP Photo

Courtesy: Jayne Kamin-Oncea/USA Today Sports

While the stiff stride leg looks unusual, it serves to effectively lengthen his stride, which can increase the force generated by the kinetic chain and allow for easier and more complete clearing of the hips to transfer that force to the baseball. For Disco, straightening the front leg seems to serve the same purpose, maximizing the stride length, as Tim Lincecum's "step over the banana peel" move at the very end of his stride.

In the photos above, his back leg is flexed, while his stride leg is straight. As he continues to drive to the plate, it reverses, as his back leg straightens, while the front leg flexes. In the photos below, you can see this happen, giving him a longer stride and the appearance of almost jumping off the mound toward the plate.

Courtesy: Rob Foldy, Getty Images

Courtesy: Steve Mitchell/USA Today Sports

Courtesy: Stephen Dunn/Getty Images

I'm a big proponent of a lengthy stride, as it has real kinetic chain benefits. However, one of the things I like most about the longer stride is that it allows for a greater differential in hip rotation and shoulder rotation. A delayed shoulder rotation allows the pitcher to more effectively throw with his entire body, reducing stress on the pitching arm. Disco has a solid differential (photo below), even if it isn't quite all it could be. As a result, his kinetic chain is effective, but isn't quite as efficient as it might be, potentially reducing the generation of force and/or increasing the effort required to generate that force.

Overall, Disco's mechanics are strong, but for a pitcher whose stuff is straddling the line between starter and reliever, any added or lost force might make a substantial difference in career path.

As for his arm action, he throws from a high three-quarter arm slot, maintains good position relative to his shoulder, uses good pronation, and has a solid deceleration phase. All of which should work to minimize his injury risk.

Here's a look at him in action, courtesy of MLBProspectPortal on YouTube:








I like Disco from a pitching mechanics point of view. His fastball, at least when it averages 94.1 mph, is a legitimate weapon and his slider can be a plus-pitch, but his changeup remains a real work in progress.

Given his inconsistent velocity and weak changeup, it's difficult to see how Disco can find consistent success in the starting rotation. And, it's difficult to see how the Reds can win this trade if he's relegated to the bullpen.

The real problem is that while Disco's fastball and slider combo might be enough for him to consistently handle righthanded hitters, it's much harder to see how he can effectively neutralize lefties. His slider is a good pitch, but he doesn't throw it with enough power to utilize it as a back-foot slider to lefties. The slider averages 81.7 mph, which makes it difficult to generate enough depth and movement to break it down-and-in under the swings of lefties. During his starts, I saw him back-foot only one slider, an 83-mph pitch that struck Anthony Rizzo out swinging. But, by and large, it's a pitch that's likely to be more effective against righties, leaving him without an out-pitch to lefties.

The numbers bear this out, as Disco posted the following splits in 2014 (obviously, small sample size caveats apply):


vs R: .273/.301/.409/.710
vs L: .333/.362/.530/.893


The performance against righties certainly isn't great, but the performance against lefties is truly ugly. In light of his limited repertoire and struggles against lefties, a move to the bullpen might be inevitable unless he can either significantly improve his changeup or increase his fastball velocity, neither of which is all that likely.

I like Disco's mechanics, but unless he has more and better stuff in his arsenal, it's difficult to see him emerging as an impact pitcher.


CHAD WALLACH

The best thing about Wallach is that the Reds seem to have prioritized acquiring more disciplined hitters. The organization has been short on on-base percentage and hitters who control the strike zone for far too long. At least they seem to have identified the problem.

Wallach isn't a highly regarded prospect, but he fits the Ryan Hanigan/Tucker Barnhart offensive profile. He's not on their level defensively, but he controls the zone well enough and has a solid enough hit tool to have some offensive upside. Of course, as with Hanigan and Barnhart, the margin for error is slim and his ceiling isn't very high, but he's an interesting bat.

Here's a look at Wallach's swing, courtesy of Big League Futures on Youtube:






And, here's a brief look at his defense, courtesy of Tucker Blair on YouTube:







Wallach isn't a bad second piece in the deal and if things break right he could generate some positive value. Still, his ceiling isn't very high and he has a fairly long development road to travel to get there.



FINAL THOUGHTS

Overall, the trade is right in principle, but questionable in execution. On one level, it's impressive that Walt was able to deal Latos after his injury plagued season and offseason, but on another level the return for his services feels light.

Ultimately, the deal hinges on DeSclafani and his ability to effectively hold down a rotation spot in Cincinnati. However, his velocity as a starting pitcher seems inconsistent at best and insufficient at worst, while his changeup really needs to develop to help him neutralize lefties. Given the cost to obtain him, DeSclafani will undoubtedly get ample opportunity to prove he can be an effective starting pitcher.

In the end, it's surprising that the return for Lato wasn't higher and the trade to bring Latos into the organization seems better than the one that took him out of it.

Trade Thoughts: Hanigan and Holmberg

The writing has been on the wall for a couple of weeks. When the Reds signed Brayan Pena to a major league deal, it was clear that change was coming behind the dish. It arrived on Tuesday when the Reds dealt Ryan Hanigan to the Rays in a three team deal.

The long and short of the deal is Hanigan, Heath Bell, and cash to the Rays; lhp David Holmberg to the Reds; rhp Justin Choate and a player to be named later to the Diamondbacks.

In essence, the D-Backs get salary relief, the Rays get a defensive minded catcher to pair with Jose Molina, and the Reds get starting pitching depth at the upper levels of the system. On the surface and in a vacuum, the deal seems like a good one all the way around. However, digging a little deeper and adding a touch of context makes me wonder if the Reds did as well as they might think; whether they really know the value of what they gave up.

If you know anything about Moneyball, then you know that (1) Billy Beane didn't actually write it; (2) it's not actually about on-base percentage, but rather market inefficiencies; and (3) statistical analysis is just a tool, a means of collecting better information than the competition so that you can better identify those market inefficiencies.

Obviously, this all started with the Oakland A's, but it's quickly spread around the league and the Tampa Bay Rays are now one of the torchbearers of this movement. The combination of small payroll and large success is a clear indication that the Rays are exceptionally well run.

In light of that, it's more than a little disconcerting when an exceptionally well run organization is not only interested in the asset you are trying to dump, but immediately hands out a 3-year commitment to that player.

Do the Rays know something we don't? If so, what?

The question that Reds nation slapped on Ryan Hanigan last year was whether his bat would bounce back or whether diminished offensive performance was his new reality. There was a lot of concern and hand-wringing over that very question.

What's curious is that the Rays don't seem to care one single whit about his offense. If you were concerned about a player bouncing back after a down year, then you wouldn't immediately hand him a multi-year deal. Instead, you'd wait until the next data point established a trend line.

If the Rays are confident enough in Hanigan to give him that guaranteed money, then it seems reasonable to infer that they find a substantial amount of value in Hanigan's defense. So much so that it makes his offensive contributions largely irrelevant.

So, why do the Rays value Hanigan's defense so much more than the Reds? I suspect the Rays have developed a proprietary metric for valuing pitch-framing and that Ryan Hanigan grades out very highly. That would be the type of information edge that enables the Rays to exploit a market inefficiency that the Reds don't see.

Pitch framing is still an a developing area, one where the proprietary information of MLB organizations outpaces the information available in the public domain. However, early studies indicate that pitch framing can have massive impact on run prevention. You can read about pitch framing here, here, here, and here.

Here's a summary blurb from one of those articles about the impact of pitch framing:

Despite using different methods, we all came to the conclusion that catchers who can (and cannot) frame pitches have a huge impact on the game: Dan estimated that the top catchers can contribute as much as .7 runs per 150 pitches (roughly a game), Bill calculated approximately six wins per 120 games, and both Mike and I quantified the effect at around 20 runs per 120 games.

These early studies are finding that pitch framing can add/subtract several wins to a team's record over the course of a season. That's a stunning finding with jaw dropping results, but one that makes intuitive sense. Impact is frequently a function of opportunity. Opportunity was a large part of my write-up on the RBI issue in a previous post. It's the same for pitch framing. A catcher handles somewhere in the neighborhood of 120-150 pitches per game. Every single pitch is an opportunity for the catcher to steal, or give back, a strike. Stealing a strike can flip the "count probability" in a pitcher's favor or even directly result in an out. If impact is a function of opportunity, then catchers have more opportunity to impact the game than any position on the field due to pitch framing.

If you look at those studies, then two of the names you consistently see at the top of the list are "Jose Molina" and "Ryan Hanigan". More accurately, Jose seems to be otherworldly, while Hanigan is merely very good. The Rays clearly appreciate Jose Molina and it's certainly not for his bat. It's not underasonable to infer that they value Hanigan for the same reasons as Molina. This seems like an under-the-radar move that may have substantial impact on the Rays in 2014. Even if Hanigan's offense doesn't rebound to previous levels, the Rays may have just added 2+ wins to their 2014 record in defensive value alone.

I must admit, I've never really understood why the Reds felt such a pressing need to deal Ryan Hanigan unless they really felt they needed to save a couple of million. I suppose I would feel better about dealing Hanigan, and giving away his defensive contributions, if Devin Mesoraco had shown more with the bat in 2013. As it stands, Hanigan's defensive contribution may be more valuable than Mesoraco's offensive contribution. It'll be very interesting to see if the Reds pitching staff as a whole takes a step backwards in 2014 without Ryan Hanigan. The Rays may have added 2+ wins in defensive value, but will the Reds lose 2+ wins in defensive value?

There is certainly still hope that Mesoraco can be the type of hitter we thought he might be, but I just can't buy into the idea that he has failed because of a lack of consistent playing time. He has 589 MLB plate appearances under his belt, which is more than enough for him to have shown what he can do. At some point, a player creates his own playing time. Mesoraco failed to do so. 

I still have hope that Mesoraco is just a tick behind where we would expect him to be because of a cold weather amateur career and pre-pro ball Tommy John surgery, both of which cost him needed development time. Also, he was slow to figure things out in the minors, so it's possible that he just takes longer to make needed adjustments. Mesoraco will get his chance in 2014 without the Ryan Hanigan safety net. The Reds need him to step forward offensively because right out of the gate it's a clear defensive downgrade.   

As for David Holmberg, I like him. He was actually a player I picked in my 2009 shadow draft. His calling card is his plus change-up, which I always like to see in a young pitcher. He's a good pickup for the Reds and a much needed one in light of the lack of upper level starting pitching depth in the system. The Reds just can't expect good health in the rotation and Holmberg is a better option for MLB starts than Greg Reynolds. So, Holmberg should be an upgrade on the spot starts the team received in 2013.

Whether this trade works out for the Reds depends largely on the progress of Devin Mesoraco. I like David Holmberg, but I wonder if the Reds undervalued what Ryan Hanigan brings to the table. I suspect the Rays have developed a more accurate valuation on Hanigan than the Reds, which probably makes this trade a winner for the Rays and one that will show up in the standings in non-obvious ways. When sitting around next season trying to figure out why the Rays are always so strong, think back to this deal and how the organization extracts value from unexpected places.

As for the Reds, they addressed a need (SP depth), saved some pocket change, and cleared the way for a homegrown talent to emerge. It's a deal that makes sense on a number of levels, but I can't help but think that they didn't fully appreciate the value that Ryan Hanigan created.

Ninja Stealth Detrimental to the Reds?

Despite what one may think of Wayne Krivksy's player personnel moves, it's difficult not to marvel at the secrecy that shrouds all of his acquisitions.

In a world that is shrinking every day due to improved technology, where information about most topics is available at the click of a mouse, Krivsky still manages to operate with ninja stealth.

Amazingly enough, Krivsky manages to make all of his big trades without the press ever catching wind of it. He must have worked extensively as a plumber, as the Reds front office never has any leaks. The ease with which the Reds withhold information from the media makes you wonder how much information is intentionally leaked to the media by other organizations. Regardless, one has to question whether or not the media blackout is advantageous to the Reds.

It's possible to infer two things from the lack of advanced notice of Reds' trades: 1) Krivsky maintains a small inner circle in his decision making process, which may not allow for the most effective use of the Reds front office personnel, and 2) Krivsky's insistence on silence may be preventing him from accurately gauging the trade market.

1) KRIVSKY'S INNER CIRCLE

The resignation of Johnny Almaraz last season is additional evidence of first inference. Almaraz left in part because he didn't feel part of the inner circle. He wasn't being included in the player personnel discussions and decisions. In fact, Almaraz said this following his resignation: "I'm not included in any of the discussions and, in fact, when I walked into the suite during the Winter Meetings, Wayne and his people would lower their voices to a whisper or take their discussions into the bedroom."

In reading John Schuerholz's book, Built to Win, one of the things he stresses is the importance of utilizing all the strengths of the organization. Schuerholz likens himself to the conductor of an orchestra, who simply works to bring out the best of the entire organization, relying on the individuals strengths of each member when appropriate.

In fact, Schuerholz mentions sending out messages to his entire scouting staff when he is interested in acquiring a player. Any of his scouts with information on the player then responds and provides his $.02. Schuerholz then utilizes this information in making the ultimate decision. Knowledge is power in all instances of decision making and it holds true in player personnel decisions.

It's difficult to know whether Krivsky works in a similar fashion, but it's hard to imagine that he does. Given what Almaraz said and the fact that there is likely to be more information in the media if Krivsky was relying on his entire scouting staff. The more people in on a discussion, the more likely there will be a leak. However, word of trades leaking out might not be such a bad thing.

2) THE MEDIA AND PLAYER VALUATION

As for second inference, it might actually be helpful for Krivsky if the rumors about the prospective deal were circulated. If word leaked out that the Reds were on the verge of a deal, then maybe the media reaction, fan response, or follow-up communication from other GMs would help the Reds determine if they were on the verge of making a solid trade. In addition, letting word leak out might bring better offers to the table, the result of which would be more value in the deal for the Reds.

The Twins have been using the media to play the Yankees and Red Sox off against each other in the Johan Santana trade talks. In so doing, the Twins have managed to get each team to up its offer. While they haven't yet received a deal to their liking, they have managed to get better offers than they would have received. The Reds would be unable to utilize this type of value maximizing strategy, as they are dead set on confidentiality in their dealings.

Krivsky thrives on bringing in undervalued talent, like Hamilton, Phillips, and Cantu. In that type of deal, there is little need to get an accurate read on the market, so his stealthy style is not a detriment. However, it is difficult to deny that Krivsky struggles to get maximum value for the established Reds players. It happened in the Kearns trade and I would suggest that it has happened again with the Hamilton deal.

In the final analysis, Krivsky needs to both widen his decision making circle to better utilize the resources of the organization and use the media to better gauge the market and flush out additional trade offers. It's imperative for the mid-market Reds to maximize the value of their assets and making these two changes is a step that may make it possible.

The End of the Hamilton Era

Well, Krivsky has done it again. He has managed to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. Personally, I'm very high on Josh Hamilton and his future in Major League Baseball, but regardless it's difficult to justify this trade for the Cincinnati Reds.

ORGANIZATIONAL DIRECTION

To me, there are only two rationales for trading Josh Hamilton.

1) The Reds want to make a big push for the pennant in 2008, so they trade away Hamilton to get an impact starting pitcher who could make the difference in 2008.

or

2) The Reds were very concerned about Hamilton's injury and relapse risk, so they trade him away to reduce their risk for the future.

Unfortunately, the deal doesn't seem to fall under either category.

If the Reds were relying on the first rationale, then you would expect the return on a Hamilton trade to include Erik Bedard or Dan Haren. Unless Edinson Volquez can step in and perform like Francisco Liriano did as a rookie, which is more than a little improbable, then he's unlikely to help much at all in 2008.

In addition, it's difficult to justify the trade by using the second rationale. If the Reds were afraid of Hamilton's risk of relapse or his ability to stay healthy, then it would be expected that the return on the trade would include an established player or a less risky prospect. However, that doesn't seem to be the case either.

Josh Hamilton certainly does come with some risk, but that risk does not include performance risk. His performance in 2007 removed all doubt about his ability to be an impact player at the big league level. So, his risk is only one of injury and relapse.

Edinson Volquez has never proved that he can perform at the big league level, despite several stints in the majors. He currently possesses a career ERA of 7.20 in 80.0 big league innings over three seasons. It's clear that there is definite performance risk with Volquez. In addition, as a pitching prospect, he brings inherent risk of injury.

Given that the risk of Volquez is both injury and performance, it's difficult to argue that the Reds have reduced their risk by trading away Hamilton. So, if the Reds didn't make the deal to improve their chances for the short run and didn't reduce the injury risk for that spot on the roster, then why was the deal made???

The only other consideration that comes to mind is that Jay Bruce is currently blocked by Ken Griffey Jr. However, it hardly seems logical to compound this problem by dealing away a player as sublimely talented as Hamilton, especially when both Griffey and Dunn are free agents after the season. There would have been room for both Hamilton and Bruce in the 2009 outfield and for years to come.

This deal is hard to take from both a baseball perspective and a fan perspective.

BASEBALL PERSPECTIVE

It's mind boggling that the Reds were willing to give up on Josh Hamilton, especially for a return that included Edinson Volquez and Daniel Herrera. Given his overall skill-set, an MVP or two could conceivably be in Hamilton's future, so this return seems like selling low.

Josh Hamilton

In 2007, Hamilton posted a line of .292/.368/.554/.922 with 19 homeruns and a 65/33 K/BB ratio in 337 plate appearances. That's remarkable performance from a rookie, especially one was has played little over the past 5 seasons and is engaged in a never ending battle with addiction. Hamilton performed at this level, despite logging only 261 professional ABs between 2002 and 2006.

His performance becomes even more impressive when you look at some of his sabermetric stats. He posted a secondary average of .372, a GPA of .287, and a Line Drive % of 21.7, all of which are very impressive for any player and especially so for a rookie with Hamilton's background. In addition, Hamilton fared very well under Bill James' Win Shares system.

In 2007, Hamilton (13) was 6th on the Reds in Win Shares, which was behind Dunn (21), Phillips (18), Harang (17), Encarnacion (17), and Griffey Jr. (16).

However, Win Shares is not prorated for playing time. Accordingly, the more you play, the more opportunity you have to accumulate Win Shares. The Hardball Times has created a stat that prorates Win Shares for playing time, which they call Win Share Percent (WSP). Here's the definition of WSP:

Win Shares Percent, a Win Shares "rate stat" -- a measure of the player's contribution, given his playing time. The math is WS/(2*ExpWS). Expected Win Shares are the number of Win Shares an average player contributed, given that particular player's time at bat, on the mound or in the field.

WSP provides a glimpse of Hamilton's true level of performance. In 2007, Hamilton had a .696 WSP, which ranked him first among all Reds position players who had at least 100 Plate Appearances. He led Keppinger (.640), Dunn (.619), Encarnacion (.562), Hatteberg (.492), Phillips (.480), Griffey Jr. (.480), Norris Hopper (.441), and Alex Gonzalez (.439).

Of course, injuries are of concern, but given the circumstances under which he played in 2007, it's not beyond the realm of possibilities that another year away from drug addiction and another offseason to prepare his body for the grind of Major League baseball will result in improved health. Regardless, one season is far too small of a sample size to definitively label a player "injury prone." It's difficult to justify giving up a player with Hamilton's upside after one season in which he was injured.

When he played, Hamilton played at the highest level of any position player on the Reds and it's not a trend that is likely to change. Baseball guru Bill James projected Hamilton to post a 2008 line of .305/.382/.598/.979 with 31 homers for the Reds. As mentioned above, that comes with the same fear of injury, which is why James projected Hamilton to play only 115 games. Of course, that's a season's worth of production in only 115 games and if he stays healthy, then he could have an MVP caliber season.

Edinson Volquez

Edinson Volquez was part of the overhyped "DVD" trio of Ranger pitching prospects. Volquez joined John Danks and Thomas Diamond as the cream of the Ranger farm system. Unfortunately for the Rangers, none of the three lived up to his reputation.

Danks was traded to the White Sox in the Brandon McCarthy trade, Diamond underwent Tommy John surgery and missed all of 2007, and now Volquez has been dealt away.

Volquez features a plus fastball that sits in the mid-90s and a plus change-up in the mid-70s. Unfortunately, he has never had a consistent breaking ball. He has always been lauded for his makeup and work ethic, but struggles at the MLB level have raised questions about his ability to make adjustments.

I've always liked pitchers who feature a top notch change-up, as it is truly a "pitcher's pitch." It's a pitch that requires good feel and understanding of how to pitch in order to use it effectively. If a pitcher features a good change-up, then you know he isn't just a thrower. So, Volquez is more than just a thrower, but he'll have to develop a breaking ball to be an effective starting pitcher in the majors.

It'll be interesting to see if he can find success at the MLB level, but he may ultimately prove to be an example of a plus fastball dominating minor league competition, but not being enough to over match the more advanced MLB hitters. Volquez's future will hinge on his ability to refine his curveball. If he can't, then he'll likely be headed to the bullpen in the future.

Danny Ray Herrera

Herrrera is one of the most unique, intriguing prospects in baseball. However, that may not be such a good thing. Herrera is a left-handed pitcher who is listed at 5"7' and 145 pounds, but even that is likely generous. He was drafted out of the University of New Mexico in the 45th round. He had tremendous success at New Mexico, despite working in one of most hitter friendly parks in college baseball.

However, Herrera features a fastball that sits in the 80-82 mph range and tops out at 84. He also features a changeup that he throws at 55-60 mph with screwball like action and a late breaking slider.

Herrera relies heavily on his change-up, which has good sink, enabling him to rack up groundballs at a healthy clip. Heavy groundball tendencies is an attribute that should serve him well in GABP.

Herrara had the best control in the Ranger system, but questions remain over whether his success was the result of a gimmick pitch which would be ineffective against MLB hitting. He seems oddly similar analogous to Carlos Guevara, the screwball pitcher that the Reds refused to ever give an opportunity at the MLB level, which makes his inclusion in the deal all the more puzzling.

Given the volatility of Volquez, I could see Herrara having the more successful career of the two pitchers. However, if that's the case, then this deal will be monumentally bad for the Reds, as Herrara's upside is limited and they need Volquez to be successful in order to justify dealing away Hamilton.

FAN PERSPECTIVE

Oddly enough, as inconceivable as I find this deal from an analytical point of view, I find the deal even more disturbing as a fan. Sadly, the Reds exhibited a complete lack of loyalty in making this deal. After years of watching baseball and long ago reaching that age where it's understood that baseball is a business, I really shouldn't have expected any loyalty. Still, the pure fan part of me is disappointed, as it seems like the Reds had a duty to stick with Hamilton.

The Reds plucked him out of relative obscurity, where he was chopping down trees for extra money. They brought him to the majors, gave him the support system he needed to succeed, and exposed him and his history to the white hot spotlight.

In spite of the long odds, Hamilton not only survived, he thrived. At that point, to me, he became inextricably linked to the Reds. He was a symbol of a possible resurgence in Cincinnati baseball. Hamilton not only resurrected his own life and career, but it seemed like the Reds might be able to revive their fortunes as well. If Hamilton could conquers his terrible demons, then the Reds could certainly conquer their own futility. In many respects, Hamilton had become the face of the organization.

The acquisition of Hamilton earned the Reds respect from media and fans across the nation. The organization was actually being lauded by everyone around baseball for an intelligent, unforeseen move. As odd as it sounds, it's been a long time since the Reds put one over on the competition and were accorded that level of respect. They stole Brandon Phillips, but Hamilton was different. The Reds pulled him out of nowhere. It was an inspired player personnel move and a great story, one that made the Reds the envy of baseball fans across the country.

However, almost before the ink is dry on the articles, the ride is over for the Reds. Hamilton moves on to Texas to write the next chapter of his amazing story and the Reds are left with another potential middle of the rotation starter and a relief pitcher who may not ever be given the opportunity to pitch in the majors.

Somehow, as fan, it's hard not to feel truly cheated by this deal, which somehow manages to wound the heart and bewilder the head at the same time.

So long, Josh, we hardly knew ya.