And, time for quick spin through the bullpen:
Francisco Cordero -- Expectations: Medium, Grade: D+
Unfortunately, the Reds are on the hook for big money to a closer who is heading in the wrong direction. When the Reds signed Coco away from division rival Brewers, they were acquiring the services of an elite, shutdown closer. In each of the three seasons prior to joining the Reds, Coco tossed at least 63 innings, posted K/9 marks of greater than 10.0, and posted BB/9 marks of less than 4.0.
The Reds have gotten a couple of good seasons from Coco, but his performance has undeniably been a notch below where it was before arriving in the Queen City. That wasn't much of a problem in 2008 and 2009, but in 2010 it was alarming.
Coco's strikeout rate has fallen from 12.22 in his final year with the Brewers to 9.98 in 2008 to 7.83 in 2009 and finally to 7.31 in 2010. Those rates are typically more than acceptable, unless they are paired with walk rates of greater than 4.0. If you are going to walk that many, then you need to strikeout hitters at a dominant rate. Since 2002 through 2007, Coco sported a K/BB ratio of 2.37 or higher, with the high water mark being 4.78 in 2007. However, starting in 2008 on forward, he has posted K/BB marks of 2.05, 1.93, and 1.64. Coco's 2010 contact rate also jumped all the way up to 79%, which matched the second worst rate of his career.
Interestingly enough, Coco's problems largely came on the fastball, which simply lost effectiveness. In 2009, Coco's fastball was 8.1 runs above average, but in 2010 Coco's fastball was a mere 0.7 runs above average. The slider was exactly as effective in 2010 as it was in 2009, clocking in at 5.1 runs above average in both years.
Additionally, Dusty was fairly conservative with Coco's usage. The Bill James Handbook includes a stat for relievers called the Leverage Index. In short, a mark of 1.0 is an average leverage index. The higher the index, the more times the reliever is working with the game on the line. The lower the index, the more times the reliever is working in mop-up duty. For 2010, Coco's leverage index was 2.1, which is pretty standard for closers.
However, it's clear that Dusty tried to protect Coco to a certain extent, as Coco only inherited 4 runners the entire season (perhaps not surprisingly, 3 of the those runners came around to score). In comparison, San Francisco Giant closer Brian Wilson was utilized much more aggressively by Bruce Bochy, as he inherited a whopping 30 baserunners and allowed a mere 4 of them to score.
On the season, Coco only had 1 "tough save" opportunity, which is defined as a situation where the reliever enters the game with the tying run on base. And, of course, Coco blew his only "tough save" opportunity. Again, for comparison sake, Brian Wilson had 9 tough save opportunities and converted on 7 of them.
Overall, this declining dominance is not unexpected, as Coco will be 36-years old in early 2011. Unfortunately, that means his days of blowing the doors off the competition in the late innings are likely over.
Nick Masset -- Expectations: Medium, Grade: C
Masset continues to be a very effective member of the Reds bullpen and his acquisition in the Ken Griffey Jr. deal was one of the more unheralded of recent memory. At the time, Griffey had little to no trade value, but GM Walt Jocketty still managed to extract a high leverage reliever from the White Sox for his services. It's a deal that has helped solidify the back end of the bullpen and provided much needed late inning stability.
In 2010, Masset was essentially the same pitcher he was in 2009. He tossed 76.2 innings and posted a 3.40 ERA, 1.27 WHIP, 3.9 BB/9, and 10.0 K/9. His walk rate and strikeout rate both increased, but the real difference in his performance came from a regression to the mean of his BABIP (from .250 in 2009 to .303 in 2010). Additionally, and not surprisingly in light of the increase in hit rate, his strand rate dropped from 80.5% in 2009 to 76.0% in 2010. Regardless, he was largely the same pitcher in 2010 as he was in 2009, as his FIP was 3.23 in 2009 and 3.38 in 2010.
On the season, his pitch mix was largely the same, except he threw the curveball 5% more often and the cutter 7.4% less often. Masset also worked heavily in key situations, as his Leverage Index was 1.3. He also inherited 32 runners, only 9 of whom came around to score, and posted an opponent OPS of .643.
In addition to the aforementioned increase in walk rate, Masset threw significantly fewer first pitch strikes (down to 48% in 2010 from 59% in 2009), so the command certainly did falter a bit in 2010.
Overall, Masset continues to post solid production that will ensure that Dusty leans heavily on him in the future high leverage situations. In fact, he could be next in line for the closer gig if Coco continues his slow fade.
Logan Ondrusek -- Expectations: Low , Grade: B+
Ondrusek quickly established that his breakthrough performance in the minors was no sample size fluke, as he carried his new found success and cutter to the bump in Great American Ballpark. He assumed a hefty workload and was a key member of the relief corps.
Logan tossed a 3.68 ERA and 1.18 WHIP over 58.2 innings. Not bad for a rookie. The strikeout (5.98 K/9) and walk (3.07 BB/9) rates aren't overly strong, but he actually did a nice job of missing bats (77.1% contact rate). The contact he did allow, however, was in the air more often than was expected by his minor league track record. On the season, Ondrusek actually had neutral groundball/flyball tendencies (0.99 GB/FB). His overall performance was aided by a lower than expected BABIP of .249. Overall, it was a nice season for Ondrusek, but he'll need to improve on his peripherals in 2011 if he wants to sustain his level of performance.
Ondrusek also did a very nice job stranding inherited runners. Of the 26 he inherited, only 7 came around to score. His 27% scoring clip was the second best on the team behind only ageless wonder, Arthur Rhodes, at 14%. Unlike Rhodes, however, Ondrusek was not used in high leverage innings (0.9 Leverage Index).
If Ondrusek can improve his peripherals, then he'll likely be spending time in more crucial, high leverage situations in 2011 and beyond. Ondrusek is a prime example of the improving depth and quality of the organization's farm system. As a general rule, the best arms in a farm system are developed as starting pitchers. In the past, the Reds had far fewer quality arms in the system, which resulted in prospects likely better suited to relieving being developed as starters. Given the miscasting of these prospects, the organization struggled to develop starters and relievers. The rebirth of the farm system has allowed the organization to bump quality arms like Ondrusek down into relief roles, where they can develop into assets for the Major League roster.
Arthur Rhodes -- Expectations: Medium, Grade: A
As remarkable as it sounds, Rhodes has posted a sub-3.00 ERA in each of the past three seasons. And, even more remarkably, the last two took place in the hitter's paradise known as Great American Ballpark. In 2010, he managed to be even better.
In 55.0 high leverage innings (1.4 Leverage Index), the 40-year old Rhodes posted a 2.29 ERA, 1.02 WHIP, and 50/18 K/BB ratio. Rhodes not only pitched well, but pitched well in crucial situations. He inherited 36 runners and stranded all but 5 of them. So, not only was his own ERA stellar, but he also bailed out other pitchers and helped keep their ERAs low.
Overall, Rhodes outperformed his peripherals, as his FIP of 3.24 was almost a full run higher than his actual ERA. Part of that discrepancy resulted from his .244 BABIP and 83.7% strand rate, which both could conceivably regress in the future.
Ultimately, Rhodes was the most valuable reliever on the roster in 2010. Unfortunately, the Reds let Rhodes get away to the Texas Rangers. After all the cries of poverty coming out of Cincinnati, one wonders if the $2M (possibly $3M if incentives are reached) they spent on Edgar Renteria would have been better used to bring Rhodes back in 2011. If Rhodes was still in the mix, then the Reds might be more willing to develop Aroldis Chapman in the minors as a starter. Art's departure created a hole in the bullpen that had to be filled. Chapman has been tabbed as just the player to do it. Aroldis dominated as a reliever, but the longer he stays in that role, the less likely he'll be moved back to the starting rotation.
The departure of Rhodes means not only the loss of his production, but perhaps also a change in long-term role for Aroldis Chapman. If true, Rhodes's departure could have a long lasting impact on the future of the organization.
Jordan Smith -- Expectations: Low, Grade: B
Smith joined Logan Ondrusek to give the Reds an unexpected tandem of homegrown, young relievers. Smith tossed 42.0 innings, posting 3.86 ERA, 1.33 WHIP, 2.36 BB/9, and 5.57 K/9. Similarly to Ondrusek, Smith outperformed his peripherals, as his 4.94 FIP was over a full run higher than his actual ERA. While his BABIP was a respectable .291, his strand rate was likely unsustainable at 83.0%.
Somewhat surprisingly, Smith's heavy groundball tendencies in the minors did not translate to the MLB level, as evidenced by his 1.06 GB/FB ratio. His defining characteristic as a pitcher is his groundball rate, as he has always been a pitch-to-contact type pitcher. And, it's tough to excel in a hitter's ballpark with that type of profile unless you are racking up the groundballs.
Smith inherited 17 runners and allowed 6 of them to come around to score. Smith was used largely in low leverage situations (0.7 Leverage Index) by Dusty Baker and will likely to continue as a long reliever or mop-up man in the future. His lack of overpowering stuff will likely prevent him from becoming a setup man or closer, but if he can rediscover his groundball touch, then he might be the type of pitcher you need in the bullpen to throw a key double-play ball.
Overall, Smith performed well out of the bullpen in 2010, but he'll likely struggle to maintain that success unless he rediscovers the heavy sink on his pitches.
Billy Bray -- Expectations: None, Grade: B
Bray continues to drive fans insane. He demonstrates flashes of brilliance in between very long stints on the disabled list. In 2010, Bray managed to stay on the field long enough to log 28.1 innings in which he posted a 4.13 ERA, 1.09 WHIP, 3.18 BB/9, and 9.53 K/9.
Unlike Smith and Ondrusek, Bray's peripherals were superior to his production. His FIP of 3.86 is lower than his ERA. Additionally, his strand rate is surprisingly low at 70.9%, which might regress to higher levels in 2011 if he can actually stay on the field long enough for it to happen.
He was used largely in non-key situations, as his Leverage Index was 0.7. Obviously, his inconsistent health has prevented the Reds from relying on him in any appreciable manner. A healthy Bray would somewhat offset the loss of Arthur Rhodes, but his track record indicates that a full season of production is rather unlikely.
Aroldis Chapman -- Expectations: Medium, Grade: A++
Incredible. Electric. Unbelievable.
The big question on Aroldis is whether the Reds will be able to convert him from mere spectacle into a big time MLB contributor.
Showing posts with label 2010. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 2010. Show all posts
Friday, January 7, 2011
Wednesday, December 22, 2010
Missed Opportunity Thy Name Be "Greinke"
Oh, boy, did the Reds miss an opportunity, let me count the ways:
1. The Reds have two holes in the lineup (leftfield and shortstop) and one area where a legitimate upgrade is warranted (starting rotation) and a farm system rather well stocked with blocked prospects (J.Francisco, T.Frazier, Y.Alonso, D.Sappelt, etc.).
When you put it all together, don't you have to come to the conclusion that we should be looking to trade from our surplus of blocked prospects to fill the holes in our lineup or address those areas to be improved?
Now, there are reports that the Royals had specific requests for a Greinke deal. Namely, up the middle talent that was nearly ready for the Majors. The Royals are wisely trying to sync-up the arrival date of all of their talent to make a serious push for the postseason. Of course, that's exactly what we should be doing, but we still line up in trade because our window is now, while the Royals are a couple of years away.
We may have lacked a shortstop the caliber of Escobar (though, Cozart is probably closer than some might think), but we certainly could have offered up a similar package and included more value to tip the scales in favor of our offer.
2. The Reds pitching staff is long on depth, short on elite talent. As a result, they are well built for the regular season, but poorly constructed for the postseason. Adding an elite pitcher at the top of the rotation would have been a significant boost to the team in the regular season, while increasing our competitiveness for the postseason.
During his 2009 Cy Young winning season, Zack Greinke had a Win Above Replacement (WAR) mark of 9.4 and in 2010 he had a WAR of 5.2. In 2010, only 2 Reds pitchers on the starting staff even had WARs of greater than 2.0 (Cueto 2.8, Wood 2.2). So, even during his down 2010 season, Greinke represented a 3+ win improvement over everyone on the staff with the exception of Cueto. In addition, Greinke did it against the tougher league, so some improvement in the NL in front of a better defense is a reasonable expectation. Now, admittedly, the WARs of some of the Reds pitchers are depressed by their lack of innings, but it's clear that Greinke represents a significant upgrade in talent over all (or at least, most) of the staff.
3. Here is the biggest factor in my mind. How many Cy Young award winning pitchers actively reject large market teams? How many elite players actively WANT to pitch in the middle of the country?
Greinke has struggled with social anxiety disorder, but that attribute made him rare among elite players. High revenue clubs are that way because they operate in larger markets. The more consumers, the more revenue. And, as odd as it sounds, larger markets are exactly what Greinke wanted to avoid. To a certain extent, he likes to avoid people and social interaction, so for once larger market teams were at a distinct disadvantage. That which typically constitutes the biggest strength of large market organizations was turned against them to be an insurmountable weakness.
Greinke utilized his no trade clause to eliminate the big boys from the competition, which pared the market down to (in essence) the second tier revenue organizations. How many times does a lower or middle revenue organization get to compete in a marketplace that excludes the big spenders? It was a remarkable situation that I can scarcely recall happening in the recent past or expect to see again in the future. Unfortunately, the Reds failed to capitalize on the opportunity.
4. And, of course, if the Reds had acquired Greinke, then they would have prevented their divisional foe from getting him. The Reds could have improved themselves, while weakening an opponent by blocking their effort at improvement. Oddly enough, it feels a bit like the cold war of the AL East, where a BoSox gain represents a corresponding loss for the Yanks (or, vice versa). So, it's a double-impact, as it becomes something of a zero-sum game, as one team's win is the other team's loss.
5. Overall, Greinke is a special talent who possesses an exceptionally rare blend of stuff, command, and feel for pitching, which is why he is one of my very favorite pitchers. To justify the lack of action by the Reds, some may point to the payroll restrictions under which the front office was laboring, but in reality either or both of the ownership group (boosting payroll) or the front office (freeing up money) could have made it work. When a unique opportunity like this comes along, you simply have to jump on it.
In short, I think this was a huge missed opportunity for the Reds and one that is likely to haunt in the very near future. I'm a huge Greinke fan and expect him to be very, very good in 2011 and beyond. Unfortunately, it just won't be for the Reds.
1. The Reds have two holes in the lineup (leftfield and shortstop) and one area where a legitimate upgrade is warranted (starting rotation) and a farm system rather well stocked with blocked prospects (J.Francisco, T.Frazier, Y.Alonso, D.Sappelt, etc.).
When you put it all together, don't you have to come to the conclusion that we should be looking to trade from our surplus of blocked prospects to fill the holes in our lineup or address those areas to be improved?
Now, there are reports that the Royals had specific requests for a Greinke deal. Namely, up the middle talent that was nearly ready for the Majors. The Royals are wisely trying to sync-up the arrival date of all of their talent to make a serious push for the postseason. Of course, that's exactly what we should be doing, but we still line up in trade because our window is now, while the Royals are a couple of years away.
We may have lacked a shortstop the caliber of Escobar (though, Cozart is probably closer than some might think), but we certainly could have offered up a similar package and included more value to tip the scales in favor of our offer.
2. The Reds pitching staff is long on depth, short on elite talent. As a result, they are well built for the regular season, but poorly constructed for the postseason. Adding an elite pitcher at the top of the rotation would have been a significant boost to the team in the regular season, while increasing our competitiveness for the postseason.
During his 2009 Cy Young winning season, Zack Greinke had a Win Above Replacement (WAR) mark of 9.4 and in 2010 he had a WAR of 5.2. In 2010, only 2 Reds pitchers on the starting staff even had WARs of greater than 2.0 (Cueto 2.8, Wood 2.2). So, even during his down 2010 season, Greinke represented a 3+ win improvement over everyone on the staff with the exception of Cueto. In addition, Greinke did it against the tougher league, so some improvement in the NL in front of a better defense is a reasonable expectation. Now, admittedly, the WARs of some of the Reds pitchers are depressed by their lack of innings, but it's clear that Greinke represents a significant upgrade in talent over all (or at least, most) of the staff.
3. Here is the biggest factor in my mind. How many Cy Young award winning pitchers actively reject large market teams? How many elite players actively WANT to pitch in the middle of the country?
Greinke has struggled with social anxiety disorder, but that attribute made him rare among elite players. High revenue clubs are that way because they operate in larger markets. The more consumers, the more revenue. And, as odd as it sounds, larger markets are exactly what Greinke wanted to avoid. To a certain extent, he likes to avoid people and social interaction, so for once larger market teams were at a distinct disadvantage. That which typically constitutes the biggest strength of large market organizations was turned against them to be an insurmountable weakness.
Greinke utilized his no trade clause to eliminate the big boys from the competition, which pared the market down to (in essence) the second tier revenue organizations. How many times does a lower or middle revenue organization get to compete in a marketplace that excludes the big spenders? It was a remarkable situation that I can scarcely recall happening in the recent past or expect to see again in the future. Unfortunately, the Reds failed to capitalize on the opportunity.
4. And, of course, if the Reds had acquired Greinke, then they would have prevented their divisional foe from getting him. The Reds could have improved themselves, while weakening an opponent by blocking their effort at improvement. Oddly enough, it feels a bit like the cold war of the AL East, where a BoSox gain represents a corresponding loss for the Yanks (or, vice versa). So, it's a double-impact, as it becomes something of a zero-sum game, as one team's win is the other team's loss.
5. Overall, Greinke is a special talent who possesses an exceptionally rare blend of stuff, command, and feel for pitching, which is why he is one of my very favorite pitchers. To justify the lack of action by the Reds, some may point to the payroll restrictions under which the front office was laboring, but in reality either or both of the ownership group (boosting payroll) or the front office (freeing up money) could have made it work. When a unique opportunity like this comes along, you simply have to jump on it.
In short, I think this was a huge missed opportunity for the Reds and one that is likely to haunt in the very near future. I'm a huge Greinke fan and expect him to be very, very good in 2011 and beyond. Unfortunately, it just won't be for the Reds.
Thursday, December 9, 2010
Today is a Good Day
Well, simply put, today is a good day.
The Reds have locked up Jay Bruce to a 6-year contract with an option for a 7th. Seven more years of Jay Bruce? I'm looking forward to each and every one. And, the deal comes at the exact right time, as I truly believe that Bruce is ready to break out. When all is said and done, this deal should work out very well for the Reds and set Jay Bruce up for life.
If Bruce avoids injury, then this deal should be a very good one for the Reds. Under the fangraphs.com "Dollars" metric, Bruce's 2010 production was worth $21.1M. In short, a single season at his 2010 level of production would be worth almost 1/3 of the cost of his entire salary over the next 7-seasons. It's scary to think just how valuable Bruce can be if he continues to improve.
Actually, today is a VERY good day.
Jerry Crasnick of ESPN.com reports that the Reds have signed outfielder Jay Bruce to a six-year, $51 million contract extension.The deal also contains a club option for a seventh year that would bring the total worth to $63 million. Bruce was up for salary arbitration for the first time this winter and could have started down a path of negotiating raises each year. Instead he opted to cash in now, committing Thursday to an extended stay in Cincinnati. These deals often go well for both sides.Source: Jerry Crasnick on Twitter
The Reds have locked up Jay Bruce to a 6-year contract with an option for a 7th. Seven more years of Jay Bruce? I'm looking forward to each and every one. And, the deal comes at the exact right time, as I truly believe that Bruce is ready to break out. When all is said and done, this deal should work out very well for the Reds and set Jay Bruce up for life.
If Bruce avoids injury, then this deal should be a very good one for the Reds. Under the fangraphs.com "Dollars" metric, Bruce's 2010 production was worth $21.1M. In short, a single season at his 2010 level of production would be worth almost 1/3 of the cost of his entire salary over the next 7-seasons. It's scary to think just how valuable Bruce can be if he continues to improve.
Actually, today is a VERY good day.
Wednesday, December 8, 2010
Spraying Bullets
A few quick, somewhat random thoughts on the offseason thus far:
- The Reds should be in on Zack Greinke in a big way. The Reds have tremendous starting pitching depth, but lack a true #1 starter. And, as anyone who watched last year's playoffs knows, pitching talks loudest in October. Prospects are currency in Major League Baseball and the Reds have more than enough set aside for a rainy day. In fact, one could argue that they are failing to properly monetize their prospects by holding on to them too long. Juan Francisco and Todd Frazier are prime examples, as their respective trade values are in danger of falling completely off the table. By themselves, they won't land Greinke, but they could be nice complimentary players in a package deal.The Reds certainly have the pieces to get a deal done and landing a legitimate #1 starter is worth the price, especially one like Greinke who has the stuff and polish to rival any pitcher in baseball. Additionally, Greinke would like be right at home in Cincy, where his social anxiety issues would likely be less problematic than in a large market city. It's fine for the Reds to be less than proactive in free agency, but there's no reason for the Reds not to go after trade targets. The Reds had a nice season in 2010, but if you aren't improving, then you are standing still. And, if you are standing still, then the competition is gaining on you. If the Reds want to repeat, they may want to do more than bank on improvement from the young guys already on the roster.
- I seem to be one of the few who doesn't have a problem with the Nationals contract for Jayson Werth. Of course, I've been a huge Werth fan since his days as a Dodger. I thought the Reds should have snapped him up after the Dodgers non-tendered him way back when. But, I digress, as everyone on Earth now knows, the Nats gave the soon to be 32-year old Werth a 7-year deal worth $126M. Obviously, that's a big investment, but Werth generates tremendous value with a rare combination of tools and skills. That combination should enable him to age well and continue to generate value even if his offense slips a bit. Under the "Dollars" metric created by Fangraphs, Werth's production over the last three seasons has been worth $22.9M, $22.0M, and $20.0M. That metric takes a player's actual production at the end of the season and then determines what it would cost a team to buy that exact production. It doesn't equate to market value because "Dollars" deals with exact production without factoring in risk of any kind (performance, injury, etc). "Dollars" deals with certainty in production, whereas market salary deals with uncertainty. "Dollars" looks backwards, while salary looks forward. In short, market rate salaries are lower than "Dollars" because teams factor in uncertainty, injury, and production risk. So, Werth's Dollar figure doesn't mean that his actual salary is supportable, but I really don't think it's that far off. The final year or two will probably be rough due to his age decline, but the Nats saw the guy they wanted and went hard after him. Salaries are going to escalate because of increasing revenue and inflation. It's the nature of the beast and has been for decades. And, among those wringing their hands and complaining are (I'm sure) the big market teams (Red Sox, Yankees, Mets, etc) and teams who have set the market in previous years (Royals with Meche, Giants with Zito, Astros with Carlos Lee, etc etc). It seems like it's only an "outrageous" deal when it's not a big money team. When the Yanks/Red Sox sign someone for big money, everyone complains about revenue disparity. When a smaller revenue team or a team that rarely makes a big splash throws around big bucks, everyone complains about the contract.
- Reds fans everywhere are already getting worried about keeping Joey Votto around long-term. Votto has given some mixed signals about his willingness to sign a multi-year deal, so maybe there is cause for concern. He recently was quoted as saying he wouldn't accept a hometown discount out of respect for the players who came before him and those to come after him. I'm not sure how genuine that rationale actually is, but regardless I wouldn't expect him to give us a discount. I would, however, expect him to at least consider giving up a couple of free agent years in exchange for a guaranteed multi-year contract that would set him up for life. For me, the time to get an extension done with Votto is now....right now. People complained about the Werth contract because it set the market. It was the first big contract and may have provided a benchmark for other free agents. Personally, I'm concerned about what happens to the Reds chances to sign Votto to an extension after the Cardinals hand out an extension to Albert Pujols. Obviously, Votto isn't in the same position as Pujols due to service time differences, but how willing will Votto be to surrender a couple of free agency seasons after the Cardinals sign Pujols (the player Votto just beat out for the MVP award) to an extension worth $25-30M on an annual basis? I could easily be wrong, but waiting could cost the Reds in a big, big way. The Reds need to work out 5-6 year contract extensions with Jay Bruce and Joey Votto this offseason. I expect Bruce to explode next year and become much more expensive. And, I expect Votto to become much harder to retain after the Pujols deal establishes a new benchmark for MVP first basemen.
- And, as I have alluded to before, I'm not a fan of the Arroyo extension. I don't like taking on unnecessary risk in an area of strength and I don't like Arroyo's chances of maintaining his level of success as he ages. Hopefully Arroyo continues to prove me wrong, but I continue to wonder if that's money that could be more effectively spent in other areas.
- It's hard for me not to think that the Reds missed out on a nice opportunity to improve their outfield by not landing Cameron Maybin. The Maybin acquisition would have been a payroll neutral move, which would fit nicely into the Reds' financial limitations this offseason. As a result, Maybin may have been the best opportunity of the offseason. As of now, Maybin's career is nothing more than a cautionary tale about the perils of rushing prospects up to the majors. However, he still has a tremendous set of tools and the opportunity to refine those skills necessary to utilize them. He still has substantial potential and the time to unlock. Unfortunately, Maybin is out of options, so he can't develop in the minors any longer, but plugging him into leftfield in the righthanded hitters haven of Great American Ballpark could have been a big boost. Additionally, an outfield of Maybin/Stubbs/Bruce would be the best young outfield in baseball and a very strong defensive trio. Maybe Maybin continues to flame out, but I remain a big fan and think he could be a sneaky good value this year. Unfortunately, that value won't be created for the Reds.
- All in all, it seems like the Reds are a tweak or two away from being a serious World Series contender and a perennial playoff team. It could be a real nice 5-year stretch for the Reds if they manage to consolidate the value of their organizational assets into the present 25-man roster. Of course, they won't get there simply by standing pat.
Friday, December 3, 2010
2010 Review: Starting Pitchers
On to the starting staff:
Bronson Arroyo -- Expectations: Medium, Grade: B-
Arroyo continues to grind out the 200+ inning seasons, topping the mark for an incredible 6th straight year in 2010. Arroyo is definitely not afraid of hard work and his tremendous durability continues to be his most valuable attribute. During his time in Cincy, almost without exception, Arroyo has taken the ball on his turn through the rotation.
However, the question remains whether he can continue to do so.
In 2010, Arroyo was almost exactly the same pitcher he was in 2009.
Year:_BB/9__K/9__GB/FB__ERA
2009:__ 2.7___5.2____1.22____3.84
2010: __2.5___5.1____1.08____3.88
I suppose that type of consistency should be comforting, but the decline in his strikeout rate during his time in Cincy is a concern (at least to me), but so far it hasn't slowed him down. Starting in 2006, his first season with the Reds, Arroyo has posted K/9 marks of 6.9, 6.7, 7.3, 5.2, and 5.1. I have concerns about whether Arroyo can continue to post a sub-4 ERA with these peripherals.
However, over the last two seasons, Bronson has significantly outperformed his FIP. His 3.84 ERA in 2009 went along with a FIP of 4.78 and a BABIP of .270, while his 3.88 ERA in 2010 when along with a FIP of 4.61 and a BABIP of .246. At first blush, it looks like he was hit lucky, but he also managed to decrease his Line Drive rate to 18.5% in 2009 and 16.3% in 2010.
Another interesting aspect of his performance is the percentage of his strikeouts that were called and his contact rate.
Year: Called K%_Contact%
2004:__28%______81%
2005:__22%______85%
2006:__20%______81%
2007:__21%______81%
2008:__19%______81%
2009:__23%______84%
2010:__17%______83%
Arroyo is allowing more and more pitches to be put in play and getting fewer called strikeouts, both of which would seem to indicate a decline in stuff. He's fooling fewer hitters and relying on his defense to a greater extent. Can he continue to succeed by, in essence, controlling the contact and relying on the defense?
A moment I found to be somewhat reassuring about Arroyo's 2010 season was his performance in the playoffs. You won't find many offenses better than the Phillies or many situations that are more high leverage than a postseason start. Regardless, Arroyo rose to the occasion and managed to keep the Phillies off-balance for most of the night. Ultimately, his outing was cut short when the defense let him down with back-to-back errors by Phillips and Rolen.
As with the regular season, the performance was more smoke-and-mirrors than dominating, as he allowed too many baserunners and walked more than he struck out. It was the same high-contact pitching style that he utilized during the season, but this time the defense let him down. Even so, he battled and came away with a solid performance, but I'm still not confident that Arroyo is the pitcher I want on the hill in a must win Game 7 situation.
Arroyo continues to be something of a contradiction. His peripherals are arguably getting worse, but his overall performance has gotten better. From where I sit, something has to give. I'm just not convinced that Arroyo can maintain his 2009 & 2010 performance level while allowing so much contact. The general thinking is that pitchers cannot control the outcome of balls in play. Additionally, high contact pitchers with neutral GB/FB tendencies in a bandbox like GABP seem like an inherently poor fit. Arroyo also benefited from the league wide decline in power, which made contact less harmful than in years past but may not continue in the 2011 season. Maybe Arroyo can continue to thrive with varied offspeed offerings, but I wouldn't be willing to extend him out past 2011. In fact, given our pitching surplus, I wouldn't hesitate to see what Arroyo would fetch on the trade market.
However, the Reds will have to hope that Arroyo can maintain his performance level by throwing the kitchen sink at opposing teams. Regardless of the performance level, the Reds can confidently pencil Arroyo in for 200+ innings in 2011.
Mike Leake -- Expectations: None, Grade: B
What Mike Leake managed to do in 2010 was nothing short of remarkable. His performance in spring training was so strong that he broke camp with the team and skipped the minors entirely, which you simply don't see all that often. And, probably for good reason.
It was an interesting decision due in no small part to the fact that Leake had never started every 5th day. In college, he started once a week, so it seemed likely and logical that Leake would start the year in the minors to acclimate to the heavier workload. But, the Reds deemed him MLB ready and it didn't take him long to prove that he was.
Leake tossed a rather stunning 138.1 innings with a 4.23 ERA, 1.50 WHIP, and 91/49 K/BB ratio. He managed to induce ground balls at a good clip (1.58 GB/FB ratio) and produced solid ratios (3.2 BB/9 and 5.9 K/9) for a rookie who bypassed the minors entirely. Not surprisingly, his early season performance was much stronger than his second half. He simply hit a wall and wasn't effective late in the season. It was likely a combination of fatigue and hitters learning the book on Leake.
His monthly splits reveal his hot start and subsequent fade:
April: 3.25 ERA in 27.2 IP
May: 1.88 ERA in 38.1 IP
June: 5.22 ERA in 29.1 IP
July: 4.56 ERA in 25.2 IP
August: 8.83 ERA in 17.1 IP
Looking at his mid/late season fade, it is easy to call the decision to start him off in the majors a questionable one. The Reds did effectively manage his pitch counts, as his highest game total was 106 pitches, but Leake simply hadn't been stretched out to handle the grind of a major league starting pitcher. His performance level was sufficient, but his endurance was not. However, he showed in his first few months that he was polished enough to succeed at the highest level right away, which made him essentially a no-risk draft pick.
Both Mike Leake and Mike Minor were polished college pitchers who have so far outperformed their projected draft positions. Minor has better stuff than was commonly believed and Leake moved much faster than thought possible. Not sure why the scouting was off the mark on these college pitchers, but polish may be somewhat underrated these days.
Overall, it was a surprising and strong rookie debut for Leake. Not surprisingly, he faded as his innings total mounted, but he gave the Reds some real big innings and some stability in the rotation at a time when it was definitely needed. The future is bright and having a pitcher in the rotation who understands how to pitch will provide some real stability for years to come.
Johnny Cueto -- Expectations: Medium, Grade: B+
Johnny has been in the majors for three seasons and has made incremental improvement each year. Despite his annual improvement, it's hard not to be somehow disappointed. Obviously, that isn't fair to Cueto, but he is a victim of his own success. In 2007, Cueto blazed through three minor league levels with a 3.07 ERA, 1.12 WHIP, 1.9 BB/9, and 9.5 K/9. That level of performance brought about notions of immediate MLB dominance. Instead, he has followed the more traditional path of incremental improvement.
In 2010, Cueto tossed 185.2 innings with a 3.64 ERA, 1.28 WHIP, and a 138/56 K/BB ratio. It was a nice combination of workload and performance level.
2008: 4.81 ERA, 1.41 WHIP, 3.5 BB/9, and 8.2 K/9 in 174.0 innings
2009: 4.41 ERA, 1.36 WHIP, 3.2 BB/9, and 6.9 K/9 in 171.1 innings
2010: 3.64 ERA, 1.28 WHIP, 2.7 BB/9, and 6.7 K/9 in 185.2 innings
He set a career high in innings pitched and improved across the board, with the exception of strikeouts which are in modest decline. Cueto is likely reining in his stuff in favor of improved command and control. As he has continued to evolve as a pitcher, Cueto has altered his pitch selection:
Year:__FB%__ SL%__CH%
2008:__61.1%__32.1%__6.7%
2009:__62.2%__29.7%__8.2%
2010:__55.2%__26.7%__10.0%
Perhaps it's the influence of roving instructor Mario Soto, who deserves a decent amount of credit for his work with our young pitchers, but whatever the reason Cueto has de-emphasized his slider in favor of his change-up. The change in pitch selection has likely brought about improved control and slightly fewer strikeouts. In short, Cueto is learning how to effectively utilize his arsenal for maximum benefit.
All in all, it was a nice season for Cueto, but one that didn't get a great deal of hype. To a certain extent, Cueto was overshadowed by Mike Leake, Travis Wood, and Aroldis Chapman. Those three each made a bigger splash, but Cueto's quiet improvement was just as impressive and certainly shouldn't be overshadowed. If Cueto makes yet another incremental improvement in 2011, then he'll be approaching some rather rarefied air.
Travis Wood -- Expectations: Low, Grade: A-
Yet another pitching surprise for the Reds and a good one at that. Wood has long been a favorite of mine due to his plus change-up and clean mechanics, but he arrived on the scene in 2010 with slightly better top-end velocity than was advertised.
Wood made quick work of the competition, flashing good stuff, great command, and a very good feel for pitching.
He stepped up to throw 102.2 innings with a 3.51 ERA, 1.08 WHIP, 2.3 BB/9, and 7.5 K/9. Wood featured a four pitch mix, including a fastball (64.1% of the time), changeup (10.1%), cutter (19.9%), and curveball (5.9%). He's got a very nice repertoire, which he used to keep the righthanders off balance and completely dominate the lefties.
On the season, Wood gave up absolutely nothing to lefties. He gave up a slash line of .136/.219/.227/.446. He also did a very nice job against righties to the tune of .240/.289/.363/.651. Overall, the addition of the cutter has really given Wood the ability to handle righthanded hitters. It allows him to keep them honest on the inner half of the plate, which improves the effectiveness of his fading changeup on the outer half.
Of course, Wood also provided one of the singular moments of the season for the Reds when he nearly tossed a perfect game against the defending NL champion Phillies in their home park. Wood threw 9 innings and gave up only 1 hit, no walks, and 8 strikeouts. His perfect game was foiled by a Carlos Ruiz double in the ninth inning and the Reds inability to score a run. The game ultimately went to extra innings where the Reds came out on the short end, but it was a national coming out party for Travis Wood.
The only potential red flag on Wood is his GB/FB ratio. He exhibited a heavy fly ball tendency, which isn't ideally suited for Great American Ballpark and may come back to bite him if hitters catch up to him as he gets around the league for a second and third time. At that point, it'll be up to Wood to adjust, which shouldn't be a problem given his feel for pitching.
Overall, it was an exciting and impressive debut for Wood and one that is very encouraging for 2011 and beyond. Wood and Leake are two pure pitchers. They may not have the best stuff on the staff, but they understand how to utilize it and how to attack the hitters. They should be consistent and reliable members of the rotation for years to come, which will provide a nice counterpart to the more volatile high ceiling/low floor starters on the staff (see below).
Homer Bailey -- Expectations: Low, Grade: C+
Homer continues to be the ultimate enigma, which may be what he is right down to his core (A pitcher who prefers to be called Homer?). I won't spend too much time parsing his numbers and analyzing his performance, as it won't really throw any additional light on the true Homer Bailey. We've seen him at his best and at his worst, but it's still impossible to tell which version will show up on any given day. He still seems to have all the potential in the world, but his performance simply never reflects it.
Here's a quick overview of Bailey in 2010. He pitched 109.0 innings at the beginning and ending of the movie with a long injury stint in between. When all was said and done, Homer had a 4.46 ERA, 1.37 WHIP, and 100/40 K/BB ratio. The biggest positives are his career best walk (3.3 BB/9) and strikeout (8.3 K/9) rates. His April and May were forgettable, at best, while his August and September were fairly impressive. He also acquitted himself well in a 2 inning postseason relief appearance against the Phillies. It does bear mentioning that Homer's numbers are somewhat skewed by his dominance against the lowly Pirates (16.0 innings, 0.56 ERA, 15/0 K/BB). Additionally, even in his good starts, I was struck by the number of times he badly missed the target. The catcher would set up on the corner only to have to reach all the way back across the plate to catch the pitch on the other corner. So, I'm not convinced that he truly turned the corner in the final two months. Once again, Homer was maddening, showing enough upside to be optimistic about his chances in 2011, but not enough to allow any certainty in that regard.
For me, the most telling thing about his season actually occurred off the field. In late May, Homer was shut down and DL'd due to shoulder stiffness. Homer was upset about the decision because he didn't feel the arm was that bad, going so far as to refuse a cortisone injection.
Two things are really striking about this situation. First, Homer seemed to have no understanding of the severity of the problem. He protested going on the DL because he didn't believe that he needed to miss even two weeks worth of games. In the end, he didn't return to the majors until August 15th. It seems a somewhat shocking lack of self-awareness about the health of his arm. Either he simply has no clue about the condition of his arm or he did and simply refused to acknowledge it due to his innate stubbornness. I'm not sure which would be the preferable explanation, but I'd certainly hope that a pitcher has a better feeling for the condition of his arm.
The second thing that jumped out at me was his refusal of the cortisone shot, which manages to seem impressive, stubborn, and disconcerting all at the same time. It's impressive in that a 20-something kid actually steps back to consider a team doctor's advice and ultimately goes against the organization's advice. If an organization had invested millions of dollars in me and had a doctor telling me what I needed to get healthy, I'd probably take the doctors advice on all but the most major procedures. However, Homer was stubborn because a cortisone shot is a minor medical matter, not a major surgery. This is an instance in which refusing the team's treatment seems rather odd and unnecessarily stubborn. The team doctor and organization simply want Bailey to get healthy and back on the mound, which (in theory at least) is what Homer wants as well. There was no divergence of interests between the player and the organization, as both want performance and health over the short and long haul.
Homer either lacks trust of any kind in the organization or he simply suffers from an over abundance of youthful arrogance that leads him to believe he always knows best. Whatever the reason, this seems to be par for the course in his development as a player, as he has butted heads with the Reds coaches throughout his time with the organization. I can't easily recall any young player having so many issues and conflicts with an organization on his way up the ladder. Developing Homer Bailey is no small task and these problems are likely the root cause of his struggles. He has all the tools, but seems to lack the mentality to put them to use.
Once again, the Reds head into 2011 with reasonably high hopes for Homer Bailey. It remains to be seen whether those hopes will again be derailed by Homer's frequently misguided actions and stubborn attitude.
Edinson Volquez -- Expectations: None, Grade: B+
Edinson's grade is based largely on the complete lack of expectations. After undergoing Tommy John surgery in early August of 2009, it was pretty remarkable for Edinson simply to get back to the majors in 2010. Not only did he return to the show, but he had flashes of brilliance.
On July 17, Volquez made his first start of the season. Facing the Rockies, he tossed 6.0 innings, allowing 3 hits, 1 run, and posting a 9/2 K/BB ratio. The other highlight of his season occurred on September 11th when he faced the Pirates. In that game, Edinson threw 7.0 innings allowing 1 hit, 0 runs, and posting a 10/1 K/BB ratio.
Unfortunately, there were also significant bumps in the road, the most notable of which occurred during Game 1 of the NLDS. Facing the Phillies, Edinson lasted a mere 1.2 innings in which he allowed 4 hits, 4 runs, 2 walks, and striking out no one. In arguably the biggest start of the season, Edinson couldn't have performed worse. That start set the tone for the entire series. It was a curious choice by the Reds brain-trust to start Edinson in Game 1, but there was some justification for it, as Volquez posted a 1.95 ERA in 27.2 September innings. So, the regrets about starting him in Game 1 are based largely on hindsight, as the decision made sense in foresight.
When all was said and done, Edinson pitched 62.2 regular season innings in which he posted a 4.31 ERA, 1.50 WHIP, and a 67/35 K/BB ratio. Overall, the strikeout rate was as impressive (9.6 K/9) as the walk rate was unimpressive (5.0 BB/9). While Edinson's command has never been his strong suit, it was worse than usual in 2010. Clearly, he had yet to regain his feel for pitching, but the power was back. In 2010, his fastball averaged 93.6 mph, which was almost exactly what it has been every year since 2006. So, the velocity is all the way back and hopefully the command improves in 2011. Pitchers are usually better in their second year back from Tommy John surgery, so the Reds have to hope that's the case with Volquez, especially since the player for whom he was traded led his team to the World Series.
Bronson Arroyo -- Expectations: Medium, Grade: B-
Arroyo continues to grind out the 200+ inning seasons, topping the mark for an incredible 6th straight year in 2010. Arroyo is definitely not afraid of hard work and his tremendous durability continues to be his most valuable attribute. During his time in Cincy, almost without exception, Arroyo has taken the ball on his turn through the rotation.
However, the question remains whether he can continue to do so.
In 2010, Arroyo was almost exactly the same pitcher he was in 2009.
Year:_BB/9__K/9__GB/FB__ERA
2009:__ 2.7___5.2____1.22____3.84
2010: __2.5___5.1____1.08____3.88
I suppose that type of consistency should be comforting, but the decline in his strikeout rate during his time in Cincy is a concern (at least to me), but so far it hasn't slowed him down. Starting in 2006, his first season with the Reds, Arroyo has posted K/9 marks of 6.9, 6.7, 7.3, 5.2, and 5.1. I have concerns about whether Arroyo can continue to post a sub-4 ERA with these peripherals.
However, over the last two seasons, Bronson has significantly outperformed his FIP. His 3.84 ERA in 2009 went along with a FIP of 4.78 and a BABIP of .270, while his 3.88 ERA in 2010 when along with a FIP of 4.61 and a BABIP of .246. At first blush, it looks like he was hit lucky, but he also managed to decrease his Line Drive rate to 18.5% in 2009 and 16.3% in 2010.
Another interesting aspect of his performance is the percentage of his strikeouts that were called and his contact rate.
Year: Called K%_Contact%
2004:__28%______81%
2005:__22%______85%
2006:__20%______81%
2007:__21%______81%
2008:__19%______81%
2009:__23%______84%
2010:__17%______83%
Arroyo is allowing more and more pitches to be put in play and getting fewer called strikeouts, both of which would seem to indicate a decline in stuff. He's fooling fewer hitters and relying on his defense to a greater extent. Can he continue to succeed by, in essence, controlling the contact and relying on the defense?
A moment I found to be somewhat reassuring about Arroyo's 2010 season was his performance in the playoffs. You won't find many offenses better than the Phillies or many situations that are more high leverage than a postseason start. Regardless, Arroyo rose to the occasion and managed to keep the Phillies off-balance for most of the night. Ultimately, his outing was cut short when the defense let him down with back-to-back errors by Phillips and Rolen.
As with the regular season, the performance was more smoke-and-mirrors than dominating, as he allowed too many baserunners and walked more than he struck out. It was the same high-contact pitching style that he utilized during the season, but this time the defense let him down. Even so, he battled and came away with a solid performance, but I'm still not confident that Arroyo is the pitcher I want on the hill in a must win Game 7 situation.
Arroyo continues to be something of a contradiction. His peripherals are arguably getting worse, but his overall performance has gotten better. From where I sit, something has to give. I'm just not convinced that Arroyo can maintain his 2009 & 2010 performance level while allowing so much contact. The general thinking is that pitchers cannot control the outcome of balls in play. Additionally, high contact pitchers with neutral GB/FB tendencies in a bandbox like GABP seem like an inherently poor fit. Arroyo also benefited from the league wide decline in power, which made contact less harmful than in years past but may not continue in the 2011 season. Maybe Arroyo can continue to thrive with varied offspeed offerings, but I wouldn't be willing to extend him out past 2011. In fact, given our pitching surplus, I wouldn't hesitate to see what Arroyo would fetch on the trade market.
However, the Reds will have to hope that Arroyo can maintain his performance level by throwing the kitchen sink at opposing teams. Regardless of the performance level, the Reds can confidently pencil Arroyo in for 200+ innings in 2011.
Mike Leake -- Expectations: None, Grade: B
What Mike Leake managed to do in 2010 was nothing short of remarkable. His performance in spring training was so strong that he broke camp with the team and skipped the minors entirely, which you simply don't see all that often. And, probably for good reason.
It was an interesting decision due in no small part to the fact that Leake had never started every 5th day. In college, he started once a week, so it seemed likely and logical that Leake would start the year in the minors to acclimate to the heavier workload. But, the Reds deemed him MLB ready and it didn't take him long to prove that he was.
Leake tossed a rather stunning 138.1 innings with a 4.23 ERA, 1.50 WHIP, and 91/49 K/BB ratio. He managed to induce ground balls at a good clip (1.58 GB/FB ratio) and produced solid ratios (3.2 BB/9 and 5.9 K/9) for a rookie who bypassed the minors entirely. Not surprisingly, his early season performance was much stronger than his second half. He simply hit a wall and wasn't effective late in the season. It was likely a combination of fatigue and hitters learning the book on Leake.
His monthly splits reveal his hot start and subsequent fade:
April: 3.25 ERA in 27.2 IP
May: 1.88 ERA in 38.1 IP
June: 5.22 ERA in 29.1 IP
July: 4.56 ERA in 25.2 IP
August: 8.83 ERA in 17.1 IP
Looking at his mid/late season fade, it is easy to call the decision to start him off in the majors a questionable one. The Reds did effectively manage his pitch counts, as his highest game total was 106 pitches, but Leake simply hadn't been stretched out to handle the grind of a major league starting pitcher. His performance level was sufficient, but his endurance was not. However, he showed in his first few months that he was polished enough to succeed at the highest level right away, which made him essentially a no-risk draft pick.
Both Mike Leake and Mike Minor were polished college pitchers who have so far outperformed their projected draft positions. Minor has better stuff than was commonly believed and Leake moved much faster than thought possible. Not sure why the scouting was off the mark on these college pitchers, but polish may be somewhat underrated these days.
Overall, it was a surprising and strong rookie debut for Leake. Not surprisingly, he faded as his innings total mounted, but he gave the Reds some real big innings and some stability in the rotation at a time when it was definitely needed. The future is bright and having a pitcher in the rotation who understands how to pitch will provide some real stability for years to come.
Johnny Cueto -- Expectations: Medium, Grade: B+
Johnny has been in the majors for three seasons and has made incremental improvement each year. Despite his annual improvement, it's hard not to be somehow disappointed. Obviously, that isn't fair to Cueto, but he is a victim of his own success. In 2007, Cueto blazed through three minor league levels with a 3.07 ERA, 1.12 WHIP, 1.9 BB/9, and 9.5 K/9. That level of performance brought about notions of immediate MLB dominance. Instead, he has followed the more traditional path of incremental improvement.
In 2010, Cueto tossed 185.2 innings with a 3.64 ERA, 1.28 WHIP, and a 138/56 K/BB ratio. It was a nice combination of workload and performance level.
2008: 4.81 ERA, 1.41 WHIP, 3.5 BB/9, and 8.2 K/9 in 174.0 innings
2009: 4.41 ERA, 1.36 WHIP, 3.2 BB/9, and 6.9 K/9 in 171.1 innings
2010: 3.64 ERA, 1.28 WHIP, 2.7 BB/9, and 6.7 K/9 in 185.2 innings
He set a career high in innings pitched and improved across the board, with the exception of strikeouts which are in modest decline. Cueto is likely reining in his stuff in favor of improved command and control. As he has continued to evolve as a pitcher, Cueto has altered his pitch selection:
Year:__FB%__ SL%__CH%
2008:__61.1%__32.1%__6.7%
2009:__62.2%__29.7%__8.2%
2010:__55.2%__26.7%__10.0%
Perhaps it's the influence of roving instructor Mario Soto, who deserves a decent amount of credit for his work with our young pitchers, but whatever the reason Cueto has de-emphasized his slider in favor of his change-up. The change in pitch selection has likely brought about improved control and slightly fewer strikeouts. In short, Cueto is learning how to effectively utilize his arsenal for maximum benefit.
All in all, it was a nice season for Cueto, but one that didn't get a great deal of hype. To a certain extent, Cueto was overshadowed by Mike Leake, Travis Wood, and Aroldis Chapman. Those three each made a bigger splash, but Cueto's quiet improvement was just as impressive and certainly shouldn't be overshadowed. If Cueto makes yet another incremental improvement in 2011, then he'll be approaching some rather rarefied air.
Travis Wood -- Expectations: Low, Grade: A-
Yet another pitching surprise for the Reds and a good one at that. Wood has long been a favorite of mine due to his plus change-up and clean mechanics, but he arrived on the scene in 2010 with slightly better top-end velocity than was advertised.
Wood made quick work of the competition, flashing good stuff, great command, and a very good feel for pitching.
He stepped up to throw 102.2 innings with a 3.51 ERA, 1.08 WHIP, 2.3 BB/9, and 7.5 K/9. Wood featured a four pitch mix, including a fastball (64.1% of the time), changeup (10.1%), cutter (19.9%), and curveball (5.9%). He's got a very nice repertoire, which he used to keep the righthanders off balance and completely dominate the lefties.
On the season, Wood gave up absolutely nothing to lefties. He gave up a slash line of .136/.219/.227/.446. He also did a very nice job against righties to the tune of .240/.289/.363/.651. Overall, the addition of the cutter has really given Wood the ability to handle righthanded hitters. It allows him to keep them honest on the inner half of the plate, which improves the effectiveness of his fading changeup on the outer half.
Of course, Wood also provided one of the singular moments of the season for the Reds when he nearly tossed a perfect game against the defending NL champion Phillies in their home park. Wood threw 9 innings and gave up only 1 hit, no walks, and 8 strikeouts. His perfect game was foiled by a Carlos Ruiz double in the ninth inning and the Reds inability to score a run. The game ultimately went to extra innings where the Reds came out on the short end, but it was a national coming out party for Travis Wood.
The only potential red flag on Wood is his GB/FB ratio. He exhibited a heavy fly ball tendency, which isn't ideally suited for Great American Ballpark and may come back to bite him if hitters catch up to him as he gets around the league for a second and third time. At that point, it'll be up to Wood to adjust, which shouldn't be a problem given his feel for pitching.
Overall, it was an exciting and impressive debut for Wood and one that is very encouraging for 2011 and beyond. Wood and Leake are two pure pitchers. They may not have the best stuff on the staff, but they understand how to utilize it and how to attack the hitters. They should be consistent and reliable members of the rotation for years to come, which will provide a nice counterpart to the more volatile high ceiling/low floor starters on the staff (see below).
Homer Bailey -- Expectations: Low, Grade: C+
Homer continues to be the ultimate enigma, which may be what he is right down to his core (A pitcher who prefers to be called Homer?). I won't spend too much time parsing his numbers and analyzing his performance, as it won't really throw any additional light on the true Homer Bailey. We've seen him at his best and at his worst, but it's still impossible to tell which version will show up on any given day. He still seems to have all the potential in the world, but his performance simply never reflects it.
Here's a quick overview of Bailey in 2010. He pitched 109.0 innings at the beginning and ending of the movie with a long injury stint in between. When all was said and done, Homer had a 4.46 ERA, 1.37 WHIP, and 100/40 K/BB ratio. The biggest positives are his career best walk (3.3 BB/9) and strikeout (8.3 K/9) rates. His April and May were forgettable, at best, while his August and September were fairly impressive. He also acquitted himself well in a 2 inning postseason relief appearance against the Phillies. It does bear mentioning that Homer's numbers are somewhat skewed by his dominance against the lowly Pirates (16.0 innings, 0.56 ERA, 15/0 K/BB). Additionally, even in his good starts, I was struck by the number of times he badly missed the target. The catcher would set up on the corner only to have to reach all the way back across the plate to catch the pitch on the other corner. So, I'm not convinced that he truly turned the corner in the final two months. Once again, Homer was maddening, showing enough upside to be optimistic about his chances in 2011, but not enough to allow any certainty in that regard.
For me, the most telling thing about his season actually occurred off the field. In late May, Homer was shut down and DL'd due to shoulder stiffness. Homer was upset about the decision because he didn't feel the arm was that bad, going so far as to refuse a cortisone injection.
Two things are really striking about this situation. First, Homer seemed to have no understanding of the severity of the problem. He protested going on the DL because he didn't believe that he needed to miss even two weeks worth of games. In the end, he didn't return to the majors until August 15th. It seems a somewhat shocking lack of self-awareness about the health of his arm. Either he simply has no clue about the condition of his arm or he did and simply refused to acknowledge it due to his innate stubbornness. I'm not sure which would be the preferable explanation, but I'd certainly hope that a pitcher has a better feeling for the condition of his arm.
The second thing that jumped out at me was his refusal of the cortisone shot, which manages to seem impressive, stubborn, and disconcerting all at the same time. It's impressive in that a 20-something kid actually steps back to consider a team doctor's advice and ultimately goes against the organization's advice. If an organization had invested millions of dollars in me and had a doctor telling me what I needed to get healthy, I'd probably take the doctors advice on all but the most major procedures. However, Homer was stubborn because a cortisone shot is a minor medical matter, not a major surgery. This is an instance in which refusing the team's treatment seems rather odd and unnecessarily stubborn. The team doctor and organization simply want Bailey to get healthy and back on the mound, which (in theory at least) is what Homer wants as well. There was no divergence of interests between the player and the organization, as both want performance and health over the short and long haul.
Homer either lacks trust of any kind in the organization or he simply suffers from an over abundance of youthful arrogance that leads him to believe he always knows best. Whatever the reason, this seems to be par for the course in his development as a player, as he has butted heads with the Reds coaches throughout his time with the organization. I can't easily recall any young player having so many issues and conflicts with an organization on his way up the ladder. Developing Homer Bailey is no small task and these problems are likely the root cause of his struggles. He has all the tools, but seems to lack the mentality to put them to use.
Once again, the Reds head into 2011 with reasonably high hopes for Homer Bailey. It remains to be seen whether those hopes will again be derailed by Homer's frequently misguided actions and stubborn attitude.
Edinson Volquez -- Expectations: None, Grade: B+
Edinson's grade is based largely on the complete lack of expectations. After undergoing Tommy John surgery in early August of 2009, it was pretty remarkable for Edinson simply to get back to the majors in 2010. Not only did he return to the show, but he had flashes of brilliance.
On July 17, Volquez made his first start of the season. Facing the Rockies, he tossed 6.0 innings, allowing 3 hits, 1 run, and posting a 9/2 K/BB ratio. The other highlight of his season occurred on September 11th when he faced the Pirates. In that game, Edinson threw 7.0 innings allowing 1 hit, 0 runs, and posting a 10/1 K/BB ratio.
Unfortunately, there were also significant bumps in the road, the most notable of which occurred during Game 1 of the NLDS. Facing the Phillies, Edinson lasted a mere 1.2 innings in which he allowed 4 hits, 4 runs, 2 walks, and striking out no one. In arguably the biggest start of the season, Edinson couldn't have performed worse. That start set the tone for the entire series. It was a curious choice by the Reds brain-trust to start Edinson in Game 1, but there was some justification for it, as Volquez posted a 1.95 ERA in 27.2 September innings. So, the regrets about starting him in Game 1 are based largely on hindsight, as the decision made sense in foresight.
When all was said and done, Edinson pitched 62.2 regular season innings in which he posted a 4.31 ERA, 1.50 WHIP, and a 67/35 K/BB ratio. Overall, the strikeout rate was as impressive (9.6 K/9) as the walk rate was unimpressive (5.0 BB/9). While Edinson's command has never been his strong suit, it was worse than usual in 2010. Clearly, he had yet to regain his feel for pitching, but the power was back. In 2010, his fastball averaged 93.6 mph, which was almost exactly what it has been every year since 2006. So, the velocity is all the way back and hopefully the command improves in 2011. Pitchers are usually better in their second year back from Tommy John surgery, so the Reds have to hope that's the case with Volquez, especially since the player for whom he was traded led his team to the World Series.
2010 Top 25 Prospects and Review
Well, time for a quick bit of housekeeping before my 2011 List gets underway. Below is my 2010 Top Prospect list for the archive and posterity sake. And, while I'm at it, I may as well take a quick spin through it with the benefit of hindsight.
All in all, I'm pretty pleased with my list this year. I don't see any glaring mistakes and my faith was rewarded on a few of these guys.
Aroldis was undeniably the top guy in the system and showed why in his limited MLB performance. An ungodly fastball and a video game slider. He just needs polish. Yonder finished strong to justify the ranking. There isn't much to separate the polished Leake and Wood, so I'm happy with where I had them pegged.
Neftali Soto's career seems to be sliding away after a strong start and Maloney is withering on the vine. If I missed the mark, it was probably on J.C. Sulbaran, whose feel for pitching simply hasn't caught up to his stuff. Wiley's 2010 season was a waste, but I still like what he brings to table. I suspect he'll do some nice things in the D-Back system. Whether he'll do enough to ever see the majors certainly remains to be seen. He has a long way to go, but he does a couple of nice things to generate value. Josh Ravin stumbled his way into a promotion, then surprisingly took his performance up a notch against tougher competition. He remains an intriguing enigma. Good stuff, clean mechanics, but simply can't find sufficient control. Time is running out.
As for Mesoraco, he obviously outperformed the ranking, but 16 was as high as I could justify ranking him based on his strong peripherals. Still, nice to see him make good.
As much as I like Fellhauer's swing, well-rounded game, and instincts, I wasn't sold on his upside and so far I'm comfortable with his ranking.
Anyway, here was the 2010 list:
0. Aroldis Chapman, lhp
1. Yonder Alonso, 1b
2. Todd Frazier, inf/of
3. Mike Leake, rhp
4. Travis Wood, lhp
5. Chris Heisey, of
6. Juan Francisco, 3b
7. Yorman Rodriguez, of
8. Zach Cozart, ss
9. Neftali Soto, inf
10. Matt Maloney, lhp
11. Billy Hamilton, ss
12. J.C. Sulbaran, rhp
13. Brad Boxberger, rhp
14. Chris Valaika, ss/2b
15. Matt Klinker, rhp
16. Devin Mesoraco, c
17. Danny Dorn, 1b/lf
18. Juan Silva, of
19. Donnie Joseph, lhp
20. Byron Wiley, of
21. Daniel Tuttle, rhp
22. Miguel Rojas, ss
23. Logan Ondrusek, rhp
24. Josh Fellhauer, of
25. Josh Ravin, rhp
xx. "Other Notables"
All in all, I'm pretty pleased with my list this year. I don't see any glaring mistakes and my faith was rewarded on a few of these guys.
Aroldis was undeniably the top guy in the system and showed why in his limited MLB performance. An ungodly fastball and a video game slider. He just needs polish. Yonder finished strong to justify the ranking. There isn't much to separate the polished Leake and Wood, so I'm happy with where I had them pegged.
Neftali Soto's career seems to be sliding away after a strong start and Maloney is withering on the vine. If I missed the mark, it was probably on J.C. Sulbaran, whose feel for pitching simply hasn't caught up to his stuff. Wiley's 2010 season was a waste, but I still like what he brings to table. I suspect he'll do some nice things in the D-Back system. Whether he'll do enough to ever see the majors certainly remains to be seen. He has a long way to go, but he does a couple of nice things to generate value. Josh Ravin stumbled his way into a promotion, then surprisingly took his performance up a notch against tougher competition. He remains an intriguing enigma. Good stuff, clean mechanics, but simply can't find sufficient control. Time is running out.
As for Mesoraco, he obviously outperformed the ranking, but 16 was as high as I could justify ranking him based on his strong peripherals. Still, nice to see him make good.
As much as I like Fellhauer's swing, well-rounded game, and instincts, I wasn't sold on his upside and so far I'm comfortable with his ranking.
Anyway, here was the 2010 list:
0. Aroldis Chapman, lhp
1. Yonder Alonso, 1b
2. Todd Frazier, inf/of
3. Mike Leake, rhp
4. Travis Wood, lhp
5. Chris Heisey, of
6. Juan Francisco, 3b
7. Yorman Rodriguez, of
8. Zach Cozart, ss
9. Neftali Soto, inf
10. Matt Maloney, lhp
11. Billy Hamilton, ss
12. J.C. Sulbaran, rhp
13. Brad Boxberger, rhp
14. Chris Valaika, ss/2b
15. Matt Klinker, rhp
16. Devin Mesoraco, c
17. Danny Dorn, 1b/lf
18. Juan Silva, of
19. Donnie Joseph, lhp
20. Byron Wiley, of
21. Daniel Tuttle, rhp
22. Miguel Rojas, ss
23. Logan Ondrusek, rhp
24. Josh Fellhauer, of
25. Josh Ravin, rhp
xx. "Other Notables"
Tuesday, November 23, 2010
2010 Review: Outfielders
Well, we tackled the infielders, so it's on to the outfielders:
Drew Stubbs -- Expectations: Medium, Grade: B-
In 2010, Drew Stubbs (he of the unrivaled opportunity cost) flashed the type of well-rounded game that first piqued the interest of Reds management and ultimately prompted his selection in the draft.
Heading into the season, Stubbs was coming off a respectable, albeit not impact level, slash line of .267/.323/.439 in 180 ABs. So, that coupled with his draft position meant he carried a decent set of expectations into the 2010 season. When all was said and done, his 2010 level of performance, .255/.329/.444, resembled what he posted in 2009. Of course, Stubbs had to travel many peaks and valleys to arrive at those final numbers.
His OPS by month was as follows:
April: .572
May: .864
June: .611
July: .657
August: .870
September: .984
October: 1.125
October consisted of only a handful of ABs, so basically Stubbs had 3 strong months and 3 weak months. It all evened out in the end, but going forward it would be easier for the team to rely on Stubbs if his production was more consistent.
The knock on Stubbs has long been his ability to make consistent contact, so it's not surprising that his AB/K rate worsened from 3.7 in 2009 to 3.1 in 2010. He struck out basically once every three ABs, which in part helps explain his long slumps. If you can't consistently put the ball in play, then the chances increase that you will struggle to produce, as swings-and-misses never produce positive outcomes.
The acquisition of Jim Edmonds notwithstanding, the Reds showed commendable patience with Drew Stubbs, giving him ample time to work through his struggles and put it together. Given Dusty's preference for veteran players, the Reds deserve quite a bit of credit for running Stubbs out there day after unproductive day. Ultimately, that patience was rewarded in a big way, as Stubbs blew up in August (.296/.363/.507/.870) and September (.311/.406/.578/.984).
On the defensive side, Stubbs didn't quite perform up to his reputation. Scouting reports have long stated that Stubbs was a Gold Glove caliber centerfielder, even while he was still a Longhorn. That reputation aside, Stubbs rated around league average under both UZR/150 (0.2) and the +/- metric (+5, ranked 14th overall). According to the +/- breakdown, Stubbs struggled significantly on shallow hit balls. He rated as a +10 on deep balls, +3 on medium balls, and -7 on shallow hit balls. What's interesting about that breakdown is that all the scouting reports on Stubbs in the minors stated that his only defensive flaw was his struggles going back on the deep ball. When you pair those two facts together, I have to wonder if Stubbs played a deeper centerfield to offset his struggles on the deep ball. That would account both for his impressive performance on deep balls and his struggles on shallow ones. Regardless, watching him effortlessly glide across the outfield turf makes it almost impossible to imagine Stubbs not becoming one of the very best defensive centerfielders in baseball.
Perhaps the most impressive component of his performance was also the least heralded: his baserunning. Not only did he swipe bases at a very impressive clip (30 of 36, 83%), but he excelled in taking the extra base. Stubbs performed as follows:
1st to 3rd: 13 Advances in 31 Opportunities
2nd to Home: 17 Advances in 21 Opportunities
1st to Home: 8 Advances in 10 Opportunities
All of which was good for a +17 mark, so Stubbs was 17 bases above average. When adding together his stellar basestealing totals and his strong baserunning, Stubbs was a real weapon on the bases. His dual success rate speaks both to his plus speed and his strong instincts on the bases, but also serves as additional evidence that Stubbs possesses both skills and tools. He doesn't simply have speed, but also the understanding of how to effectively utilize it.
Despite the inconsistencies and the disappointing defense, it's difficult not to be optimistic about Stubbs heading into 2011 based solely on his final 2+ months of play. If Stubbs can perform at that level over the course of an entire season, then his value will go through the roof. In the future, we may look back at 2010 as being a big stepping stone in the career of Drew Stubbs.
Jay Bruce -- Expectations: Medium, Grade: B+
After his 2010 season, it seems crystal clear that Jay Bruce is on the cusp of stardom. Bruce told the press that he would be open to a long term deal with the Reds and they would be foolish to not have him locked up long term prior to the first pitch of opening day.
In 2010, Bruce hit a rock solid .281/.353/.493 with 25 homers and a 136/58 K/BB ratio. After a substantial drop in line drive rate in 2009 (13.0%), Bruce fixed his swing and was again ripping line drives at a very good clip (20.1%). His walk rate has increased from 7.3% to 9.8% to 10.1% in his three years in the majors. He also performed better against southpaws (.899 OPS) than righthanders (.822 OPS) in 2010. That may be a sample size outcome, but at the very least he has improved against lefties. Over the last three seasons, Bruce's HR/FB has dropped from 20.2% to 16.8% to 15.3%. While the rate at which fly balls leave the yard is considered a skill largely within a hitter's control, it's not difficult to imagine a homerun surge in 2011, as all of his other skills seem to be trending up so it seems logical that the homeruns will almost inevitably follow.
Bruce's OPS by month was as follows:
April: .833
May: .827
June: .824
July: .508
August: 1.076
September: 1.025
October: 1.944
Unlike Stubbs, Bruce had only 1 bad month. He also had 3 pretty good months and 2 outstanding ones. As with Stubbs, if Bruce can maintain his final 2+ months of production in 2011, then he'll be on the verge of superstar status. And, of course, superstars are both incredibly valuable and incredibly expensive. (Subliminal message: Lock him up NOW!!!)
On the defensive side of the ball, regardless of the metric, Bruce graded out as one of the best rightfielders in the game. Under UZR/150, Bruce posted a robust 19.0. Under the +/- metric, he posted a stellar +25, which translates into 14 runs saved with the leather. That level of performance graded out as the best defensive rightfielder in baseball. Additionally, unlike Stubbs, Bruce excelled on all batted balls (+4 shallow, +6 medium, +15 deep), so there is little question that Bruce is already a legitimate impact talent on defense.
Bruce was also strong on the bases, albeit not in the stolen base department (5 stolen bases in 9 attempts). On the bases, Bruce grades out as a +9, so he was roughly 9 bases above average.
Bruce performed as follows:
1st to 3rd: 11 Advances in 25 Opportunities
2nd to Home: 15 Advances in 18 Opportunities
1st to Home: 6 Advances in 7 Opportunities
Overall, I'm more than a little bullish on Bruce going forward. He struggled in 2009, but showed his ability to deal with adversity by bouncing back strong in 2010. His peripherals are trending in the right direction and he already possesses an incredibly well-rounded game. Bruce has performed up to his considerable ceiling at times, now all he needs to do is maintain that level of performance over a full season.
Jonny Gomes -- Expectations: Medium, Grade: D-
On a certain level, I'm a fan of Jonny Gomes. I like his attitude and feel his skill set can create value if used properly, especially when his cost is low. Unfortunately, the cost is rising and the Reds failed to properly utilize Gomes. As a result, the "cost per unit of production" about which I was optimistic when he was first signed vanished in 2010. The production has been hindered by improper usage and the cost continues to escalate along with his service time.
Heading into the season, Gomes was coming off a strong slash line of .267/.338/.541 which raised expectations for 2010. Unfortunately, his production tailed off as he posted a slash line of .266/.327/.431/.758, which isn't terrible except when you factor in that his performance was skewed heavily by one very strong month.
Gomes's OPS by month was as follows:
April: .621
May: 1.056
June: .704
July: .673
August: .700
September: .768
October: .546
He basically had 1 Ruthian month, 1 decent month, and 4 really poor months. His offense simply needs to be significantly better than that to justify the Reds carrying his glove. In keeping with his career norms, he performed better against southpaws (.285/.378/.479) than he did against righthanders (.257/.301/.408). On defense, there's no kind way to put it, Gomes was atrocious. Under the UZR/150 mark, he posted an abysmal -19.1 mark. Under the +/- metric, he posted an awful -18, which translates into a -10 runs saved.
On the plus side, Gomes actually ran the bases fairly well. In 2010, he graded out at as a +7, so he was roughly 7 bases above average. Gomes performed as follows:
1st to 3rd: 14 Advances in 39 Opportunities
2nd to Home: 8 Advances in 21 Opportunities
1st to Home: 5 Advances in 9 Opportunities
In light of all the success the Reds are having running the bases, it may be time to give some credit to the base coaches. The Reds obviously have talent, but Billy Hatcher and Mark Berry seem to deserve a bit of credit as well.
Unfortunately, but not surprisingly given his struggles on offense and defense, Gomes actually graded out as below replacement level. His WAR (Wins Above Replacement) was a mere -0.1. By definition, that level of performance can be obtained from a minor league free agent or a AAAA caliber player.
I still believe Gomes can generate positive value, but he needs to be utilized in a fashion that minimizes his weaknesses and emphasizes his strengths. Namely, he needs to be a platoon outfielder or a source of power off the bench.
Lanyce Nix -- Expectations: Low, Grade: B
Nix posted a .239/.291/.476 line in 2009, so expectations for 2010 were rather muted. The slugging percentage was strong, but when two of the three slash line numbers fall below .300 there is cause for concern. Regardless, Nix took his performance up a notch in 2010 and provided a nice bit of production for minimal cost.
Nix posted a line of .291/.350/.455 to go along with a 39/15 K/BB ratio. He managed to club 4 homeruns in the process. Unlike Gomes, the Reds utilized Nix properly, giving him 149 ABs against righties and only 16 against lefties. Interestingly enough, Nix received about half as many ABs in 2010 as he did in 2009. On the flip side, Gomes received about twice as many ABs in 2010 as he did in 2009. Can it be mere coincidence that the more these two play, the less impressive their numbers become? The larger the sample size, the worse the production.
On the defensive side, the metrics are all stellar, but the small sample size limits their utility. They are in line with his reputation on defense, which has long been solid. Still, Nix has long had decent tools, but struggled to effectively utilize them. That may be why he always seems to have untapped potential, which is why Dusty once lovingly called him a "monster."
Unlike the aforementioned on this list, Nix struggled on the bases. He posted a -5, so was roughly 5 bases below average. He also lacks basestealing ability, so he's largely a station-to-station type player.
Maybe it's simply a sample size issue, but Nix was a better value in 2010 than he was in 2009.
Chris Heisey -- Expectations: Low, Grade: B
Despite his strong performance in the minors, Heisey came into the season with minimal expectations. It simply wasn't clear that he would get the opportunity and, if he did, that he would be able to produce. All in all, he did rather well with the opportunity he received.
Heisey posted a respectable rookie slash line of .254/.324/.433/.757 with a somewhat lackluster 57/16 K/BB ratio and 8 homeruns. His walk rate isn't great, but he supplemented his OBP with 6 hit by pitches, which may or may not be sustainable. If it's not sustainable, then he'll need to improve his walk rate in the future. Additionally, he hit line drives at a solid 19.4% rate. Surprisingly, he struggled against southpaws (.545 OPS), but performed well against righties (.925 OPS).
On defense, Heisey split time between all three outfield spots. The sample size is too small for defensive metrics to mean much of anything, but he actually grades out as above average at all three spots under both UZR/150 and the +/- metric. I question his range in center, but he certainly was up to the task in 2010.
As with all the outfielders on this list save Nix, Heisey was very effective in running the bases. Impressively, Heisey was roughly 12 bases above average, which is very strong in light of his limited playing time.
Heisey performed as follows:
1st to 3rd: 7 Advances in 13 Opportunities
2nd to Home: 6 Advances in 8 Opportunities
1st to Home: 3 Advances in 3 Opportunities
Despite his limited playing time, Heisey managed to post a 1.3 WAR (Wins Above Replacement), which was significantly better than Gomes. Overall, it was a strong overall rookie season for Heisey and one that could have him in line for more playing time in 2011.
Drew Stubbs -- Expectations: Medium, Grade: B-
In 2010, Drew Stubbs (he of the unrivaled opportunity cost) flashed the type of well-rounded game that first piqued the interest of Reds management and ultimately prompted his selection in the draft.
Heading into the season, Stubbs was coming off a respectable, albeit not impact level, slash line of .267/.323/.439 in 180 ABs. So, that coupled with his draft position meant he carried a decent set of expectations into the 2010 season. When all was said and done, his 2010 level of performance, .255/.329/.444, resembled what he posted in 2009. Of course, Stubbs had to travel many peaks and valleys to arrive at those final numbers.
His OPS by month was as follows:
April: .572
May: .864
June: .611
July: .657
August: .870
September: .984
October: 1.125
October consisted of only a handful of ABs, so basically Stubbs had 3 strong months and 3 weak months. It all evened out in the end, but going forward it would be easier for the team to rely on Stubbs if his production was more consistent.
The knock on Stubbs has long been his ability to make consistent contact, so it's not surprising that his AB/K rate worsened from 3.7 in 2009 to 3.1 in 2010. He struck out basically once every three ABs, which in part helps explain his long slumps. If you can't consistently put the ball in play, then the chances increase that you will struggle to produce, as swings-and-misses never produce positive outcomes.
The acquisition of Jim Edmonds notwithstanding, the Reds showed commendable patience with Drew Stubbs, giving him ample time to work through his struggles and put it together. Given Dusty's preference for veteran players, the Reds deserve quite a bit of credit for running Stubbs out there day after unproductive day. Ultimately, that patience was rewarded in a big way, as Stubbs blew up in August (.296/.363/.507/.870) and September (.311/.406/.578/.984).
On the defensive side, Stubbs didn't quite perform up to his reputation. Scouting reports have long stated that Stubbs was a Gold Glove caliber centerfielder, even while he was still a Longhorn. That reputation aside, Stubbs rated around league average under both UZR/150 (0.2) and the +/- metric (+5, ranked 14th overall). According to the +/- breakdown, Stubbs struggled significantly on shallow hit balls. He rated as a +10 on deep balls, +3 on medium balls, and -7 on shallow hit balls. What's interesting about that breakdown is that all the scouting reports on Stubbs in the minors stated that his only defensive flaw was his struggles going back on the deep ball. When you pair those two facts together, I have to wonder if Stubbs played a deeper centerfield to offset his struggles on the deep ball. That would account both for his impressive performance on deep balls and his struggles on shallow ones. Regardless, watching him effortlessly glide across the outfield turf makes it almost impossible to imagine Stubbs not becoming one of the very best defensive centerfielders in baseball.
Perhaps the most impressive component of his performance was also the least heralded: his baserunning. Not only did he swipe bases at a very impressive clip (30 of 36, 83%), but he excelled in taking the extra base. Stubbs performed as follows:
1st to 3rd: 13 Advances in 31 Opportunities
2nd to Home: 17 Advances in 21 Opportunities
1st to Home: 8 Advances in 10 Opportunities
All of which was good for a +17 mark, so Stubbs was 17 bases above average. When adding together his stellar basestealing totals and his strong baserunning, Stubbs was a real weapon on the bases. His dual success rate speaks both to his plus speed and his strong instincts on the bases, but also serves as additional evidence that Stubbs possesses both skills and tools. He doesn't simply have speed, but also the understanding of how to effectively utilize it.
Despite the inconsistencies and the disappointing defense, it's difficult not to be optimistic about Stubbs heading into 2011 based solely on his final 2+ months of play. If Stubbs can perform at that level over the course of an entire season, then his value will go through the roof. In the future, we may look back at 2010 as being a big stepping stone in the career of Drew Stubbs.
Jay Bruce -- Expectations: Medium, Grade: B+
After his 2010 season, it seems crystal clear that Jay Bruce is on the cusp of stardom. Bruce told the press that he would be open to a long term deal with the Reds and they would be foolish to not have him locked up long term prior to the first pitch of opening day.
In 2010, Bruce hit a rock solid .281/.353/.493 with 25 homers and a 136/58 K/BB ratio. After a substantial drop in line drive rate in 2009 (13.0%), Bruce fixed his swing and was again ripping line drives at a very good clip (20.1%). His walk rate has increased from 7.3% to 9.8% to 10.1% in his three years in the majors. He also performed better against southpaws (.899 OPS) than righthanders (.822 OPS) in 2010. That may be a sample size outcome, but at the very least he has improved against lefties. Over the last three seasons, Bruce's HR/FB has dropped from 20.2% to 16.8% to 15.3%. While the rate at which fly balls leave the yard is considered a skill largely within a hitter's control, it's not difficult to imagine a homerun surge in 2011, as all of his other skills seem to be trending up so it seems logical that the homeruns will almost inevitably follow.
Bruce's OPS by month was as follows:
April: .833
May: .827
June: .824
July: .508
August: 1.076
September: 1.025
October: 1.944
Unlike Stubbs, Bruce had only 1 bad month. He also had 3 pretty good months and 2 outstanding ones. As with Stubbs, if Bruce can maintain his final 2+ months of production in 2011, then he'll be on the verge of superstar status. And, of course, superstars are both incredibly valuable and incredibly expensive. (Subliminal message: Lock him up NOW!!!)
On the defensive side of the ball, regardless of the metric, Bruce graded out as one of the best rightfielders in the game. Under UZR/150, Bruce posted a robust 19.0. Under the +/- metric, he posted a stellar +25, which translates into 14 runs saved with the leather. That level of performance graded out as the best defensive rightfielder in baseball. Additionally, unlike Stubbs, Bruce excelled on all batted balls (+4 shallow, +6 medium, +15 deep), so there is little question that Bruce is already a legitimate impact talent on defense.
Bruce was also strong on the bases, albeit not in the stolen base department (5 stolen bases in 9 attempts). On the bases, Bruce grades out as a +9, so he was roughly 9 bases above average.
Bruce performed as follows:
1st to 3rd: 11 Advances in 25 Opportunities
2nd to Home: 15 Advances in 18 Opportunities
1st to Home: 6 Advances in 7 Opportunities
Overall, I'm more than a little bullish on Bruce going forward. He struggled in 2009, but showed his ability to deal with adversity by bouncing back strong in 2010. His peripherals are trending in the right direction and he already possesses an incredibly well-rounded game. Bruce has performed up to his considerable ceiling at times, now all he needs to do is maintain that level of performance over a full season.
Jonny Gomes -- Expectations: Medium, Grade: D-
On a certain level, I'm a fan of Jonny Gomes. I like his attitude and feel his skill set can create value if used properly, especially when his cost is low. Unfortunately, the cost is rising and the Reds failed to properly utilize Gomes. As a result, the "cost per unit of production" about which I was optimistic when he was first signed vanished in 2010. The production has been hindered by improper usage and the cost continues to escalate along with his service time.
Heading into the season, Gomes was coming off a strong slash line of .267/.338/.541 which raised expectations for 2010. Unfortunately, his production tailed off as he posted a slash line of .266/.327/.431/.758, which isn't terrible except when you factor in that his performance was skewed heavily by one very strong month.
Gomes's OPS by month was as follows:
April: .621
May: 1.056
June: .704
July: .673
August: .700
September: .768
October: .546
He basically had 1 Ruthian month, 1 decent month, and 4 really poor months. His offense simply needs to be significantly better than that to justify the Reds carrying his glove. In keeping with his career norms, he performed better against southpaws (.285/.378/.479) than he did against righthanders (.257/.301/.408). On defense, there's no kind way to put it, Gomes was atrocious. Under the UZR/150 mark, he posted an abysmal -19.1 mark. Under the +/- metric, he posted an awful -18, which translates into a -10 runs saved.
On the plus side, Gomes actually ran the bases fairly well. In 2010, he graded out at as a +7, so he was roughly 7 bases above average. Gomes performed as follows:
1st to 3rd: 14 Advances in 39 Opportunities
2nd to Home: 8 Advances in 21 Opportunities
1st to Home: 5 Advances in 9 Opportunities
In light of all the success the Reds are having running the bases, it may be time to give some credit to the base coaches. The Reds obviously have talent, but Billy Hatcher and Mark Berry seem to deserve a bit of credit as well.
Unfortunately, but not surprisingly given his struggles on offense and defense, Gomes actually graded out as below replacement level. His WAR (Wins Above Replacement) was a mere -0.1. By definition, that level of performance can be obtained from a minor league free agent or a AAAA caliber player.
I still believe Gomes can generate positive value, but he needs to be utilized in a fashion that minimizes his weaknesses and emphasizes his strengths. Namely, he needs to be a platoon outfielder or a source of power off the bench.
Lanyce Nix -- Expectations: Low, Grade: B
Nix posted a .239/.291/.476 line in 2009, so expectations for 2010 were rather muted. The slugging percentage was strong, but when two of the three slash line numbers fall below .300 there is cause for concern. Regardless, Nix took his performance up a notch in 2010 and provided a nice bit of production for minimal cost.
Nix posted a line of .291/.350/.455 to go along with a 39/15 K/BB ratio. He managed to club 4 homeruns in the process. Unlike Gomes, the Reds utilized Nix properly, giving him 149 ABs against righties and only 16 against lefties. Interestingly enough, Nix received about half as many ABs in 2010 as he did in 2009. On the flip side, Gomes received about twice as many ABs in 2010 as he did in 2009. Can it be mere coincidence that the more these two play, the less impressive their numbers become? The larger the sample size, the worse the production.
On the defensive side, the metrics are all stellar, but the small sample size limits their utility. They are in line with his reputation on defense, which has long been solid. Still, Nix has long had decent tools, but struggled to effectively utilize them. That may be why he always seems to have untapped potential, which is why Dusty once lovingly called him a "monster."
Unlike the aforementioned on this list, Nix struggled on the bases. He posted a -5, so was roughly 5 bases below average. He also lacks basestealing ability, so he's largely a station-to-station type player.
Maybe it's simply a sample size issue, but Nix was a better value in 2010 than he was in 2009.
Chris Heisey -- Expectations: Low, Grade: B
Despite his strong performance in the minors, Heisey came into the season with minimal expectations. It simply wasn't clear that he would get the opportunity and, if he did, that he would be able to produce. All in all, he did rather well with the opportunity he received.
Heisey posted a respectable rookie slash line of .254/.324/.433/.757 with a somewhat lackluster 57/16 K/BB ratio and 8 homeruns. His walk rate isn't great, but he supplemented his OBP with 6 hit by pitches, which may or may not be sustainable. If it's not sustainable, then he'll need to improve his walk rate in the future. Additionally, he hit line drives at a solid 19.4% rate. Surprisingly, he struggled against southpaws (.545 OPS), but performed well against righties (.925 OPS).
On defense, Heisey split time between all three outfield spots. The sample size is too small for defensive metrics to mean much of anything, but he actually grades out as above average at all three spots under both UZR/150 and the +/- metric. I question his range in center, but he certainly was up to the task in 2010.
As with all the outfielders on this list save Nix, Heisey was very effective in running the bases. Impressively, Heisey was roughly 12 bases above average, which is very strong in light of his limited playing time.
Heisey performed as follows:
1st to 3rd: 7 Advances in 13 Opportunities
2nd to Home: 6 Advances in 8 Opportunities
1st to Home: 3 Advances in 3 Opportunities
Despite his limited playing time, Heisey managed to post a 1.3 WAR (Wins Above Replacement), which was significantly better than Gomes. Overall, it was a strong overall rookie season for Heisey and one that could have him in line for more playing time in 2011.
Friday, November 19, 2010
2010 Review: Infielders
Well, I'm boosting an idea from Rany Jazayerli who borrowed it from Jason Whitlock during his Kansas City Star days for my review of 2010 Reds season. A quick report card for our players based on performance in light of preseason expectations.
Ramon Hernandez -- Expectations: Low, Grade: C
Ramon arrived in Cincy with mild expectations, as he was carrying around three straight seasons of .715 or lower OPS. He simply hasn't been an impact hitter, rather just an inexpensive veteran backstop with mediocre expectations. On the plus side, Great American Ballpark is the fountain of youth for righthanded hitters, so Hernandez would have that working in his favor.
Not surprisingly, Hernandez had his best season in four years, posting a line of .297/.364/.428/.792 with an OPS of .818 at home and .763 on the road. Ultimately, Hernandez was a solid player in 2010, providing decent production behind the plate and his ability to speak Spanish to the young Spanish speaking pitchers on the staff could only have helped. All in all, Hernandez was a solid veteran presence behind the dish. After factoring in the friendly hitting environment, Hernandez performed pretty much right in line with expectations.
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of Hernandez is his ability to elevate his hitting in key situations. I always have lingering doubt about a hitter's ability to consistently perform better in a specific spot in the lineup or in a specific situation. My thoughts run along the lines of "if he can elevate in certain spots, why wouldn't he elevate it all the time?" But, Ramon is just such a hitter. He seemingly DOES possess the ability to elevate his game in key situations.
In 2010, Hernandez hit .233/.285/.367/.652 with no runners on base, .318/.392/.447/.839 with runners on, and .327/.418/.451/.869 with runners in scoring position. The bigger the situation, the better the performance.
Additionally, over the course of his career, Hernandez has hit better in big situations.
Total Career: .265/.329/.418/.747
Career "High Leverage": .295/.360/.458/.818
Career "Medium Leverage": .264/.323/.397/.719
Career "Low Leverage": .251/.320/.416/.736
Both in 2010 and over the course of his career, Hernandez seemingly has had the knack for elevating his game when situation so requires. He seems to like the big moments and the chance for the big hit. Despite my skepticism of whether a player can consistently elevate his game in different situations, Hernandez seems to be able to do just that.
Hernandez was good enough that when paired with the next player in our list, he formed part of one of the most productive catching tandems in the majors.
Ryan Hanigan -- Expectations: Low, Grade: A-
The Reds signed Hanigan as an amateur free agent in 2002. After going undrafted and spending parts of 9 seasons in the minors, he finally broke through at the MLB level in 2010. Hanigan stepped up in a big way in 2010, posting a slash line of .300/.405/.429/.834. He didn't show much power, but made up for it with a stellar K/BB ratio of 21/33 and the second highest OBP among qualifying Reds hitters. Not too shabby.
One of the biggest reasons for Hanigan's success is his plate approach, as he rarely chases pitches outside the zone. It's remarkable how much easier hitting becomes when you don't help the pitcher out by chasing bad pitches. Let those pitches go and tilt the probability of success in your favor. Hanigan does just that.
Year: O-Swing%
2007: 22.2%
2008: 15.8%
2009: 17.6%
2010: 18.9%
In 2010, only 18.9% of Hanigan's swings were on pitches outside the strikezone, which landed him among the league leaders in the category. He also saw quite a few pitches per plate appearance (4.08 #P/PA), which when coupled with his refusal to chase bad balls makes him something of a tough out for opposing pitchers. Hanigan forces the pitcher to beat him, rather than making it easy by helping the pitcher out.
Once Hanigan did get a pitch to his liking he made contact 92.5% of the time. And, when he made contact, it resulted in a line a robust 20.8% of the time. Hanigan doesn't have much power, but he seems an ideal hit-and-run candidate and one of the better table-setters on the roster. The fact that he spent a grand total of 1 AB in the top 5 spots in the batting order is a clear failure on the part of Dusty Baker. But, of course, Dusty has long favored speed over on-base skill in his table-setters, which remains his biggest flaw as a manager.
Hanigan also did his part to slow the opposition running game, as he threw out 13 of 41 basestealers (31.7%) and seemed to call a better game than Hernandez.
If he can maintain that performance level, then it wouldn't be at all surprising to see Hanigan take over the larger role of the catching tandem in 2011. Overall, Hanigan was a very pleasant surprise for the Reds and helped provide one of the most productive catching tandems in baseball.
Joey Votto -- Expectations: High, Grade: A+
.324/.424/.600/1.024. A truly amazing season which establishes Votto as one of the top 2 or 3 hitters in the National League. As impressive as it was, even more impressive is that it was supported by the peripherals. Votto ripped line drives at a 20% clip and surprisingly was more productive on the road. At home, he posted a .950 OPS, while on the road he had a 1.093 OPS, which forecloses any notion that Votto was merely a product of a hitter friendly environment.
In fact, in the long history of the team, Votto's 2010 season was tied for the 14th best offensive season (at least according to Offensive WAR). The list reads as follows:
1. Joe Morgan (1975) 10.3
2. Joe Morgan (1976) 9.9
3. Joe Morgan (1972) 9.2
4. Joe Morgan (1973) 8.9
5. Joe Morgan (1974) 8.5
6. Frank Robinson (1962) 8.0
7. Cy Seymour (1905) 7.8
t8. Barry Larkin (1996) 7.7
t8. Johnny Bench (1972) 7.7
10. Ted Kluszewski (1954) 7.5
11. Pete Rose (1969) 7.4
12. Eric Davis (1987) 7.3
13. Joe Morgan (1977) 7.1
t14. Joey Votto (2010) 6.9
t14. Frank Robinson (1961) 6.9
Votto exceeded all my expectations in 2010, which continues a theme. I have never been happier to be wrong on a player than I have been on Votto. I simply didn't see this type of upside as he climbed the ladder, but his level of performance continued to improve as the competition got tougher. All of this culminated in an MVP caliber season with more undoubtedly on the horizon for one of the two or three best hitters in the NL.
Brandon Phillips -- Expectations: Medium, Grade: C+
At this point, there is no less surprising player on the roster than Phillips, whose performance has a metronome like consistency. His performance baseline is well established as .750-.770 OPS on offense and Gold Glove caliber defense.
On the season, Phillips hit the usual .275/.332/.430/.762, but struggled mightily on the basepaths where he stole 16 bases and was nabbed 12 times. It was the first time in 5 seasons that Phillips failed to swipe over 20 bases. Obviously, that type of "success" rate is unacceptable, as Phillips simply gave away too many outs.
Overall, it was largely what we've come to expect from Phillips. His production was on pace to be a tick better than in years past, but a terrible September (caused in part by a hand injury) dragged his numbers back down to his career norms. Phillips logged 97 ABs in September and posted a lackluster .175/.266/.278/.544 slash line. The Reds were pushing for a postseason spot, but in hindsight it was clearly a questionable decision for Dusty Baker to keep running Phillips out there. Not only did it drag down his overall numbers, but most importantly his performance simply didn't help the Reds win ballgames.
Overall, for better or worse, Phillips is as consistent as a metronome. His most valuable attribute is and always has been his defense. As a 29-year old, Phillips should have a few more peak seasons left in him, but his decline phase isn't too far off. Until it arrives, we'll continue to know what to expect.
Scott Rolen -- Expectations: Medium, Grade: B+
I was in favor of the Scott Rolen experiment and he certainly didn't disappoint. For me, Rolen was a key component in the Reds breaking through and into the postseason in 2010.
In 2010, Rolen was a 5-win player, which was roughly a 3-win improvement over the production the Reds got out of third base in 2009. And, his presence seemed to extend beyond the playing field, as he seemed to be a stabilizing influence on a young Reds lineup. In addition, he gave the Reds much better L/R balance in the lineup (a legitimate problem in years past), and was a very steady glove who helped out the entire pitching staff with his ability to make plays. Rolen not only improved the Reds significantly at the hot corner, but also seemed to make those around him better.
Unfortunately, Rolen faded in the final two months of the season, especially in slugging percentage which fell down to .402 in August and .365 in September. It's becoming clear that this is a problem that is unlikely to go away, as his pre and post All Star splits over the past 3-years showed a marked decline Rolen's ability to drive the ball. Over the 2008-2010 seasons, Rolen has hit .293/.366/.484/.850 before the All Star break and .272/.347/.427/.774 after the break. His slugging percentage drops .057 after the break. Clearly, some combination of age and shoulder injury cause him to wear down, sapping his ability to drive the ball.
As a result, the Reds will be forced to address the question of how to get the most out of Rolen in 2011. Simply put, the team will need to find a respectable back-up, both to give Rolen a breather and fill in when injuries arise. Rolen was certainly a pleasant surprise, but going forward the Reds would be better served by finding an impact righthanded cleanup hitter. Doing so would allow them to shift Rolen down to a more complimentary spot in the lineup (i.e. 6th). Rolen remains a very good baseball player, but at this point it would be foolish to expect him to carry a team like he did during his peak seasons.
Paul Janish -- Expectations: Low, Grade: B
Paul Janish had the type of season I suspected was in there all along. I have long liked Janish's combination of short, quick, line-drive swing and disciplined approach at the plate. That combination of attributes should have been sufficient in light of his stellar defensive tools.
In 2010, Janish made the most of his opportunity. However, the Reds decision to sign Orlando Cabrera still leaves Janish with something of a question mark over his head. Janish performed rather well, but the sample size isn't quite large enough to state that Janish is a surefire starter. Unfortunately, that leaves the Reds on the horns of a dilemma for 2011, as they still don't know if they can rely on Janish to hold down the job fulltime.
Despite a solid .260/.338/.385/.723 slash line, Janish sported some rather strange splits. Despite Great American Ballpark being a hitter's Valhalla for righthanders, Janish actually performed significantly better on the road. At home, Janish hit .213/.307/.247/.554, while he was appreciably better on the road at .297/.363/.495/.858. He also performed significantly better during the day (.318/.389/.435/.824), than at night (.217/.300/.348/.648).
So, the question is whether the 2010 splits will normalize over a larger sample size or whether Janish was protected from his splits by the small sample size. The Reds will have to decide, but early rumblings indicate that they have no intention of handing the starting job over to Janish. At the very least, Janish has proven his value as a utility infielder who packs a steady glove. When the Reds were kicking the ball around the field in the postseason, Paul Janish was the only player I actually trusted to have a ball hit his way.
In short, Janish went from a borderline MLB player to potentially a legitimate starting shortstop. It's hard not to label that type of season a success.
Orlando Cabrera -- Expectations: Low, Grade: D+
When the Reds announced the signing of O-Cab, I was immediately against it. I thought Paul Janish offered comparable, if not superior, production at a much lower cost. The bang-for-the-buck easily favored Janish.
One thing I thought would actually work in O-Cab's favor was the boost he would get from Great American Ballpark. Unfortunately and surprisingly, the boost never arrived. In 2009, O-Cab hit .284/.316/.389 combined in Minnesota and Oakland, while in 2010 he hit only .263/.303/.354 for the Reds. He declined in batting average, on-base percentage, and slugging percentage.
The one saving grace for O-Cab was that he actually exceeded expectations on defense. Under the UZR/150 metric, O-Cab was 5.3 runs above average, while under the John Dewan +/- metric O-Cab was a -2. Neither metric rates him as elite, but it's fair to say he was not the big liability with the leather that I expected him to be.
The Reds declined Cabrera's option, but remain interested in bringing him back at a reduced rate. However, given the strong performance of the Reds in 2010, it's probably time to completely embrace the younger talent. There is little to nothing to be gained from players like O-Cab, especially with the capable Paul Janish and Zack Cozart in the organization. Older players like O-Cab are nothing more than expensive security blankets for GMs, as they aren't going to provide legitimate upgrades in production, but the name recognition gives the appearance of improvement. For some reason, fans are placated by an acquisition like O-Cab and become less critical than they would be if the production was generated by an internal option lacking such name recognition (i.e. Paul Janish).
Overall, O-Cab disappointed on offense and surprised on defense. Regardless, the overall result was rather uninspiring. For an organization renowned for its shortstop play, O-Cab's 2010 season was hardly a memorable data point.
Ramon Hernandez -- Expectations: Low, Grade: C
Ramon arrived in Cincy with mild expectations, as he was carrying around three straight seasons of .715 or lower OPS. He simply hasn't been an impact hitter, rather just an inexpensive veteran backstop with mediocre expectations. On the plus side, Great American Ballpark is the fountain of youth for righthanded hitters, so Hernandez would have that working in his favor.
Not surprisingly, Hernandez had his best season in four years, posting a line of .297/.364/.428/.792 with an OPS of .818 at home and .763 on the road. Ultimately, Hernandez was a solid player in 2010, providing decent production behind the plate and his ability to speak Spanish to the young Spanish speaking pitchers on the staff could only have helped. All in all, Hernandez was a solid veteran presence behind the dish. After factoring in the friendly hitting environment, Hernandez performed pretty much right in line with expectations.
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of Hernandez is his ability to elevate his hitting in key situations. I always have lingering doubt about a hitter's ability to consistently perform better in a specific spot in the lineup or in a specific situation. My thoughts run along the lines of "if he can elevate in certain spots, why wouldn't he elevate it all the time?" But, Ramon is just such a hitter. He seemingly DOES possess the ability to elevate his game in key situations.
In 2010, Hernandez hit .233/.285/.367/.652 with no runners on base, .318/.392/.447/.839 with runners on, and .327/.418/.451/.869 with runners in scoring position. The bigger the situation, the better the performance.
Additionally, over the course of his career, Hernandez has hit better in big situations.
Total Career: .265/.329/.418/.747
Career "High Leverage": .295/.360/.458/.818
Career "Medium Leverage": .264/.323/.397/.719
Career "Low Leverage": .251/.320/.416/.736
Both in 2010 and over the course of his career, Hernandez seemingly has had the knack for elevating his game when situation so requires. He seems to like the big moments and the chance for the big hit. Despite my skepticism of whether a player can consistently elevate his game in different situations, Hernandez seems to be able to do just that.
Hernandez was good enough that when paired with the next player in our list, he formed part of one of the most productive catching tandems in the majors.
Ryan Hanigan -- Expectations: Low, Grade: A-
The Reds signed Hanigan as an amateur free agent in 2002. After going undrafted and spending parts of 9 seasons in the minors, he finally broke through at the MLB level in 2010. Hanigan stepped up in a big way in 2010, posting a slash line of .300/.405/.429/.834. He didn't show much power, but made up for it with a stellar K/BB ratio of 21/33 and the second highest OBP among qualifying Reds hitters. Not too shabby.
One of the biggest reasons for Hanigan's success is his plate approach, as he rarely chases pitches outside the zone. It's remarkable how much easier hitting becomes when you don't help the pitcher out by chasing bad pitches. Let those pitches go and tilt the probability of success in your favor. Hanigan does just that.
Year: O-Swing%
2007: 22.2%
2008: 15.8%
2009: 17.6%
2010: 18.9%
In 2010, only 18.9% of Hanigan's swings were on pitches outside the strikezone, which landed him among the league leaders in the category. He also saw quite a few pitches per plate appearance (4.08 #P/PA), which when coupled with his refusal to chase bad balls makes him something of a tough out for opposing pitchers. Hanigan forces the pitcher to beat him, rather than making it easy by helping the pitcher out.
Once Hanigan did get a pitch to his liking he made contact 92.5% of the time. And, when he made contact, it resulted in a line a robust 20.8% of the time. Hanigan doesn't have much power, but he seems an ideal hit-and-run candidate and one of the better table-setters on the roster. The fact that he spent a grand total of 1 AB in the top 5 spots in the batting order is a clear failure on the part of Dusty Baker. But, of course, Dusty has long favored speed over on-base skill in his table-setters, which remains his biggest flaw as a manager.
Hanigan also did his part to slow the opposition running game, as he threw out 13 of 41 basestealers (31.7%) and seemed to call a better game than Hernandez.
If he can maintain that performance level, then it wouldn't be at all surprising to see Hanigan take over the larger role of the catching tandem in 2011. Overall, Hanigan was a very pleasant surprise for the Reds and helped provide one of the most productive catching tandems in baseball.
Joey Votto -- Expectations: High, Grade: A+
.324/.424/.600/1.024. A truly amazing season which establishes Votto as one of the top 2 or 3 hitters in the National League. As impressive as it was, even more impressive is that it was supported by the peripherals. Votto ripped line drives at a 20% clip and surprisingly was more productive on the road. At home, he posted a .950 OPS, while on the road he had a 1.093 OPS, which forecloses any notion that Votto was merely a product of a hitter friendly environment.
In fact, in the long history of the team, Votto's 2010 season was tied for the 14th best offensive season (at least according to Offensive WAR). The list reads as follows:
1. Joe Morgan (1975) 10.3
2. Joe Morgan (1976) 9.9
3. Joe Morgan (1972) 9.2
4. Joe Morgan (1973) 8.9
5. Joe Morgan (1974) 8.5
6. Frank Robinson (1962) 8.0
7. Cy Seymour (1905) 7.8
t8. Barry Larkin (1996) 7.7
t8. Johnny Bench (1972) 7.7
10. Ted Kluszewski (1954) 7.5
11. Pete Rose (1969) 7.4
12. Eric Davis (1987) 7.3
13. Joe Morgan (1977) 7.1
t14. Joey Votto (2010) 6.9
t14. Frank Robinson (1961) 6.9
Votto exceeded all my expectations in 2010, which continues a theme. I have never been happier to be wrong on a player than I have been on Votto. I simply didn't see this type of upside as he climbed the ladder, but his level of performance continued to improve as the competition got tougher. All of this culminated in an MVP caliber season with more undoubtedly on the horizon for one of the two or three best hitters in the NL.
Brandon Phillips -- Expectations: Medium, Grade: C+
At this point, there is no less surprising player on the roster than Phillips, whose performance has a metronome like consistency. His performance baseline is well established as .750-.770 OPS on offense and Gold Glove caliber defense.
On the season, Phillips hit the usual .275/.332/.430/.762, but struggled mightily on the basepaths where he stole 16 bases and was nabbed 12 times. It was the first time in 5 seasons that Phillips failed to swipe over 20 bases. Obviously, that type of "success" rate is unacceptable, as Phillips simply gave away too many outs.
Overall, it was largely what we've come to expect from Phillips. His production was on pace to be a tick better than in years past, but a terrible September (caused in part by a hand injury) dragged his numbers back down to his career norms. Phillips logged 97 ABs in September and posted a lackluster .175/.266/.278/.544 slash line. The Reds were pushing for a postseason spot, but in hindsight it was clearly a questionable decision for Dusty Baker to keep running Phillips out there. Not only did it drag down his overall numbers, but most importantly his performance simply didn't help the Reds win ballgames.
Overall, for better or worse, Phillips is as consistent as a metronome. His most valuable attribute is and always has been his defense. As a 29-year old, Phillips should have a few more peak seasons left in him, but his decline phase isn't too far off. Until it arrives, we'll continue to know what to expect.
Scott Rolen -- Expectations: Medium, Grade: B+
I was in favor of the Scott Rolen experiment and he certainly didn't disappoint. For me, Rolen was a key component in the Reds breaking through and into the postseason in 2010.
In 2010, Rolen was a 5-win player, which was roughly a 3-win improvement over the production the Reds got out of third base in 2009. And, his presence seemed to extend beyond the playing field, as he seemed to be a stabilizing influence on a young Reds lineup. In addition, he gave the Reds much better L/R balance in the lineup (a legitimate problem in years past), and was a very steady glove who helped out the entire pitching staff with his ability to make plays. Rolen not only improved the Reds significantly at the hot corner, but also seemed to make those around him better.
Unfortunately, Rolen faded in the final two months of the season, especially in slugging percentage which fell down to .402 in August and .365 in September. It's becoming clear that this is a problem that is unlikely to go away, as his pre and post All Star splits over the past 3-years showed a marked decline Rolen's ability to drive the ball. Over the 2008-2010 seasons, Rolen has hit .293/.366/.484/.850 before the All Star break and .272/.347/.427/.774 after the break. His slugging percentage drops .057 after the break. Clearly, some combination of age and shoulder injury cause him to wear down, sapping his ability to drive the ball.
As a result, the Reds will be forced to address the question of how to get the most out of Rolen in 2011. Simply put, the team will need to find a respectable back-up, both to give Rolen a breather and fill in when injuries arise. Rolen was certainly a pleasant surprise, but going forward the Reds would be better served by finding an impact righthanded cleanup hitter. Doing so would allow them to shift Rolen down to a more complimentary spot in the lineup (i.e. 6th). Rolen remains a very good baseball player, but at this point it would be foolish to expect him to carry a team like he did during his peak seasons.
Paul Janish -- Expectations: Low, Grade: B
Paul Janish had the type of season I suspected was in there all along. I have long liked Janish's combination of short, quick, line-drive swing and disciplined approach at the plate. That combination of attributes should have been sufficient in light of his stellar defensive tools.
In 2010, Janish made the most of his opportunity. However, the Reds decision to sign Orlando Cabrera still leaves Janish with something of a question mark over his head. Janish performed rather well, but the sample size isn't quite large enough to state that Janish is a surefire starter. Unfortunately, that leaves the Reds on the horns of a dilemma for 2011, as they still don't know if they can rely on Janish to hold down the job fulltime.
Despite a solid .260/.338/.385/.723 slash line, Janish sported some rather strange splits. Despite Great American Ballpark being a hitter's Valhalla for righthanders, Janish actually performed significantly better on the road. At home, Janish hit .213/.307/.247/.554, while he was appreciably better on the road at .297/.363/.495/.858. He also performed significantly better during the day (.318/.389/.435/.824), than at night (.217/.300/.348/.648).
So, the question is whether the 2010 splits will normalize over a larger sample size or whether Janish was protected from his splits by the small sample size. The Reds will have to decide, but early rumblings indicate that they have no intention of handing the starting job over to Janish. At the very least, Janish has proven his value as a utility infielder who packs a steady glove. When the Reds were kicking the ball around the field in the postseason, Paul Janish was the only player I actually trusted to have a ball hit his way.
In short, Janish went from a borderline MLB player to potentially a legitimate starting shortstop. It's hard not to label that type of season a success.
Orlando Cabrera -- Expectations: Low, Grade: D+
When the Reds announced the signing of O-Cab, I was immediately against it. I thought Paul Janish offered comparable, if not superior, production at a much lower cost. The bang-for-the-buck easily favored Janish.
One thing I thought would actually work in O-Cab's favor was the boost he would get from Great American Ballpark. Unfortunately and surprisingly, the boost never arrived. In 2009, O-Cab hit .284/.316/.389 combined in Minnesota and Oakland, while in 2010 he hit only .263/.303/.354 for the Reds. He declined in batting average, on-base percentage, and slugging percentage.
The one saving grace for O-Cab was that he actually exceeded expectations on defense. Under the UZR/150 metric, O-Cab was 5.3 runs above average, while under the John Dewan +/- metric O-Cab was a -2. Neither metric rates him as elite, but it's fair to say he was not the big liability with the leather that I expected him to be.
The Reds declined Cabrera's option, but remain interested in bringing him back at a reduced rate. However, given the strong performance of the Reds in 2010, it's probably time to completely embrace the younger talent. There is little to nothing to be gained from players like O-Cab, especially with the capable Paul Janish and Zack Cozart in the organization. Older players like O-Cab are nothing more than expensive security blankets for GMs, as they aren't going to provide legitimate upgrades in production, but the name recognition gives the appearance of improvement. For some reason, fans are placated by an acquisition like O-Cab and become less critical than they would be if the production was generated by an internal option lacking such name recognition (i.e. Paul Janish).
Overall, O-Cab disappointed on offense and surprised on defense. Regardless, the overall result was rather uninspiring. For an organization renowned for its shortstop play, O-Cab's 2010 season was hardly a memorable data point.
Friday, October 22, 2010
Jocko Strikes Again, Acquires Edmonds
Well, time to catch up on a few things that went down during the season, starting with the Jim Edmonds deal.
Walt Jocketty sent another jolt through Reds nation by once again staking the future on a name from the past. It worked to such great effect with Scott Rolen that he once again tried to catch lightening in a bottle, this time he turned to Jim Edmonds. And, it's hard not to think it's somewhat cool to see Jocketty target "his guys," because that's exactly what most of us would do if we were in his shoes.
Unfortunately, the cost of obtaining the services of Edmonds was Chris Dickerson. As a general rule, I don't think it's wise to trade away players who provide plus defense and plus on-base skills from premier defensive positions, as they are rather rare talents. Obviously, Dickerson has yet to put it altogether, but he still has the upside that would make him a very productive, valuable player if he does.
2010 Production
In 2010, Chris Dickerson hit a paltry .205/.222/.273/.495 mark in 20 games and 44 At Bats. However, I tend to discount his performance to a certain extent, as I suspect his wrist was bothering him early in the season. Not only was Dickerson wholly unproductive, but he was also a completely different type of hitter. His K/BB ratio was 19/1, which isn't typical of his on-base skill. Either Dusty got into his head and encouraged him to be more aggressive or he was simply hampered by injury. Given that he saw a robust 4.42 pitches per plate appearance, I suspect that Dickerson simply couldn't do enough with the pitches he saw to keep pitchers honest. If you can't put the fear of an extra base hit in the pitcher's mind, then he has no reason not to pound the strike zone. Hitters need a decent hit tool to get any value from on-base skills. Dickerson's injured wrist may have substantially limited his ability to drive the ball, which means pitchers didn't have to resort to nibbling to get him out.
However, after the hamate bone procedure and during his rehab stint, Dickerson was flashing the type of production that first earned him a promotion to the majors. In 43 ABs in triple-A, Dickerson was hitting a robust .442/.528/.767/1.296. The surprising part of his slash line is the power he flashed, which isn't typical after having the hamate bone removed (see: Alonso, Yonder).
In the end, Dickerson once again flashed the type of ceiling at the minor league level that makes him so intriguing, while in the same season demonstrating the type of floor at the MLB level that makes him so frustrating. Are there still possible explanations for his struggles? Yes. But, it's also entirely possible that he'll be nothing more than an AAAA type player who will age out before he can carve out an MLB career.
On the other hand, Jim Edmonds was surprisingly productive at the major league level with a slash line of .281/.344/.484/.828. He also provided well above average defense in centerfield and could have held down any of the outfield positions and first base without much difficulty. Jocketty rightly recognized that outfield depth was a problem and that a reliable veteran bat would be a nice option in leftfield.
At the time of the trade, Edmonds had a higher Win Above Replacement (WAR) mark (2.5) than our entire outfield, including Gomes (0.1), Stubbs (1.1), and Bruce (1.4). So, despite the low profile of the trade, it was a legitimate effort by Jocketty to upgrade the outfield production, especially the Gomes/Nix tandem in leftfield.
In light of Dickerson's lackluster production and injury problems, Edmonds was clearly the better option for the present.
Depth Chart
Another factor weighing in favor of the trade was Dickerson's standing on the organizational depth chart. Unfortunately, Chris Dickerson probably just didn't fit into the organization's future plans in any way shape or form. Generally speaking, a prospect's window of opportunity is small and closes in a hurry. So much of a player's career is largely a function of timing. The best of the best just kick in the door, but the non-blue chip prospects have to slide through the window before it slams shut. In Dickerson's case, he simply didn't make it, which was due in no small part to the players ahead and behind him on the organizational ladder.
At the Major League level, Dickerson was in direct competition with Drew Stubbs and Chris Heisey. At double-A, Dave Sappelt was ripping the cover off the ball and playing elite defense. At the lower levels, you had players like Ryan LaMarre and Yorman Rodriguez. So, if Dickerson was not the centerfielder of the present, then, at age 28, he was not the centerfielder of the future, either. As a result, it's difficult to see how he fit, especially given his struggles adjusting to leftfield.
To utilize his value, the Reds would have had to affirmatively act to make room for Dickerson, which is probably too big a leap of faith for the Reds to take based on the fact that he has not consistently performed at a level high enough to justify such an act. If the Reds cleared room for Dickerson and he failed to produce, then they would have altered their depth chart to accommodate what ultimately turned out to be an unproductive player.
Even so, Dickerson could be the type of player that the Reds regret giving away. He has been a personal favorite of mine for a number of years now for one simple reason: he grades out highly from both a statistical and traditional scouting point of view. Statistical analysis focuses on outcomes, while traditional scouting focuses on the process. It's a means/ends type distinction. And, when a player has good baseball skills and very good baseball tools, I'm willing to give them a bit more time to try to put it altogether.
Jayson Werth is another player who I have long appreciated because he grades out equally well under a statistical analysis method as he does under a traditional scouting method. I love his stats and his baseball mechanics, which made him an undervalued, sleeper candidate. I still feel like Dickerson fits a similar mold, even if he lacks Werth's baseball instincts.
Future Value
As for future value, it was clear that Edmonds had absolutely none. If ever there was a "win now" type move, this was it. Instead of a 28-year old player who had years of value ahead of him to benefit the organization, the Reds acquired a 40-year old player whose value completely disappears upon his retirement. As a result, Edmonds's value was always going to bleed completely out of the organization, which makes the deal a bit less palatable. As soon as the deal was consummated, the Reds committed to riding his value all the way into the ground.
Final Thoughts
Given that the Reds were in a position to make the playoffs for the first time in over a decade, sacrificing some future value for potential present value was certainly a defensible and understandable decision.
In hindsight, this deal likely ranks among the least consequential in all of baseball last season. Edmonds's injury made him a non-factor for the Reds and Dickerson continues to struggle to carve out a significant MLB career. In the final analysis, I liked the acquisition of Edmonds, but disliked giving up a player I still like in Chris Dickerson. In the grand scheme of things, it probably won't matter, but now that he has a fresh start it wouldn't surprise me to see Dickerson grab hold of a centerfield/leadoff hitter job and run with it in another organization.
Walt Jocketty sent another jolt through Reds nation by once again staking the future on a name from the past. It worked to such great effect with Scott Rolen that he once again tried to catch lightening in a bottle, this time he turned to Jim Edmonds. And, it's hard not to think it's somewhat cool to see Jocketty target "his guys," because that's exactly what most of us would do if we were in his shoes.
Unfortunately, the cost of obtaining the services of Edmonds was Chris Dickerson. As a general rule, I don't think it's wise to trade away players who provide plus defense and plus on-base skills from premier defensive positions, as they are rather rare talents. Obviously, Dickerson has yet to put it altogether, but he still has the upside that would make him a very productive, valuable player if he does.
2010 Production
In 2010, Chris Dickerson hit a paltry .205/.222/.273/.495 mark in 20 games and 44 At Bats. However, I tend to discount his performance to a certain extent, as I suspect his wrist was bothering him early in the season. Not only was Dickerson wholly unproductive, but he was also a completely different type of hitter. His K/BB ratio was 19/1, which isn't typical of his on-base skill. Either Dusty got into his head and encouraged him to be more aggressive or he was simply hampered by injury. Given that he saw a robust 4.42 pitches per plate appearance, I suspect that Dickerson simply couldn't do enough with the pitches he saw to keep pitchers honest. If you can't put the fear of an extra base hit in the pitcher's mind, then he has no reason not to pound the strike zone. Hitters need a decent hit tool to get any value from on-base skills. Dickerson's injured wrist may have substantially limited his ability to drive the ball, which means pitchers didn't have to resort to nibbling to get him out.
However, after the hamate bone procedure and during his rehab stint, Dickerson was flashing the type of production that first earned him a promotion to the majors. In 43 ABs in triple-A, Dickerson was hitting a robust .442/.528/.767/1.296. The surprising part of his slash line is the power he flashed, which isn't typical after having the hamate bone removed (see: Alonso, Yonder).
In the end, Dickerson once again flashed the type of ceiling at the minor league level that makes him so intriguing, while in the same season demonstrating the type of floor at the MLB level that makes him so frustrating. Are there still possible explanations for his struggles? Yes. But, it's also entirely possible that he'll be nothing more than an AAAA type player who will age out before he can carve out an MLB career.
On the other hand, Jim Edmonds was surprisingly productive at the major league level with a slash line of .281/.344/.484/.828. He also provided well above average defense in centerfield and could have held down any of the outfield positions and first base without much difficulty. Jocketty rightly recognized that outfield depth was a problem and that a reliable veteran bat would be a nice option in leftfield.
At the time of the trade, Edmonds had a higher Win Above Replacement (WAR) mark (2.5) than our entire outfield, including Gomes (0.1), Stubbs (1.1), and Bruce (1.4). So, despite the low profile of the trade, it was a legitimate effort by Jocketty to upgrade the outfield production, especially the Gomes/Nix tandem in leftfield.
In light of Dickerson's lackluster production and injury problems, Edmonds was clearly the better option for the present.
Depth Chart
Another factor weighing in favor of the trade was Dickerson's standing on the organizational depth chart. Unfortunately, Chris Dickerson probably just didn't fit into the organization's future plans in any way shape or form. Generally speaking, a prospect's window of opportunity is small and closes in a hurry. So much of a player's career is largely a function of timing. The best of the best just kick in the door, but the non-blue chip prospects have to slide through the window before it slams shut. In Dickerson's case, he simply didn't make it, which was due in no small part to the players ahead and behind him on the organizational ladder.
At the Major League level, Dickerson was in direct competition with Drew Stubbs and Chris Heisey. At double-A, Dave Sappelt was ripping the cover off the ball and playing elite defense. At the lower levels, you had players like Ryan LaMarre and Yorman Rodriguez. So, if Dickerson was not the centerfielder of the present, then, at age 28, he was not the centerfielder of the future, either. As a result, it's difficult to see how he fit, especially given his struggles adjusting to leftfield.
To utilize his value, the Reds would have had to affirmatively act to make room for Dickerson, which is probably too big a leap of faith for the Reds to take based on the fact that he has not consistently performed at a level high enough to justify such an act. If the Reds cleared room for Dickerson and he failed to produce, then they would have altered their depth chart to accommodate what ultimately turned out to be an unproductive player.
Even so, Dickerson could be the type of player that the Reds regret giving away. He has been a personal favorite of mine for a number of years now for one simple reason: he grades out highly from both a statistical and traditional scouting point of view. Statistical analysis focuses on outcomes, while traditional scouting focuses on the process. It's a means/ends type distinction. And, when a player has good baseball skills and very good baseball tools, I'm willing to give them a bit more time to try to put it altogether.
Jayson Werth is another player who I have long appreciated because he grades out equally well under a statistical analysis method as he does under a traditional scouting method. I love his stats and his baseball mechanics, which made him an undervalued, sleeper candidate. I still feel like Dickerson fits a similar mold, even if he lacks Werth's baseball instincts.
Future Value
As for future value, it was clear that Edmonds had absolutely none. If ever there was a "win now" type move, this was it. Instead of a 28-year old player who had years of value ahead of him to benefit the organization, the Reds acquired a 40-year old player whose value completely disappears upon his retirement. As a result, Edmonds's value was always going to bleed completely out of the organization, which makes the deal a bit less palatable. As soon as the deal was consummated, the Reds committed to riding his value all the way into the ground.
Final Thoughts
Given that the Reds were in a position to make the playoffs for the first time in over a decade, sacrificing some future value for potential present value was certainly a defensible and understandable decision.
In hindsight, this deal likely ranks among the least consequential in all of baseball last season. Edmonds's injury made him a non-factor for the Reds and Dickerson continues to struggle to carve out a significant MLB career. In the final analysis, I liked the acquisition of Edmonds, but disliked giving up a player I still like in Chris Dickerson. In the grand scheme of things, it probably won't matter, but now that he has a fresh start it wouldn't surprise me to see Dickerson grab hold of a centerfield/leadoff hitter job and run with it in another organization.
Friday, October 8, 2010
NLDS Game 2: Pre-Game Thoughts
The Reds took it on the chin in Game 1 and look to get up off the mat in Game 2. Playing the role of stopper for the Redlegs will be Bronson Arroyo. For all intents and purposes, the Reds playoff livelihood is on the line tonight. If they dump Game 2, then the climb back into the series is all but insurmountable, especially with Roy Halladay lurking around the corner. Interestingly enough, Bronson Arroyo is, or at least should, be pitching for his future with the organization.
The Reds hold an $11M team option on Arroyo for 2011 with a $2M buyout. The Reds also have a surfeit of starting pitching in 2011, including Cueto, Edinson, Homer, Travis Wood, Mike Leake, Aroldis Chapman, and others. Does it make sense to pay Arroyo that kind of money when you have stable of young, cost effective starters already in the mix? I would submit that it only makes sense for games like tonight. That's the role that Arroyo needs to fill to justify such a significant financial outlay. We simply don't need him to beat up on the dregs of the NL Central. No, we need him to be a veteran stopper against the elite teams. If he can do that, then he should certainly have a role on this team going forward.
Tonight is a prime example of the caliber of lineup you have to face and defeat to win a championship. Unfortunately, Arroyo's current pitching profile is not that of a dominating pitcher, which could mean struggles against an offense like the Phillies. Of course, he has made a career out of proving me wrong, but from a statistical standpoint, the odds are likely against him tonight.
In 2010, Arroyo has 3.88 ERA and a 1.15 WHIP, which are impressive numbers, but the component stats simply don't support his overall performance. His FIP is 4.61 and his xFIP is 4.60, so there are some legitimate questions on Arroyo. He managed to outperform his FIP and xFIP last year as well, but I'm not sure gambling big money on Arroyo continuing this level of performance is the best way to go. His strikeouts per nine has fallen for the third year (7.34 to 5.19 to 5.05) in a row and now sits at a borderline acceptable level. History shows that starting pitchers need to strikeout more than 5.0 hitters per nine in order to maintain consistent, year-in year-out success. Arroyo is trending in the wrong direction. Additionally, Arroyo had a BABIP of .246, which is probably unsustainable, even if he has managed to reduce his line drive rate to 16.3%. Additionally, all contact pitchers are getting a bit of a boost from the league wide decline in power hitting, which may or may not continue into 2011. It's largely a question of whether Arroyo can decrease his contact rate or, failing that, continue to effectively manage the type of contact that he gives up.
Overall, Arroyo is a high contact pitcher facing a stacked lineup that is lefthand heavy. Add in the bandbox that is Citizens Bank and it's a tall order for Arroyo. However, if Arroyo can't get the job done, then I'm not entirely sure we can justify paying him $11M in 2011. Granted, his 200 plus innings every year are nice, but this is a team that needs to continue improving. Given it's current position on the organizational win cycle, that may well mean building a team that is structured to succeed in the playoffs. If Arroyo can't succeed in the big games against the elite lineups, then maybe it's time to turn the rotation over to the young guys and use the salary savings to acquire some high leverage relievers or a better option in leftfield. Branch Rickey once said "Trade a player a year too early rather than a year too late." Arroyo will be 34 in 2011, so the Reds will have to factor that in when they determine Arroyo's fate with the organization.
The Reds need a win tonight and they are turning to Arroyo to get it. To be honest, I fully expect the Reds to bring Bronson back in 2011, but if he gets lit up tonight then I'm not so sure he deserves it. Still, I'm hoping he goes big tonight against the Phils and earns his next contract with the Reds.
GO REDS GO!!!!!!!!
The Reds hold an $11M team option on Arroyo for 2011 with a $2M buyout. The Reds also have a surfeit of starting pitching in 2011, including Cueto, Edinson, Homer, Travis Wood, Mike Leake, Aroldis Chapman, and others. Does it make sense to pay Arroyo that kind of money when you have stable of young, cost effective starters already in the mix? I would submit that it only makes sense for games like tonight. That's the role that Arroyo needs to fill to justify such a significant financial outlay. We simply don't need him to beat up on the dregs of the NL Central. No, we need him to be a veteran stopper against the elite teams. If he can do that, then he should certainly have a role on this team going forward.
Tonight is a prime example of the caliber of lineup you have to face and defeat to win a championship. Unfortunately, Arroyo's current pitching profile is not that of a dominating pitcher, which could mean struggles against an offense like the Phillies. Of course, he has made a career out of proving me wrong, but from a statistical standpoint, the odds are likely against him tonight.
In 2010, Arroyo has 3.88 ERA and a 1.15 WHIP, which are impressive numbers, but the component stats simply don't support his overall performance. His FIP is 4.61 and his xFIP is 4.60, so there are some legitimate questions on Arroyo. He managed to outperform his FIP and xFIP last year as well, but I'm not sure gambling big money on Arroyo continuing this level of performance is the best way to go. His strikeouts per nine has fallen for the third year (7.34 to 5.19 to 5.05) in a row and now sits at a borderline acceptable level. History shows that starting pitchers need to strikeout more than 5.0 hitters per nine in order to maintain consistent, year-in year-out success. Arroyo is trending in the wrong direction. Additionally, Arroyo had a BABIP of .246, which is probably unsustainable, even if he has managed to reduce his line drive rate to 16.3%. Additionally, all contact pitchers are getting a bit of a boost from the league wide decline in power hitting, which may or may not continue into 2011. It's largely a question of whether Arroyo can decrease his contact rate or, failing that, continue to effectively manage the type of contact that he gives up.
Overall, Arroyo is a high contact pitcher facing a stacked lineup that is lefthand heavy. Add in the bandbox that is Citizens Bank and it's a tall order for Arroyo. However, if Arroyo can't get the job done, then I'm not entirely sure we can justify paying him $11M in 2011. Granted, his 200 plus innings every year are nice, but this is a team that needs to continue improving. Given it's current position on the organizational win cycle, that may well mean building a team that is structured to succeed in the playoffs. If Arroyo can't succeed in the big games against the elite lineups, then maybe it's time to turn the rotation over to the young guys and use the salary savings to acquire some high leverage relievers or a better option in leftfield. Branch Rickey once said "Trade a player a year too early rather than a year too late." Arroyo will be 34 in 2011, so the Reds will have to factor that in when they determine Arroyo's fate with the organization.
The Reds need a win tonight and they are turning to Arroyo to get it. To be honest, I fully expect the Reds to bring Bronson back in 2011, but if he gets lit up tonight then I'm not so sure he deserves it. Still, I'm hoping he goes big tonight against the Phils and earns his next contract with the Reds.
GO REDS GO!!!!!!!!
Thursday, October 7, 2010
NLDS Game 1: John Hirschbeck's Work Behind the Dish
Interestingly enough, there is a decent amount of griping going on about John Hirschbeck's calls behind the dish. Mostly the gripes came from fans, but one Reds player in particular joined in on the fun. John Fay tweeted that Orlando Cabrera, perhaps demonstrating those famous intangibles and his veteran influence, stated the following after Game 1:
Other Reds, however, were willing to give full credit and a tip of the cap to Halladay:
Personally, I was rather impressed by the strikezone. Several times, while facing lefthanded hitters, Ramon Hernandez set up on the outside corner only to have Edinson throw the offspeed pitch on the inside corner. Before the pitch, Hernandez shifted his body over behind the outside corner, but Hirschbeck maintained good position behind the plate, rather than shifting with Hernandez for protection. By maintaining his position behind the plate, Hirschbeck increased the odds of getting struck by a foul tip, but also ensured that he would have a proper view of both sides of the plate. Additionally, despite Hernandez having to reach all the way back over to the inside corner, which is almost a foot-and-a-half, Hirschbeck continually stayed with those pitches and called them strikes.
It's not uncommon for umpires to essentially give up on a pitch that is so drastically off the catcher's target, but Hirschbeck refused to do so. To his credit, he simply called pitches in the strikezone strikes, which happens to be a large part of his job description.
Anyway, as Craig Calcettera pointed out on HardballTalk, brooksbaseball.net produced the below strikezone plot from last night's game (click on it for a better, more clear view). I haven't studied a ton of these, but it looks to me like Hirschbeck was quite good last night. Every game is going to have a missed call or two, but this looks more than respectable to me, which is refreshing considering all the ammunition umpires have given to the "expand instant replay" crowd as of late.
Here is the "how to read" guide from Brooks Baseball:
And, here is the Hirschbeck plot from last night's game. Again, click on it to get a better view:
Well, regardless of the reasons for the shellacking, the Reds need to put this one out of their minds. It'll be interesting to see if there is any hangover in Game 2 from this performance. I would imagine a fast start would help wash away any remnants of this game. Hopefully, the Reds prove to be a mentally tough and resilient ball club, but having the bizarre extra day off between Games 1 and 2 probably won't help matters.
"He and the umpire pitched a no-hitter. He gave him every pitch. Basically we had no chance."
Other Reds, however, were willing to give full credit and a tip of the cap to Halladay:
"I don't think there was going to be any other outcome. He threw all four pitches in all four corners. He's a bulldog later in the game." --- Jonny Gomes
"You're swinging at nothing. Every time he makes a mistake, it's in a safe zone: Down, away. He doesn't miss in the middle of the plate." --- Joey Votto
Personally, I was rather impressed by the strikezone. Several times, while facing lefthanded hitters, Ramon Hernandez set up on the outside corner only to have Edinson throw the offspeed pitch on the inside corner. Before the pitch, Hernandez shifted his body over behind the outside corner, but Hirschbeck maintained good position behind the plate, rather than shifting with Hernandez for protection. By maintaining his position behind the plate, Hirschbeck increased the odds of getting struck by a foul tip, but also ensured that he would have a proper view of both sides of the plate. Additionally, despite Hernandez having to reach all the way back over to the inside corner, which is almost a foot-and-a-half, Hirschbeck continually stayed with those pitches and called them strikes.
It's not uncommon for umpires to essentially give up on a pitch that is so drastically off the catcher's target, but Hirschbeck refused to do so. To his credit, he simply called pitches in the strikezone strikes, which happens to be a large part of his job description.
Anyway, as Craig Calcettera pointed out on HardballTalk, brooksbaseball.net produced the below strikezone plot from last night's game (click on it for a better, more clear view). I haven't studied a ton of these, but it looks to me like Hirschbeck was quite good last night. Every game is going to have a missed call or two, but this looks more than respectable to me, which is refreshing considering all the ammunition umpires have given to the "expand instant replay" crowd as of late.
Here is the "how to read" guide from Brooks Baseball:
These graphs only plot calls made by the home plate umpire. In other words, they only plot balls and called strikes. No other pitches or results are included. Intuitively, this provides a representation of the strikezone for each game.
Each pitch is represented by a single dot. Green dots are balls and red dots are strikes. Pitches marked as belonging to a particular team (for example "bos" or "nya") are designated with different shapes. These teams represent the pitching team, not the batting team. So, a pitch marked "bos-Called Strike" was thrown by a Boston pitcher.
As is indicated on the graphs, these are from the Umpire's perspective, not the Pitcher's perspective.
Normalized maps attempt to correct the Y-Axis on this graph by using the sz_top and sz_bot values in the PitchFX data for any individual hitter. These parameters are variable and should not be taken as gospel (or any other works of Holy Writing, including Torah or Qu'ran). These values are then scaled to 1 and -1 respectively. The outside edges of the strikezone are then drawn to specifications corresponding to an average umpire's strikezone.
Non-Normalized maps simply use the actual height of each pitch as it crosses the plate. But, because of variable batter height, this may not provide a completely accurate picture of an Umpire's Strikezone in the Vertical Axis. The outside edges of the strikezone are then drawn to specifications corresponding to an average umpire's strikezone.
And, here is the Hirschbeck plot from last night's game. Again, click on it to get a better view:
Well, regardless of the reasons for the shellacking, the Reds need to put this one out of their minds. It'll be interesting to see if there is any hangover in Game 2 from this performance. I would imagine a fast start would help wash away any remnants of this game. Hopefully, the Reds prove to be a mentally tough and resilient ball club, but having the bizarre extra day off between Games 1 and 2 probably won't help matters.
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