Dusty Baker: The Natural Man

The Wolfman; Universal Studios

Lawrence Talbot: "Villagers still have the same wild ideas."

Sir John Talbot: "Yes, well, very provincial lot, I must say. Ignorant, superstitious. to a worldly man such as yourself we are savages at the end of the Earth. All I'm saying is that you dismiss the natural man at your peril."  ---The Wolfman


Sabermetricians are a worldly lot. Dusty Baker is a natural man. The former dismiss the latter at their peril.

At the end of another disappointing season, the Reds handed Dusty Baker his walking papers. His dismissal has me reflecting on Dusty and the long, strange path I've traveled in my views of him over the course of his managerial career. Quite the reverse, I suspect, of most Reds fans, I traveled the road from disdain to grudging respect for Dusty. In some respects, he won me over.

Sabermetricians are a worldly lot with a world view formed by education, rational thought, and science. Dusty Baker is a natural man with a world view formed by personal experience, intuition, and tradition. Given these wildly differing perspectives, it's hardly surprising that these two groups are constantly at odds.

I've been dismissing Baker for years. In fact, prior to his hire, if you had asked me for a list of those candidates that I wouldn't want to manage the Reds, then Dusty quite literally would have been at the top of the list. My issues with Baker weren't new or novel. In fact, they were those cited most by his critics. First, he overworks his starting pitchers. Second, he favors underwhelming veterans to young talent. And, third, he doesn't value on-base percentage.

Dusty's first problem was largely eliminated by an industry-wide shift in what constitutes reasonable pitching workloads. He still skews towards the upper end of the reasonableness range, but his natural tendencies are now confined in ways that they previously were not. The industry has eliminated one of his biggest issues. So, now we're down to two problems.

As for the second problem, aside from the decision to give Ryan Hanigan the majority of the playing time over Devin Mesoraco (more on that later), Dusty has done a better job embracing youth. Maybe this was an issue made irrelevant by the Reds renewed emphasis on player development and the ways in which the roster was constructed, leaving Dusty little choice but to embrace youth. Or, maybe it was always an overstated issue, the result of his teams' rosters being littered with aging players. Whatever the reason, this issue never seemed to emerge in Cincinnati. Down to one problem.

The third problem, well, let's be honest, continues to be a problem. Dusty will never live down his "base clogging" comment. He values speed over on-base ability. His flirtations with Corey Patterson and Wily Taveras were difficult to stomach and even more difficult to justify. Dusty will never value on-base percentage the way he should.

Courtesy: AP

Whether it was of his own doing or a shifting workplace environment, Dusty evolved to the point that he eliminated two of my biggest problems with him. The on-base percentage issue will always be a large one, no denying it, but most of the criticism of Dusty these days is directed to his tactical decisions.

In many ways, that's fair criticism, as roster construction and in-game strategy are not one of Dusty's strengths. Not coincidentally, the tactical is the easiest aspect of the job for sabermetricians to evaluate. It's much more difficult to quantify the other areas of the manager job. And, there ARE other areas of the job.

For example, Theo Epstein recently stated that he was evaluating the Cubs' manager by "looking at the development of young players; in-game decision making; the way (the manager) used the roster; the manager's ability to create a culture of accountability; hard work and preparation; and the ability to develop solid, trusting relationship with the players."

Not surprisingly, it's far more difficult to quantify the impact of a manager in some of those areas. And yet, those areas still matter. Those areas still impact on-field performance. Those areas still drive team success. Unfortunately for Dusty, he excels in those areas that are difficult to evaluate/quantify and struggles in those areas that are more easily evaluated/quantified. His managerial mix is easy to criticize and difficult to defend.  

Or, put more succinctly by Theo Epstein: "In the information age, things that are precisely measured are rewarded disproportionally relative to impact."

Over his 20 year managerial career, Dusty Baker has a 1671-1504 win/loss record, good for a .526 winning percentage, spread over three different organizations. His career includes eight seasons of 90 or more wins. That's an impressive career and with each successful stop it becomes more difficult to discount Dusty's positive impact. Only the most strident Dusty-haters chalk that success up to luck and player personnel. Dusty deserves some real credit. At the same time, his postseason career has been far less successful.

The disparity between his regular season success and postseason struggles is not that surprising. Dusty is weak in tactical decision-making, which is far more likely to rear its head in a short postseason series where the impact of a single play can make all the difference. Dusty is strong in managing egos, developing solid, trusting relationships, and getting the most out of his players, which is far more likely to make an impact over the course of a 162-game season.

Dusty's strengths have brought him substantial regular season success. Dusty's weaknesses have resulted in underwhelming postseason results. The reasons for Dusty's postseason failures are easier to identify than the reasons for Dusty's regular season successes.

I'm a proponent of statistical analysis. I love the way it has illuminated the game, a shining light revealing new truths. However, as Theo mentioned above, statistical analysis has an inherent bias towards those areas that can be quantified. However, just because something can't be quantified, doesn't mean that it doesn't exist. It MAY mean that something doesn't exist or it MAY mean that we just haven't figured out how to quantify it yet. The absence of evidence is not the same as evidence of absence.

What sabermetricians are able to study, they typically study very well. It's difficult to argue with math, after all. However, the things that are not (or maybe are not yet) quantifiable occasionally prove to be blind spots for sabermetricians. After all, the value of a commodity is necessarily determined in relation to the value of everything else. If sabermetricians cannot effectively study a specific area, then they inevitably de-emphasize its importance merely by focusing on those areas that CAN be effectively studied.

If the worldly man cannot recognize what he does not know, then his opinions may be less valid than those of the natural man. In this context, statistical analysis may not be more accurate than simple intuition and personal experience. Dusty may have illustrated precisely this in his handling of the Hanigan/Mesoraco situation (I told you we'd circle back around to these guys).

Dusty took a fair amount of heat for continuing to give Hanigan the majority of the playing time in 2012 and 2013. People were in love with Mesoraco's upside, offensive potential, and prospect ranking, but Dusty seemed to place a greater emphasis on Ryan Hanigan's game calling and handling of the pitching staff.

This is arguably an instance where Dusty's personal experience, intuition, and adherence to tradition were more insightful than the education, rational thought, and science of sabermetricians. Dusty's intuition about the catcher situation, which may have more accurately valued the impact of catcher defense, was arguably more valid than the statistical analysis perspective, which has only recently begun to study pitch framing.

In other words, Dusty was probably right in his decision to start Hanigan over Mesoraco.

There's an ESPN Insider article about the value of pitch framing that's worth a read, but since it's Insider content I'll just post a snippet that's instructive regarding a weakness of sabermetrics:

"There's an old joke about economists that I'll reframe here to make a point: A sabermetician loses his keys while leaving a bar late at night. He crosses the street and starts looking for his keys under the streetlight. His friend asks him, "Why aren't you looking in front of the bar where you dropped them?" The sabermetician replies, "Because I can't see over there!"

Before Turkenkopf used pitch data to investigate catcher framing in 2008, sabermeticians generally valued catcher defense less than, for lack of a better term, baseball people did. The lesson for sabermetrics is that pitch framing existed and was important well before the pitch data that gave light to it became available. Value exists even in the areas we can't yet see."

The take-away from all of this? Statistical analysis is tremendously valuable, but it does have inherent weaknesses and limitations. As with most things, the most important thing to know is what you don't know. And, it's important not to discount those people with views based on personal experience, intuition, and tradition solely because their views are based on personal experience, intuition, and tradition. Sometimes those views turn out to be the most valid.

Dismiss the natural man at your own peril, especially one with 1671 career wins under his belt.

Bryan Price: Job #1 "Relief Ace"

For the very first act of his managerial career, Bryan Price should announce a role change for Aroldis Chapman.

I know, I know. I can already hear you shouting through the screen: "They have no inclination to take your brilliant and inspired suggestion to trade him and Aroldis continues to announce loud and proud to anyone who will listen that he won't start games, so how can Price change his role???"

Well, Bryan Price needs to come right out and say: "Aroldis is NOT going to be our Closer in 2014, he's going to be our Relief Ace." 

First and foremost, the team needs to let Aroldis know who calls the shots. These statements to the press by Aroldis about what he's willing and not willing to do give the appearance of the tail wagging the dog. Someone on the team, and here's where we could use some leadership in the clubhouse, should polite remind Aroldis that he'll play when and where the organization wants or he won't play at all; that while he can express these ideas to management behind closed doors, it's completely inappropriate to be making these statements to the press. But, I digress. 

Price is already on record as saying he wants to extract more value from Aroldis, so his thoughts are clearly running in this direction anyway, so why not go whole-hog and fundamentally change the way bullpens are managed? Why not be an "early adopter" and reap the benefits that go along with it? Formally announce the change in roles to ensure that people's expectations for Chapman change accordingly. Changing the usage pattern without formally changing the name of the role would reduce fan buy-in and increase resistance to the change. 

If we are managing our bullpen more effectively and efficiently than other organizations, then we are building a competitive advantage. And, given that this team is close to getting over the hump, the marginal value of a win is very high. So, every competitive advantage should be actively sought out and exploited. 

So, what's the difference between a "closer" and a "relief ace"? Namely, usage patterns. As we all know, closers are used when save situations arrive. The concept of the "closer" is so ingrained in the baseball woodwork that it's functionally impossible to change the usage pattern without changing the label. The problem becomes even more intractable when you factor in that reliever compensation is frequently tied to the concept of the "save", so there will be resistance from closers and agents, as well. Again, it's ingrained. So, to make this work, we need not only a clean break from the "closer" concept, but an entirely new label. Fortunately, some forward thinking sabermetricians have advanced the idea of the "relief ace" and it suits our purposes perfectly. 

The "Relief Ace" usage pattern would be based on "leverage", not "save situations." In short, the greater the value of a single run in a game, the higher leverage the situation. In other words, the more likely that a situation will impact the outcome of the game, the higher the leverage. So, a bases loaded situation with 0 outs in the 9th inning of a tie ballgame is about as high leverage as it gets. That's a situation wherein the "Closer" may or may not be used, but the "Relief Ace" absolutely would. On the other hand, a bases empty situation in the 2nd inning of a 15-0 game is about as low leverage as it gets.

Intuitively, the "relief ace" idea makes a tremendous amount of sense. Don't you want your best reliever pitching when his contribution will make the greatest impact on the team's chances of winning? Of course! If you want Aroldis to be more valuable, then you have to use him in situations where he can generate value. Again, as with pitch framing, value is a function of opportunity. Give Aroldis more opportunities and he'll deliver more value.

This is also a perfect way for Bryan Price to immediately put his own stamp on the organization and make a clean break from any residual fan disdain for Dusty Baker. This is a fan base thirsting for a forward-thinking approach. It not only allows him to immediately differentiate himself from the tradition-bound strategies of his predecessor, but it has the added benefit of being good business. It's clear that, if done correctly, it's a move that would more effectively deploy the bullpen. 

Now, the "problem" with this switch is that using Aroldis earlier in the game means he won't always be there to slam the door in the 9th. And, inevitably, some of those saves will be blown, which will ratchet-up public and pundit resistance to the idea. So, Price would need three things to effectively break with tradition: (1) a functional "closer" for those times when Aroldis is used in earlier high leverage situations, (2) a bit of luck that a significant number of saves aren't blown before public/pundit acceptance of the switch, and (3) more than a bit of backbone to go along with complete confidence in the idea. 

Fortunately, the Reds have a couple of options for players who could handle 9th inning duties. While not bringing the dominance of Aroldis, some combination of J.J. Hoover, Jonathan Broxton, and Sean Marshall should be able to convert most save chances. 

Just to lend some legitimacy to the "relief ace" idea and illustrate that we could survive without Aroldis slamming the door, it's worth discussing an interesting Bill James/John Dewan rule of thumb on save chances. The 30-60-90 rule of saves sets forth the likely conversion rate in different save situations, which may make it more palatable to have a lesser reliever in some of these easier save chances.

Here's John Dewan on the idea:

What's the 30-60-90 rule of saves?
By John Dewan
May 18, 2005

The manager brings in a relief pitcher up by three runs in the ninth. The pitcher finishes the game and gets the save. It's done all the time, but in fact, it's not a good time to use what normally is the best pitcher on your team.

This situation falls under the category of Easy Save. An Easy Save is earned when a pitcher enters the game with a 2 or 3 run lead, no one on base and pitches one inning or less while finishing the game for a team victory. No need to use your best pitcher here. Pitchers convert these save opportunities about 90% of the time.

Use your best pitcher in a Tough Save situation. That happens when he enters the game with the tying run on base. The conversion rate for saves in this situation is only 30%.

All other saves or Regular Saves are converted at a 60% rate.

The 30-60-90 rule of saves: Tough saves—30% conversion. Regular saves—60%. Easy saves—90%.

The take-away from this 30-60-90 concept is that just about any pitcher is going to convert most of the "Easy Saves". And, one of the aforementioned non-Aroldis options would nail down most "Regular Saves". So, Aroldis isn't really needed in many of these save chances, which again supports the notion that he can be more impactful in the "Relief Ace" role. 

Aroldis may continue to resist a change to the rotation, but the Reds can still extract more value out of him by changing his usage pattern in the bullpen. Aroldis may not want to move INTO the rotation, but he can still be moved OUT OF the closer role. 

For a team that has made the playoffs but come up just short in consecutive years, wringing every last drop of production out of the roster and exploiting every possible competitive advantage is not only advisable, but necessary. The difference between losing in the first round of the playoffs and winning the World Series is razor thin and having a Relief Ace may make all the difference for the Reds.  

Trade Thoughts: Hanigan and Holmberg

The writing has been on the wall for a couple of weeks. When the Reds signed Brayan Pena to a major league deal, it was clear that change was coming behind the dish. It arrived on Tuesday when the Reds dealt Ryan Hanigan to the Rays in a three team deal.

The long and short of the deal is Hanigan, Heath Bell, and cash to the Rays; lhp David Holmberg to the Reds; rhp Justin Choate and a player to be named later to the Diamondbacks.

In essence, the D-Backs get salary relief, the Rays get a defensive minded catcher to pair with Jose Molina, and the Reds get starting pitching depth at the upper levels of the system. On the surface and in a vacuum, the deal seems like a good one all the way around. However, digging a little deeper and adding a touch of context makes me wonder if the Reds did as well as they might think; whether they really know the value of what they gave up.

If you know anything about Moneyball, then you know that (1) Billy Beane didn't actually write it; (2) it's not actually about on-base percentage, but rather market inefficiencies; and (3) statistical analysis is just a tool, a means of collecting better information than the competition so that you can better identify those market inefficiencies.

Obviously, this all started with the Oakland A's, but it's quickly spread around the league and the Tampa Bay Rays are now one of the torchbearers of this movement. The combination of small payroll and large success is a clear indication that the Rays are exceptionally well run.

In light of that, it's more than a little disconcerting when an exceptionally well run organization is not only interested in the asset you are trying to dump, but immediately hands out a 3-year commitment to that player.

Do the Rays know something we don't? If so, what?

The question that Reds nation slapped on Ryan Hanigan last year was whether his bat would bounce back or whether diminished offensive performance was his new reality. There was a lot of concern and hand-wringing over that very question.

What's curious is that the Rays don't seem to care one single whit about his offense. If you were concerned about a player bouncing back after a down year, then you wouldn't immediately hand him a multi-year deal. Instead, you'd wait until the next data point established a trend line.

If the Rays are confident enough in Hanigan to give him that guaranteed money, then it seems reasonable to infer that they find a substantial amount of value in Hanigan's defense. So much so that it makes his offensive contributions largely irrelevant.

So, why do the Rays value Hanigan's defense so much more than the Reds? I suspect the Rays have developed a proprietary metric for valuing pitch-framing and that Ryan Hanigan grades out very highly. That would be the type of information edge that enables the Rays to exploit a market inefficiency that the Reds don't see.

Pitch framing is still an a developing area, one where the proprietary information of MLB organizations outpaces the information available in the public domain. However, early studies indicate that pitch framing can have massive impact on run prevention. You can read about pitch framing here, here, here, and here.

Here's a summary blurb from one of those articles about the impact of pitch framing:

Despite using different methods, we all came to the conclusion that catchers who can (and cannot) frame pitches have a huge impact on the game: Dan estimated that the top catchers can contribute as much as .7 runs per 150 pitches (roughly a game), Bill calculated approximately six wins per 120 games, and both Mike and I quantified the effect at around 20 runs per 120 games.

These early studies are finding that pitch framing can add/subtract several wins to a team's record over the course of a season. That's a stunning finding with jaw dropping results, but one that makes intuitive sense. Impact is frequently a function of opportunity. Opportunity was a large part of my write-up on the RBI issue in a previous post. It's the same for pitch framing. A catcher handles somewhere in the neighborhood of 120-150 pitches per game. Every single pitch is an opportunity for the catcher to steal, or give back, a strike. Stealing a strike can flip the "count probability" in a pitcher's favor or even directly result in an out. If impact is a function of opportunity, then catchers have more opportunity to impact the game than any position on the field due to pitch framing.

If you look at those studies, then two of the names you consistently see at the top of the list are "Jose Molina" and "Ryan Hanigan". More accurately, Jose seems to be otherworldly, while Hanigan is merely very good. The Rays clearly appreciate Jose Molina and it's certainly not for his bat. It's not underasonable to infer that they value Hanigan for the same reasons as Molina. This seems like an under-the-radar move that may have substantial impact on the Rays in 2014. Even if Hanigan's offense doesn't rebound to previous levels, the Rays may have just added 2+ wins to their 2014 record in defensive value alone.

I must admit, I've never really understood why the Reds felt such a pressing need to deal Ryan Hanigan unless they really felt they needed to save a couple of million. I suppose I would feel better about dealing Hanigan, and giving away his defensive contributions, if Devin Mesoraco had shown more with the bat in 2013. As it stands, Hanigan's defensive contribution may be more valuable than Mesoraco's offensive contribution. It'll be very interesting to see if the Reds pitching staff as a whole takes a step backwards in 2014 without Ryan Hanigan. The Rays may have added 2+ wins in defensive value, but will the Reds lose 2+ wins in defensive value?

There is certainly still hope that Mesoraco can be the type of hitter we thought he might be, but I just can't buy into the idea that he has failed because of a lack of consistent playing time. He has 589 MLB plate appearances under his belt, which is more than enough for him to have shown what he can do. At some point, a player creates his own playing time. Mesoraco failed to do so. 

I still have hope that Mesoraco is just a tick behind where we would expect him to be because of a cold weather amateur career and pre-pro ball Tommy John surgery, both of which cost him needed development time. Also, he was slow to figure things out in the minors, so it's possible that he just takes longer to make needed adjustments. Mesoraco will get his chance in 2014 without the Ryan Hanigan safety net. The Reds need him to step forward offensively because right out of the gate it's a clear defensive downgrade.   

As for David Holmberg, I like him. He was actually a player I picked in my 2009 shadow draft. His calling card is his plus change-up, which I always like to see in a young pitcher. He's a good pickup for the Reds and a much needed one in light of the lack of upper level starting pitching depth in the system. The Reds just can't expect good health in the rotation and Holmberg is a better option for MLB starts than Greg Reynolds. So, Holmberg should be an upgrade on the spot starts the team received in 2013.

Whether this trade works out for the Reds depends largely on the progress of Devin Mesoraco. I like David Holmberg, but I wonder if the Reds undervalued what Ryan Hanigan brings to the table. I suspect the Rays have developed a more accurate valuation on Hanigan than the Reds, which probably makes this trade a winner for the Rays and one that will show up in the standings in non-obvious ways. When sitting around next season trying to figure out why the Rays are always so strong, think back to this deal and how the organization extracts value from unexpected places.

As for the Reds, they addressed a need (SP depth), saved some pocket change, and cleared the way for a homegrown talent to emerge. It's a deal that makes sense on a number of levels, but I can't help but think that they didn't fully appreciate the value that Ryan Hanigan created.

For the Last Time, Joey Votto is NOT The Problem!

Fan Appreciation

Courtesy: Jim Davis/Globe Staff

Cam Neely is a man in full. If you don't know the first thing about hockey, but respond "Cam Neely" to the question of your favorite player, then you'll undoubtedly get a nod of approval from hockey fans while instantly improving your hockey street cred. And, of course, if you don't know Cam Neely for his hockey exploits, then you might know him for his performance as SeaBass in Dumb and Dumber. As I said, a man in full.

In hockey, a player's career is frequently characterized by his ability, or lack thereof, to elevate his play in the postseason. It's a reality that works to the advantage of certain types of players; to the disadvantage of other types. It certainly worked to the advantage of Cam Neely, and the disadvantage of another former Bruin star, Joe Thornton.

Cam Neely was a goal scorer. He was strong like a bull and had a nose for the net. Unfortunately, his career was cut short by a degenerative hip condition and a knee injury, which, late in his career, prevented him from even taking the ice for practice, but somehow he still managed to get out on the ice for games and score goals. It was gutty, gritty, and remarkable.

Neely's game was direct. He was able, through elevated individual effort and sheer force of will, to make a direct impact on the fortunes of his team. Taking things to the extreme, the nature of his game didn't force him to rely on the play of teammates to directly impact the game. The puck went directly from the tape of his stick into the back of the net. Obviously, more goals scored improves the team's goal differential. An improved goal differential improves the team's win/loss record. Direct.

On the other hand, this reality worked to the disadvantage of Joe Thornton.

Joe Thornton isn't Cam Neely. He's spectacular in his own right, but always struggled to get the type of love showered on Neely by the Boston fans. In fact, he was traded right out of town due largely to the team's postseason struggles. Thornton is a premier set-up man, rather than a goal scorer. His game is predicated not on brute strength and determination, but rather on vision, spacing, and feel. His game is indirect. Thornton elevating his game is about making his teammates better. As a result, elevating his game won't have the same impact on the Win/Loss record unless his teammates finish off his work. An assist is a step (or two) removed from the actual goal. The puck goes from the tape of Thornton's stick, to the tape of a teammate's stick, and only then into the back of the net. Thornton is one step removed from the goal and, consequently, the admiration of the fans.

Because of the nature of their respective games, Boston fans appreciated Cam Neely much more than Joe Thornton. Not because one type of player is inherently more valuable than the other, but because the value of "direct" is easier for fans to appreciate than the value of "indirect". Direct is visceral. Indirect is nuanced and contextual. "Indirect" requires a bit more background and knowledge to appreciate. All of which brings us to the Cincinnati Reds, circa 2013.


Joey Votto and Brandon Phillips

This season has seen all kinds of complaints about the Reds ricocheting around the interwebs, ranging from Dusty's roster construction, Joey Votto's disciplined approach, Jonathan Broxton's contract, Aroldis Chapman's workload, and Brook Jacoby's hitting instruction. The noise of those complaints obscures the Reds real problem, one that may come back to haunt them in the postseason, but more on that in a minute. First, we need to do away with the complaint over Joey Votto's disciplined approach.

This season, Joey Votto is a bit more "Joe Thornton" than "Cam Neely". Fan appreciation has fallen accordingly. Brandon Phillips is more "Cam Neely" than "Joe Thornton". Fan appreciation has risen accordingly.

RBIs are the baseball equivalent of hockey goals, while walks are the equivalent of hockey assists. The walks help you get the RBIs, but fans appreciate the RBIs far more than the walks. RBI are direct, while walks are indirect, never mind that it's infinitely more difficult to get RBIs if hitters aren't getting on base for you. The two are clearly interrelated.

Accordingly, it's ABSOLUTELY RIDICULOUS to hear praise being heaped on Brandon Phillips for driving in runs, while in the very same breath scorn heaped on Joey Votto for taking too many walks, because they are essentially flip sides of the same coin. Table-setting and table-clearing. Run creation and run production.

It couldn't be more obvious that the main reason why Brandon Phillips has so many RBIs this year is because Joey Votto (and Shin-Soo Choo) are such disciplined, patient hitters. In 2013, Phillips had 492 runners on base during his plate appearances, which was third most in all of baseball. For the record, Joey Votto had 441 runners on base during his time at bat, 51 fewer than Phillips. Prince Fielder (536) and Jay Bruce (500) were the only two hitters with more runners on base during their plate appearances.

It's mere coincidence that all three of those hitters batted behind either Miguel Cabrera or Joey Votto and Shin-Soo Choo, right? Or, maybe, just maybe we can concede that it's easier to pile up RBI when you have among the most RBI opportunities in all of baseball.

In actuality, Brandon Phillips has been a mediocre hitter this year. The only area where he's excelled is in hitting with runners in scoring position. That said, his situational hitting has been undeniably superb.

2013 Situational Batting Average
None On -- .213
Runners On -- .307
Scoring Position -- .338
Bases Loaded -- .611

Whether that's the result of a conscious decision by Phillips, in response to his move to the clean-up spot, to be a run producer or just a small sample size fluke is debatable. The commonly held belief is that hitters can't elevate their performance in certain situations and that's probably the case. If they could, then why wouldn't they elevate it in all situations? But, maybe Phillips is an exception to the rule.

Regardless of the reason, it can't be argued that Phillips hasn't excelled in driving in runs this year. On some level, he has been the ideal compliment to the high on-base rates of Choo and Votto. In some ways, they are flip sides of the same coin. Together they are more than the sum of their individual parts.


The Real Problem!!

The real problem that has plagued the Reds in 2013, and the one that could well be their undoing against the Pirates in the playoffs, is the utter lack of complimentary offensive production.

On the season, of the hitters who received at least 150 plate appearances, the Reds have only 3 above average hitters. Their names are Votto, Choo, and Bruce. This is a lineup that only has three impact hitters, none of whom hits from the right side. It is a limited and unbalanced offense.

In short, this offense is plagued with inconsistency not because Joey Votto is too disciplined, but because he is 1 of only 3 impact hitters. The problem isn't with the top tier hitters in the lineup, it's that there IS NO second tier.

Weighted Runs Created (wRC) is an attempt to quantify a player's total offensive value and measure it by runs. Weighted Runs Created Plus (wRC+) measures how a player's wRC compares with league average. League average is 100, every point above 100 is a percentage point above league average.

2013 wRC+ (Players with 150+ PAs)
Joey Votto -- 156
Shin-Soo Choo -- 151
Jay Bruce -- 117

Xavier Paul -- 106
Todd Frazier -- 100
Brandon Phillips -- 91
Chris Heisey -- 89
Derrick Robinson -- 81
Zack Cozart -- 79
Devin Mesoraco -- 74
Jack Hannahan -- 71
Ryan Hanigan -- 53


For comparison sake, here is how we stack up against the Pirates:

2013 wRC+ (Players with 150+ PAs)
Andrew McCutchen -- 155
Starling Marte -- 121
Jose Tabata -- 118
Gaby Sanchez -- 117
Neil Walker -- 114
Jordy Mercer -- 114
Pedro Alvarez -- 111

Russell Martin -- 101
Garrett Jones -- 97
Travis Snider -- 70
Clint Barmes -- 52


Obviously, McCutchen and Votto cancel each other out. While they have no one who compares with Choo, they have much greater depth of production. They are a more diversified offense than we are, which makes for less streakiness in production. The postseason is a crap shoot, but in today's one game playoff it'll come down to our star driven offense against their diversified attack.

For more context, the Red Sox have 11 out of 12 qualifying hitters with wRC+ numbers of 109 or higher. The A's have 7 hitters at 114 or higher and 10 of 14 qualifying hitters at 101 or higher. The Cardinals have an astounding 6 hitters at 132 or higher and 8 at 105 or higher.

The Red Sox took a lot of heat for their offseason free agent acquisitions. I didn't agree with what they were doing either, because they were paying top dollar for second tier type players. The more common strategy is to pay top dollar for star players and go cheap on complimentary players. The Red Sox were doing the opposite, paying good money to obtain certain second tier production. A large part of the A's success has been driven by complimentary production instead of star talent. The success of both teams illustrates the importance of complimentary production.

Unfortunately, the Reds problem isn't one that will be naturally covered up in the playoffs. If a team is short on pitching, then the postseason can help hide that flaw. The shorter series means that you need fewer starters, allowing you to minimize the contributions of lesser pitchers. There is no such relief for a team short on impact hitters. That's a flaw that the Reds will have to overcome throughout the postseason.


Final Thoughts

Reds fans are appreciating the wrong player. Phillips has done some nice situational hitting, but Votto is one of the best hitters in all of baseball. Still, the fact that Phillips' contribution is more direct, while Votto's is, in some ways, indirect, means that fans are overvaluing Phillips.

In some ways, Joey Votto and Brandon Phillips have perfectly complimented each other this year, with each filling in the weaknesses of the other. Of course, Joey Votto had a borderline MVP caliber season, while Phillips was a below average hitter. So, Votto had more holes to fill in Phillips' game than Phillips did in Votto's, but Votto could have done a bit better job driving in runs. That much is true.

Still, the real problem on the Reds this year is lack of production from the complimentary players. This is a three hitter offense. That's the problem that should be the focus of the fans. That's the problem that may very well sink us against the Pirates. That's the problem that needs to be addressed this offseason, especially since we are likely to lose Shin-Soo Choo to free agency.

Joey Votto is the farthest thing from being the problem with this team and treating him like he is only obscures the real issue: The team needs someone other than the top tier to step up during the postseason. We may need to hear some broadcaster shout: "Zack Cozart for President!"

Marlon Byrd Burnout

Courtesy: Unknown

Josh: "Sir, if the House successfully overrides the veto, we're gonna look weak."

President Bartlett: "If the House successfully overrides the veto, we ARE weak."

---"On the Day Before", The West Wing





For whatever reason, the above quote always leaps to mind when i hear people talking about Marlon Byrd.

I'm tired of Marlon Byrd. He's a 36-year old outfielder with a career slash line of .276/.335/.424 and an IPED rap sheet. And, yet, one of the current narratives permeating Reds Nation is that the failure to claim him off of waivers from the New York Mets will sink the season.

There are some who think the Reds should have claimed Byrd and paid the cost to acquire his services. There are others who think the Reds should have claimed Byrd just to prevent the Pirates from getting him.

The problem with the former is that the Reds may have lacked the assets, and the willpower, necessary to get it done. The problem with the latter is that it's damn hard to do.

Whether you can chalk it up to Dusty's loyalty to his guys, the organization's concern over upsetting locker-room chemistry, or maybe Walt being concerned that Byrd's late-career resurgence and power spike are due to something other than just clean living, the plain fact of the matter is that the organization simply didn't have any interest in Byrd. It's impossible to know why. This is a situation where the front office may be basing its decision on information that people outside the organization simply don't have. Or, maybe, like me, they just aren't that high on him.

As for claiming Byrd just to block him from the Pirates, that's not as easy as it sounds. It's common practice for teams to place the vast majority of their players on revocable waivers after the trade deadline. If a player of value is claimed, then the team simply pulls them back off waivers. So, there are a LOT of players on waivers, which makes the task of deciding which players to try to block a challenge. If you choose wrong, then you could get stuck with a player (or two) that you really don't want. That happened recently with the Giants and Cody Ross and more famously with the Padres and Randy Myers. It's obviously more damaging if the claimed player has a large contract, but even if the monetary hit is minor the team still has to clear up a roster spot for him. And, if you are trying to block multiple players, then you might end up needing to clear multiple roster spots.

Here's what MLB.com had to say about Waiver Trading:

Do teams often put in waiver claims simply to "block" a trade?

Once in a while it happens, but not very often. There is a risk involved, especially if the player trying to go through waivers has a large contract. By claiming a player, a team could prevent that player from being traded to a division rival. Of course, if a team claims a player and that player isn't pulled back by the team that requested waivers, the claiming team could get that player, contract and all.

An example of that happened in 1998, when Toronto was attempting to deal former All-Star closer Randy Myers late in the year to Atlanta. The Padres, in the midst of a pennant race, put in a waiver claim for the veteran left-hander to block him from being traded to the Braves. The Blue Jays let Myers go to the Padres rather than pull him back from the waiver process. Myers appeared in just 14 1/3 innings for the Padres, going 1-3 with no saves, and he did not pitch after the '98 season, leaving San Diego on the hook for the balance of his $13.6 million salary for 1999-2000.

From what I know of the waiver wire process, it just seems too messy for the type of blocking transaction that the fan base desperately wanted to see. If the Reds didn't actually want Byrd, then I find it difficult to fault them for not blocking the Pirates from getting him.

Or, maybe when Reds fans continue to argue that Marlon Byrd will be the difference-maker in the Reds and Pirates postseason showdown, I can't help but think that if we are too weak to bring down the Pirates because of our multi-layered Marlon Byrd "failure", then we were simply too weak to begin with.***







***Post-script -- I now fully expect Marlon Byrd to play an integral part in the Reds postseason demise, causing me to eat crow. It's cosmic. It's karmic. It's inevitable. Apologies.

2013 Top 25 Prospect List

For posterity's sake, here's the final list of top Reds prospects for the 2013 season with links to those that have a full prospect write-up. I came up a few write-ups short of a full slate, so not all have links, but I'll do better next season. It's good to have aspirational goals!

Overall, I'm pretty happy with the list. After a rocky season in the minors, Billy Hamilton is showing in September why he deserved the top spot on the list. Despite Stephenson's very strong 2013 season, I'm happy with my decision to slot Cingrani in the 2nd spot. For me, Cingrani's advantage in floor was simply greater than Stephenson's potential advantage in ceiling. I thought Cingrani could perform at a high level quickly, while Stephenson still had to manage a couple of years of development and injury risk. If Stephenson can effectively manage that risk, then he could still prove to be the better pitcher at the MLB level.

If the Reds want to be concerned about anything in the development process, then they might want to take a look at the reasons why the wheels completely came off on Corcino, Lotzkar, and Guillon. All completely fell apart in 2013. Probably for different reasons, but it's worth asking the question and reviewing the development process to see if there is a common thread.

I'm still content with my ranking of Tucker Barnhart, who had a solid season, as I expect the game to shift back in the direction of defensive catchers. And, Barnhart is one of the best in that department.


1) Billy Hamilton, of
2) Tony Cingrani, lhp
3) Robert Stephenson, rhp
4) Daniel Corcino, rhp
5) Didi Gregorius, ss
6) Nick Travieso, rhp
7) Jesse Winker, of
8) Ismael Guillon, lhp
9) Jeff Gelalich, of
10) Amir Garrett, lhp
11) Dan Langfield, rhp
12) Carlos Contreras, rhp
13) Tucker Barnhart, c
14) Ryan LaMarre, of
15) Kyle Lotzkar, rhp
16) Tanner Rahier, ss/3b
17) Yorman Rodriguez, of
18) Donald Lutz, 1b/of
19) Drew Cisco, rhp
20) Jonathan Reynoso, of
21) Seth Meijas-Brean, 3b
22) Chad Rogers, rhp
23) Henry Rodriguez, 2b/3b
24) Curtis Partch, rhp
25) Kyle Waldrop, of



Overall, it seemed to be more of a boom-or-bust kind of season down on the farm for the Reds. There wasn't a lot in between. If you were in the Reds organization, then chances are you either launched into space and streaked across the sky or you fizzled out on the launchpad.

The Reds are going to need a consistent flow of homegrown talent in the near future if they intend to keep the window for winning a championship from slamming shut. They have too many long-term contracts and too many key contributors on the verge of big money pay-days to remain an upper echelon team unless they have a strong, productive farm system to fill in the gaps.

Fortunately, they have another couple of years to bolster the system, which they need due to a few too many flame-outs in 2013.

2013 Top Prospect List: #12 Carlos Contreras, rhp

Courtesy: MILB.com

CARLOS CONTRERAS
DOB: 1/8/1991
HEIGHT: 5-11, WEIGHT: 205, B/T: R/R

As a result of trades and promotions, the Reds farm system is thin at the upper levels and short on overall impact prospects. However, there a few prospects who could develop into valuable pieces if they can manage their remaining development risk. Carlos Contreras is one such prospect who fits that description.

The Reds have done a nice job of supplementing the farm system with prospects signed out of Latin America. Curiously enough, aside from Aroldis Chapman, they have had better success with the inexpensive signings (i.e. Cueto, Gregorius, Corcino, Contreras, etc) than they have with the more high profile signings (i.e. Yorman Rodriguez, Juan Duran, etc).

If Contreras can step forward into potential impact prospect status, then it would really boost the farm system going forward.


PROFESSIONAL CAREER

Patience. That's what the organization has been with Contreras, who was signed by the Reds out of the Dominican Republic in 2008. The Reds were conservative during his first four professional seasons, sending him to various short season rookie leagues. He spent the first two in the Dominican Summer Leagues, the third season in the Arizona Rookie League, and the fourth with the Billings Mustangs in the Pioneer League.

Finally, in 2012, he was ready for full season ball and split time between low-A and high-A. Even in full season ball, he only logged only 60.2 total innings. To that point, he worked primarily as a reliever, but the Reds took the training wheels off in 2013.

Courtesy: Getty Images

In 2013, Contreras moved into the rotation full-time. He started out in high-A Bakersfield, more commonly known as hitter's heaven, and more than held his own. He threw 90.0 innings over 18 starts in which he posted a 3.80 ERA, 1.23 WHIP, 4.1 BB/9, and a 9.6 K/9. Impressively, he maintained the high strikeout rate that he flashed out of the bullpen over longer outings in the rotation. He earned a bump to double-A Pensacola.

For the Blue Wahoos, Contreras actually found a bit tougher sledding. He actually dropped his ERA, but his peripherals took a tumble. He worked 42.1 innings over 8 starts, posting a 2.76 ERA, 1.35 WHIP, 4.5 BB/9, and 5.5 K/9. He'll obviously need a return engagement in double-A, but overall it was a strong season and a significant step forward in his development.

In the middle of his 2013 season, Contreras made an appearance in the MLB Futures Game. During his appearance, Contreras worked exclusively out of the stretch. Of course, the first batter he faced reached base and there were runners on base the rest of the time, but he still started off the inning out of the stretch. Maybe not surprising given his bullpen background, but maybe reflective of a lingering reliever mindset.

He worked 2/3 of an inning and had to consistently work through some trouble. It's difficult to draw too many conclusions from such a short appearance, but his fastball seemed to clock in from 89-96. His change-up was very impressive, showing good tailing and sinking action. The bottom really fell out of it. The breaking ball was tougher to get a read on, as he threw a couple of mid-70s breaking balls that were loose and really rolled, but also some tighter, sharper breaking pitches in the low 80s.

Early in his appearance, the hitters squared up his fastball consistently. Later in the appearance, his fastball velocity increased to the mid-90s. He showed the ability to work both sides of the plate with the fastball to lefties, but wasn't as precise with his fastball to righties.



PITCHING MECHANICS

Contreras starts with strong rocker step towards first base, allowing him to rotate his plant foot down and onto the rubber. That strong first step flows smoothly up into his leg kick, which subsequently flows into his stride. There's a real and natural fluidity to his mechanics. After the rocker step, he rotates his body and brings his leg up into the leg kick. His leg kick comes up a tick past parallel and includes some leg wrap, which generates tension in the spine through body coil.

At apex, Contreras maintains good balance and effectively stays over his plant leg to gather his momentum before driving to the plate. He has a fluid unpacking of the leg kick and solid stride length. His stride isn't quite as long as might be optimal, but it's long enough that it allows him to (1) effectively rotate the hips, and (2) effectively get his momentum out over the stride leg in the delivery.

As for his arm action, it's clean. He maintains his elbow in proper position relative to his shoulder throughout the delivery and gets his arm up into proper throwing position at foot strike. He uses a high three-quarters arm slot with a loose arm action.

After he releases the pitch, he enters into the deceleration phase. However, Contreras occasionally has a bit of recoil in his delivery. After his pitching arm comes down past his left hip, it occasionally bounces back up, instead of finishing low on his left side, a bit more than is ideal. This recoil occurs in tandem with an upright follow-through, as his upper body doesn't release and finish out over his plant leg, which restricts the ability of the delivery to dissipate the force.

Here's a look at Contreras in action, courtesy of ProspectNotes on YouTube:







The consistent knock on Contreras in the scouting community is that he's "long in the back", a result of a long arm swing, leading to inconsistency in release point. But, I'm not overly concerned about that. If there's anything that jumps out to me it's that he seems highly rotational in his delivery. Instead of driving his momentum directly to the plate, his momentum seems to rotate around his body a tick too much. The main reason for that is the shoulder rotation, which seems to happen earlier than I'd like to see. The shoulder rotation in combination with the lower arm slot and upright follow-through gives his delivery a rotational look.

If I was going to address the control problems, then I'd start by having him keep his lead shoulder tucked in longer. I'm not really worried about the longer arm-action in the back, but if he flies open too soon with the front shoulder, then he may consistently miss his spot to the arm-side with the fastball and may pull his breaking ball too far to the glove-side. If he drives his chest towards home plate a bit more, then it'll help delay the rotation of the shoulders a tick longer, give him a less upright finish in the follow-through, and improve the consistency of his release point.

Overall, Contreras has solid, functional mechanics. On one hand, there aren't any major red flags indicating heightened injury risk, on the other they aren't so impressive that they'll lead to increased performance benefits.


REPERTOIRE

Contreras features a fastball that sits 92-94 and touches 97. His change-up has plus potential and very good tailing, sinking action. He also uses a slurvy breaking ball that sits in the low 80s, though I've seen a few slower pitches in the mid-70s, but needs to be tightened up to avoid inconsistency and rolling. His change-up is currently more advanced than his breaking ball, which means he is frequently more effective against lefties than righties. The change-up sinks and tails away from lefthanded hitters, while the breaking ball isn't always sharp enough to be effective against righthanders.

Another consideration is whether Contreras' height will allow him to succeed against advanced competition, as he'll struggle to get downward plane on the fastball, leaving him with a flatter fastball that lingers longer in the contact zone. However, fastball effectiveness is largely a function of (1) velocity, (2) movement, (3) command, and (4) downward plane. You don't need all four components to have an effective fastball, but you do need the right mix.

Tim Lincecum is a good example. He's also an "under six feet" righthanded pitcher, but his fastball helped him win two Cy Young awards because of its plus velocity and movement. Early in his career, it didn't matter that he lacked downward plane and it didn't matter that he didn't have Greg Maddux like command. However, now that he's in mid-career and has ~1400 MLB innings under his belt, his velocity has declined to the point that the lack of both plus command and downward plane has become problematic.

The component mix on Lincecum's fastball is out of balance and, as a result, he's struggling because he now lacks the velocity to overcome shortfalls in the other components. The result is that Tim Lincecum is more hittable than he used to be, as his fastball is now flat and slow. To take his game back to his previous performance level, he'll need to find improvements in fastball command or velocity.

The takeaway is that Contreras doesn't necessarily need significant downward plane to be successful as long as his blend of velocity, command, and movement is sufficient to overcome the flatter plane on his fastball. Currently, his velocity is strong, but he'll need to show improved command or movement to get away with minimal plane on his fastball.

While he has the right blend of components to have an effective fastball, he still needs to refine his breaking ball, as he can't work effectively in the rotation with just a fastball and plus change-up.


FINAL THOUGHTS

In a farm system that is short on both depth and upper echelon talent, Contreras makes for an intriguing prospect. He needs to refine his repertoire in order to avoid having a reverse platoon split, as he currently lacks a consistently effective breaking ball that moves away from righties. His change-up has very good sink and tails away from lefties, so as of now he's better suited to success against opposite side hitters, which is unusual. He also needs to refine his mechanics to take his command and control up a notch.

There is still some development risk with Contreras, as despite the slow march up the development ladder, he still has some work to do. Ideally, he'll develop into a viable starting pitcher, but a return to the bullpen is a legitimate fallback option. His fastball would play up in short stints and a limited repertoire would play better without having to face hitters two and three times a game.

Still, there are some intriguing elements to his game that could, if things break right, turn him into a valuable pitcher at the MLB level. Given that the Reds have locked in several players to long-term extensions and have several more on the verge of big paydays, they could use all the inexpensive homegrown talent they can find.

Contreras has some work to do, but for now he lands at #12 on the list.

On MLB, Maximus Decimus Meridius, and the Power of "Reasonableness"

Over on the message board side of things, I recently had an interesting conversation about politics. The discussion started off being largely about drone attacks and due process, but evolved into a broader discussion of the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches.

The point was made that Americans should fear an executive branch that has the power to deem someone an "enemy combatant" and order a targeted killing without any other branches having the express ability to check the executive's authority. Basically, that the lack of direct institutional safeguards means that there is simply too much power vested in the executive.

The notion that the executive, in the absence of direct institutional safeguards, had free reign was one with which I disagreed. To me there are other factors operating to confine the scope of the executive branch's authority. A good example is found in the following quote from a newspaper article:

"When Congress and the executive clash about the meaning of those powers, there is no neutral way to decide who is right."  

Given the separation of powers in our government, no branch, in theory, has more power than the others. If the President and Congress adopt differing interpretations of a constitutional issue, then there's no tiebreaker. Both branches just sit there, eyeball-to-eyeball. You'd think that would potentially give the executive branch unchecked authority under any reasonable constitutional interpretation. Who could or would stop it from acting under that interpretation? No structural resolution exists. And, yet, the system works. Somehow, the actions of the executive are confined within acceptable limits.

Those limits are not established by checks-and-balances of other branches of government, rather they are imposed by reasonableness. The press, public, and the ingrained rule of law operate to ensure that the actions of various branches of government do not exceed reasonable limits. The ultimate power of a government derives from the people, so if the people determine that a government's actions exceed reasonable limits, then they can retract their consent to be governed. If that happens, the government loses legitimacy and likely collapses.

This reasonableness concept doesn't apply solely to politics. The larger point is that power derives from the masses. And, inherent in situations where power is derived from the masses is the existence of a reasonableness limitation. Success in politics, business, and religion is largely driven by the ability to get the people to buy-in to what you're doing. To get the masses to authorize you to act on their behalf; to license your conduct. Success frequently depends upon your ability to scale your endeavor over a larger and larger consumer base. To successfully spread it from the few to the many. If success is derived from the license of the many, then failure is driven by the revocation of that license by the many.

Here are a few quick non-baseball examples:

Politics: In a democracy this is obvious, as you have to get the majority of the votes to win the election. By it's very nature, politics is about convincing people to buy into what you're doing.

Business: If you compare two wildly popular businesses, Five Guys Burgers and Fries and Facebook, then you can see the concept of scaling-up. Both are brilliant and wildly successful businesses. Both have increased their wealth by increasing their market-share, increasing the size of their respective consumer bases. However, if you were an investor, Facebook may have been the better bet for one simple reason: it's a much easier business model to scale-up. It's far easier for an online business like Facebook to grow from 100,000 customers to 1,000,000 customers than it is for a brick-and-mortar business like Five Guys. Five Guys has to invest in new physical locations in order to grow, while Facebook just has to add another server or two.

Religion: In the first few decades of the 19th century, the United States underwent a period of religious experimentation. That period is frequently known as the Second Great Awakening. During that period, a number of homegrown religions emerged. One survived: Mormonism. Setting aside the question of the validity of the beliefs contained in those religions, which is largely irrelevant for our purposes, why did Mormonism thrive while the other homegrown religions faded away? In short, the religion was able to get more people to buy into it.

Why do organized religions constantly seek converts? To spread "the word"? Undoubtedly, but in order to wield influence, or even survive, organized religions require the license of the many. A religion's secular power is driven largely by the quantity of followers.

The clear takeaway from all of this is that: the masses can grant power, but they can revoke it if it's used in an unreasonable way. If you want to continue to wield the power and authority granted to you by your customer, constituent, or congregation, then you need to satisfy not only the express institutional requirements, but also the unwritten reasonableness requirements.

Courtesy: Unknown

Even Maximus Decimus Meridius from Gladiator had an inkling of the true source of power and wealth:

"I think he knows what Rome is. Rome is the mob. Conjure magic for them and they'll be distracted. Take away their freedom and still they'll roar. The beating heart of Rome is not the marble of the senate, it's the sand of the coliseum."

It's no different in Major League Baseball. There are, of course, direct institutional safeguards in place. The owner can check the authority/power of the organization's GM and President. Examples are easy to find. Think of Arte Moreno dictating to GM Jerry DiPoto that they sign Albert Pujols and Josh Hamilton. Think of every instance where a GM is fired for poor performance. Further, the league itself can check the authority/power of the owner/organization. Again, examples abound. Think MLB suspending Ted Turner or George Steinbrenner for improprieties; think MLB forcing Marge Schott to sell the Reds. However, above and beyond these institutional safeguards, there remains a reasonableness limitation. It's a limitation imposed by the fan base.


Kansas City Royals: Trusting "The Process"?

There are two recent examples of this reasonable limitation at work in Major League Baseball. First, and most obvious, is the Kansas City Royals. If you've been following along, the Royals fan base and blogger community slipped into an apoplectic rage when former hitting coach Jack Maloof gave an interview in which he claimed that hitting homeruns simply wasn't an effective strategy in Kauffman Stadium.

That interview, given at a time when the team was underperforming at the plate and in the standings, was the final straw. After years of ineptitude, the front office went "all in" this year, trading uber-prospect Wil Myers for James Shields, a win-now move that was accompanied by assurances from the front office that THIS was the year. After that interview, the fan base could no longer buy-into front office exhortations to "trust the process" and "be patient". The uproar over that interview was so swift and unyielding that the organization clearly heard and feared the rumblings. The owners may still have believed in the front office. The front office may still have "trusted the process". The fans did not. "The process" was no longer reasonable.

Courtesy: Charlie Riedel/Associated Press

The organization acted quickly in the interests of self-preservation. They fired/demoted the hitting coach tandem of Jack Maloof and Andre David and brought in the most famous and popular player in franchise history, George Brett, to fill the role and put out the fire. It was a clear last ditch effort to placate the fan base and salvage the season. It's fair to wonder whether the front office brought in Brett more for (1) his ability to impart hitting knowledge to the players, or (2) his ability to galvanize support from the fan base.

The Royals tripped over the "reasonableness" requirement, forcing them to call in an organizational legend to save the day. To date, it seems to have worked. Playing meaningful games in September likely staves off what looked to be an inevitable regime change over the offseason. Whether George Brett actually helped jump-start the offense, especially Eric Hosmer, remains to be seen, but it is undeniable that he brought the Royals' operations back within those acceptable limits imposed by the fan base.


Houston Astros: Playing to Lose?

The second example is the Houston Astros. Given that MLB and owner Jim Crane have both sanctioned the scorched earth rebuilding process implemented by GM Jeff Luhnow, the institutional safeguards are not going to reverse that process. However, there is a danger that the organization will violate the reasonableness requirement and lose the power granted to it by the fan base. Like the Royals, the Astros have a limited amount of time that they can "play to lose". There is a tipping point. There is a point at which the fans will revoke their license from the ownership group. They'll stop attending games (more than they already have); stop buying merchandise; stop watching games on TV; stop caring. And, it's that last one that should be truly worrisome to the front office. There's a moment when the rumblings of the blogger community, twitter, and the mainstream media will gain so much traction that the organization won't be able to continue to operate as it has been. That is to say, they won't be able to make such a concerted effort to lose, and lose cheaply, at the MLB level.

Courtesy: Associated Press

The only question with the Astros is whether their plan will bear fruit before the tipping point arrives. I'm a big fan of Jeff Luhnow, so I believe it will. But, he needs to be right in his decision-making. And, he needs to be right on a consistent basis, which isn't easy to do. Setbacks will delay the organization's progress and bring them closer to the reasonableness tipping point. Not surprisingly, Luhnow seems to understand that his rebuilding plan will strain the tolerance of the fan base. Accordingly, he's made a conscious effort, as evidenced by this letter to his season ticket holders, to get out in front of the issue by communicating his plans to his customer base and ensure that they continue to buy-in to what he's trying to do. He understands that it doesn't matter how well he does what he does if he loses the fan base in the process. It's still failure.


Reasonableness Be Damned!

Of course, failure in baseball doesn't look like failure in other industries. In other industries, failure looks a lot like extinction. Your operations are wiped from the face of the earth, your remaining assets devoured by bigger, strong competitors. Your marketshare snapped up by organizations who are more efficiently and effectively run. In baseball, however, failure isn't extinction, it's irrelevance.

In baseball, the reasonableness requirement only applies to organizations who actually care. Who care about winning. Or, who, at the very least, care about not losing so much that they become a laughingstock.

Prior to this year, the Pirate organization was a perennial failure. After years of ineptitude, they lost the fan base, slipping from awful to irrelevant in the process. They were irrelevant. Revenue sharing ensured that the Pirates' ineptitude wouldn't bring about their extinction. Instead, they would fall into irrelevance. Profitable irrelevance.

Similarly, in Miami, revenue sharing and a publicly financed boondoggle ensured that the Marlins and their odious owner would not go the way of the dodo bird. The loss of the fan base wasn't enough to force any real, substantive change, instead they continue to limp along collecting their revenue share from organizations who actually care about their business. The Marlins are the ultimate free-rider.


Major League Soccer and Final Thoughts

Curiously, Major League Soccer is the scene of an interesting experiment. The Seattle Sounders are attempting to convert the informal reasonableness limitation imposed by the fan base into a direct institutional standard. The organization allows members of the fan Alliance, season ticket-holders or fans who pay a $125 fee, to vote on whether to retain or dismiss the general manager. They are increasing fan buy-in by giving them a direct, rather than indirect, voice in the operation of the team. The Sounders have been a massive success. To what extent that's been a result of giving the fans a direct voice is unclear, but it's an interesting recognition of the relationship between the club and the fans.

In Major League Baseball, there remains an informal reasonableness limitation. While the collaborative nature of the professional sports and the safety net created by revenue sharing combine to ensure that the punishment for exceeding that limitation won't be as severe as it could be, those organizations who actually care about success, both on-the-field and on-the-books, would be wise not to exceed it. 

The Evolution of Johnny Cueto

It's not hard to argue that the Reds 2012 season was defined, for better and worse, by the health of their starting pitchers. The Reds regular season success was driven by a rotation that was the very picture of health, while the Reds postseason was undone by an untimely injury to Johnny Cueto.

Given the obvious importance of pitcher health to the fortunes of this team, it's worth the time to take a look at the shoulder injuries that have plagued Johnny Cueto. When I first gave thought to Cueto's adoption of a Luis Tiant type coil, I thought it was more of an overnight change. Something he picked up and incorporated prior to the 2012 season. However, if we look at Cueto's position at the apex of the leg kick since he first arrived in the league, it's clear that that's not the case. It was actually a gradual evolution.


Here's a look at Cueto pitching in his first MLB season on August 8, 2008:

As you can see, his leg kick at apex is pretty conventional (and, the quality of the video from 2008 is poor!). He brings his leg up past parallel and has minimal coil. There's very little leg wrap at apex.


Here's Cueto during his second MLB season, pitching in a game on May 24, 2009:

His leg kick in his second season is substantially the same as it was in his first year. Again, he's up past parallel with minimal body coil. And, there's still minimal leg wrap at apex. Note that there is little differential between the line of the hips and the line of the shoulders, both run basically on a line from 2b-to-homeplate.



Here's Johnny in his third season, pitching in a game on August 27, 2010:

Now, you can start to see more body coil at apex. His third year in the majors has brought some mechanical changes, as he has started wrapping his leg at apex. His knee is no longer pointed at third base, but is pointed more towards the third baseman or maybe even the shortstop.

The benefit of the leg wrap is that it creates a differential in the rotation of the hips and the rotation of the shoulders. This differential creates tension in the spine that can increase the force generated by the windup. That differential was not present in his 2008 and 2009 mechanics. So, this version of his mechanics is arguably more efficient, as it potentially generates more force with the body. Force that does not then have to be generated by the arm.

Here he is during his fourth season, pitching on June 9, 2011:

You can, again, see the difference, as he has again changed his mechanics to incorporate even more body coil. His leg is wrapped even farther, pointing almost at second base instead of at the third baseman/shortstop. Despite the increased hip rotation, the differential between the rotation of the shoulders and hips has likely decreased because of the increased rotation of the shoulders. In short, his 2011 set of pitching mechanics is arguably somewhat less efficient than his 2010 mechanics, reducing the potential force generated by the body and, consequently, increasing the force that has to be generated by the pitching arm.


Here's Johnny during his fifth season, working in a game on June 6, 2012:

Finally, in his fifth season, Cueto evolved into his current version. His body coil is now massive. Not only does he have substantial wrapping of the leg, with his knee pointing at second base, but he also uses significantly more shoulder rotation. In 2011, he used a significant degree of leg wrap, but the shoulders stayed in a more traditional position. In 2012, he started rotating his shoulders so far that he showed his back to the hitter. Maybe he wanted to remind the hitters exactly who they were facing. Or, maybe he thought there were benefits to be reaped in deception and gathering his momentum before driving to the plate. Whatever the reason, the transformation was complete.

My initial impression of these pitching mechanics was that they would be very hard on his right knee. The rotating of the hips and upper body against the planted, stationary right leg seemed likely to create significant stress on the right knee. That concern never materialized, but the shoulder problems certainly did.


Finally, here's Johnny during his sixth season, pitching on May 31, 2013:

The mechanics here are essentially the same as the 2012 version.

The interesting thing is that, in one respect, Johnny is right back to where he started: minimal differential between his hip and shoulder rotation. Early in his career, he had limited differential because the line of both his hips and shoulders at apex ran from 2b to homeplate. Now, he has limited differential because the line of both his hips and shoulders at apex runs from 1b to 3b. In one respect, he's gone from "inefficient" (2008 & 2009) to "efficient" (2010 & 2011) and right back to "inefficient" (2012 & 2013).

The only tension created by his current body coil is against the right knee. However, that doesn't provide the same kinetic chain benefits as mechanics that create tension in the spine through a substantial differential, both at apex and after the stride, between hip rotation and shoulder rotation. The latter reduces stress on the arm because it permits a delayed shoulder rotation that results in the pitching arm being pulled through the delivery by the force travelling up through the hip rotation to the spine to the shoulder rotation.

The real problem with using a twisting motion that coils up against the right knee, as Cueto does,  is that it precludes the effective operation of the kinetic chain by forcing the hips and shoulders to move in tandem. If they move in tandem, then they have to uncoil at exactly the same time, making it very difficult to delay the shoulder rotation and thus necessitating that a greater percentage of the force imparted to the baseball be generated by the pitching arm. That could be a reason for the increased arm injuries.

In hindsight, it's obvious that Cueto's body coil wasn't an overnight change, but rather a gradual evolution. His first two seasons (2008 & 2009) involved minimal body coil. He started incorporating more coil in 2010. It got even more severe in 2011 before reaching its current form in 2012 and 2013.

Now that we can see the gradual evolution, the question is whether the Luis Tiant move has resulted in increased performance benefits and/or heightened injury risk. Thanks to the injury history on the brilliant Baseball Prospectus player cards, we can review his specific injury problems.

As anyone who watched the playoffs last year knows, shoulder and back strains are the main problem, so here's a history of his shoulder/back woes:

• 8/16/2009 -- Right shoulder inflammation, missed 15 days. 
• 3/22/2011 -- Right shoulder inflammation, missed 47 days. 
• 9/15/2011 -- Right shoulder strain, latissimus dorsi, missed 14 days.  
• 10/7/2012 -- Right abdomen strain, oblique, missed 5 days.
• 4/14/2013 -- Right shoulder strain, latissimus dorsi, missed 36 days.
• 6/1/2013 -- Right shoulder strain, latissimus dorsi, missed 15 days.
• 6/29/2013 -- Right shoulder strain, latissimus dorsi, missed an as yet to be determined number of games.

Given that he started incorporating more body coil in 2010, which started getting more severe starting in 2011, it's not inconceivable that his shoulder strains are related to his twisting body coil. The increasing frequency of his shoulder strains certainly seemed to correspond with the increasing severity of his twisting body coil. Causation? Or, merely correlation? Unfortunately, it's impossible to know for sure.

If the injury problems continue, then the Reds have no choice but to make some kind of changes. So, it's worth considering whether his changing mechanics have resulted in improved performance. Here's a look at his peripheral stats over the years:

• 2008 -- 8.2 K/9, 3.5 BB/9, 38.6 GB%
• 2009 -- 6.9 K/9, 3.2 BB/9, 41.6 GB%
• 2010 -- 6.7 K/9, 2.7 BB/9, 41.7 GB%
• 2011 -- 6.0 K/9, 2.7 BB/9, 53.7 GB%
• 2012 -- 7.1 K/9, 2.0 BB/9, 48.9 GB%
• 2013 -- 7.6 K/9, 2.6 BB/9, 51.1 GB%

His performance level throughout his career has been fairly consistent, though it does improve a tick over time. But, is that a result of changing mechanics? Or, just gaining more and more experience at the MLB level?

The biggest area of improvement in his peripherals is the ground ball rate. That seems more likely to be the result of a shift in pitch mix, focusing more on the 2-seamer down in the zone than the 4-seamer up in the zone, than any mechanical change.

At this point, it's difficult to conclude that the twisting body coil is directly tied to his success. My biggest concern would be if the twisting action creates better movement on his pitches. Even so, if the shoulder/back injuries require it, he should be able to alter his mechanics and still maintain a high performance level.

Cueto is an experienced Major League starting pitcher and there's no reason he can't continue to evolve in his pitching mechanics, incorporating a bigger differential between the rotation of the hips and the rotation of the shoulders, to reduce his injury risk. A return to the pitching mechanics of 2010 would likely do the trick. As it stands, his current pitching mechanics undercut the effectiveness of the kinetic chain, requiring his arm to work harder to generate the force for the pitch.

At some point, the Reds season may again come to rest on the right shoulder of Johnny Cueto. Let's hope it proves up to the task. If not, it'll be time for mechanical changes.