John Fay, Hall of Fame Voting, and IPEDs

Today is the deadline for mailing in Hall of Fame ballots. This year is more challenging than most, because the first wave of infamous (alleged) IPED users is eligible. So, instead of wrestling solely with the question of whose production is worthy of enshrinement, voters, in the absence of guidance from the Hall of Fame, are left to establish their own voting criteria.

You've heard all the arguments and they run the gamut, with the extreme ends of the spectrum occupied by "never voting for anyone with the slightest whiff of IPED stench" to "excluding the IPED question entirely from the voting calculus."

While I certainly have my opinion, it's hard to definitively state that one person's argument is better or more valid than another. Is there a right answer to this question? Probably not. But, while a correct course of action may prove elusive, there remains an incorrect course of action. The clear-cut incorrect course of action is to abstain from voting. To decide that the question is simply too difficult. To submit a blank ballot in protest or to not submit a ballot at all. In short, to abdicate your responsibilities.

To quote the great Walter Sobchak: "Nihilists! F*ck me. I mean, say what you like about the tenets of National Socialism, Dude, at least it's an ethos."  Or, if you prefer something more classic, you can go with Dante: "The hottest places in hell are reserved for those who, in times of great moral crisis, preserve their neutrality."

Now, we aren't talking about Nihilists and the IPED issue doesn't rise to the level of a "great moral crisis" requiring a trip to the hottest places, but the underlying point remains: form an opinion, take a stand, do SOMETHING even if it's wrong.

All that said, today John Fay, unfortunately, announced that he's punting on the IPEDs/Hall of Fame issue. Here's what he had to say:

I simply can’t do it. I put off mailing in my 2013 Hall of Fame ballot until today’s deadline.

It will not be sent.

I’d rather abstain than play judge and jury this year. The two most deserving players statistically of the 37 on the ballot are Barry Bonds and Roger Clemens. Bonds was the best hitter I’ve seen. Clemens was the most dominant pitcher.

Both should be absolute locks to be first-ballot inductees.

But Bonds and Clemens also top of the list of players linked to performance-enhancing drugs. I believe both players used PEDs. From the BBWAA Rules for Election to the National Baseball Hall of Fame:

“Voting shall be based upon the player’s record, playing ability, integrity, sportsmanship, character and contributions to the team(s) on which the player played.”

I’m one of the eligible voters as a 10-year member of the Baseball Writers’ Association of America. I feel woefully unqualified to judge the “integrity, sportsmanship and character” of players in the steroid era.

I’ve read a lot of columns from fellow voters. Some vow to never to vote for anyone with PED taint on their record. I didn’t vote Rafael Palmeiro and Mark McGwire on those grounds in the past.

At some point last night, I made up my mind that I would vote Bonds and Clemens on basis that they would have been Hall of Famers if they used PEDs or not.

There’s also the argument that steroids in 1990s and 2000s were like the amphetamines in 1970s and 80s. Everybody used them, so just vote based on the stats.

But this morning, I was too torn to pull the lever.

My gut feeling is that I’m done as a voter. Maybe time will give me clarity on the issue, but, right now, I’d rather not vote than send in a ballot I don’t fully believe in.

Now, I certainly understand the difficulties faced, and frustrations felt, by baseball writers. They are being given greater responsibility and less guidance than at any time in recent memory. Add in the fact that, whatever their vote, some faction of the internet will criticize it. The ability of social media to stampede public opinion with the digital equivalent of torches (tweets) and pitchforks (blog posts) is disconcerting. Anyone willing to stand up and voice their opinion voluntarily incurs the risk of a stampede. None of this excuses a writer's refusal to voice an opinion. To cast their vote and make an argument. It's a challenging job, but it's a job that must be done and the eligible writers are among the privileged few who get to do it.

This is another step in furtherance of an emerging and disturbing trend. In today's society, more and more (and I'm looking at you Washington, D.C.), the "do-nothing" option is being taken. Somehow, it's being argued that refusing to carry out the job you agreed to perform is a valid and viable option. People whose job it is to make decisions on the tough issues are refusing. People whose professional responsibilities require them to act are choosing inaction.

I like and respect John Fay, but maybe the most important thing he wrote he saved for last. Maybe he's done as a voter. I give him credit for the seriousness with which he considered the matter. It would, after all, have been easy to fill in a few random bubbles and drop it in the mail. The fact that he didn't reflects the seriousness with which he attempted to perform his task. Even so, if you punt away your responsibilities, then it's time to move on and let someone else wrestle with the issues. These issues, in all their complicated glory, remain even if people refuse to address them.
 
Major League Baseball has taken serious strides to eliminate IPEDs from the sport, but it will never be able to remove the IPED stain from its history. The best Major League Baseball could hope to do is effectively consign the IPED problem to the dustbin of history. Unfortunately, even that wouldn't grant a reprieve to baseball writers, as the Hall of Fame is the embodiment of history. And, now, it falls to the Hall of Fame voters to wrestle with the consequences of this history, advance the discussion, and work towards some type of resolution. Abdicating voting responsibility is the only course of action that fails to satisfy all of these goals.

This situation reminds me of a clip from the new movie Zero Dark Thirty, containing the following (paraphrased) quote: "Look around the room. There's no other agency in another building or on another floor that's going to get the job done. We're it. There's no one else."

Obviously, MLB Hall of Fame balloting falls well short of the life and death struggle depicted in Zero Dark Thirty, but the issue similarly falls to baseball writers to resolve.

There's no one else.   

Pitching Mechanics and "The Kinetic Chain"

The first time I saw Tim Lincecum pitch, way back prior to the 2006 MLB draft, I was hooked. That's all it took. Part of it was his electric, Bugs Bunny like stuff, but another part was his pitching mechanics. Lincecum's pitching mechanics embodied much of what I was, on my own, beginning to piece together about pitching. Namely, that the pitching motion involved a specific sequence of movements that, when performed properly, could incrementally build force. That proper pitching was a summation of force. That each properly executed movement stacked velocity on the one that came right before it. That some types of movements were more effective than others. That flaws in any one part of the sequence would create inefficiency and act as a drag on performance. In short, that "throwing with the entire body" was the best way to increase performance and reduce injuries. It was the kinetic chain right before my very eyes. 

Hitting a baseball is one of the most difficult things to do in sports. Pitching a baseball is one of the most unnatural. During a pitch, the shoulder exceeds 7,000 degrees per second of internal rotation for adult pitchers. It is considered the fastest human movement, a movement generated by the windup process. The stress placed on the arm is tremendous and it's only exacerbated by any mechanical flaws in the delivery.

There is a new wave of interest in managing that stress, spurred on by a combination of escalating salaries and the evolution of information technology, which make it more desirable and easier to study and understand pitching mechanics. Many teams, including the Brewers, view player health as a potential market inefficiency to be exploited. If they can keep their pitchers healthier than their opponents, they'll have a competitive advantage on the field and more efficient production per dollar spent off the field.

The kinetic chain involved in pitching encompasses a coordinated human movement in which both energy and momentum are transferred up through body segments to achieve maximum magnitude in the final segment. The concept of a kinetic chain is developed from the idea that the energy expended in the pitching process is created with large muscle segments and is transferred through the legs and trunk, out to the throwing arm, wrist, and ultimately to the ball. For example, the kinetic chain for throwing consists of the legs, hip, trunk, upper arm, forearm, hand, and the baseball. Pitching's kinetic chain includes a sequence of motions: the stride, rotation of the pelvis or trunk, upper torso rotation, elbow extension, internal shoulder rotation, and wrist flexion. The potential velocity at the distal end where the ball is released is greater if the body segments contribute to the total overall force. Less energy is required if the kinetic chain is executed properly; if the pitcher's mechanics are correct. And, the performance of the pitch - whether velocity, movement, or location - will be improved when the chain is unbroken. But if "the gate breaks" (i.e. one part of the body gets ahead of another, goes off center, etc.), then the chain breaks down and the summation of force becomes inefficient, robbing the pitch of (1) velocity, (2) movement, (3) location, or all three.


At the time, people pointed to Lincecum's size and unorthodox mechanics as reasons to drop him down on draft boards, when in actuality the latter was a tremendous positive, to such an extent that it made the former largely irrelevant. Lincecum was the first high-profile kinetic chain pitcher. There may have been others in baseball's long history, but Lincecum brought it to the mainstream, changing minds and entrenched beliefs along the way. One young pitcher who took note of what Lincecum was doing is Diamondback pitcher Trevor Bauer. Bauer, a mechanical engineering student at UCLA, appreciated and embraced Lincecum's torque-driven delivery as a means of reducing injury risk and maximizing performance.

Lincecum was the trailblazer, Bauer is spreading the word. Bauer, who has the analytical type personality commonly found in mechanical engineering, loves to talk pitching and mechanics, which has made information on the kinetic chain easier to find than ever before. Both Lincecum and Bauer have done much to heighten the discussion and debate surrounding proper pitching mechanics. If you look at their pitching mechanics, the similarities are unmistakeable. Both pitchers stand as prime examples of torque-based/kinetic chain pitching mechanics.

Here's a look at a series of photos of both at key stages in the kinetic chain:

LEG KICK


















Here, they both utilize a high leg kick, which is an essential part of the kinetic chain. Both pitchers coil up during the leg kick, which creates tension and torque. The angle on the photo of Bauer provides a better visual example of coiling, as you can see the knee of his left leg breaking the vertical plane of his right leg. This wrapping of the knee in the leg kick creates tension in the spine, which generates energy. The high leg kick is also very necessary to set up the proper stride, as seen in the photos below.

I have come to view the windup as two phases, divided by the apex of the leg kick. The first phase is all about sequencing movements to generate force to impart on the baseball, while the second phase is all about properly imparting that force to the baseball. Until the apex of the leg kick, the delivery is about building up force, after the apex of the leg kick it's all about transferring that force to the baseball. While kinetic chain pitchers would probably reject the premise that there are two distinct phases, choosing instead to see each distinct movement as nothing more than another link in the chain, but the "two phases" view is one that seems to suit my thinking on the subject. And, makes a degree of intuitive sense. So, I have referenced it in my past write-ups and likely will continue to do so going forward.    



APEX AND DRIVE TO THE PLATE

Upon reaching the apex of the leg-kick, it's time to begin the drive to the plate:

After reaching the apex, the next move is to unleash all the momentum that has been created. Here, they both began their drive to the plate FROM THE APEX of the leg kick. There is a massive difference in the amount of force generated between (1) starting the drive towards the plate from the apex of the leg kick and (2) completely unpacking the leg before beginning the drive to the plate. The force generated by the height of the leg and the body coil are completely wasted if the leg is lowered back down to the ground before driving to the plate. Heading into the 2012 draft, I had concerns about draft prospect Andrew Heaney (my write-up and a video clip of Heaney's pitching mechanics are worth a look if you want to see this leg kick issue for yourself) because he didn't drive towards the plate until after he had already unpacked the leg kick, which is highly inefficient and wastes a tremendous amount of energy generated by the leg kick. In order to pitch at a high level, that lost force must, to some extent, be made up by the arm. Either the lost force will be generated by the arm, causing additional arm stress and likely increasing the risk of injury, or the lost force will be lost forever, reducing the performance level of the pitcher.

Lincecum and Bauer both drive towards the plate from the apex position. You can see that both utilize a lean towards the plate as the leg kick unpacks. This aggressive move is important because it puts them in position to take a long, powerful stride. More and more, it is becoming clear that a long stride is a significant key to the kinetic chain delivery and power pitching in general. (On a related note, ultra-velocity Aroldis Chapman is another pitcher with a very long stride. I've previously posted pictures comparing his stride to that of Lincecum and the similarities are striking.)


STRIDE

Here are photos of Lincecum and Bauer in mid-stride:

As you can see, both pitchers use a very long stride. A stride so long that they almost have to leap off the rubber towards the plate in order to cover that much ground. For kinetic chain pitchers, the long stride is exceptionally important, as it is what permits full, explosive hip rotation. Pitchers who utilize a short stride frequently cut off the rotation of their hips, which limits their ability to transfer the force generated by the body to the baseball. By utilizing a long stride, the pitcher clears the body and allows sufficient time for full and complete rotation of the hips.    

Generally speaking, short stride pitchers are likely to be command and control pitchers (or, power pitchers who generate velocity largely with their arm, which increases the risk of injury), while longer stride pitchers are likely to be power pitchers. But, of course, there are exceptions to every rule, which is what makes baseball, and life, enjoyable. 


PITCHING POSITION

The photos in this section are the two most important in this entire post. These photos are the biggest key to the kinetic-chain/torque based method of pitching:

















As was mentioned previously, a long stride is important for full-and-complete rotation of the hips. If you look at both of these photos, you can see the hips of both Lincecum and Bauer are almost on a line running from first base to third base, while the shoulders are still on a line running from second base to home plate. At this point, the momentum has moved from the legs to the hips. The long stride permits the pitchers to delay rotating the shoulders. This delayed trunk rotation maximizes the torque in the delivery.

An aggressive, long foot plant allows pitchers to maximize hip rotation, while delaying the back shoulder and arm as long as possible. This high-velocity hip rotation, generated by the legs, along with the loose and delayed torso, PULLS the upper body along at high speed, delivering the arm at the same time. Both Lincecum and Bauer have mentioned that they don't have to ice their arms down after pitching. The simple reason is that they throw with their entire body and the arm is merely pulled along by the explosive hip rotation. The body simply pulls the arm along, reducing stress on the arm. The arm is nothing more than the distal end of the chain, like the person at the end of the whip in a game of crack-the-whip, the conduit for all the momentum generated by the chain. The arm doesn't have to generate the force itself, rather it just channels and imparts that force generated by the sequential movements of the delivery to the baseball.

While the kinetic chain reduces the stress on the arm, it also increases the importance of health of the entire body. For example, lingering injuries to the lower body of a kinetic chain pitcher can cause "the gate to break", leading to a decline in performance. This happened to Trevor Bauer in 2012, causing his velocity to drop and his performance to suffer, as he explained:

"It was like the tale of two pitchers or Jekyll and Hyde," Bauer said. "I'm so heavily dependent on my legs to keep myself in line and generate everything, so when something that low in the chain goes, it's hard to accommodate for it."

Ultimately, these types of mechanics may be a key to understanding how to reduce stress on the arm and avoid pitcher injuries. And, increasing pitcher durability is undoubtedly a way to gain a competitive advantage and increase your return on investment. At the very least, discussion of these pitching mechanics advances the conversation regarding what actually are desirable attributes in a pitcher's mechanics. If a team can more accurately evaluate pitching mechanics, then they can more accurately target players in the draft and teach those new mechanics to players already in the system through their player development department. Both Lincecum and Bauer, through words and deeds, are making a strong case for the use of kinetic chain pitching mechanics to maximize both durability and performance.  

AFL Rising Stars Game: A Look at Billy Hamilton

I finally got around to writing up Billy Hamilton's performance in the Rising Star Game. His performance was definitely noteworthy and made him one of the stars of the game. Given the hype surrounding him, it was a tall task for him to live up to the expectations. Yet, he managed to do so. Here's a quick look at what and how he did.


Top of 1st - 0 on, 0 Outs, vs. rhp Jarred Cosart

Pitch 1 - Fastball down, Hamilton shows bunt. Ball 1
Pitch 2 - Fastball down, Hamilton shows bunt. Ball 2
Pitch 3 - Fastball down-and-in. Ball 3
Pitch 4 - Fastball over the heart. Strike 1
Pitch 5 - Fastball over the heart. Strike 2
Pitch 6 - Fastball misses inside. Ball 4

Hamilton never seriously considered swinging and Cosart never forced him to make any difficult swing/no-swing decisions. Cosart's poor control made this an easy AB for Hamilton, putting him in a hitter's count early and letting Hamilton wait him out. 

Hamilton appeared to be taking until he got a strike. He showed bunt on the first two pitches, but it didn't look like he was ever seriously considering bunting. When Hamilton reached 3-0, he took two fastballs over the heart of the plate for called strikes 1 and 2. The only pitch that required Hamilton to make a swing/no-swing decision was the full-count pitch, which missed inside for ball 4.

Photo courtesy of Baseball America.

Steals 2nd vs. c Austin Romine and rhp Jarred Cosart

Hamilton steals second base on second pitch fastball. Good pitch for catcher to throw on, as fastball drifted up-and-away off the plate, resulting in a close play at second. Hamilton slides safely into second feet-first.

Hamilton kept his feet moving on his leadoff from first, rather than getting set, seeming to prefer as close to a walking lead as he can get.

The steal of second was about pure speed. He stole it during a 1-0 count, which is both a hitters' count and a fastball count. But, Hamilton doesn't  need to pick his spots quite as closely as mere mortals and he simply outran the play.


Steals 3rd vs. c Austin Romine and rhp Jarred Cosart

Hamilton steals third on a delayed steal. Hamilton flashes the brashness and aggressiveness that allows him to steal so many bases. It's one thing to be quick/fast, but you need a lot of confidence to steal as often as Hamilton does. Hamilton took his initial lead off of second base as the pitch was being delivered. He then took three more lateral steps towards third base during his secondary lead. From the centerfield camera, you could see that, instead of retreating back to second base when the catcher caught the ball, he was intently watching the catcher receive the ball and begin to throw it back to the pitcher. Once the catcher flipped the ball back to the pitcher, Hamilton broke for third and stole the base without a throw and with a head-first slide.

Hamilton had a great read on the play, recognizing that the catcher wasn't firing the ball back to the pitcher, rather flipping it back. Also, Hamilton likely realized that by the time the pitcher caught the ball, he'd still have to recognize the steal attempt without panicking and then fire the ball to third to get him. I also wonder if Hamilton factored in that Cosart is righthanded and as a result would have to spin his body in order to throw to third, whereas a lefty is already facing thirdbase and might have a better shot to nail him.

The steal of third showed a take-no-prisoners style of baserunning that wouldn't have been out of place during Ty Cobb's era. Put the pressure on the defense, keep them jumpy and on edge, force them to make a perfect play or into making mistakes.

An impressive and smart play by Hamilton. He caught both the defense and announcers off-guard. While he simply outran the defense on the steal of second, he out-thought the defense on the steal of third.   


Hamilton scores from third on a double to the rightfield wall



Bottom of 2nd - Austin Romine double off centerfield wall

Hamilton chases the ball all the way to the warning track, but it hit high off the centerfield wall. It was 2-3 feet from being a homer, instead Romine managed to leg out a triple as the ball bounded back towards the infield. Hamilton, arguably, should have pulled up at, or before, the warning track and played the carom. Even with his great speed he didn't have a realistic chance of running it down and by trying to track it down he let the catcher leg out a triple.

When Hamilton ran the bounding ball down, he threw it back to the cutoff man with the low three-quarter arm-slot that he used as an infielder.

More playing in time in centerfield will improve Hamilton's reads off the bat and allow him to more effectively handle these types of plays. 


Top of the 3rd - 0 on, 1 out, vs. rhp Chase Anderson

Pitch 1 - 91-mph fastball low and on outer half. Strike 1
Pitch 2 - 81-mph changeup belt high and running off outside corner. Hamilton swings and (I thought missed, but) ump signals foul tip caught by catcher. Strike 2
Pitch 3 - 79-mph sinker/changeup borderline at bottom of the zone. Hamilton fouls it off to protect. Strike 2
Pitch 4 - 91-mph fastball running away and off outside corner. Hamilton takes it. Ball 1
Pitch 5 - 80-mph changeup low and on outside corner. Hamilton tries to pull it, fouls it off. Strike 2
Pitch 6 - Fastball up and at the letters, Hamilton chops it foul wide of third. Strike 2
Pitch 7 - 76-mph curveball drops over middle of the plate. Very good pitch. Hamilton frozen. Called Strike 3

This AB was the exact opposite of the first AB, as Anderson immediately gets ahead 0-2, putting Hamilton on the defensive the rest of the AB. Unfortunately, this AB once again precludes any study of Hamilton's swing/no-swing decision making, as he was forced into protect mode immediately. Hamilton does a nice job of fouling off pitches and was punched out on a nasty curveball.  


Bottom of the 4th - Double by Brian Goodwin

Long flyball to center over Hamilton's head. Hamilton turns and tracks it down on the warning track. When he reaches to catch it, his momentum carries him to the ground. It wasn't a pure diving catch, but he ends up almost kissing the wall as his momentum carries him close to face first into the wall.

Hamilton made the play, but he made it more difficult than it needed to be. It's possible that the ball drifted in the Arizona air or the wind carried it farther than it would normally travel, but Hamilton drifted back with the ball rather than running full out. As a result, he ended up barely reeling it in on the warning track. This is another play where more experience will result in better defense. As it stands, his athleticism allows him to outrun most mistakes he makes, including this one. 


Top of the 5th - 1 on, 0 Out, vs. rhp Tony Zych


Pitch 1 - Fastball on outer half at the belt, Hamilton pulls a perfect drag bunt down the first base line. Speed causes first baseman to rush his throw, which sails down the right field line. Hamilton easily advances all the way to third. A single and an E-3.

The bunt was very well executed. The form was good and he looked very comfortable doing it. It's very encouraging to see him combine the secondary skills necessary to utilize his plus-plus speed.   

While on third, Hamilton had a running start towards home and got almost halfway home before causing the pitcher to step off the rubber. Disruptive.

Hamilton scores easily on a single to center.  

The bunt showed a high level of skill and an understanding of the type of player he needs to be. Hamilton has no problem embracing the small ball skills he needs to be an impact player.


Bottom of the 5th - Corey Dickerson single to centerfield with runners on 1st and 2nd

Hamilton charges a ground ball single and fields it cleanly in shallow center. Hamilton comes up throwing to the plate, but the run scores.

Hamilton's throw is a tick late and up the line. The catcher comes off the plate to field it up the third base line. Hamilton used a high three-quarter arm slot, so it's not surprising that his throw had arm-side run and drifted up the third base line.


Bottom of the 5th - David Adams doubles to right-center gap

Hamilton runs to the right center gap to field a double after right fielder Rhymer Liriano took a poor route. Hamilton cuts it off and stops his momentum about 10 feet short of the warning track, spins and makes a solid throw to the cut-off man. Not the strongest throw, but certainly playable. 


Bottom of the 5th - Brian Goodwin doubles with a short hop off the wall in center

Even Hamilton has no shot to run this one down, as its zips over his head. He plays it well off the wall, grabbing the big hop, and throws it towards the second cutoff man. The throw had a little arc to it and it actually came in high, tipping off the glove of the second cutoff man. A solid, but unspectacular throw.


Top of the 7th - Billy Hamilton, 0 on, 0 out, vs. lhp Santos Rodriguez

1st Pitch - Fastball up and away out of the zone. Hamilton tries to drag bunt to third, pops it up and it's caught by the third baseman.
 
The first opportunity Hamilton has to hit from the right-side of the plate ends quickly. This was a failure of judgment, as he shouldn't have attempted to bunt this pitch. It was out of the zone and difficult to handle, so the pop-out wasn't a surprise.
 

Top of the 9th - Billy Hamilton, 1 on, 0 out, vs. rhp Trey Haley (plus velocity)

1st Pitch - 92 mph fastball, way outside. Ball 1
2nd Pitch - Fastball very high. Ball 2
3rd Pitch - Fastball up and in. Ball 3
4th Pitch - 92 mph fastball on the outer half. Called strike 1
5th Pitch - 92 mph fastball. Ball 4

This was an opportunity to see how Hamilton fared against plus velocity. One of the question marks on Hamilton is his strength and whether he has the bat speed to turn around a good fastball. Unfortunately, Haley didn't cooperate, once again throwing Hamilton three straight balls to put him in a massive hitter's count. Haley cedes control of the AB to Hamilton and ultimately walks him without Hamilton ever having to lift the bat off his shoulder.


Hamilton forced out at second on a ground ball, ending his day.


Overall, it was a very good game for Hamilton. He drew two walks and reached on a perfectly executed bunt single. He flashed the elite speed that makes him the most hyped prospect in baseball and held his own in centerfield. It was comforting to see him so fully embrace the small ball approach, dropping down two bunts, drawing two walks, and stealing two bases. Admittedly, I was hoping to see him swing the bat a bit more, but Hamilton seems to understand that you can't steal first base and seems committed to maintaining a high on-base percentage.

I'm still not sure how much of his stellar OBP is the result of a disciplined approach and how much is due to command issues of the pitchers. Given his combination of elite speed and minimal power, pitchers have tremendous incentive to throw strikes and yet...they don't. Hamilton's two walks in this game were more attributable to the pitcher's struggles than a grinding approach by Hamilton. Still, he had the good sense to not help the pitcher out and was rewarded with two free passes. 

Hamilton still has some developing to do, but he's been impressive thus far. A bit more polish and he'll be ready for prime-time.

On "Balancing Forces", Swing Mechanics, and Dustin Ackley

Over the years, I have gained a greater appreciation for motor sports. In the ability of drivers to push their cars to the limit, where peak performance and peak danger coexist. To drive right on, but not tip over, the edge. To maximize speed without the loss of control.

I remember watching a Formula 1 race back in the heyday of Michael Schumacher and team Ferrari. Schumacher was leading the race, but still had to make an additional pit stop that the cars trying to run him down didn't need to make. His team, which knew that the pit stop would take roughly 10 seconds, got on the radio and informed Schumacher that he needed to post a specific lap time over each of the next 20 laps in order to win. In essence, he needed to improve his lap times by roughly half a second over the next 20 laps in order to build up a 10 second buffer to ensure that when he exited his the pits he would still be ahead of the teams behind him. Anything less would see him reenter the race track outside of the lead, looking at tail-lights with little chance of passing to win the race. The team calculated the lap times needed to win and Schumacher delivered those lap times, exiting pit lane just ahead of the cars that were trying to run him down. He needed more speed and knew just how to wring it out of the car. The ability to just "go faster" when needed, to outperform teams who spent hundreds of millions of dollars to best him, was a testament to the car developed by Team Ferrari, but also to the pure skill that enabled Michael Schumacher to drive at the absolute limit of the car's capabilities.
 

One of the main keys to driving a race car at the limit is controlling those forces (resulting from braking, accelerating, and cornering) that act on the car. Basically, controlling the balance of the car. When a car is balanced, you maximize the tires' traction. The more traction the car has, the more control the driver will have and the faster the car will travel around the track. If you don't push hard to the limit, then you'll be slow and noncompetitive. If you push too hard and exceed the limit, then you'll be slow and noncompetitive because the tires will break away, losing grip, and start to slide. You can be uncompetitive by not generating enough power and you can be uncompetitive by generating too much power and exceeding your ability to control the car. In short, you can generate all the power you want from the car, but it will be ineffective in improving racing performance without the ability to balance the car. If you can't balance the forces acting on the car, then you will struggle to maximize performance.

Baseball is no different. Hitting is no different. It's about generating power, but it's also about controlling the forces that create that power. Hitting is balancing forces to maximize performance. 

A hitter can fail to maximize performance by not pushing hard enough, not generating enough power. Perfect balance of minimal power doesn't maximize performance. (An example of this might be David Dahl, who I rated third on my last draft write-up wish list, but one potential red-flag was that he seemed to be largely an upper-body hitter. He had perfect balance, but limited force to his swing). A hitter can also fail to maximize performance by failing to balance the forces generated by the swing, basically exceeding the limit. Too much power, not enough control. (An example would be a hitter who takes a big cut, but is out of balance or, in the extreme, falls down during his swing).

The physical actions required to play baseball at the highest level involve utilizing the entire body. The best pitching mechanics are based on the kinetic chain, reducing stress on the arm by throwing with the entire body. Sequencing the moves in your mechanics to gradually build and stack velocity before imparting it on the baseball. However, if  any link in the chain breaks down, then your delivery becomes inefficient. That inefficiency reduces velocity and the level of performance. Pitching is an act of the entire body. The best hitting mechanics also require use of the entire body.

The power in a hitter's swing is generated substantially from the core, not the hands, wrists, or forearms. More specifically, the rotation of the hips is what powers the swing. Once the plant foot lands, the hips rotate rather than slide forward. The mental image is that a hitter standing in a barrel wouldn't touch the sides of the barrel with his hips during his swing. In order to generate power through hip rotation, the hitter has to effectively cock the hips via the stride. To properly fire the hips, the hitter needs a proper foundation. That foundation requires a firm front leg, which Albert Pujols ably demonstrates here:


















The hitter cocks his hips to build up potential energy, but to properly and efficiently unleash it requires a firm front leg. If the front leg isn't firmly planted, then the swing is inefficient and the power generated bleeds out of the swing instead of being transferred to the baseball. 

All of these thoughts were in my head when I undertook to answer a question that has been bothering me:


Why can't Dustin Ackley hit?

Ackley seemed a pure hitter with very little development risk when he was drafted out of North Carolina. He had bat speed, hand-eye coordination, pitch recognition, the ability to barrel the ball, solid power potential, and a good grasp of the strike zone. It was almost inconceivable that he wouldn't hit. And yet, to date, he really hasn't.

This offseason, I've been reevaluating hitters and hitting mechanics to better understand what makes a good hitter. So, answering the Ackley question was a natural extension of this process. It didn't take long for a possible explanation for Ackley's struggles to emerge.

If you look at the following photos, the aspect of the swing that catches my eye is the front leg.

Unlike Albert Pujols, Ackley does NOT consistently hit against a stiff front leg. The severe flex in his front knee is fairly surprising, as it not only seems wholly unnatural, but it may also be indicative of a number of problems. As was mentioned above, potential power bleeds out of the swing when the hitter does not utilize a firm front leg. Ackley's position in the above photos significantly limits hip rotation and may lead to the hips sliding forward to compensate for the lack of rotation. It's simply not possible to fire the hips from this type of foundation. Further, hitting in this position may lead to the eye-level dropping, creating difficulties in tracking the pitch. Overall, it's simply not a proper foundation for hitting.   

While this flaw jumps off the screen, it's not one from which Ackley suffers all the time. He does show flashes of a stronger, more efficient foundation. Here's a look at Ackley doing it right. If you watch his front leg, it straightens out, rather than his knee getting almost outside his front foot. This allows his hips to rotate properly and efficiently unleash the power he has generated.






To me, the above video reveals a much stronger set of hitting mechanics. At the 00:36 second mark, you can see a stronger foundation, which permits both better generation of force and better balance of those forces. So, he certainly is capable of this type of swing.

However, while Ackley clearly doesn't suffer from the flaw all the time, he does frequently fall into the bad habit of not hitting with a stiff front leg. The following video, despite resulting in a double, is a prime example of this flaw in his swing:




At the 00:29 second mark, there is a great view of Ackley's swing. You can see him hitting against a flexed front knee, though he still manages to drop the head of the bat on the low pitch and muscle it into the right-center gap with his arms and upper body. At the 00:35 second mark, there is a great super slo-mo view of his hip rotation. There is a point where you can see the hips stop rotating and his swing become upper body driven. In fact, at the moment he makes contact, you can actually see his hips actually reverse-rotate back towards home plate. So, as his shoulders continue to rotate clockwise, his hips actually start to rotate counter-clockwise against his shoulder rotation. While, in this instance, the final outcome is good, the process is bad. And, relying on a flawed process to produce good results is a recipe for inconsistency and failure. 

It remains unclear exactly when and why Ackley falls into this habit. At first I thought it was his way of handling low pitches, but if you look at the Ackley photos above, those aren't exactly down in the zone. So, that's not it. Next, I thought it might happen on offspeed pitches where he's fooled and trying to slow down his swing to keep the bat in the zone longer, however the following video reveals that not to be the case:




Facing Franklin Morales, Ackley's swing falters as his front leg badly breaks down, but this happens against a straight 94-mph fastball. So, it's not a swing flaw brought about by being fooled by an offspeed pitch. There's a great view of the swing flaw starting at the 00:25 second mark. You can see how the flaw leaves him with an arm and upper body swing, as the front leg position limits hip rotation, causing instead the hips to slide forward. The flaw saps the swing of substantial power. If I was the hitting coach of the Mariners, then this is the first change I would make to Dustin Ackley. He needs to firm up his front leg and avoid breaking down. The flaw creates massive inefficiency in the swing and saps his ability to drive the ball consistently.

Hitting is both creating power and balancing the forces that generate that power. Dustin Ackley's flexed front knee leaves him unable to properly balance those forces. As a result, his swing is inefficient and bleeds potential power. It's possible that this flaw has already been pointed out to Ackley, as sometimes correcting a flaw is far more difficult than identifying it, but if I was the Mariner hitting coach this is where I would want Ackley to expend his energies. He has far too much natural ability to not be an impact hitter at the MLB level.

In reflecting on hitting, I think it really IS the hardest thing in sports to do well. It's also one of the most difficult to properly evaluate. What makes a good hitter? It's harder to identify than I previously thought. It involves both swing mechanics and reactive abilities. As for the former, it shares similarities with other sports, particularly properly balancing the forces you generate to ensure efficiency and peak performance.

Offseason Target #2: Marc Rzepczynski

Admittedly, this one strikes me as being rather unlikely and really doesn't address an area of need for the Reds, but if the following comes to pass, then the Reds would be foolish not to pounce:

MLB.com's Jenifer Langosch lists Marc Rzepczynski as a non-tender candidate. Rzepczynski made $504,000 in 2012 and is arbitration-eligible for the first time this winter. Langosch believes that right-hander Kyle McClellan is also a non-tender possibility.

Personally, I just can't see the Cardinals cutting Rzepczynski loose, as I suspect the Cardinals recognize that his value will likely outpace even his arbitration award. Even if they didn't feel he was worth, it seems likely that they would trade him rather than non-tender him, but crazier things have happened so we'll consider it for a moment.

I was intrigued by Rzepczynski the first time I saw him work in Toronto. He combined good stuff with a lot of polish, but we'll get back to that after a quick detour through his pitching mechanics. Rzepczynski has solid mechanics, which are largely defined by an unusual arm swing that I can't recall having seen seen in any other pitcher...except one. Curiously, that other pitcher also made his MLB debut in 2009. If you compare Rzepczynski with Madison Bumgarner, the mechanics are pretty close.  

Both pitchers utilize high leg kicks with coil at the apex to build up momentum to impart on the baseball. Each also maintains good balance at the apex of the delivery, while being fairly deceptive with the ball.

As both unpack the leg kick and start to drive towards the plate, they incorporate an unusual arm-swing to bring the ball up into the pitching position. Most pitchers use a far less severe arm-swing, but Bumgarner and Rzepczynski both swing their pitching arm directly out towards third base.














I can't imagine anyone teaching such an arm-swing, as not only does it seems like an unnatural motion, but it also eliminates any deception in the delivery. The ball is right there for the hitter to pick up. Even so, it's likely the way both pitchers naturally threw the ball when they first climbed up a pitching mound. It certainly works for them.

After they use the arm-swing to bring the ball up into position, they use similar stride lengths and throw with similar high-three quarter arm slots.
















While the mechanics are the same, I'm not suggesting that Rzepczynski is in Bumgarner's class as a pitcher. Bumgarner has an advantage in physical stature, which gives him a tick better stuff. And, for whatever reason, Bumgarner has an uncanny feel/command for pitching, which gives him another edge over Rzepczynski. Even so, Rzepczynski has value in his own right.

Personally, I think Rzepczynski is being wasted in relief, though his stuff undoubtedly plays up out of the bullpen. Still, I could see him as a solid mid- to back-of the rotation starting pitcher. Given that the Reds are short in the southpaw department, both in the rotation and in the bullpen, adding another lefty would have value.

For his career, Rzepczynski has ratios of 3.97 BB/9 and a 8.13 K/9 to go along with a 4.04 ERA and a 1.38 WHIP. One other factor would make him a good fit for the Reds, as he has heavy ground ball tendencies. On his career, he has a 56.1% ground ball rate, which was even better over his last two seasons (64.8% and 58.9%, respectively). To put it in perspective, his career rate is better than that of the Reds two biggest ground ball starters, Johnny Cueto and Mike Leake, who each chimed in with a rate of 48.9%.

The acquisition of Rzepczynski wouldn't address an area of immediate need, but adding value is always a good idea. The Reds lacked a southpaw starter in 2012 and, unless they move Aroldis Chapman into the rotation, that will likely be the case in 2013 as well. Further, given the impossibility of relying on the man of glass, Bill Bray, the Reds could use Rzepczynski as a second or third lefty out of the bullpen.

If the Reds learned nothing else from the loss to the Giants in the NLDS, they should at least recognize the advantage that having three lefties in the bullpen afforded Bruce Bochy. By having Javier Lopez, Jeremy Affeldt, and late season acquisition Jose Mijares, Bruce Bochy could use a very aggressive approach to running his bullpen. Frankly, that, and his willingness to actually manage aggressively, gave him an advantage over Dusty Baker.

Adding an lefty arm like Marc Rzepczynski is a good value play, regardless of whether they would utilize him in the rotation or out of the bullpen. Now, all they need is for the Cardinals to do something foolish to make him available. I probably won't hold my breath.

Reds Offseason Target #1: Ryan Sweeney

Photo courtesy of Kelly O'Connor

Now that the Giants have salted away the 2012 season and added their second title in three years (seriously, what universe is THIS???), it's time to look at the Reds' needs for 2013. The obvious needs are (1) table-setting, (2) bench depth, and (3) finding a replacement third baseman or leftfielder.

I was blown away by the caliber of the At Bats in the NLCS. Both the Giants and Cardinals featured a number of professional hitters who combined a disciplined plate approach with an all-fields hitting style. These hitters seemingly never gave away an AB and were difficult to beat. Particularly, Buster Posey and Marco Scutaro for the Giants; Carlos Beltran and David Freese for the Cardinals. I would love to see the Reds add another professional hitter with a disciplined approach, the obvious need being the top of the order spots.

There is simply no way the Reds can head into the 2013 season with the same sub-sub-sub-standard table-setters they featured last year. It's almost inconceivable just how putrid the Reds were in the 1st and 2nd spots in the order. And, it's indefensible, especially when you have the best hitter in baseball in the third slot. The number one job for the Reds this offseason is to ensure that Joey Votto has more ducks on the pond in 2013. Given how much the Reds have invested in Votto, the offense will and should revolve around him, which means that putting him in a position to do as much damage as possible is a must.

Anyway, avert your eyes, as here are those numbers for posterity sake:

Leadoff: .208/.254/.327/.581
2nd Spot: .257/.310/.390/.700


It's almost literally impossible to do worse in 2013.

There is an unspoken, and occasionally spoken, idea that the Reds should just ride out 2013 because Billy Hamilton is on the horizon for 2014 and beyond. The first problem is that you simply can't count, or rely, on the great Hamilton to pan out. He's an exciting prospect, but exciting prospects, especially those with questionable hit tools, flame out all the time. Second, there's simply no way the Reds can afford to wait another season without addressing the top of the order.

Given how close the Reds came to winning it all in 2012, it's imperative that they seize the opportunity. The time is now. The Reds very easily could have won a championship in 2012. As a Reds fan, it's absurd and surreal to even write the prior sentence, but it's true. For the first time in seemingly forever, there was no huge revenue, dominating AL team lurking in the shadows. No Yankee or BoSox team waiting to club the NL pennant winner into submission. Not even the Rangers, who, while never getting over the hump in 2010 or 2011, were certainly a much more well-rounded team than the 2012 Tigers. The AL was weak this year.

While the Reds' flame-out was somewhat understandable, given the loss of Johnny Cueto and the power-sapped Joey Votto, but it's not easy to get over. That's especially true because the Rangers are only getting wealthier, the Angels are likely to be better, the A's more experienced, the Tigers still strong, the Rays lurking, and the BoSox and Yankees will reload to some degree. And, that's just the AL, so the 2013 season will be no cake-walk.   

I can't support the idea of sitting on our hands and waiting/hoping for Billy Hamilton to be the savior, especially since even if he becomes the next Rickey Henderson we could still slot our 2013 table-setter into the second spot in the order behind Hamilton. I could make the argument (and I probably will later this offseason) that the Reds should  make a Mat Latos-type trade for an established, legitimate leadoff hitter. But, for now, I would target an undervalued player who could address a few areas of need.

If I was Walt Jocketty, I would definitely make a play for Boston Red Sox outfielder Ryan Sweeney. In the past, I haven't been that high on him because the power never developed. That may preclude him from being a true impact bat, but he can still be a nice complimentary player. And, the boxes he does tick happen to be areas of need for the Reds.

As I mentioned above, the Reds need more disciplined, professional hitters and more tough ABs at the top of the order. While Sweeney has had some volatility to his performance, his offensive profile certainly fits the bill. Frankly, I think one area of roster construction where the Reds deserve some criticism is in their failure to bring in players with the right offensive profile for the top of the lineup.

It's certainly understandable that they haven't managed to land a legitimate leadoff hitter. They are rare. In fact, I'm not convinced that it isn't more difficult to find a legitimate leadoff hitter than it is to find a number 1 starter. On the other hand, the Reds failure to buy any "leadoff hitter lottery tickets" is less understandable. Maybe it's Dusty's influence that has seen the likes of Corey Patterson and Wily Taveras sprint through the revolving door at the top of the lineup. Maybe it was Walt. Regardless, the Reds have rarely even brought in players who possess the right offensive profile for the leadoff spot.

As a result, they have not only lacked a legitimate leadoff hitter, but have never given themselves a chance to catch lightning in a bottle. A good example of lightning in a bottle can be found in the San Francisco Giants championship history. Two times. The Giants are not an organization known for valuing late-count, disciplined hitters, but in both of their championship seasons they won the leadoff hitter lottery with players who fit that offensive profile.

In 2010, the Giants got significant contributions from Andres Torres, who hit .268/.343/.479 out of the leadoff slot. Torres wasn't projected to be the full-time leadoff man, but he had the right offensive profile, including two minor league seasons where his OBP was .80+ points higher than his batting average, when his performance peaked. The peaking performance made him a valuable contributor to the Giants' championship push. 

The same thing happened in 2012, as the Giants once again hit the lottery with Gregor Blanco. They didn't need him in the leadoff slot (rather using him as a second leadoff hitter in the 7th spot), but he had that type of profile and his performance peaked. When Melky Cabrera was nabbed for cheating, Blanco slid comfortably into the starting lineup. Blanco hit .244/.333/.344 on the season after having some hot streaks during the season. Blanco had a strong walk rate and rarely chased pitches outside the zone. While a larger sample size caught up to him, he was a significant contributor for the Giants during the season and in the postseason. The Giants, in both championship seasons, benefited from taking a chance on a hitter with a leadoff hitter profile. The performance level wasn't there going into the season, but the offensive profile was.

Sweeney has the offensive profile the Reds desperately need. On his career, Sweeney has a slash line of .280/.338/.378 and has seen an average of  3.99 pitches per plate appearance. However, in his four years with the A's he had OBPs of .350, .348, .342, and .346 in a very tough park for hitters. Further, his disciplined approach seems to be improving, as in 2011 with the A's Sweeney saw 4.34 pitches and in 2012 with the Red Sox he saw 4.31 pitches, which made him one of the most disciplined hitters in baseball over the last two seasons. Given that the Reds, as a team, saw 3.80 pitches per plate appearance in 2012, good for only 19th in all of baseball, adding more disciplined plate appearances should be a priority. Further, while Sweeney's power is still underwhelming, that could play up in a hitter's park like Great American Ballpark.

Sweeney can also hit, as evidenced by his 21.6% career line drive rate. In fact, his line drive rate hasn't dipped below the 20% mark since his last season (2007) with the White Sox. And, he also makes contact at a very high clip, 88.4% contact rate for his career, which would be good for third on the Reds behind Ryan Hanigan (90.6%) and Miguel Cairo (89.6%).

So, Sweeney sees a lot of pitches, draws a good number of walks, makes a lot of contact, and hits a lot of line drives, which gives him the offensive profile the Reds need. And, while his current level of performance is already enough to be a significant improvement for the Reds at the top of the order, there remains a decent possibility of an uptick in performance level to "impact player" for our 2013 championship push. 

The final reason Sweeney makes sense is that he is a very good defensive player who can handle all three outfield spots. That gives him three possible roles as the roster develops this offseason. He could be the starting centerfielder, if the Reds want to turn the page on the Drew Stubbs era. He could be the starting leftfielder, if the Reds decide Ryan Ludwick is simply too expensive. Or, he could be a 4th outfielder/platoon mate, if the Reds bring back both Ludwick and Stubbs.

In addition to the lack of power, Sweeney's other drawback is his durability. In 2012, Sweeney missed time with separate issues, including a mild concussion, a toe injury, and a broken pinkie finger from punching a door after being robbed of a hit by Omar Infante. His 2012 performance level was disconcerting, as he hit a paltry .260/.303/.373, but it's hard to imagine anyone succeeding in the Bobby Valentine tornado of despair. Further, I wonder if concussions have a tendency to linger longer in baseball player performance than in other sports, as hitting is such a highly reactive process. So, that might be at play as well, but the larger point is that a fresh start in hitter friendly park would likely give him a performance boost.

As for his availability, the BoSox were reportedly looking to trade him right before he broke his pinkie last season, so he is likely both available and affordable.

All in all, Sweeney seems like the right player at the right time for the Reds. To recap, Sweeney (1) has the offensive profile the Reds need, (2) has the defensive ability and position to address the Reds problems, (3) is affordable in terms of salary ($1.75M in 2011), and (4) is likely available at a reasonable cost from the BoSox. Unless the Reds are looking to make a Latos-type move for a legitimate leadoff hitter, Sweeney is definitely worth considering. 

Anatomy of a Meltdown: 5th Inning of Game 5

It's difficult to believe that the Reds, after breaking out to a 2-0 lead in the series and looking like the most dominant Reds incarnation since the Big Red Machine, even allowed the Giants to extend the National League Division Series to a fifth game. But, they did and even took it one step further by letting the whole series slip through their fingers.

I suppose the kiss of death happened shortly after Game 2. After watching Bronson baffle the Giants with a combination of slow, slower, and slowest offerings, I had an epiphany that I've never had in my entire life. It occurred to me that the Reds were the team to beat. Not just in the NL, but in all of Major League Baseball. For the first time in my entire rooting life, the Reds appeared to be the best team in baseball. So thorough and complete was the dismantling of the Giants in the first two games that there appeared to be no stopping the Reds. There was almost a sense of inevitability regarding a World Series championship. That was something that I had never previously experienced. And, of course, the wheels on the championship bus ground to a halt immediately thereafter.

The death knell sounded in the 5th inning of Game 5, leaving us with nothing more than dashed dreams and the familiar refrain of "wait 'til next year."

Here's how the top of the 5th inning unfolded:


Gregor Blanco - 0 Outs, 0 On-Base, 0 Runs Scored

1st Pitch: Swinging bunt attempt on high curveball - Strike 1
2nd Pitch: Fouled off fastball up and on outside corner - Strike 2
3rd Pitch: Fastball called ball in off the plate - Ball 1
4th Pitch: Elevated breaking ball over middle of plate fouled off - Strike 2
5th Pitch: Slaps 95 mph fastball on outside corner through 5.5 hole - Single

Latos looked tough in this AB. He got ahead in the count and effectively worked on the periphery of the strike zone. Latos may not have been happy with one of the calls, but this was just a high quality AB by Gregor Blanco, an underrated hitter who has been a sneaky good value for the Giants.


Brandon Crawford - 0 Outs, 1 On-Base, 0 Runs Scored

1st Pitch: Fastball low and just off outside corner - Ball 1
2nd Pitch: Fastball just a tick low - Ball 2
3rd Pitch: 90 mph fastball over the heart of the plate - Triple to right, Blanco scores.

Working out of the stretch, Latos started off the AB against Crawford well. His first two pitches were again on the periphery of the strike zone, arguably half the ball was in the zone and half the ball was outside the zone. Latos didn't get either call, but they could have gone either way. They were tough, effective pitches, but I can't fault the umpire for not calling them strikes. Unfortunately, Latos was behind 2-0 and had to come into the hitter. The third pitch was a BIG mistake, a low velocity fastball that up in the zone and right over the heart of the plate. Crawford, the number 8 hitter, didn't miss it, ripping a triple down the right field line to score Gregor Blanco.

As tough as the first two pitches were, the third pitch was delivered with a "Hit-Me!" sign on it. It was a clear mistake by Latos and he paid the price. Given how poor the pitch was, it's fair to wonder whether Latos was losing focus out of frustration over the calls he thought he should have gotten against Blanco and Crawford. In fact, after time was called, the ump walked halfway out to the mound without his mask on to throw a new ball to Latos. It's likely that Latos, in some way shape or form, had expressed frustration prior to that  exchange. One of the knocks on Latos prior to the season was that he struggled to control his emotions at times, an issue which may have come back to haunt him here.     


Matt Cain - 0 Outs, 1 On-Base, 1 Run Scored

1st Pitch: Fastball 94 mph well up and well in off the plate, Cain leans out of the way - Ball 1
2nd Pitch: 94 mph fastball a tick inside, but close to the middle of plate, fouled off - Strike 1
3rd Pitch: 85 mph breaking ball in middle of plate, chopper back to Latos, holds Crawford at third and throws to first for the out.

Here, the first pitch of the AB was well off the plate. Considering (1) how effectively he was working the periphery of the zone to the previous two hitters and (2) that he was facing the pitcher, this pitch was a poor effort. Either Latos was simply losing effectiveness or losing focus, but this was the second poor pitch of the inning, the first resulting in the triple to Crawford. After the first pitch to Cain, Latos got back on track with his next two pitches, ultimately inducing a chopper back to the mound for the 1st out and holding Crawford at third.


Angel Pagan - 1 Out, 1 On-Base, 1 Run Scored

Pre-1st Pitch: After looking into the dugout, Hanigan calls time, drops shoulders and head, pats his mitt a few times, his body language expresses frustration...with a delay in either the pitch or defensive call being relayed from the dugout???
1st Pitch: 92 mph fastball, fouled off by Pagan, catching more of the zone, slightly away/elevated - Strike 1
2nd Pitch: 92 mph fastball, up and in, that Pagan chops to shortstop Cozart. With the infield playing in, Cozart tries to come home to get Crawford, who was running on contact, but loses the handle on the ball on the transfer and everyone was safe. It was a bad camera angle on the pitch, but Hanigan, who appeared to be setting up outside, reached a long way for it and it looked like a significant location mistake.

In hindsight, this AB is where it became clear that things were unraveling. Given that the Reds were in an "all hands on-deck" situation, it would have been appropriate for Dusty, if he noticed the signs, to get someone up in the pen with the heart of the Giants order coming up. The first thing that surprised me was the body language of Ryan Hanigan prior to the first pitch. It was looking like Latos was getting frustrated in the first two hitters of the inning, but Hanigan was looking frustrated in this AB. Not sure if the frustration was the result of the dugout being late to relay in signs or with the calls of the umpire, either way it wasn't a good sign with an increasingly rattled Latos on the mound.

As for Cozart, the play resulted in the worst possible outcome. It was a big moment and we needed either the out at the plate or the out at first. Instead, the run scores, a runner ends up on first, and we give away an out. If Cozart concedes the run and takes the easy play at first, then Latos faces Scutaro with 2 outs and no runners on base. If that happens, maybe Latos pulls it back together when faced with a clean slate. In an elimination game, the players simply have to execute. The Reds didn't.


Marco Scutaro - 1 Out, 1 On-Base, 2 Runs Scored

1st Pitch: Pitch out, runner not going - Ball 1
2nd Pitch: 86 mph breaking ball, misses up and in - Ball 2. Scutaro showing bunt, pulls back and leans out of the way as the pitch is somewhat close to him.
3rd Pitch: 84 mph breaking ball. Misses low and away - Ball 3
4th Pitch: 93 mph fastball, misses in off the plate - Ball 4

This was a terrible AB for Latos. Given that things were starting to slip away, the wisdom of a first pitch pitch-out can be called into question. The fact that Dusty called it may be another example of Dusty viewing speed as more impactful than on-base percentage, as he feared Pagan moving up a base more than spotting Scutaro, a professional hitter, an early advantage in the count. Latos was struggling and putting him in an immediate 1-0 hole was not ideal. Latos followed up by throwing balls all around the strike zone to walk Scutaro, never even challenging him, which is inexcusable ahead of Sandoval and Posey.


Bryan Price visit to the mound. Sam LeCure up in the bullpen.

At this point, the Reds go out to talk to Latos and the bullpen starts to heat up. Was it too late? Should they have visited the mound sooner? For example, prior to the Scutaro AB when it was apparent that Hanigan and Latos appeared frustrated and Cozart mishandled the chopper? Was that the time to visit the mound to break the rhythm of the inning to try to calm the team down and refocus Latos? Did they put too much trust in Latos?

After the way Latos had pitched this season and during the playoffs, you could certainly justify it, but you could also justify warming up the bullpen in such a critical game.


Pablo Sandoval - 1 Out, 2 On-Base, 2 Runs Scored

1st Pitch: 91 mph fastball. Good pitch, low and away - Strike 1
2nd Pitch: 92 mph fastball. Hanigan in standing-crouch, wanting the pitch elevated, Latos misses badly away - Ball 1
3rd Pitch: 84 mph breaking ball off the outside corner, very good pitch by Latos, Pablo flips a soft liner to left field and the runners move up to 2nd and 3rd to load the bases.

This AB was nothing more than good hitting. Pablo beat a good pitch, a pitcher's pitch, a pitch that wasn't even a strike. Tough to pin this one on Latos. Pablo executed in a big moment.


Buster Posey - 1 Out, 3 On-Base, 2 Runs Scored

1st Pitch: 92 mph fastball up and in. Buster leans away. Not close - Ball 1
2nd Pitch: 89 mph fastball on inside corner. Buster fouls grounder to third - Strike 1
3rd Pitch: 92 mph fastball misses inside, a purpose pitch to set up 4th pitch? - Ball 2.
4th Pitch: 93  mph fastball off the outside corner. Posey chases, swings and misses - Strike 2
5th Pitch: 94 mph fastball. Hanigan sets up on inside corner, pitch drifts back right over the middle. Posey crushes it off the facing of the second deck in left. Mistake pitch. Grand slam. Done.

Hanigan drops glove, spins away from the plate and takes steps towards the stands in frustration/disgust. Latos never turns to watch it go. No doubt where it was heading.

This was pretty much the worst case scenario. Buster Posey is the NL MVP this year and I thought that before this series. He has controlled both sides of the game better than any other NL player this year. His ABs are just tremendous, he handles a pitching staff and controls the running game better than everyone. So, to face him with the bases loaded is as bad as it gets. No where to put him. No way around him. The highest leverage situation of the game and facing the NL MVP.

It was a huge situation. Our best (healthy) starting pitcher against their best hitter. History remembers winners. The pitch that Posey hit was a big mistake, drifting back over the middle of the plate. It had good velocity, which is frequently results in a significant margin of error for the pitcher, but Posey can handle plus velocity without much difficulty. Once again, the Giants' players execute in a big moment, while the Reds' players do not. Maybe that's how all contests should be decided: best vs. best. An "I'm better than you and I can prove it" moment. That provides little comfort to Reds' fans who haven't experienced postseason glory in almost two decades.


Pitching Change. Latos out, LeCure in

The day comes to an end for Latos. Was it too late? Did Dusty close the barn door after the horse had already escaped? Or, did Latos earned the benefit of the doubt? Credit Dusty for having faith in his fellas or criticize him for not utilizing the bullpen like it was a do-or-die game?

Dusty has had tremendous regular season success, but limited postseason success. Is that due to his refusal to alter his managerial style to permit more micro-managing in the playoffs? Or, does this one fall squarely on the players for poor execution?


Hunter Pence - 1 Out, 0 On-Base, 6 Runs Scored

First Pitch: 87 mph fastball - Called Strike 1
Second Pitch: 80 mph breaking ball. Weak grounder foul to third - Strike 2
Third Pitch: 91 mph fastball on outside corner. Ground out to Phillips.

LeCure comes in and makes quick work of Hunter Pence. There is a theory that home runs are a rally killer. It's a theory that's frequently lampooned, but it appeared to be the case here, as the Giants went meekly against an inferior pitcher after the Posey grand slam.


Brandon Belt - 2 Outs, 0 On-Base, 6 Runs Scored

First Pitch: 71 mph curveball. Misses up and away - Ball 1
Second Pitch: 90 mph fastball. Low and away -  Called Strike 1
Third Pitch: 73 mph curveball. Fouled off - Strike 2
Fourth Pitch: 91 mph fastball. Misses in and down - Ball 2
Fifth Pitch: 74 mph curveball down. Belt chases. Strikes out swinging

LeCure, once again proving to be a very capable and valuable long reliever type, makes quick work of Belt, recording the final out of the inning.


Final Thoughts

In hindsight, it's easy to see how all the events came together to sink the Reds season. But, whether anything could realistically have been done to prevent it is arguable. You could argue that Dusty was too passive, managing this game no differently than he would have managed on opening day. You could argue that the pitch-out was ill timed. You could argue that Price should have gone to the mound after the misplay by Cozart, before the 4-pitch walk to Scutaro. Frankly, all three critiques are valid. It just seemed that things were gradually slipping away and Dusty/Price did nothing to stop it. Maybe, this was a case of Dusty having too MUCH faith in his players, lacking a sense of urgency in an elimination game. Or, maybe, because the damage was done largely on one swing of the bat, things just happened too fast to prevent.

Player inexperience and failure to execute were also to blame. Latos had the opportunity to cement a legacy in Cincinnati. After coming into a difficult Game 1 in relief and putting up a dominating effort, Latos could have been the toast of the town. It was a moment. One that could be defining, but it's tough to say this early in his career. But, if he had followed that outing by shutting down the Giants in an elimination game, then he probably would have been King of the Queen City. However, it didn't happen. Latos' struggles to control his emotions may have played a part, causing him to lose focus. Cozart's nerves may have gotten to him on the chopper causing him to rush his actions. Finally, Hanigan failed to be a calming influence on Latos, which was surprising, but also seemed frustrated himself, which was even more surprising.

I suppose we can hope that our young players will use this game to become battle-hardened veterans for future postseason games. A type of "learning how to win, Fast Eddie Felson style" process. But, future postseason appearances are never guaranteed and given how many chances the offense had to close the gap in this game, it's impossible not to be frustrated by the Reds' inability to, at a bare minimum, contain the damage in the 5th inning.    

In final analysis, the Giants executed in big moments, the Reds did not. Brandon Crawford made the plays, Zach Cozart did not. Buster Posey controlled the game, Ryan Hanigan did not.

That's why the Reds are now sitting at home. That's why this winter will be longer and darker than most...

2012 Breakout Star: Homer Bailey

In honor of Homer Bailey's late season, spot-on Tom Seaver impersonation, including a no-hitter and a stellar postseason performance, now seems an appropriate time to revisit my preseason thoughts on Homer, which you can read here.

In summary, based on the trend lines of four peripheral statistics, I thought Homer was a legitimate breakout candidate in 2012. The conclusion of my write-up read as follows:

At this point, it's looking like the question isn't whether Homer will be better in 2012, but rather by how much? If I was a betting man, then I'd have to look at these peripherals and say "quite a bit."

One of the more interesting recent developments in the baseball universe is the attempt to strip away anything and everything that could cloud player evaluation, including narratives created by fans and baseball writers. In fact, I sometimes think that this "stripping away" comes at the cost of the pure enjoyment of the game. A compelling narrative may not always be relevant to player valuation, but it can certainly make the game more engaging and enjoyable for the fans. But, I digress, anyway, this "stripping away" development is driven by the emergence of statistical analysis, which has provided a newer and more accurate measure of the value of players. As the more accurate measure of player value became apparent, the narratives crafted by the fans and media began to ring untrue, whereas in the past there was far less ability to differentiate between the narrative and the truth. One of the players for whom the narrative had begun to overshadow the value appeared to be Homer Bailey.

Not many players entered the 2012 season with more narrative baggage than Homer Bailey, who originally arrived on the MLB scene with massive expectations and who proceeded to consistently underwhelm all while displaying a questionable attitude. Homer's perennial struggles kicked up so much noise in the form of fan frustration that it was very, very easy to overlook the incremental improvement that he had been making. In fact, I admit to falling prey to that myself, as when I took an objective look at him this offseason, I was rather surprised by what I saw.

Taking a look at four separate peripheral stats (BB/9, K/9, F-Strike%, and SwStr%) revealed that Homer was likely closer to figuring it out than fans, myself included, previously realized. 


Here are those peripheral stats, this time with the 2012 season included:

BB/9

2007: 5.56
2008: 4.21
2009: 4.13
2010: 3.30
2011: 2.25
2012: 2.25

Interestingly, Homer maintained the same exact walk rate, to the 100th decimal point, as he did in 2011, which is very encouraging given how impressive that mark was in 2011.

F-Strike%

2007: 54.6%
2008: 57.8%
2009: 55.7%
2010: 60.4%
2011: 62.4%
2012: 66.0%

F-Strike% is the percentage of batters that Homer starts off with a first pitch strike. Major League average is 59%. It's an important metric for the simple fact that getting ahead in the count permits the pitcher to tilt the probability of success in his favor. As good as Homer was in 2011, he was substantially better in 2012, evidencing vastly improved command inside the strike zone.

SwStr%

2007: 8.9%
2008: 5.4%
2009: 7.9%
2010: 8.4%
2011: 9.3%
2012: 9.4%

In 2012, Homer posted the highest SwStr percentage of his career, which is encouraging given the correlation between swing-and-miss strikes and strikeout rate.

K/9

2007: 5.56
2008: 4.46
2009: 6.83
2010: 8.26
2011: 7.23
2012: 7.27

Obviously, a strong strikeout rate is important to dominating pitching, especially when the pitcher operates in a launching pad like Great American Ballpark where contact frequently spells trouble. Homer maintained a posted the second highest strikeout rate of his career in 2012.

Total IP

2007: 45.1
2008: 36.1
2009: 113.1
2010: 109.0
2011: 132.0
2012: 208.0


Finally, while the four peripheral stats indicated a potential breakthrough to a new performance level, that breakthrough would have been far less valuable if it had not been paired with a heavy workload. Prior to the 2012 season, Homer had never thrown more than 132.0 innings in a season. Obviously, 2012 was an entirely different animal, as Homer combined health and performance to break the 200 inning mark for the first time.

When all was said and done, those peripherals and workload came together to produce a season of 3.68 ERA, 1.24 WHIP, and 168/52 K/BB ratio over 208.0 innings pitched. Granted, there were times when it didn't look like a breakthrough was coming and he continued a level of "own-age" of the Pirates that has rarely been seen in nature, but Homer excelled in the second half and took his game to the next level.

While it is possible that Homer will regress in 2013, his peripherals indicate that this is a legitimate and sustainable breakout driven by incremental improvement in his game. Homer is actually looking like a top of the rotation pitcher on whom the Reds can rely in the future. That would be one of the biggest and most important developments of the 2012 season for the Reds franchise.

"Bestiary of Imagined Causes"

In 2003, a book entitled "Moneyball" (perhaps you've heard of it) upended the baseball apple-cart, effectively overturning over a century of entrenched dogma, including ingrained beliefs, valuations, and standard operating procedures.  

Moneyball, as we all know, is about the existence of market inefficiencies and the manner in which the Oakland A's identified and exploited those inefficiencies. Statistical analysis was the tool by which the A's more accurately valued ballplayers than the market. What Moneyball did NOT explain was why these inefficiencies existed in the first place. That question was the precursor to the events of Moneyball.

Shortly after publication, Michael Lewis began to look into this very question, a journey he documented in the December 2011 issue of Vanity Fair. His journey necessarily led him to the work of psychologist Daniel Kahneman. Kahneman, while studying the decision-making process, discovered that people unknowingly incorporate irrelevant factors into their decision-making process. This discovery was directly at odds with economic theory that viewed market participants as being rational and selfish.

To identify the existence of market inefficiencies, you have to first conclude that the marketplace does not incorporate all readily available information of value. That the decisions of market participants are, in some respect, irrational. Kahneman's work made that conclusion easier to reach.

One of Kahneman's research experiments was to rig a wheel-of-fortune. It was marked from 0 to 100, but was rigged to land on only 10 or 65. Kahneman would stand in front of a group of people, spin the wheel and ask the people to write down the number on which it landed, which of course was 10 or 65. He would then ask two questions: (1) Is the percentage of African nations among UN members larger or smaller than the number you just wrote? (2) What is your best guess of the percentage of African nations in the UN?

The wheel was entirely unrelated to the question asked, but it affected the answers that were given. The average estimate of those who saw the number 10 was 25%. The average estimate of those who saw the number 65 was 45%. The group had included wholly irrelevant factors, which served as a kind of anchor for their thought processes/answers, in its decision-making.

Kahneman's work led to the establishment of a sub-field of economics known as "behavioral economics." That field ultimately sparked the interest of Harvard undergraduate Paul DePodesta who went on to exploit the irrational decision-making of baseball market participants.

While DePodesta put the work of Kahneman to good use, another premier baseball mind sought out Kahneman long before DePodesta discovered him.

On June 4, 1985, Bill James wrote a letter to Kahneman. James sought out Kahneman in hopes of determining why baseball professionals always tried to explain random events; why they tried to extract meaning from inexplicable events; why they tried to order a universe that frequently defied order. The letter read, in part, as follows:

"Baseball men, living from day to day in the clutch of carefully metered chance occurrences, have developed an entire bestiary of imagined causes to tie together and thus make sense of patterns that are in truth entirely accidental. They have an entire vocabulary of completely imaginary concepts used to tie together chance groupings. It includes 'momentum,' 'confidence,' 'seeing the ball well,' 'slumps,' 'guts,' 'clutch ability,' being 'hot' and 'cold,' 'not being aggressive' and my all time favorite the 'intangibles.' By such concepts, the baseball man gains a feeling of control over a universe that swings him up and down and tosses him from side to side like a yoyo in a high wind."

Whether or not ALL these phrases are "completely imaginary concepts" is still debatable, but those that are would be examples of irrelevant factors included in the decision-making process. The inclusion of such factors ultimately leads to the creation of market inefficiencies in Major League Baseball. On a micro level, it's almost impossible not to have James' premise in mind whenever you hear announcers, managers, or players prattle on about these concepts. I find that James' letter, to a certain extent, now frames my thinking on the subject.

In the modern game, statistical analysis has become the tool by which smart organizations attack and exploit those unfounded beliefs that arose out of the efforts of baseball men to explain the discrete events of the sport. In an effort to give practical meaning to those events, baseball men incorporated irrelevant factors into their decision-making process. The flawed decision-making process created market inefficiencies; inefficiencies that could ultimately be exploited if those irrelevant factors could be identified and stripped from the decision-making process.