Showing posts with label 2008. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 2008. Show all posts

Sunday, August 23, 2009

Rebuilding the Big Red Machine: Step 1

**Note: Originally written in May of 2008**

Go Back To: Introduction



ESPN’s Steve Phillips recently wrote an article about how the Reds could build a new Big Red Machine. While I appreciate his efforts, his article consisted of simply shifting around the MLB roster to create a more talented team. However, in this day and age, building a sustainable dynasty will by and large be accomplished through decisions that do not involve the make-up of the 25-man roster. There is so much that goes on below the surface of an MLB team, that the 25 man MLB roster is really just the tip of the iceberg. The substance is under the surface and not easily seen.

While I certainly didn't agree with Phillips' take on rebuilding the Reds, I do enjoy the topic, so I thought I'd take on the task of rebuilding the Big Red Machine myself. Let's see if I can put together a slightly more insightful plan than the esteemed Mr. Phillips.

Lessons Gleaned from the MLB "Cold War"

I recently read an article about the Yankees and Red Sox and how they were running their ball clubs. Suffice it to say, I was pretty well blown away. The Yankees and Red Sox like to talk about themselves as “Nations” for marketing purposes. The new push for the “Red Sox Nation” and the Yankees contention that they are essentially America’s Team” are examples of how they want their organizations to be viewed by the public. However, a closer look reveals that this is NOT how they view their OWN organizations.

The front offices of the Yankees and Red Sox do not view their teams as nations, but rather as Multi-National Corporations. These two organizations view themselves as Global Brands and they are running their business in that spirit. Judging by the strategic moves they have undertaken to position themselves in the market, these two teams are playing for keeps. If other teams want to remain competitive on the field, then they’ll have to step up to the plate off the field.

In that spirit, let’s look at how we can begin to build a new Big Red Machine in a few "easy" steps.

Step 1: Establish a Team Owned Regional Sports Network, which is Essential to Build the Brand and Increase the Revenue Stream.

A significant portion of a team’s revenue is generated by its local television contracts. In the usual scenario, a team will sell the broadcast rights to its games to a cable channel, who will then have the sole right to broadcast the games to the local public. The cable channel will then sell advertising during the games to recoup their investment. Under this scenario, the revenue garnered by the team from selling the broadcast rights is subject to revenue sharing.

So, if the team sells the rights for $50M, then a portion of that is paid to MLB where it is pooled together and divided out into equal shares for distribution to all 30 MLB teams. That way, all teams benefit to a certain extent from the Yankees massive local television revenue. While this provision has had a significant impact on the small market teams, it has also had some ancillary effects. Like any business, the BoSox and Yanks are not fond of having to give up some of their revenue to their competitors. Accordingly, they are now constantly searching for new revenue streams that are not subject to the revenue sharing provisions of MLB.

However, some teams have found a new way to increase revenue from local broadcasts without a corresponding increase in revenue sharing. These teams have now begun to buy and run their own regional sports networks, which generate additional revenue for the team that should outpace the additional costs that come with it. Nine different teams have gone this route, including the Yankees (32% of YES), Mets (66% of SNY), Red Sox (80% of NESN), Orioles (88% of MASN), Indians (100% of SportsTime Ohio), Cubs (25% of Comcast SportsTime Chicago), White Sox (15% of Comcast SportsTime Chicago), Nationals (12% of MASN), and Giants (25% of FSN Bay Area).

For MLB financial purposes, these broadcast companies are treated as separate entities from the team. As such, the team still nominally sells the broadcast rights to its broadcast company and the revenue earned from the sale of those rights is still subject to revenue sharing. However, all other revenue generated by the team owned cable channel is NOT subject to revenue sharing. Accordingly, instead of the cable channel selling advertising during the games, the team now sells advertising time during the game and all revenue generated from advertising sales is kept free and clear of revenue sharing. In addition, the team could also sell advertising during non-game programming, which is additional revenue garnered from owning the network.

Benefits to the Reds of Having their Own Regional Sports Network

In addition to these immediate revenue benefits, the team would also benefit from the ability to build the Cincinnati Reds brand. If the team owns the channel, then they are free to create 24 hour a day Reds programming. Televise old Big Red Machine games, interview current players, show the ballpark and the surrounding communities, develop kids programming, showing instructional programs that teach the fundamentals, etc. The possibilities seem endless. It’s difficult to imagine a better tool for building fan loyalty and bringing in new fans than a 24-hour a day Reds channel. By creating an outlet solely for the Reds, the team could really ignite the passion of the fan base and increase interest in the organization, both of which would only help with ticket sales and ratings for telecasts.

While the difference in population means that the Reds television network would never be as successful financially as the YES network, there would still seem to be a real opportunity to increase the revenue flow and create a stronger financial foundation on which to build the baseball team. In addition, the Reds could strengthen loyalty among existing fans and tap into that segment of the market consisting of non-fans. Starting their own network would likely increase revenue to the organization and help the Reds develop the team brand.

Final Thoughts

Despite all the talk about the curse, the Red Sox have really only been cursed by mismanagement over the years. However, that's all changed, as the Red Sox now have very savvy management in place, who have built a foundation for the organization that is as solid as the Rock of Gibraltar. They are very sound financially and they use their solid financial position to acquire a consistent flow of revenue to support the MLB roster. They can readily convert their substantial revenue stream into assets to help them win at the MLB level. As it stands, they have waves of talent in the minors just waiting to roll up to the majors. This enables them to better survive bad contracts, injuries, or the aging of the team, as they are always ready to bring up more youthful, cost controlled talent.

Establishing a strong financial foundation is a big key in building a sustainable dynasty, which is why the Reds should invest in their own television network. That would be a very strong first step towards improve their chances at having a consistent winner in Cincinnati.


Go To: Step 2


Monday, December 29, 2008

Is it time to consider signing Joe Crede?

Now, I'll preface this by signing that I'm not much of a Joe Crede fan. If we were to roll the dice with a top draw defensive third baseman with limited offensive skills, then I'd put Brandon Inge well above everyone else. But, building a baseball team requires flexibility and practicality, so maybe it's time to consider someone like Joe Crede.

First, Crede would likely be inexpensive. The market for corner position players is soft, so a reasonable contract would be a real possibility. In addition, the Reds have gone on the record countless times stating that they want a right-handed bat for leftfield. Well, maybe the best option for that particular role is already on the team. Maybe, just maybe, it's Edwin Encarnacion that should be playing leftfield, which would open up third base for Joe Crede. Crede, of course, hits righthanded, so he would balance the line-up a bit more, even if he would be a poor fit to hit fourth between Joey Votto and Jay Bruce.

While it is undeniable that Crede doesn't have the offensive upside of some of the leftfielders being considered, he would give us a huge boost defensively, which may offset the difference in offensive value between Crede and a right-handed hitting leftfielder.

Here is Crede's Ultimate Zone Rating per 150 games for the past three years:

2006: 13.0
2007: 20.4
2008: 8.2

He's had some back problems, so let's play it conservatively and say that he'll be good for 10.0 UZR/150 in 2009, which means that he's 10 runs above average on defense.

Now, here's Edwin's performance over the past 3 seasons:

2006: -13.4
2007: -15.5
2008: -11.6

Let's be generous and give Edwin his best level of performance and say he'll post a -11.5 in 2009, which means that he's 11.5 runs below average on defense.

So, the difference between the two is 21.5 runs, which works out to roughly a 2 win improvement simply by replacing an iron gloved Edwin with a quality gloved Crede. And, of course, I don't think it's a stretch to say that Edwin would be at least as capable in left as Dunn was in 2008, which means there would be no corresponding decline in leftfield defense to take into account (now, the downgrade from Dunn's bat to Crede's bat is another story, but I digress).

Unfortunately, Crede isn't much with the bat and his injury risk is a bit high, but there is improvement to be made with such a signing. In 2008, Crede's overall value to the White Sox was +18.1 runs, which makes him a 1.8 win player. His value would be higher for the Reds because of who he would be replacing, however, even standing alone Crede could prove to be a good value. The money value of a win to a team in 2009 is projected to be ~$5M. So, if Crede can produce 1.8 wins for the team, then his value to that team would be ~$9M. Given that the free agent market is soft and that Crede has a heightened injury risk, he'd likely command far less. In fact, I could see the Reds getting him for ~$5M and a starting job (roughly what he received last year), which would seem to make him a good risk and a solid acquisition, especially since he has the upside to produce more than 1.8 value wins for the Reds. In fact, I wouldn't be surprised if Crede signed for less than $5M, as the market on him isn't very robust these days.

In the end, I suppose it all comes down to his ability to avoid injury, but at the right price that may be a risk the Reds would be wise to consider.

Tuesday, December 23, 2008

Arthur Rhodes gets 2 years and $4M

I suppose it's difficult to complain much about the Arthur Rhodes signing, but I'll do my best.

Why does this signing seem like deja vu all over again?

Let's see, the organization deems itself so desperate for a lefthanded reliever that they throw a multi-year contract at an elderly lefty coming off a single bounce back season after several years of lackluster performance.

Hmmm.....Mike Stanton anyone?

Well, I suppose we can realistically hope for better, as Rhodes has much better stuff and is far less dependent on the team's defense. In 2008, Rhodes struck out 10.19 hitters per nine innings, while Stanton regularly sat in the ~6.0 K/9 range. Any time a Reds pitcher can avoid relying on the team's inept defense the better, so Rhodes has that going for him.

In addition, Rhodes mainted good velocity on his fastball, which averaged 91.4 mph and regained some velocity on his slider, which was back up to an average 83.6 mph for the first time since 2005.

So, while there are a few positives on Rhodes, I'm still not sure it was the best way to go. Over the past 3 years, Rhodes has been appreciably better against lefties (.220 BA and .295 OBP) than righties (.266 BA and .379 OBP), so Dusty will need to fight the urge to over-utilize Rhodes if this deal is going to work out at all.

Once again, the Reds have acquired a player who really doesn't seem likely to make the Reds appreciably better. At the very least, I suppose the risk is fairly low given the annual salary that he is set to make. However, I think the upside is rather limited as well and there is significant performance risk. Treading water seems to be the order of the day in Cincinnati this offseason.

I would like to see the Reds pursue players who would actually improve the club. In this instance, I would rather have seen the Reds pursue Huston Street. The Rockies were rumored to want Aaron Heilman and Pedro Feliciano from the Mets in exchange for Street. It would seem that an equivalent Reds package would be Micah Owings and Billy Bray. If that's the case, I would have pulled the trigger and not thought twice. Bray is a nice pitcher, but I'm just not sure there is any more projection left in him, which would make him a solid lefty reliever and nothing more. The idea of a back-end of the bullpen consisting of Jared Burton in the 7th, Huston Street in the 8th, and Coco Cordero in the 9th is something devoutly to be wished, as the Reds could shorten games to 6 innings. That kind of shutdown bullpen would be the best in the NL and probably all of baseball. Not to mention, it would be the best bullpen the Reds have had since the Nasty Boys were roaming the earth.

To me, acquiring a player like Street would actually improve the team. Street is an impact player, while Rhodes is not. The cost is higher on Street, but so is the reward. The Reds are now in a position where they should be willing to pay a higher cost for a better player. They have the value in the organization to afford better, more long-term solutions. The days of having to settle for retreads and second-hand goods is over. So, once again, I'm underwhelmed by the acquisition, but this time I fear that it will blow up in a Mike Stanton type way.

The Reds should have set their sights higher than mediocre stopgaps like Ramon Hernandez and Arthur Rhodes. It seems like a missed opportunity, as they could have acquired players who were a cut above, like Jarrod Saltalamacchia and Huston Street. Impact players who could have pushed the Reds up the standings in 2009 and still been in the mix for 2010 and beyond. Instead, they have acquired players who will at best be stopgaps until as yet identified players arrive in the future to take over those roles.

Unfortunately, it seems like the continuation of yet another mediocre offseason for the Reds where the goal is to appear to be improving without actually paying the price to do so.

Reds baseball: Full of sound and fury signifying nothing.

Monday, December 22, 2008

Neftali Soto Homerun Derby Performance

Now, this is truly must see t.v. for Reds fans. Neftali Soto cranking homerun after homerun in the 2006 PowerShowCase amateur homerun derby. You don't often see such a beautiful, free flowing swing from a righthanded hitter. And, you don't typically see such raw power in young prospects. Given his swing and raw power, it's no surprise that he broke Juan Gonzalez's amateur homerun record in Puerto Rico. And, here's a scary thought, he's only going to get stronger as he fills out. Anyway, enjoy, Reds fans!!!


Ramon Hernandez Trade

Well, better late than never, time to weigh in on the Ramon Hernandez trade. While the Reds obviously need a catcher, it's hard to think too much of this deal. We had an obvious need for a catcher, but I would much prefer us to address that need in a different manner, ideally by acquiring a long-term solution. To do so, they could either acquire an impact young catcher or a quality veteran. Instead, the Reds chose door number 3.

First option, I would have loved to see us acquire either Jarrod Saltalamacchia or Taylor Teagarden. Either one would have been tremendous, but given how highly the Rangers seem to regard Teagarden, it likely would have been Salty. And, frankly, that would be just fine with me. Salty, as a 23-year old, posted a line of .253/.352/.364 in 230 plate appearances. While that may not seem all that impressive, his splits make it more impressive. As a lefty, Salty hit .311/.426/.451/.877. However, as a righty he fared much worse, posting a slash line of .158/.220/.224/.444. Clearly, Salty has a lot of work to do from the rightside, but a 23-year old catcher who can post a .877 OPS as lefty? Where do I sign up?

Not to mention, it makes all kind of sense for both, as the Rangers have a glut of catchers and need pitching, while the Reds had a hole behind the dish and a surplus of pitching. Unfortunately, it seems like the Rangers set a very high price on their catchers, so maybe a deal wasn't likely to happen. However, this is the type of deal that the Reds should have pursued. It would have been a long-term solution, rather than just a mediocre stopgap.

Second option, they could have acquired a quality veteran catcher along the lines of Russ Martin. I can't imagine that he was actually on the block, but there were such rumors coming out of Los Angeles.

Either of those options would have represented an actual upgrade. Unfortunately, we chose to follow a different path. We acquired a veteran catcher who isn't likely to be appreciably better than what we already had.

RAMON HERNANDEZ

To acquire Ramon Hernandez, the Reds gave up Ryan Freel, Brandon Waring, and Justin Turner. Freel was simple a salary dump, and I won't much miss Waring, but I would have preferred to hang on to Turner. So, while the cost wasn't exorbitant, Hernandez wasn't exactly free, either. And, what exactly did we get for Freel, Waring, and Turner?

Ramon Hernandez is a player who has already caught 9,528 MLB innings, which is the type of workload that usually catches up with catchers at the plate. The wear and tear from strapping on the tools of ignorance for so many years really diminishes the offensive production of veteran catchers. Not surprisingly, he is coming off of two consecutive seasons of .714 OPS. When he was younger, I actually liked what Ramon Hernandez brought to the table, as he offered a well rounded game with a quality righthanded stick.

He even managed to hit 20+ homeruns twice in his MLB career. Once in 2003 (21 bombs) with Oakland and once in 2006 (23 bombs) with Baltimore. Unfortunately, it seems doubtful that he'll reach those heights again in Cincinnati. In 2006, Ramon benefited from his highest number of plate appearances ever (560) and a homer friendly ballpark. I think it's worth remembering that Camden is VERY homer friendly. And, in fact, it's MUCH easier for righties to hit homers in Camden than lefties.

Bill James Park Factors for 2005-2007 for Camden Yards

Total: 110 (10% easier to hit a homerun in Camden than the average AL park)
Lefties: 97 (3% more difficult for lefties to homer in Camden)
Righties: 120 (20% easier for righties to hit homers in Camden)

Bill James Park Factors for 2005-2007 for GABP
Total: 128
Lefties: 128
Righties: 127

So, Hernandez won't be moving into a hitting environment that is much better than the one he is leaving, so there isn't likely to be a significant boost from the new home ballpark. At best, he seems to be mediocre stopgap. Personally, I think the Reds missed a real opportunity to make an appreciable, long-term upgrade behind the dish. The Reds have a deeper farm system than in years passed and adding a young impact bat behind the dish would have made the Reds significantly better.

If we really didn't want, or weren't able, to acquire a young impact catcher like Jarrod Saltalamacchia and instead insisted on turning to an older veteran, then I'm not even sure that Hernandez was the best option.

ANOTHER VETERAN OPTION

I still have to wonder if Kenji Johjima wouldn't have been the better target on this particular organizational path. The funny thing about Johjima is that while his overall 2008 stats look pretty putrid, his component stats aren't too shabby at all. In fact, they may be BETTER than his component stats from 2006 & 2007.

Year: BA/OBP/SLG/OPS
2006: .291/.332/.451/.783
2007: .287/.322/.433/.755
2008: .227/.277/.332/.609

Obviously, his 2008 season was a bust, but lost in the mosh pit of people jumping up and down on Bill Bavasi for extending Johjima's contract is the fact that Johjima may have been more unlucky than anything in 2008.

Year:_LD%__FB%__GB%
2006: 19.0%_36.1%_44.8%
2007: 20.1%_34.3%_45.6%
2008: 21.1%_33.5%_45.4%

So, despite falling completely off the table in 2008, he actually increased his Line Drive rate. What about his selectivity and contact rate?

Year:_BB%__K%__Contact%
2006: 3.8%__9.1%__86.4%
2007: 3.0%__8.5%__85.4%
2008: 4.8%__8.7%__88.0%

So, he actually walked more, struck out about the same amount, and made contact at an even higher rate than in the past. So, how did his numbers fall off the table?

Well, the obvious answer is the hit luck. His BABIP was a paltry .233, which is very low for someone who hit 21.1% line drives. So, that should be expected to rebound. In addition, his rate of infield fly balls was up, which seems like a fluke more than anything else. Infield fly balls are the most automatic type of out a hitter can make by putting the ball in play, so the fewer of these the better. Still, his IFFB% jumped from 12.6% in 2006 and 13.2% in 2007 all the way up to 17.2% in 2008.

In 2009, his BABIP and IFFB% should return to more normal levels and Kenji should return to being the high contact, early count hitter that he has been in the past. Even though I prefer patient, late count hitters, Johjima is the type of player for whom many Reds fans have been clamoring over the past few years. Not to mention, he's a better defensive catcher than Hernandez, as evidenced by his 32.5% career caught stealing rate. And, to top it off, he actually WOULD get a significant boost from switching to GABP, as Safeco is a very tough place to play. Quality righthanded hitters like Jeff Cirillo, Adrian Beltre, Rich Aurilia, and Richie Sexson have all had their careers derailed by the menace that is Safeco Field, so I don't think it would be unreasonable to expect Kenji to have received a significant boost in Cincinnati.

I would imagine the Mariners would have been willing to eat some contract to move him and he's the type of player who actually could get a big offensive boost from a fresh start and a hitter friendly park. I still can't believe I'm actually saying it, but Johjima would have been a better pickup in my opinion.

CONCLUSION

Personally, I think giving up quality prospects in exchange for a quality young MLB catcher would have been far and away the best course of action. I have no problem dealing value from our farm system for a young MLB player who could have solved our catching problems for the next 5-10 years. Unfortunately, we acquired a mediocre veteran who is unlikely to make any kind of appreciable impact on the Reds and whose acquisition seems to indicate that the Reds are willing to just tread water in 2009. At the rate the Reds are going, it seems like another disappointing and lackluster offseason for the Reds. Hopefully, things will improve from here on out, but I'm not overly optimistic.

A Word about the 20-80 Scouting Scale

I thought it would be interesting to post the scale that MLB scouts use to grade out prospects. I found this information in the Baseball America Prospect Handbook and it provides a clear look at the system used by scouts and what the system means.

The Scouting Scale

When grading a player's tools, scouts use a standard 20-80 scale (or, some variation thereof). When you read that a pitcher throws an above-average slider, it can be interpreted as a 60 pitch, or a plus pitch. Plus-plus is 70, or well-above-average, and so on. Scouts don't throw 80s around very freely. Here's what each grade means:

80 - Outstanding
70 - Well-above-average
60 - Above-average
50 - Major league average
40 - Below-average
30 - Well-below-average
20 - Poor


A player's overall future potential is also graded on the 20-80 scale, though some teams use a letter grade. This number is not just the sum of his tools, but rather a profiling system and a scout's ultimate opinion of the player.

70-80 (A): This category is reserved for the elite players in baseball. This player will be a perennial all-star, the best player at his position, one of the top five starters in the game, or a frontline closer. Alex Rodriguez, Ichiro Suzuki, and Johan Santana reside here.

60-69 (B): You'll find all-star-caliber players here: #2 starters on a championship club and first-division players. See John Lackey, Torii Hunter, and Carl Crawford.

55-59 (C+): The majority of first-division starters are found in this range, including quality #2 and #3 starters, frontline set-up men, and second-tier closers.

50-54 (C): Solid-average everyday major leaguers. Most are not first-division regulars. This group also includes #4 and #5 starters.

45-49 (D+): Fringe everyday players, backups, some #5 starters, middle relievers, pinch-hitters, and one-tool players.

40-44 (D): Up-and-down roster fillers, situational relievers, and 25th players.

38-39 (O): Organizational players who provide depth for the minor leagues, but are not considered future major leaguers.

20-37 (NP): Not a prospect.

2008 Top 25 Reds Prospects and Review

Well, I'm cleaning up the blog and getting ready for the 2009 list, so I'm continuing to look back at my thoughts on 2008. So, here was my list of the 2008 top Reds' prospects with links to my individual scouting reports. I'll post the link to this post under my past thoughts list. While I'm at it, may as well use the benefit of hindsight to see how some of these guys performed.

Overall, I'm pretty pleased with how my 2008 rankings shook out. Obviously, Homer Bailey has suffered a major setback. I went back and forth over whether to rank him behind Cueto, but ultimately stuck with Homer in the #2 slot. At this point, a case could be made that he should have been even lower than #3.

Some of the national publications were down on Valaika after his 2007 season, but I thought he'd be a nice bounce back candidate and it's looking good so far. Still, the one that jumps out the most in the top 10 is Travis Wood, who was very good at high-A, but really struggled at double-A in 2008. The jump from A-ball to double-A is widely regarded as the most difficult in professional baseball, so there is still time for him to bounce back. Even so, it was a discouraging performance, as a 7+ ERA is never a good thing.

I'm pretty pleased with where I had Dorn and Soto ranked, as each was very impressive in 2008. Dorn continues to rake and look for some respect among the national publications, while Soto exploded on the scene in 2008.

Unfortunately, Josh Ravin still struggled massively with his control, which at this point threatens to completely derail his career. That said, he's still my favorite pitching prospect and I'm still high on him. Even so, he needs to show improved control in 2009 to get his career back on track.

As for Kyle Lotzkar, 2008 was about what I expected. He's got the good stuff and put it to good use, but he also suffered a significant arm injury which may be attributable to his less than ideal pitching mechanics. His mechanics and likely heightened injury risk are what pushed him down to #16 on the list, as his raw tools would warrant a higher ranking. He was great while healthy, but wasn't healthy all that long.

Brandon Waring and Justin Turner continued to do what they do best. Waring whiffed and homered, while Turner continued to grind out good numbers despite possessing less than impressive tools. While I wish both the best in the Oriole organization, I'll admittedly miss Turner more than Waring.

Finally, Roenicke, Viola, Watson, Fisher, and Pelland showed why I hesitate to rank relievers near the top of the list. Viola, Watson, and Pelland struggled mightily, while Roenicke and Fisher were solid. Even so, none managed to make an impact at the MLB level.

Finally, two of my biggest omissions may turn out to be Daryl Thompson and Chris Dickerson. Honestly, I'm still not completely sold on DT, but his minor league season was impressive. As for Dickerson, nothing would make me happier than to be wrong about him, but despite a massive MLB debut, I'm not convinced that I am. I'll take a closer look at each in the 2009 rankings.

Anyway, for posterity's sake, here is my top prospect list for 2008. I'll be starting with my 2009 list over the next few days, so keep an eye out for it.

Reds Prospects for 2008
1) Jay Bruce
2) Homer Bailey
3) Johnny Cueto
4) Joey Votto
5) Drew Stubbs
6) Todd Frazier
7) Juan Francisco
8) Devin Mesoraco
9) Travis Wood
10) Chris Valaika

11) Neftali Soto
12) Danny Dorn
13) Matt Maloney
14) Josh Ravin
15) Adam Rosales
16) Kyle Lotzkar
17) Josh Roenicke
18) Pedro Viola
19) Brandon Waring
20) Sean Watson

21) Carlos Fisher
22) Sam LeCure
23) Justin Turner
24) Justin Reed
25) Tyler Pelland
Other Notables

Sunday, December 21, 2008

All Under-Valued Team in Review


Well, time for the rubber to meet the road, so let's see how the all undervalued team panned out. Werth and Brian Wilson hit the biggest, while Harang, Barton, and Ensberg were the big disappointments. Unfortunately, injuries derailed Everett and Frandsen in 2008, and slowed Fernando Cabrera down early in the season.

I still have faith in everyone on this list, but I was expecting a bit more out of a few of these guys. Even so, Werth finally lived up to my expectations and Wilson demonstrated the kind of stuff that should make him a shutdown closer for years to come.

Anyway, here is how the guys fared in 2008 with links to preseason write ups.

1b) Daric Barton - There's no sugar coating it. Simple put, Barton had a horrendous 2008 season. He posted a disappointing .226/.327/.348/.675 and may have played his way out of Billy Beane's good graces. On the plus side, he hit line drives at a 19.3% clip, he hit .279/.419/.500 in September, and he was still a very young 23 year old. So, I still think the upside is there and I'd put him on the undervalued list for 2009 as well. It's too soon to write him off, but 2008 was a tough pill to swallow. Even so, he still has a tremendous blend of hitting skills and the power could still develop enough to allow him to post a few seasons with a slash line of .300+/.400+/.500+. I still have a lot of faith in Barton and 2009 will reveal quite a bit about his likely career arc.

2b) Kevin Frandsen - It was over before it began for Franny, as he blew out his achillies tendon and missed essential the entire season. He worked hard and the Giants rewarded him with a pinch hitting appearance in September. He saw three pitches and grounded out in that one at-bat. Unfortunately, Franny may have frittered away his best chance to claim a starting job at the MLB level.

It's odd just how often a player's career is aided or derailed by nothing more than timing. How many quality ballplayers missed their legitimate chance at an MLB career because they were blocked by a superior player? Jack Cust almost missed his window, because few teams recognized that he could be a quality MLB hitter. I have to wonder if that will be the case with Frandsen, as the Giants just signed Edgar Renteria to play short. That may make Emmanuel Burriss the front runner to play 2b and Frandsen the front runner to ride the pine.

Frandsen still has a Freddy Sanchez type skillset, a huge baseball IQ, and a tremendous work ethic. There is still a chance that he'll develop into a quality player, but he'll be 27 next year and the window of opportunity probably closed a bit on Frandsen's chances to be a starter at the MLB level. Still, the Giants love him and he does have skills, so 2009 could still be a breakthrough year for him.

3b) Morgan Ensberg - Probably the most disappointing player on the list for me, as I really like Morgan. Even so, it's getting difficult to keep the faith on him. He'll be 33 in 2009, so he's still got time left in his career, but he needs to redevelop the swing and approach that made him so valuable in 2005.

It was clear that the Yankees were a poor fit for Ensberg, as he needs consistent playing time and unless your are an All-Star, you won't be a starter in the Bronx. Not surprisingly, he hit .203/.263/.243 and was soon out of the Yankees' plans.

I still think Ensberg offers an upside that includes a unique blend of batting average, power, and patience. In addition, he's a solid defensive third baseman. I still think he could be a player in line for a bounceback season and I'd be willing to give him a look if I were a GM. Ideally, he could get some consistent playing time at third base in a hitter friendly ballpark. Not many clubs fit that bill, but the Reds are one of them. Still, Morgan would have to earn a spot on the roster before he could even make a play for a starting job. I will continue to root for him and I still think he could get back on track. However, it's looking less and less likely that he will.

ss) Adam Everett - Like his double play partner Kevin Frandsen, Everett saw his season derailed by injuries. He signed with the Twins, but didn't play much as a shoulder injury made it difficult for him to throw. He just signed with the Tigers and will try to regain the health that enabled him to be the best defensive shortstop since Ozzie Smith.

The Tigers were a massive disappointment in 2008, but one thing I'll be watching (and, yes, I'll be the only one watching for it) in 2009 is the leftside of their infield. They are planning on having Brandon Inge at third and Adam Everett at short. If both can stay healthy, then they'll have one of the best defensive left sides of the infield in baseball history. While that may seem like a stretch, when you have one of the best defensive shortstops in history and one of the best defensive third basemen in the game today, then I don't think it's overreaching.

The Tigers were undone last year by going for the sexy big names, regardless of how they fit in defensively. In 2009, they are going for top flight defensive players, even though they aren't much on offensive. I'll be hoping that both Inge and Everett can stay healthy, as they'll be epically good on defense. Still, offensive ineptitude and injury threaten to derail at least one of their seasons.

lf) Matt Murton - Murton continued an underwhelming streak of offensive performance. On his career, Murton is still at a respectable .288/.354/.438/.792, which may not seem respectable for a leftfielder, but when you add in his fantastic defense then the total package still seems undervalued. While his bat was disappointing in 2008, he defense was not.

In 2008, his combined Cubs/A's defensive performance in leftfield resulted in a 34.6 UZR/150 and a +3 over 123 innings. I still submit that given a fulltime starting job in leftfield, he could be the best defensive leftfielder in baseball.

Unfortunately, his bat lately hasn't lived up to his career line, which is about the floor of production that he'd need to justify a starting gig. Still, I love his glove and think his bat would play if he can maintain his career slash line.

cf) Sam Fuld - Fuld was disappointing in 2008. However, I was surprised that he wasn't actually as bad as I remembered him being. In 2007, he posted a line of .287/.376/.395 between double-A and triple-A. Unfortunately, he lost out on the starting job with the Cubs out of spring training (though, he probably wasn't really given a shot), then cratered in 63 triple-A ABs. He then was demoted to double-A, where he posted a respectable .271/.366/.381.

I still think he could be the type of "free" minor league talent that could pay dividends to a team willing to roll the dice on him. He is rated as having the best plate discipline and being the best defensive outfielder in the Cubs system. Fuld is a favorite of mine from his college days, but I still hold out hope that he can be a sneaky good leadoff hitter and defensive centerfielder. Still, he'll need to take a step forward to catch the eye of an organization.

rf) Jayson Werth - After years of waiting for his massive skillset to emerge, it finally started happening in 2008. Werth possesses plus power, good speed, great defense, and tremendous baseball instincts. And, to top it all off, he's got tremendous on-base-skills. The most interesting thing about Werth is that he has not only the power and patience that you see in undervalued players like Jack Cust, but he also has tremendous defensive and basestealing skills. He's a very complete ballplayer, as evidenced by his 20/20 season. And, if he can prove that he can handle righties, then I wouldn't be surprised to see a 30/30 season out of him in 2009. That may be optimistic, but he's got the power and the speed to do just that. Still, it'll depend on his ability to hit the righties, which hasn't been his best attribute. Still, he had a great 2008 season.

Here's an article on just how valuable Werth was in 2008 and how valuable he could be in 2009 with more playing time.

sp) Aaron Harang - Harang suffered from the All-Undervalued Team curse, as he imploded after being used out of the bullpen in San Diego. He should rebound in 2009, but it's hard not to be disappointed and he certainly didn't prove that I was right about him being undervalued.

sp) Kevin Correia - Correia continues to be underwhelming, but I still like his chances. He's a prime example of a guy needing a change of scenery. He was bounced back and forth early in his career and between the rotation and bullpen later in his career. At this point, I think he needs to be put into the rotation and left alone. He's got good stuff and good movement, but he doesn't ever get a consistent chance. I still think he's undervalued and I'll be curious to see where he lands in 2009.

rp) Fernando Cabrera - Cabrera is back and healthy, which allowed him to demonstrate the type of stuff that got him on this list in the first place. In 2008, he posted a 9.8 K/9, but a concerning 5.4 BB/9. Even so, I think he's primed to take a step forward in 2009, as he's got dominant stuff.

cl) Brian Wilson - Wilson performed as well as I expected him, too. He racked up 41 saves with a 9.7 K/9. He needs to take his command up a tick, but he's primed to be a dominant reliever for a long time. He's got a filthy slider and the closer mentality that should help him get better in the future.

"Heathens" Storm the Gates

The last bastion of traditional, old fashioned baseball thought has finally been breached by the new wave of baseball thought. Rob Neyer and Keith Law have been voted into the Baseball Writers Association of America. The Baseball Writers Association of America (BBWAA) is the professional association of baseball writers who organization vote for the Hall of Fame, MVP, Cy Young, and Rookie of the Year awards in Major League Baseball.

The BBWAA was long limited to beat writers who covered an MLB team for a daily newspaper. In recent years, criticism of the BBWAAs voting choices has increased, leading to calls for changing the membership requirements. People have called for membership to be broadened to include broadcasters, researchers, and internet writers. The BBWAA choices of late have brought about frequent second-guessing over the qualifications of beat writers, as questions were raised over their inability to utilize the new statistical player valuation tools in their decision making.

However, on December 5, 2007, the BBWAA finally opened its membership to internet writers. This was inevitable, as unfortunately newspapers continue to decline in readership and preeminence as a news medium. The first vote for membership included 16 internet writers, including Peter Gammons, Jim Caple, Jerry Crasnick, Tim Kurkjian, Amy Nelson, Buster Olney, and Jayson Stark. Notably absent from the list of approved members were Rob Neyer and Keith Law, who were the only 2 of 18 candidates for membership to be rejected by the BBWAA. Over the years, Law and Neyer have been openly critically of the award choices and Hall of Fame votes made by the BBWAA, as Law and Neyer are two the leading voices for the new wave of statistical analysis. Each has decried the BBWAA as being riddled with old school thinking, as evidenced by the emphasis placed on batting average and RBIs, two metrics that have been statistically proven to be poor measures of a player's value.

The omission of Neyer and Law turned into a very contentious event, as both believed that their past critical writing of the BBWAA led vindictive members to reject their applications. The BBWAA stated that the reason for their rejection was that they did not attend enough games to warrant inclusion in the BBWAA, but questions were raised about whether the BBWAA even inquired into the amount of games each attended. Neyer and Law believe the stated reason was mere pretext for censorship and the issue grew even more contentious over time, even boiling over onto the internet.

Both Neyer and Law publicly decried their rejection at the hands of the BBWAA. Neyer railed against his omission on a message board thread on baseballanalysts.com. In addition, Keith Law wrote about it on his blog, where he ended up in a rollicking debate with Baseball Americe and Colorado Rockie beat writer Tracy Ringolsby (pictured). It is exceedingly rare to see professional journalists engage in this type of open bickering, but that just evidences the controversy and level of hurt feelings that accompanied their rejection.

That Law and Neyer were approved for membership in the very next year may be a sign that the BBWAA recognized their mistake and attempted to rectify it. However, not all is forgiven, as when he was reached for comment on his inclusion, Neyer simply said that he "is happy for all who are happy to be included" in the BBWAA. I am a huge Rob Neyer fan and have a lot of respect for Keith Law (even though I don't always agree with him), and their inclusion is a great thing for baseball fans everywhere. Neyer and Law will add a new perspective to the awards decisions and they represent a big step forward in ensuring that the most deserving players are voted into the Hall of Fame (For example, why isn't Tim Raines getting more support????). In addition, this can only help Reds fans who are hoping to see Barry Larkin enshrined in Cooperstown, which should be a complete no-brainer, but sadly may not be.

Over the past decade, baseball has struggled with the collision between new statistical analysis and traditional baseball thought in several different areas. The first collision was documented by Moneyball, which focused in part on the use of statistics to value players and not just traditional scouting. Given the validity of the new statistical measures, it is inevitable that they will be adopted across the game and the BBWAA may have been the last pure bastion of old school thinking. The revolution may finally be complete and baseball is much better for it.

Saturday, December 20, 2008

Opt-Out Clauses in MLB Contracts

Baseball contracts are completely guaranteed. As soon as a player signs on the dotted line, he is guaranteed to get the complete monetary value of that contract. Just about the only way he won't get the complete value of that contract is if he retires before the contract expires.

While they are legal contracts, in common sense terms they are devices designed to apportion the risk between the player and the team. The longer the contract, the greater the risk undertaken by the baseball organization. The shorter the contract, the greater the risk undertaken by the player. As free agent salaries skyrocket, the risk of a long-term contract is even greater. If a player gets hurt (i.e. Carl Pavano) or simply loses effectiveness (i.e. Barry Zito, Eric Milton), then it can be highly detrimental to the team. However, as stupefying as it may seem, organizations have found a new way to assume an even greater percentage of the risk.

A few years ago, the Toronto Blue Jays signed A.J. Burnett to a hefty free agent contract. The Jays were so anxious to sign Burnett that they gave him a 5 year and $55M contract. Not only did they give him a significant number of years and a huge amount of money, but they also gave Burnett an opt-out clause. Under the terms of the contract, Burnett could elect to opt out of the contract after the 2008 season. Of course, this is just what he decided to do, which is why he'll be wearing pinstripes in 2009.

That was the first time I had heard of an opt-out clause, but the Yankees just used one to get C.C. Sabathia to sign on the dotted line. The Yankees gave C.C. $161M over 7 years. However, C.C. can opt out of the contract after only 3 seasons. So, from an assumption of the risk standpoint, C.C. is assuming only 3 years worth of risk, from 2009-2011, while the Yankees are assuming 7 years worth of risk from 2009-2015.

It seems like an odd trend, but maybe it's the wave of the future. Maybe the scales are tipping even farther in favor of the players in contract negotiations. It's the inverse of the situation in the NFL, where contracts are not guaranteed and teams can opt out of the deal well before the contract runs its course. The difference between the two leagues can be explained by the differences in the strength of the respective player unions. So, unlike the NFL, in MLB it's the players who are beginning to wield this power. For a team like the Yankees, it really doesn't matter much. They can afford to absorb risk like no other team, as their massive revenue stream gives them a much larger margin for error in player personnel decisions. However, it could be highly detrimental to teams without the financial resources of the Yankees.

The Blue Jays are just such an example. They took on a great deal of risk to sign A.J. Burnett. They gave him the money and years to lure him away from the Yankees and Red Sox. However, they also gave Burnett an opt out clause, which ultimately ended up costing them, as they lost him to a team within the division. However, it could have been worse.

For example, if Burnett had blown out his elbow on the last pitch of the 2008 season and required Tommy John surgery, then there is no way he would have chosen to opt out. He would have declined his opt out provision and kept the Blue Jays on the hook for $12M a year. He would have missed all of 2009 and was very likely to be at less than 100% in 2010. Under his contract, A.J. could opt-out to get a better deal if he performed well and stayed healthy in 2008, but could keep the Jays on the hook if he got injured or was ineffective.

If more and more teams agree to these types of clauses, then teams are going to be forced to assume a greater portion of the risk just to attract the best free agents. That would be problematic for smaller market teams and make free agency an even less viable option for these teams. Hopefully, the big market teams won't be willing to offer these clauses, because it would have an inevitable trickle down effect and make it even more difficult for smaller market teams to compete in the marketplace.

Thursday, November 27, 2008

Wanted: Leftfielder who can "GO GET IT"

While the Reds continue to bandy about the names of potential leftfielders for the 2009 season, I once again ascend to the top of my soap box to advocate for the importance of team defense.

As Rany on the Royals (seriously, if you like good baseball writing, go read this site. And, we can all rejoice that Rob Neyer's ESPN work has been moved out from "behind the wall" again, so everyone can enjoy it free of charge) recently noted, Dayn Perry wrote a book entitled "Winners," in which he looked back on championship MLB teams to try to find similarities. One thing he found was that championship teams frequently have two centerfielders in the starting lineup, usually playing one in leftfield. The most recent example that leaps to mind was the Chicago White Sox playing Scotty Podsednik in left and Aaron Rowand in center in their championship season.


For far too long, the Reds have been hamstrung defensively by the structure of their roster. They had an aging and injury riddled Ken Griffey Jr. in center and the defensively challenged Adam Dunn in left. Injuries made the Griffey contract immovable and Dunn was too valuable offensively and too undervalued by the market to trade. So, we as Reds fans were left, on a nightly basis, to perservere through a defensive spectale that would only be appropriate under the big top. Poor range, misjudged flyballs, and singles turned into extra base hits. Unfortunately, I just don't think a team like the Reds will ever have enough superfluous talent to offset the damage done to their Win/Lose record from having a poor defensive squad.

So, as names like Magglio Ordonez, Juan Rivera, and even Adam Dunn are kicked around, I can't help but hope that the Reds don't repeat the mistakes of the past by locking up a defensively challenged player to a contract that will strip the club of roster flexibility and bring about another circus themed defense.

Personally, I don't think it's a coincidence that the best defensive squads are frequently still playing into October. Defense seems to be perpetually undervalued, perhaps because of the inherent difficulty in measuring it. A homerun is easy to see and appreciate, but tremendous range in the outfield isn't always easy to notice or appreciate. Still, a run saved is worth at least as much as a run scored, a fact I hope the Reds keep that in mind for the future.

Given the importance of having a quality team defense, perhaps the best course of action for the 2009 season is to just promote Drew Stubbs to play centerfield and shift Chris Dickerson over to leftfield. That would give the Reds two gold glove caliber centerfielders in their starting outfield. If those two can save the Reds 20-30-40 runs over the course of a season, then they would add roughly 2-3-4 more wins in the win column with their defense alone. Will they be able to acquire an offensive outfielder who can add that kind of impact with the bat? At what cost?

That said, if the Reds do want to sign an impact bat to play leftfield, then I might be be ok with Milton Bradley. I know Uncle Milty is a bit of a headcase and has significant injury problems, but I have long been a fan of his. I don't think I have ever mentioned him on this blog, but I have been a fan of Bradley's since his stellar 2003 season when he hit .321/.421/.501. I have been hooked ever since, as I tremendous appreciate for guys who can post a 3/4/5 slash line. They are the ultimate hitters, as they have the batting average skills, on base skills, and power to be incredibly well-rounded. That's the type of offensive game Bradley brings to the table. Granted, he benefitted from playing in the Ballpark at Arlington, but Great American Ballpark likely wouldn't suppress his numbers very much.

Unfortunately, I wonder whether the risk/reward balance is in our favor on signing Bradley. I love Milty's game, but there is undeniably a significant amount of risk to him. It's the same problem I had when Gil Meche hit the free agent market. Gil has long been one of my favorite pitchers and over the years I had thought of countless different scenarios for the Reds to acquire him from the Mariners. That said, I'm not sure I would have had the stones to sign him to the type of contract the Royals used to acquire him. The risk/reward balance wasn't great, but it is paying off in a big way for the Royals. Given the risk, you may not find great organizational success by rolling the dice on this type of acquisition very often, but maybe this is a time where it would pay off. Dropping Milton into the cleanup spot of the lineup between Votto and Bruce could a huge impact move on the Reds. As a switch hitter, he would bring much more R/L balance to the lineup and give the Reds the threat they need from the right side. Not to mention, his on base skills rival those of Adam Dunn, which is always a good thing.

Bradley has stated that he wants (and feels he has earned) a multi-year contract. With that in mind, I'd be tempted to offer him a three year deal worth $7-8M annually. That would be an increase in salary and in security for Bradley, but it would still make sense for the Reds, as it isn't high enough to limit the Reds in other areas and as a Type B free agent they wouldn't have to forfeit a draft pick to get him. Not to mention, given Bradley's injury history and volatility, I think most teams would have a hard time justifying signing him for more money or years. The Blue Jays, who are reputed to be interested and also have a DH slot available, may be the exception and could offer him more. If they would, then they can have him. That said, if the Reds actually CAN get him for three years and $24M....

Even with his injury problems, I'd have a hard time turning down 130 games a year from Bradley at $7-8M. If we felt comforable that he could give us that as a full-time leftfielder, then I'd pull the trigger. If we need to bring in a caddy for him as a late inning defensive replacement and a starter when injuries strike, then I'd look at Matt Murton. I still like Murton's game and, whaddaa know, he's probably the best defensive leftfielder in all of baseball. Maybe it always actually DOES come back to defense.

Monday, November 24, 2008

Getting a Feel for Jocketty and A Confirmation on Dusty


WALT JOCKETTY


I'm still trying to get a feel for the predilections of Walt Jocketty. Admittedly, I didn't follow his every player personnel move with the Cardinals, but he seems to have made a number of solid moves, got lucky with Albert Pujols, and made one terrible trade for Mark Mulder.

Still, it's difficult to imagine what he was thinking when he hired Cam Bonifay and Bill Bavasi as special assistants to the General Manager. In fact, it's difficult to see it as anything other than a black mark against Jocketty, as Cam and Bill are two of the worst general managers in the history of Major League Baseball. In fact, Cam and Bill were listed #6 and #8 respectively on Jonah Keri's worst General Managers in the history of professional sports.

Cam Bonifay was the general manager of Pirates and made some of the biggest headscratcher moves imaginable. He gave hefty multi-year contracts to Kevin Young, Mike Benjamin, and one of the worst contracts in recent memory when he signed the mediocre Pat Meares. Not to mention, he topped it all off with a six year deal worth $60M for Jason Kendall. In addition, the Pirates constantly frittered away their top draft picks and never had a farm system of note.

As for Bavasi, he cut a swath of destruction up and down the west coast, first as the General Manager of the California/Anaheim Angels and then later with the Seattle Mariners. The list of mistakes is long and distinguished, including signing Mo Vaughn, Richie Sexson, Carlos Silva, and trading the entire farm system away for Erik Bedard.

Now, I can certainly understand that some people are quality baseball minds, but are just ill-suited for the role of general manager. In that category, I could see including Dan O'Brien, who suffered from paralysis by analysis as a GM, but seemed to have a knack for building a farm system. Unfortunately, I find it impossible to include Bonifay and Bavasi in that category, as neither seems to have the slightest clue about player valuation, building up a farm system, or any other aspect of front office work.

Jocketty may have a solid track record with the Cardinals, but he's not exactly building a 21st century version of the "best and the brightest" for his advisers. In fact, it's difficult to conceive what kind of advice of value either Bonifay or Bavasi could even offer.

DUSTY BAKER

Now that we have shed no additional light on the mystery that is Walt Jocketty, it's time to turn our attention to one Johnnie B. Baker Jr. And, while we all know the reputation of Dusty Baker, is it actually true? How does Dusty manage the game? And, who better to measure the tendencies of MLB managers than Bill James?

The 2009 Bill James Handbook includes a section that tracks the tendencies of managers. Unfortunately, since it's a relatively new metric, there is no baseline for comparison. Even so, there are things to be revealed from the career of Dusty.

First and most obviously, Dusty works his starting pitchers harder than most. Dusty's managerial career is notable for his tendency to allow his pitchers to work "long outings" and using a "slow hook." Slow hooks are calculated by by adding the number of pitches plus 10 times the number of Runs Allowed. The top 25% of the scores in the league are considered Slow Hooks. Dusty led the league with 63 slow hooks.

"Long outings" are defined as an outing in which the starting pitcher throws more than 110 pitches. In 2008, Dusty had 39 long outings. In addition, Dusty has frequently led the league in Pitch Outs. In 2008, Dusty had good success utilizing the intentional base on balls. He called for four wide ones 40 times and of those 28 had a "good" result and 12 were "not good." Of the 12 "not good," 4 of those were a "bomb."

So, it's pretty clear that Dusty lived up to his reputation, as he likes to work his starters hard and gives them a lot of rope. However, I think it's just as interesting to see how Dusty handles the bullpen.

One of the more interesting new baseball statistics is the Leverage Index, which is the amount of swing in the possible change in win probability, compared to the average swing in all situations. The average swing value, by definition, is indexed to 1.00. If the score is 14-1, then the possible changes in win probability will be very close to negligible. Whether the pitcher gives up a home run or gets a double play ball, it doesn't really change the outcome of the game. However, in the late innings of a close game, the change in win probability among the various events will have rather wild swings. With a runner on first, two outs, down by one, and in the bottom of the ninth, the game can hinge on one swing of that bat. A home run and an out will both end the game, but with different outcomes for the teams involved.

So, given all of that, it's clear that you want to use your best relievers in the high leverage situations. When the game is on the line and the pitches are the most valuable, those are the pitches you want to be thrown by your best relievers. So, how did Dusty stack up?

In 2008, the leverage index was as follows for the Reds relievers:

Francisco Cordero - 1.8
David Weathers - 1.3
Jared Burton - 1.1
Jeremy Affeldt - 0.6
Mike Lincoln - 1.0

So, in the crucial moments, Dusty relied heavily on Cordero and Weathers. However, it's difficult to argue that Jared Burton was not the most effective reliever on the team and yet he rarely pitched in high leverage situations. In addition, Jeremy Affeldt was very effective, but he was used mostly as a mop-up man.

Now, you can certainly make the "chicken-and-the-egg" argument on Affeldt. Was he effective solely because he was used in mop-up situations or would he have been equally as effective in the high leverage situations?

Whatever the explanation, it will be key to the Reds chances for success in 2009 for Jared Burton to work significantly more high leverage innings. Given their talent, the Reds don't have the margin of error necessary to be successful without using their best relievers in key situations.

It's too soon to be drawing any conclusions, but it seems clear that Dusty needs to handle the bullpen better in 2009.

Friday, November 21, 2008

Great News out of Reds-ville, Affeldt Signs with the Giants

In what looks like a clear win/win situation, the Giants signed Jeremy Affeldt to a two year deal worth $4M per season. The Giants get a very effective lefty who can handle a heavy workload (78.1 Innings in 2008) and the Reds get a compensatory draft pick and salary relief to sign a replacement.

If the compensatory pick wasn't available, then I would have been happy to have Affeldt back on the $8M deal the Giants cut. However, the Giants and Reds weren't in the same situation, as the draft pick tips the scales the Reds gambled on Affeldt last off-season on a one year contract and it paid off in a big way. It's impossible for an outsider to say that the Reds planned to sign Affeldt in hopes of landing a compensatory pick, but one can certainly hope. If that wasn't the plan, then hopefully they can now see the value in churning players. And, hopefully they can see it in a hurry, because they are waffling back and forth on David Weathers.

Before the free agency period began, Walt Jocketty stated that they had made an offer to Weathers and I was none-to-pleased. However, Weathers and his agent stated that no offer had been made. When free agency arrived, Weathers announced that he had "flipped the page" on the Reds and it looked like a second compensatory pick was forthcoming. However, it looks like the Reds are back in the mix, as negotiations are on-going.

One would have to hope that the Reds realize that the draft pick is going to yield more value to the organization than a 39 year old reliever, but the Reds may just choose to ride the value of Weathers right into the ground.

Turning back to Affeldt, his departure opens up a slot in the bullpen for a second southpaw. Personally, I'd be very interested in seeing what Danny Herrera could do as the second lefty out of the bullpen. Billy Bray should be just fine as the primary lefty, but the Reds seem heistant to rely on Herrera. They may well be right, as depth is an important attribute for an MLB team, but I think Herrera and Matt Maloney could both do a nice job out of the bullpen. I'd still like to see Maloney in the rotation, but if he falls short then he could be in the mix for the spot in the bullpen vacated by Jeremy Affeldt.

In 2008, Herrera struck out 9.82 batters per nine innings and posted a 3.50 GB/FB ratio. In 7.1 innings, Herrera racked up 8 strikeouts, 14 ground balls, 4 fly balls, and 4 line drives. Unfortunately, those stats come with a 7.36 ERA, but that is likely the result of his poor luck. He posted a very unlucky BABIP at .415 (should be ~ .300) and LOB% at 58.8% (should be around 70%), so he allowed more hits than was to be expected and stranded fewer runners than you would expect. Admittedly, it's difficult to draw any significant conclusions based on such a small sample size, but I do think there are some real positives there. Best of all, Herrera is a groundball machine, which helped him succeed at high altitude for the University of New Mexico. Of course, he doesn't fit the mold of a major league pitcher, topping out at 5'7" and 83.8 mph. Still, height and velocity aren't everything, so Herrera could be an intriguing fit in Great American Ballpark. But, will he get a chance?

Monday, November 17, 2008

Video: Kyle Lotzkar Pitching in 2007

Here's a clip of Reds pitching prospect Kyle Lotzkar from 2007. It's a short clip, but I think it actually reveals a number of interesting things about Lotzkar.

First, you can see what got him drafted so high. He has the long and lean body type that major league organizations often favor in pitchers. His height allows him to throw on a downward plane and he has a loose delivery. However, you can also see how he raises his pitching arm elbow above his shoulder before bringing the ball up into throwing position. This is the mechanical issue that may increase his risk of an arm injury in the future. Unfortunately, Lotzkar suffered a fractured elbow last year, which is an unusual injury. Hopefully, he can rebound and stay healthy in 2009.


Thanks to ProEthan for posting this clip.

Sunday, November 16, 2008

Video: Sweet Swinging Neftali Soto Homers

Here is a great clip of Neftali Soto crushing a homerun earlier this year for Dayton. Soto is a young prospect with a very big upside, but the thing that stands out the most for me is his swing. It's a beautiful swing for a right handed hitter and the impressive results are showing that sometimes looks aren't deceiving.

Soto has a quiet approach, great balance, and a quick bat. It's easy to dream on a swing like his, but you can judge for yourself. Enjoy!


Thanks to mikerivers30 for posting this clip:

Friday, November 14, 2008

2008 Season Review: Bullpen

The Reds bullpen was a bit of a pleasant surprise in 2008. Of the many problem areas of this team, the bullpen wasn't really among them. In 2008, the Reds relievers put up an 8th ranked 3.81 ERA , but a 21st ranked 1.45 WHIP and a 24th ranked .342 opponents OBP. Here is what the preseason projection looked like.

Francisco Cordero

2008 Projections
Bill James: IP: 61.0, ERA: 3.69, WHIP: 1.33, K/BB: 66/24, SVs: 33
ZIPS: IP: 70.0, ERA: 3.34, WHIP: 1.26, K/BB: 80/27, SVs: n/a
Actual 2008: IP: 70.1, ERA: 3.33, WHIP: 1.41, K/BB: 78/38, SVs: 34

Former GM Wayne Krivksy's big free agent signing was effective, but really didn't do much to alter the fortunes of the Reds.

Closer is an interesting position and one I find difficult to properly value. Their limited workload reduces their opportunity to impact the game, but when they actually are used in high leverage situations their value is beyond measure. However, managers don't always use the closer in the high leverage situations, choosing instead to utilize their best reliever in situations where the team has a 3 run lead and nobody on base.

However, it's undeniable that an ineffective closer can destroy the confidence of a team and cost the team victories in the Win/Loss column.

Rany from "Rany on the Royals" wrote an interesting blurb (which I've quoted below) about Nate Silver's keys to postseason success.

"Before my friend Nate Silver became the world’s most famous pollster, he used to write about baseball. One of his most-cited articles, in “Baseball Between The Numbers”, was an analysis of which teams are likeliest to win the crapshoot that we call the baseball playoffs. What Nate found was that there were three things that were most correlated with a team’s ability to win in the playoffs. Those three things are: 1) Team defense, as measured by Fielding Runs Above Average (FRAA); 2) The strikeout rate of the team’s pitching staff; 3) The quality of the team’s closer, as measured by WXRL. To rephrase this: over the last 40 years (i.e. the divisional era), it is in fact true that good pitching beats good hitting in October. And the best way to beat good hitting in the playoffs is to keep your opponent’s batting average down. The way you do that is to prevent them from making contact (K rate), and when they do make contact, prevent them from getting a hit on balls in play (FRAA). If good pitching beats good hitting, one pitcher matters above all: your closer. With more at stake in each game, managers are inclined to use their closers more aggressively, and all the extra off-days make it easier to run your closer out there. Plus, since every team is a playoff team, blowouts are rare and close games the norm, and the cool October weather also dampens scoring and increases the likelihood of a tie game. Mariano Rivera has never appeared in more than 74 games in a season, and his career high in innings as a closer is 80.2 (he did throw 107.2 innings as a set-up man for John Wetteland in 1996). But since joining the Yankees in 1995, the team has played a total of 128 postseason games, and in just 128 games he’s made 76 appearances and thrown 117.1 innings. Game for game, Rivera has had twice as much impact in the postseason as he's made in the regular season. These three aspects of a team are known as the Secret Sauce.”

While Silver's findings comport with my belief in the importance of defense, they also reveal the importance of a good closer to postseason success. However, Billy Beane has had substantial success with his "Trading the Closer" philosophy, which basically entails selling his closer when the cost gets too high and replacing him with a less expensive, but equally effective reliever. It worked in large part because the marketplace overvalued the "save" statistic, rather than looking to the underlying performance.

So, what is value of a closer? Is it an overvalued position that can be filled easily without resorting to throwing big money at a free agent? Or, is it a key factor for team confidence and postseason success?

To be honest, I'm not sure anymore. I will say that I think the value of the closer would be higher if managers were more willing to use them in high leverage situations, rather than just the traditional 9th inning role. Why waste your best reliever in a low leverage situation like the 9th inning with no runners on and a 3 run lead?

Setup: David Weathers

2008 Projections
Bill James: IP: 75.0, ERA: 3.84, WHIP: 1.35, K/BB: 54/31
ZIPS: IP: 68.0, ERA: 3.84, WHIP: 1.35, K/BB: 46/26
Actual 2008: IP: 69.1, ERA: 3.25, WHIP: 1.53, K/BB: 46/30

Weathers is pretty extraordinary. I have been doubting his ability to maintain a quality level of production since he was 36, but at age 38 he continues to prove me wrong. How does he do it?

Well in 2008, Weathers changed his approach. His pitch mix was as follows: 59.5% fastballs, 32.9% sliders, and 7.6% change-ups. This is a significantly different mix than he used in 2007, when he used more fastballs (74.8%), fewer sliders (23.0%), and fewer change-ups (2.2%).

Weathers seems to be able to adapt his game to the situation and continue to pile up quality innings. However, in keeping with my tradition, I'll say that the Reds should part ways with Mr. Weathers. If they keep him another year, then they will have ridden his value into the ground. This may be the last chance the Reds will have to exchange the value of David Weathers and apply it to a younger asset.

Still, Weathers will probably pitch until he's 50 just to spite me.

7th Inning Guy: Jared Burton

2008 Projections
Bill James: IP: 40.0, ERA: 4.28, WHIP: 1.48, K/BB: 33/19
ZIPS: IP: 67.0, ERA: 4.16, WHIP: 1.45, K/BB: 54/32
Actual 2008: IP: 58.2, ERA: 3.22, WHIP: 1.38, K/BB: 58/25

Jared Burton is flat out nasty and that's all there is to it. The Reds really did their homework when they nabbed him as a Rule V selection from the A's. I'm still surprised that the A's left him unprotected so that they could grab Jay Marshall in the Rule V draft. Marshall is another reliever with a funky arm slot and the A's are believers in those guys, but I'd imagine they'd like a mulligan on this one.

He struck out almost a batter an inning and was probably the Reds most effective reliever. Burton features a Splitter (93.03 MPH), Cutter (88.73 MPH), and a Slider (87.22 MPH). Everything he throws is hard and really moving.

All that's left for him to do is improve his walk rate and workload. He logged 43.0 innings in 2007 and 58.2 innings in 2008, so it would be very beneficial to the Reds if they could get his workload up to ~75.0 innings. Outside of that, the Reds are very lucky to have Burton in the mix.

Middle Relief: Jeremy Affeldt

2008 Projections
Bill James: IP: 200.0, ERA: 4.46, WHIP: 1.46, K/BB: 150/97
ZIPS: IP: 72.0, ERA: 4.75, WHIP: 1.54, K/BB: 48/39
Actual 2008: IP: 78.1, ERA: 3.33, WHIP: 1.31, K/BB: 80/25

Before the season, I had Jeremy Affeldt pegged as a breakthrough candidate or a bust. Thankfully, he broke through. In addition, I really liked the signing because it was a good way to troll for compensatory picks.

Affeldt threw a lot of quality innings for the Reds in 2008 and is now exploring the free agent market. He's earned a hefty payday, so probably won't be back with the Reds. He struck out more than a batter an inning and racked up 121 groundballs and only 60 flyballs.

From a production standpoint, Affeldt would be a nice guy to keep around, but his cost and ability to bring back a draft pick makes it better to let him walk.


Middle Relief: Todd Coffey

2008 Projections
Bill James: IP: 50.0, ERA: 4.86, WHIP: 1.46, K/BB: 36/15
ZIPS: IP: 75.0, ERA: 4.92, WHIP: 1.52, K/BB: 50/25

Lefty Specialist: Kent Mercker

2008 Projections
Bill James: N/A
ZIPS: N/A

Both Mercker and Coffey imploded almost before the season got underway. They combined to log a paltry 23 innings and that was the end of it. Despite possessing good stuff, Coffey was once again undone by the mental good side of pitching.

As for Mercker, his career ended with a whimper, not a bang. Injuries caught up with him, but he had a very nice career and should enjoy his retirement.

Middle Relief: Mike Lincoln

2008 Projections
Bill James: N/A
ZIPS: N/A
Actual 2008: IP: 70.1, ERA: 4.48, WHIP: 1.28, K/BB: 57/24

I owe Mike Lincoln a mea culpa. I honestly didn't get the signing and couldn't imagine what the Reds saw in him. However, Lincoln was fairly effective and he certainly exceded my expectations. Health was likely all he needed to be a reasonably effective MLB reliever.

Perhaps the most impressive thing about his season was his heavy groundball tendencies. He posted a stellar 1.70 GB/FB ratio, which is always a plus in Great American Ballpark.

Given the volatility of relievers, Lincoln probably won't be able to maintain his success into 2009, so perhaps it isn't surprising that the Reds seem to have little interest in bringing him back.

Lincoln does bring up an interesting observation about Walt Jocketty. One thing that is hard to overlook about Walt Jocketty is his preference for groundball pitchers. It was a built-in philosophy for the Cardinals. Jocketty acquired them, Dave Duncan groomed them, and Tony LaRussa put them in the best position to succeed. It seems like every starting pitcher they had was a groundballer and Anthony Reyes couldn't succeed in that organization because he wasn't a guy who would get groundballs.

Perhaps Mike Lincoln is the first sign of the groundball trend being carried over to the Reds organization, which would be a good thing given the reduced pull of gravity that seems to exist in Great American Ballpark.