Bryan Price: Job #1 "Relief Ace"

For the very first act of his managerial career, Bryan Price should announce a role change for Aroldis Chapman.

I know, I know. I can already hear you shouting through the screen: "They have no inclination to take your brilliant and inspired suggestion to trade him and Aroldis continues to announce loud and proud to anyone who will listen that he won't start games, so how can Price change his role???"

Well, Bryan Price needs to come right out and say: "Aroldis is NOT going to be our Closer in 2014, he's going to be our Relief Ace." 

First and foremost, the team needs to let Aroldis know who calls the shots. These statements to the press by Aroldis about what he's willing and not willing to do give the appearance of the tail wagging the dog. Someone on the team, and here's where we could use some leadership in the clubhouse, should polite remind Aroldis that he'll play when and where the organization wants or he won't play at all; that while he can express these ideas to management behind closed doors, it's completely inappropriate to be making these statements to the press. But, I digress. 

Price is already on record as saying he wants to extract more value from Aroldis, so his thoughts are clearly running in this direction anyway, so why not go whole-hog and fundamentally change the way bullpens are managed? Why not be an "early adopter" and reap the benefits that go along with it? Formally announce the change in roles to ensure that people's expectations for Chapman change accordingly. Changing the usage pattern without formally changing the name of the role would reduce fan buy-in and increase resistance to the change. 

If we are managing our bullpen more effectively and efficiently than other organizations, then we are building a competitive advantage. And, given that this team is close to getting over the hump, the marginal value of a win is very high. So, every competitive advantage should be actively sought out and exploited. 

So, what's the difference between a "closer" and a "relief ace"? Namely, usage patterns. As we all know, closers are used when save situations arrive. The concept of the "closer" is so ingrained in the baseball woodwork that it's functionally impossible to change the usage pattern without changing the label. The problem becomes even more intractable when you factor in that reliever compensation is frequently tied to the concept of the "save", so there will be resistance from closers and agents, as well. Again, it's ingrained. So, to make this work, we need not only a clean break from the "closer" concept, but an entirely new label. Fortunately, some forward thinking sabermetricians have advanced the idea of the "relief ace" and it suits our purposes perfectly. 

The "Relief Ace" usage pattern would be based on "leverage", not "save situations." In short, the greater the value of a single run in a game, the higher leverage the situation. In other words, the more likely that a situation will impact the outcome of the game, the higher the leverage. So, a bases loaded situation with 0 outs in the 9th inning of a tie ballgame is about as high leverage as it gets. That's a situation wherein the "Closer" may or may not be used, but the "Relief Ace" absolutely would. On the other hand, a bases empty situation in the 2nd inning of a 15-0 game is about as low leverage as it gets.

Intuitively, the "relief ace" idea makes a tremendous amount of sense. Don't you want your best reliever pitching when his contribution will make the greatest impact on the team's chances of winning? Of course! If you want Aroldis to be more valuable, then you have to use him in situations where he can generate value. Again, as with pitch framing, value is a function of opportunity. Give Aroldis more opportunities and he'll deliver more value.

This is also a perfect way for Bryan Price to immediately put his own stamp on the organization and make a clean break from any residual fan disdain for Dusty Baker. This is a fan base thirsting for a forward-thinking approach. It not only allows him to immediately differentiate himself from the tradition-bound strategies of his predecessor, but it has the added benefit of being good business. It's clear that, if done correctly, it's a move that would more effectively deploy the bullpen. 

Now, the "problem" with this switch is that using Aroldis earlier in the game means he won't always be there to slam the door in the 9th. And, inevitably, some of those saves will be blown, which will ratchet-up public and pundit resistance to the idea. So, Price would need three things to effectively break with tradition: (1) a functional "closer" for those times when Aroldis is used in earlier high leverage situations, (2) a bit of luck that a significant number of saves aren't blown before public/pundit acceptance of the switch, and (3) more than a bit of backbone to go along with complete confidence in the idea. 

Fortunately, the Reds have a couple of options for players who could handle 9th inning duties. While not bringing the dominance of Aroldis, some combination of J.J. Hoover, Jonathan Broxton, and Sean Marshall should be able to convert most save chances. 

Just to lend some legitimacy to the "relief ace" idea and illustrate that we could survive without Aroldis slamming the door, it's worth discussing an interesting Bill James/John Dewan rule of thumb on save chances. The 30-60-90 rule of saves sets forth the likely conversion rate in different save situations, which may make it more palatable to have a lesser reliever in some of these easier save chances.

Here's John Dewan on the idea:

What's the 30-60-90 rule of saves?
By John Dewan
May 18, 2005

The manager brings in a relief pitcher up by three runs in the ninth. The pitcher finishes the game and gets the save. It's done all the time, but in fact, it's not a good time to use what normally is the best pitcher on your team.

This situation falls under the category of Easy Save. An Easy Save is earned when a pitcher enters the game with a 2 or 3 run lead, no one on base and pitches one inning or less while finishing the game for a team victory. No need to use your best pitcher here. Pitchers convert these save opportunities about 90% of the time.

Use your best pitcher in a Tough Save situation. That happens when he enters the game with the tying run on base. The conversion rate for saves in this situation is only 30%.

All other saves or Regular Saves are converted at a 60% rate.

The 30-60-90 rule of saves: Tough saves—30% conversion. Regular saves—60%. Easy saves—90%.

The take-away from this 30-60-90 concept is that just about any pitcher is going to convert most of the "Easy Saves". And, one of the aforementioned non-Aroldis options would nail down most "Regular Saves". So, Aroldis isn't really needed in many of these save chances, which again supports the notion that he can be more impactful in the "Relief Ace" role. 

Aroldis may continue to resist a change to the rotation, but the Reds can still extract more value out of him by changing his usage pattern in the bullpen. Aroldis may not want to move INTO the rotation, but he can still be moved OUT OF the closer role. 

For a team that has made the playoffs but come up just short in consecutive years, wringing every last drop of production out of the roster and exploiting every possible competitive advantage is not only advisable, but necessary. The difference between losing in the first round of the playoffs and winning the World Series is razor thin and having a Relief Ace may make all the difference for the Reds.  

2014 Armchair GM Thoughts

Well, I haven't written anything in a little while, so I thought it would be fun to put a toe back in the water before getting into the heavy lifting of prospect write-ups and more heavily analytical posts. In that spirit, here is a fun bit of speculation on something the Reds GM could do to improve the team this offseason.

As mentioned in the previous post, the Reds problem in 2013 was a complete lack of complimentary offensive production. Basically, they were a three hitter offense and one of those three is undoubtedly headed out of town. The problem is that there are few areas where legitimate upgrades can be made, namely catcher, third base, and shortstop.

The Reds may also be facing a rapidly closing window. The team isn't getting any younger and the starting pitchers are only getting closer to free agency. As it stands, Homer Bailey is set to reach free agency after the 2014 season; Johnny Cueto and Mat Latos after the 2015 season.

The question the Reds must answer is whether they are going to make a big push to win a championship in the next couple of seasons or try to be consistently competitive for the next 5 years. If it's the former, then they need to convert the future value of assets into present value. If it's the latter, then the strategy is identifying which assets to keep in the fold and which prospects can be promoted to replace players who are either aged or priced out of the organization.

The decision is complicated by the recent success of the Cardinals and Pirates, who may well have more talent at both the MLB and minor league levels. So, do the Reds go all in now or try to hold the window open for the foreseeable future?

If we want to "win now", then we have two surplus assets that could help us do that: Robert Stephenson and Aroldis Chapman. Stephenson is an asset with purely future value, while Chapman is an asset whose potential is continues to outpace his production. If we want to make a push this year and compete with not just the Cardinals and Pirates, but the AL's best as well, then here are two "win now" moves* I would consider making:

*(These moves are in the broad strokes and may need a tweak or a sweetener added to balance them out)

1) Robert Stephenson to the Mariners for SS Brad Miller and 2b/of Dustin Ackley

Stephenson could be a top five overall prospect in the near future and a legit #1 starter down the road. He's a hefty trade chip. That said, he probably needs at least another full season of development. And, another year in the minors comes with both injury and development risk. If we want to reshape the lineup with an eye towards improvement in 2014, then he may be our best bet.

As for the return, I'm already a huge Brad Miller fan. He has tools, skills, and intangibles and, on some level, the world just seems to make more sense when the Reds have a top drawer shortstop in the starting lineup. The Mariners promoted him midseason and used him as their leadoff hitter and shortstop. Miller has the ability to control the strike zone, hit for average, and hit for respectable power. He's probably average defensively at short, so he'd be a slight downgrade from the above-average glove of Zack Cozart. That said, he also brings top-flight intangibles to the table and could emerge as the leader this team seemed to lack in 2013, as evidenced by his amateur travel team coach Chet Lemon calling him "a coach's dream". Cozart is a 2.0-2.5 win player and I suspect he's reached his ceiling. I could see Brad Miller as a 4.5-5.0 win player at his peak, which could make him a significant upgrade for the Reds over Zach Cozart.

Still, given Stephenson's trade value, I'd also want Dustin Ackley in the deal. Ackley does a lot of things well. He hits line drives, makes contact at a strong clip, draws walks at a respectable rate, and doesn't chase many bad pitches. He's a pure hitter with very good hand-eye coordination, reminding me of Dustin Pedroia in that respect. To date, however, Ackley has been a massive disappointment, but I think he's fixable and I'd roll the dice on being able to do just that. Ackley has a clear swing flaw, he doesn't firm up his front side, instead letting his hips and front knee slide forward, which robs him of the rotational power generated by the hips. His hand-eye coordination is so strong that it actually works against him here, as the weak front side flaw doesn't prevent him from making contact, but does prevent him from driving the ball with authority. Given that the Mariners have been a huge disappointment as of late, they may be willing to turn the page on Ackley.

This deal would give us Miller at shortstop and Ackley in center until Hamilton is ready. Once Hamilton is ready, Ackley could split time in left/center, providing an insurance policy for both Ludwick and Hamilton, and be a backup for Phillips at second and Votto at first. If either the Reds or Ludwick decide not to exercise the mutual option for 2015, then Ackley could take over in left.

If we can unlock Ackley's bat, then this deal would give us two professional, impact hitters atop the lineup and holding down up-the-middle positions. Stephenson is a high price to pay, but these two could provide us with an immediate boost and significantly greater complimentary production.


2) Aroldis Chapman and Zach Cozart to the Padres for 3b Chase Headley and RHP Burch Smith

Chapman is another asset that could be both expendable and valuable. Chapman posted a 1.6 WAR this year, which means that his hype/trade value outpaces his actual value, making him an attractive trade option. The Reds either need to extract more value from Chapman or flip him. The only real way to extract more value from him is to shift him to the rotation, but if that fails then his trade value takes a hit. Frankly, I would much rather deal him and let someone else assume the risk of converting him to the rotation, especially since Chapman himself has expressed a desire to work out of the bullpen.

That said, I would move Chapman to the Padres for Chase Headley and Burch Smith. Headley had a down season last year after a true power breakout season in 2012. So, there is some performance risk in the deal. However, even if the 2012 power isn't sustainable, he posted a .374 OBP in 2011 and a .376 OBP in 2012.  That type of OBP would take the sting out of losing Shin Soo Choo. While Headley's true power remains something of a question, a move from Petco Park to GABP will only help him in that department. And, his OBP would look mighty good in the 2nd spot in the order ahead of Joey Votto, which would also give him better pitches to hit. 

Headley is only under team control for 1 more season, so we would likely be entitled to something more for 3 years of Chapman. I would want RHP Burch Smith, who is rumored to be on the block and who I like quite a bit. Smith has a very good change-up, a low 90s fastball that can touch 95, and good control. He is on a development path to being a solid mid-rotation starter and he would join David Holmberg in improving our pitching depth in the upper levels of the minors. 

Final Thoughts

These two moves give us two potential offensive upgrades (B.Miller over Z.Cozart and C.Headley over T.Frazier), vastly improved MLB depth (D.Ackley and T.Frazier off the bench), and more starting pitching depth in the upper minors (B.Smith). The Reds main problem last year was a top heavy offense, but the team also lacked depth. 

Given the inevitable injuries and the preference of all MLB managers for, as our former peerless leader Dusty Baker said, "having options", this would make us a more balanced and deeper offensive team. Headley in a hitter friendly park and hitting in front of a former MVP could have another breakout season. Miller could hit 20+ homers as soon as next year with a solid slash line. And, I would still have Ackley and Frazier in my plans for the future, as I think both can get back on track and emerge as valuable MLB players, but having them serve as depth on the bench for 2014 wouldn't be the worst idea. 

After those trades, the roster would look something like the following: 

1. B.Miller ss l

2. C.Headley 3b s

3. J.Votto 1b l

4. R.Ludwick lf r

5. J.Bruce rf l

6. B.Phillips 2b r

7. B.Hamilton cf s

8. D.Mesoraco c r

c. B.Pena s

inf T.Frazier r

inf J.Hannahan l

of S.Schumaker l

of/2b D.Ackley l

Obviously, there's no clear back-up shortstop, but I wouldn't be that uncomfortable with going without one on a game-to-game basis. If Miller were to get hurt, then we could call someone up from the minors. Until that time, I wouldn't mind having a more offense heavy bench with a few guys who could handle shortstop in a pinch (Frazier, Phillips, Hannahan). 

And, if Hamilton can handle MLB pitching, then he'd be the leadoff man. If Hamilton is so lost that he needs to back to the minors, then Ackley would take over in centerfield and we could add a true backup shortstop to the bench. Dusty was right, it's good to have options.   

1. M.Latos r

2. H.Bailey r

3. J.Cueto r

4. T.Cingrani l

5. M.Leake r

6. D.Holmberg triple-A lhp

7. B.Smith triple-A rhp

cl J.J. Hoover

rhset J.Broxton

lhset S.Marshall

mr A.Simon

mr L.Ondrusek

mr M.Parra

lr S.LeCure

Obviously, giving up Robert Stephenson wouldn't be popular and for very good reason. He is the Reds best pitching prospect since Homer Bailey and I'm just as high on him as everyone else. But, if we are really trying to go all-in for the next two seasons, then it might be wise to consider moving him. It took Homer Bailey a long time to emerge as a dependable, impact starting pitcher. And, it's unreasonable to expect Stephenson to reach that status within the next 2-3 seasons, or longer. 

If the Reds decide that our window is now, then Stephenson is an asset that simply won't help us. On the other hand, if the Reds aren't going all in for the next two years, then you simply don't move a prospect the caliber of Stephenson, not at any cost. If the organization wants to try to maintain consistent, year-in/year-out success, then Stephenson is exactly the type of player the Reds need in the system. 

Anyway, that's a fun post to get back in the swing of things. I suspect most will be apoplectic at the mere idea of trading Stephenson and Aroldis, but it's something to consider if we think we can win a championship in the near future. That would be a strategy that requires syncing up the present value of our assets. On the other hand, if we aren't going all in, then forget I wrote this. 

2011 Season Pressing Question #1: The Aroldis Decision

Well, time to start looking ahead to the 2011 season. The 2010 season met or exceeded all reasonable expectations and served as a good first step on the road to the promise land. The Reds have enough young talent to take another sizable step on their journey, but most teams that take a significant step forward in one year frequently slide back the next.

To me, it seems that the two World Series contestants, Texas and San Francisco, are ripe for a regression. The Giants did little to nothing this offseason and had a few too many overperformers last year to bank on a repeat performance. And, they simply don't have many young players that they can count on improving in 2011. They are going to need a bounce back from Pablo Sandoval or a Posey-like debut for Brandon Belt. Outside of that, they seem a candidate to slide backwards. As for the Rangers, they landed Adrian Beltre, but lost Cliff Lee. As a result, I'm not convinced that they have the pitching to get back to October. As for Beltre, he might be an upgrade, but they also completely undercut the standing of their team leader, Michael Young, to do so. Who knows how that will impact the chemistry and clubhouse. There are significant questions surrounding both teams.

As for the Reds, what do we make of them after seeing them stand pat? Well, their emerging young talent makes standing pat less detrimental, as several young players are in line for a step forward. Even so, there are a handful of questions that will likely determine the level of success that the Reds are able to achieve this season. And, first on the list is:


1. Whether the Reds can help Aroldis Chapman make the transition from "unbelievable spectacle" to "massively productive" baseball player.

In short, spectacles sell tickets, but production wins ballgames. Aroldis is currently long on the former and short on the latter.

Chapman exploded on the scene with a blazing fastball and a Bugs Bunny slider, which put the Reds on the national radar in a way not seen since the days of Josh Hamilton. The Reds haven't had the kind of sustained success necessary to be consistently relevant to the national discussion, but when a story that transcends the game lands in the Queen city the Reds once again resurface in the national consciousness. Hamilton was just such a story and upon his departure I lamented the loss of both the player and the story, which were inseparable and equally valuable to the organization.

Now, the Reds have another chance, but to fully reap the rewards from the marriage of story and production, they'll have to determine how to properly utilize Chapman. How do they get more from him than the spectacle? How do they get production that effectively advances the team towards the postseason? Aye, there's the rub.

To start, the Reds have decided to use Chapman out of the bullpen in 2011, rather than letting him develop as a starter. Just like everyone else, I find that decision to be a questionable one. I understand that the Reds are closer now to a championship than they have been in decades. So, the desire to have all hands on deck is understandable. At the same time, I think if you have any confidence in Chapman's ability to start, then you have to send him down. Once he becomes entrenched as a reliever, it will become increasingly difficult to shift him back to the starting rotation. A similar situation is happening in Texas with Neftali Feliz, who thus far has been deemed too valuable as a reliever to be switched back to the rotation.

Personally, I am beginning to question whether Chapman can smoothly make the transition to the rotation, so I'm not as opposed to the notion of him as a reliever as I was previously. Still, given the disparity in workload between starting (200 IP) and relieving (60 IP), there is no doubt that starters have a greater ability to make an impact. As a result, Chapman should be given every opportunity to start. Regardless, the Reds have decided that the best way to extract production from Chapman is to use him as a reliever.

To be a productive reliever, Chapman will need to work high leverage innings. He already has the stuff to thrive in such a role, as evidenced by his stellar 12.8 K/9 and his paltry 66.7% contact rate. However, he'll have to continue refining his command, as evidenced by his 3.4 BB/9, First Pitch Strike % of only 57%, and 16.6 pitches per inning. As a pitcher who avoids contact, he'll always be less efficient with his pitches, but a first pitch strike would make him that much tougher, simply by tipping the probability of success in his favor. And, as the Phillies demonstrated in the playoffs, his pitches aren't completely untouchable, so a bit of refinement would serve him well.

Overall, Chapman has the type of stuff to be as effective as Neftali Feliz was last year for the Rangers. And, once he establishes himself, the Reds will have just as much difficulty in switching him back to the rotation. Regardless, the Reds ability to extract production from Chapman will go a long way to determining their success in 2011.

2010 Top Prospect List: #0 Aroldis Chapman, lhp

Aroldis Chapman
Height 6-4, Weight 185, B/T: L/L, DOB: 2/28/1988
2009 Redlegs Baseball Prospect Ranking: NA

Chapman is the type of player who could completely change the fortunes of an organization. These types of players are obviously few and far between. The Reds squandered their last opportunity to acquire the services of such a player. The organization passed on Tim Lincecum in favor of Drew Stubbs in the 2005 draft. And, quite seriously, I'm not sure any draft pick in MLB history has ever come with a higher opportunity cost.

Stubbs is undoubtedly intriguing, but he's still struggling to establish himself at the MLB level, while Lincecum has already run out of shelf space for all his Cy Young awards. I can't recall any prospect having such an immediate impact and performing at such an elite level. Not only did Lincecum pay off almost immediately, but he completely changed the fortunes of the San Francisco Giants organization. In baseball, it is a rare talent who can almost single-handedly advance an organization forward on the win curve.

Lincecum is that kind of talent. So is Chapman. Of course, Chapman has a long way to go to reach that ceiling, but the ability is certainly there.


INTERNATIONAL HISTORY

Chapman was slated to be the next ace pitcher on the Cuban national team. However, Aroldis had a different idea. He first attempted to defect in 2008, but was unsuccessful. The attempt resulted in Chapman being left off the 2008 Cuban team for the Beijing Olympics. He worked his way back into the good graces of the Castro brothers in time for the World Baseball Classic.

In the WBC, Chapman made two starts and went 0-1 with a 5.68 ERA. He lost to the Japanese team, lasting only 2 innings, which probably wasn't surprising. In some respects, the Japanese team is the worst possible matchup for Chapman. The Japanese teams are always extremely fundamentally sound. They may not have the best tools, but they will not do anything to beat themselves. When facing a pitcher like Chapman, who is equal parts erratic and electric, it is a big advantage when you force him to beat you. If you aren't willing to expand the zone and help him out by chasing pitches, then you increase your chances of exploiting the weaknesses of his game. If you don't give away outs needlessly on the bases, then you force him to earn everything he gets.

Shortly after the WBC, Chapman again tried to defect, but with drastically different results. He successfully defected, set up residency in Andorra, and became an international free agent under MLB rules. In one of the biggest surprises of recent memory, the Reds flew in under the radar and signed Chapman to a 6-year, $30.25M contract. The Reds acted decisively and outbid both the Red Sox and Yankees.


PHYSICAL BUILD AND REPERTOIRE

Chapman stands 6-4 and weighs in at 190 pounds. He has a tall, lean, lanky frame that allows him to throw on a significant downward plane. He also has long limbs and fingers. These longer levers give him greater leverage and arm speed to impart on the ball. Chapman has a very quick pitching arm in his delivery, which is part of the reason why he has one of the best arms in the world. Chapman generates some of the best and easiest velocity I've ever seen. It's really remarkable to see a pitcher reach triple digit velocity with such an easy delivery. Typically when a pitcher can throw that fast, it's the result of a lot of labor and effort. Not so with Chapman.

Chapman features a fastball that sits in the mid-90s and touches 101 mph. It grades out as a true 80 on the 20-80 scouting scale. His secondary offerings are not comparable to his plus-plus fastball, but include a curveball, slider, and changeup. At this point, Chapman remains more of a thrower than a pitcher, but his upside rivals that of just about anyone, anywhere.


PITCHING MECHANICS

Chapman stands tall on the rubber with his hands in front of his chest and his glove-side foot positioned down in front of the rubber. From that position, he strides directly towards third base. Once his stride foot lands, he un-weights his left foot and rotates it down on the rubber. At this point, he has a slight pause in his delivery. After the hesitation, Chapman continues his delivery and brings his glove-side leg up into his leg kick.

The apex of Chapman's leg kick exceeds parallel to the ground and he points his toe down towards the ground. The height on Chapman's leg kick creates significant potential energy in his delivery. Additionally, when his leg kick begins to approach its apex, Chapman begins to rotate his lead hip inward. Chapman incorporates such significant hip rotation into his delivery that he almost shows his back to the hitters.

By wrapping his leg kick and coiling his body, Chapman creates even more potential energy. By rotating his hips against his stationary plant leg, Chapman creates tension that he can release as he unpacks his leg kick and drives towards the plate.

Chapman gets good push off the rubber and utilizes good lower body drive towards the plate. As he unpacks his leg kick and drives to the plate, Chapman utilizes a very long stride. In fact, the aggressiveness and sheer length of his stride reminds me a bit of Tim Lincecum. Both seem to almost leap up off the rubber towards the plate.











Due to his height and longer stride, Chapman actually releases the ball a bit closer to the plate than other pitchers. As a result, the pitch gets on hitters a bit quicker, which makes it seem even faster.

As for his arm action, it's pretty clean. He uses more of a three-quarter arm slot instead of a pure over the top arm slot. He keeps his elbow in good position relative to his shoulder. The timing on his arm action is also good, as his arm is up in proper throwing position when his plant foot lands. Chapman's longer levers give his arm action a bit of a whip-like action.

So, Chapman has several key components necessary for generating plus velocity. He is tall and has long arms, so he releases the ball closer to the plate. He has a well above average body coil and a high leg kick. And, most importantly, he simply has a very strong, quick arm.

Here are a few looks at Aroldis in action:













As for potential issues, after reaching the apex of his leg kick, Chapman has a tendency to break down his back leg. He flexes his knee a bit more than normal, which could lead to inconsistency.

In light of his height and longer arms, it's more of a challenge for Chapman to keep all the parts of his delivery in sync. The whip action created by his longer levers also brings struggles to maintain a consistent arm slot.

In addition, Chapman has a tendency to land on his heel more than the ball of his foot. The heel does not absorb and distribute the shock of impact as well as the ball of the foot. When the foundation is unsteady, a pitcher's command can be inconsistent.

He will need to tighten up his delivery and refine his mechanics to be more repeatable in order to improve his ability to locate the ball inside the strikezone.

CONCLUSION

Chapman has upside that rivals that of just about anyone in baseball. His live arm and massive velocity gives him a sky high ceiling, but the lack of polish on his secondary pitches and inconsistent command means he still has work to do to reach his ceiling. He is also a prime example of the benefits to be gleaned from using international free agents to bolster a farm system.

Chapman is widely regarded as having the talent of a #1 overall pick in the draft, so the fact that the Reds were able to sign him away from the larger revenue teams could be a massive turning point for the organization. In a perfect world, the Reds will be able to give Chapman some significant innings in the minor leagues. He was electric in spring training, but he never dominated in Cuba or on the international stage, so it's rather unrealistic for Chapman to step right in and dominate at the MLB level.

Chapman has the upside to completely alter the fortunes of the Reds organization. Of course, he still has significant work to do, but his pure stuff not only gives him a massively high ceiling, but also a fairly high floor. Even if he can't refine his mechanics and improve his command, he could still be a middle of the rotation pitcher.

The Reds paid a hefty price to acquire Chapman's services, but the massive upside makes it well worth it. For now, Chapman checks in as the best prospect in the system and lands at #0 on the list.

Quick Hits on Aroldis Chapman

I'll save the breakdown of Chapman the player until his prospect write up, but here's a look at the acquisition itself.

At first glance, I was warying of signing Chapman. I'm not high on Cuban arms. The Cuban people love their baseball and due to the political system in place on the island, they live in a somewhat isolated bubble. As such, I think the hype and reputations of the Cuban players frequently outpace the reality.

Still, the existence of the WBC gives these players a bit better exposure and gives teams a better measuring stick for evaluating them. They get to face a more established level of competition, so hopefully the Reds got a nice, long look at Chapman. Ideally, it'll merge the reputation and reality to a certain extent.

I was hoping to get a better breakdown of the contract he received. I've heard that he is going to receive $30.25M over 6-years. I've heard he's set to make only $1M in 2010, but also that he's receiving a signing bonus of $16.25M spread over 10 years. So, I really don't know how the $30.25M is going to be distributed.

At first, I was encouraged by the $1M salary in 2010, as I don't think he's ready for prime time. He's going to need some time to polish up his command and secondary offerings. In addition, he's going to have to adjust to the American culture, which is a bigger deal than we might think. So, it'll help that we aren't on the hook for much of his salary in 2010. Even so, given that it's all guaranteed money, it does little but increase the average salary of the next 5 years.

Even so, I must say that the price is certainly right. I'm a bit surprised that no other team was willing to go to that level. At first, I was concerned that the Red Sox, who are perhaps the best team in baseball at properly valuing players, were unwilling to go much past $15M. But, I suspect that has more to do with the BoSox bumping up against the luxury tax than anything else. To me, the Chapman contract makes sense even if he ends up being nothing more than a #4/5 starter. An annual salary of ~$5-6M isn't all that much for a back-end of the rotation starter, especially one that comes with Chapman's massive upside. He obviously can't be the bargain that Stephen Strasburg could be for the Nats, but that's the difference between draft eligible prospects and international free agents.

Another reason to like the signing is that it seems to fit in nicely with other aspects of their front office game plan. The Reds addressed an area of need, as they lacked much southpaw depth in the system. In addition, the loss of Stewart is less painful now that Chapman is in the fold. And, 2009 1st round pick, Mike Leake, makes more sense. He strikes me as more of a high-floor, lower ceiling type draft pick. So, the addition of a high-upside, higher risk type player like Chapman fits nicely.

Perhaps most importantly, this is another player personnel decision that really "moves the needle." It's the type of move that reverberates around MLB. Far too often, the Reds are completely ignored and marginalized. The years and years of poor play have made the Reds largely irrelevant in the mainstream media. So, it takes a jolt for them to even register across the country. This is a statement move and we haven't had one of those since the Josh Hamilton acquisition. A move that reminds the media that there actually are franchises that reside between the coasts.

It's hard not to like Chapman's upside. Personally, I don't buy the stories of a "102 mph fastball," but even 95+ mph is something special. He's obviously got the potential to be a stud and most pundits rank him among the top 25 prospects in all of baseball. So, the Reds just acquired a #1 prospect, which is pretty impressive. On the downside, rumor has it that they are going to pay for his contract out of the 2010 draft budget, which is potentially a significant opportunity cost which could drag down the value/impact of acquiring him.

Overall, it's a nice signing. It's not quite the bargain that you'll find in the Rule IV draft, but when you can add a player with his immense skills it's worth the risk. As for 2010, I don't think it's an exaggeration to say that he might be better served getting in some consistent work in the minors. It'll be tempting to rush him, but a bit of development time and polish would likely be best for all.