Should the Reds Go Moose Hunting?

There's an interesting situation unraveling in the Bronx. Mike Mussina has been pulled from the rotation and elite prospect Ian Kennedy called up to take his turn in the rotation. The Yankees are saying that it could be a one start demotion only, but if Kennedy pitches well then it's difficult to imagine the Yankees pulling Kennedy and putting Mussina back in the rotation, especially with the success they have had with their other elite pitching prospect, Joba Chamberlain.

If the Yankees decide to stick with Kennedy, then there is a good chance that Mussina will be dealt, as he is not an option in the bullpen. In his entire MLB career, Mussina has never pitched even a single inning as a reliever. Given the Yankees potential desire to move Mussina and the Reds need for another quality starting pitcher, the situation begs the question of whether the Reds should attempt to acquire Mussina.


THE TRADE PROPOSAL

Given that the waiver trade deadline is approaching, it would seem to make sense for the Reds to attempt to acquire Mussina now. Given his lower level of performance in 2007 and his high salary, Mussina would likely clear waivers. That would enable him to be traded before the deadline on August 31.

The Yankee bullpen currently lacks lefthanded pitching. Given that, the Reds could try to trade Mike Stanton to the Yankees for Mike Mussina. Mike Stanton also is likely to clear waivers, as his performance does not justify his salary. Also, Stanton has a long history of pitching for the Yankees, so he might prove to be an attractive option.

The Yankees would be able to shed payroll in the deal and possibly improve their bullpen, by adding an left-hander with substantial post-season experience to the team. Given that the Yankees are pushing for the playoffs, Stanton is someone who could improve their chances of reaching the post-season.

Maybe the Reds would have to add something else to the deal for it to make sense for the Yankees, but I think those should be the two principle players. Both teams subtract a player they don't need, improve their salary situation, and add a player who may be able to help them reach their respective goals.

Given that the structure of the deal makes some sense, the question then becomes, is Mike Mussina a good bet to bounce back in 2008?

MUSSINA'S PERFORMANCE

Mussina's performance in 2007 has not been stellar, but how much of it has been his fault and is it indicative of a poor 2008?

Year:___ERA__WHIP__BB/9__K/9___GB/FB___HR/9
2007:___5.53__1.49____2.1___5.5____1.09____1.02
2006:___3.51__1.11____1.6___7.8____1.07____1.00
Career:__3.70__1.19____2.0___7.1____1.14____0.97

Mussina has maintained his walk rate, groundball/flyball ratio, and his homerun rate. His ERA and WHIP have skyrocketed because his strikeout rate has fallen. His K/9 is currently about 1.5 strikeouts per nine innings below his career rate. A 5.5 K/9 is still high enough for a pitcher to maintain long-term success, but clearly Mussina would like to miss a few more bats.

Mussina's declining strikeout rate means that he is allowing more contact. More balls in play typically means more hits allowed. That said, Mussina seems to be giving up a disproportionate number of hits, given the number of balls in play.

Year:___H/9__Strand Rate
2007:__11.29___63.5%
2006:__8.39___72.1%
Career:__8.67__71.9%

Given that Mussina's strikeout rate has fallen by ~1.5 K/9, you would expect some increase in hits allowed. However, Mussina is giving up almost 3 more hits per nine innings than before, which seems too high.

If you look at Mussina's Batting Average on Balls in Play (BABIP) for 2007, it is very high at .348, which indicates that Mussina has been unlucky. A greater percentage of balls in play than statistically expected have fallen in for hits. A .280-.290 rate is the average rate, so Mussina is well above that. Given enough time, that .348 rate can be expected to fall and his performance improve.

Another problem with his 2007 performance is his 63.5% Strand Rate, which is well below his career rate of 71.9%. If BABIP is a measure of how many balls in play will fall in for hits, then Strand Rate is a measure of how those hits are distributed. Obviously, clusters of hits will result in more runs allowed than a more well dispersed pattern. Mussina has suffered from both poor hit luck and poor distribution of those hits in 2007, neither of which is really attributable to him.

All things considered, Mussina's biggest problem in 2007 has been his poor luck. Of course, his declining strikeout rate ensured that his season wouldn't be as stellar as his previous seasons, but his peripheral stats do not support an ERA of 5.53 and a WHIP of 1.49. Given those peripheral stats, he should have better overall numbers.

If you look at his pitch data, his 2007 season has seen him throw a similar amount of both strikes (66%) and first pitch strikes (64%). He's also been consistent in the types of counts in which he has worked, as 2% of the Plate Appearances he has seen have been 3-0 counts and 19% have been 0-2 counts. All of those rates are in line with his career performance, but the one statistic that stands out is his Contact Rate.

This season, Mussina has just been more hittable. He is getting fewer swings and misses than in years past. In 2007, when batters have swung at Mussina's pitches they have made contact 86% of the time. This is up from 81% in 2006 and an 81% career average. It is difficult to be successful in the majors if you aren't missing more bats than that, so it is cause for concern.

However, the increased contact rate could be do to nothing more than the hamstring problems that have plagued him this season. His injury problems could be preventing him from getting the leg drive he needs to get good velocity on his fastball or the same snap on the breaking ball. Also, Mussina would likely see a reduced contact rate in switching to the NL, so that would be a benefit. The higher contact rate is a bit of a concern, but it also could be a statistical outlier and Mussina's track record may warrant taking that chance, especially if he isn't suffering from any injuries.

CONTRACT IMPLICATIONS

In the offseason, the Yankees signed Mike Mussina to a two year contract extension. The terms of the contract included salaries of $11,000,000 in 2007 and $11,000,000 in 2008.

The Reds signed Mike Stanton to a contract which included a $2,000,000 salary in 2007, a $3,000,000 in 2008, and a $2,500,000 club option for 2009. The 2009 option comes with a $500,000 buyout.

So, if the Reds could use Mike Stanton and his contract to reduce the amount of money and the inherent risk in acquiring Mike Mussina. If the Reds swapped Stanton for Mussina, then they would save around $3.75M on Stanton, which would reduce their net salary obligation on Mussina to $7,250,000 for 2008. Given the contracts handed out to free agent pitchers last offseason, $7.25M could be a bargain for a pitcher of Mussina's caliber.

By lowering the amount owed to Mussina in 2008, the Reds would also be reducing the inherent risk that he won't provide the amount of production needed for his salary. The lower the salary, the more likely the Reds will get their money's worth out of Mussina.

LEAGUE COMPARISON

Another factor at work in determining the risk on Mussina is the switch from the AL East to the NL Central. Given the payroll explosion in the AL East and the existence of the DH, there are some strong offenses in that division. By moving from the AL East to the NL Central, Mussina would be facing weaker offensive lineups and his numbers would likely improve.

In 2007, the non-Yankee AL East teams have scored 4.8 runs per game (2528/528). The non-Reds NL Central teams have scored 4.5 runs per game (2981/657). A switch from the Yankees to the Reds would allow Mussina to face offenses that score fewer runs per game. The Reds found similar success in Bronson Arroyo, who came over from the AL East.

Mussina would also benefit from such a move.

CONCLUSION

Given the needs of both teams, this might be a deal worth considering. The offseason free agent starting pitcher pool is weak and the Reds may need to look elsewhere to fill out their rotation. The Yankees have three young starters in Phillip Hughes, Joba Chamberlain, and Ian Kennedy who could be ready to fill out the rotation with Andy Pettite and Chien-Ming Wang in 2008. Accordingly, they may not have much need for Mike Mussina. However, the Yankees could be interested in fan favorite Mike Stanton as a situational lefty to help them out in October.

Mike Mussina does have no trade protection, but if he isn't in the starting rotation for the Yankees, then a trade is the only logical option. He may need some convincing, but maybe Cincinnati could be the place he'd call home in the future.

All in all, it may be a deal that would be worth considering for both sides. It'll be interesting to see what happens to Mussina as the waiver trade deadline approaches, but a 1-2-3 of Harang, Mussina, and Arroyo could be a big improvement in Cincy in 2008.

It all depends on risk and Mussina seems to be a lesser risk than throwing ~$10,000,000 at a league average starting pitcher in free agency.

And, as the dust settles...

...it's time to evaluate where the Reds stand.

When all is said and done, the Reds chose not to shake things up. The Reds chose not to restructure the lineup. The Reds chose not to hold a fire-sale. When it was all said and done, the Reds chose not to do much at all. They decided to stay the course, which is slightly disappointing and yet, slightly encouraging.

Personally, I find it slightly encouraging because I don't believe the Reds need to hold a fire-sale. I think this team drastically underperformed in the first half and are closer to being a playoff contender than many realize. This team should be around .500, which puts the playoffs in reach with a couple of tweaks to the roster and makes the idea of a fire-sale ill-advised.

The Reds have a very strong core of young talent. A core that includes Brandon Phillips, Homer Bailey, Josh Hamilton, Joey Votto, and Jay Bruce stacks up rather well with just about any team's core of young talent. Shifting the focus of the team away from Adam Dunn and Ken Griffey Jr. towards this young collection of talent should have been the goal. We have passed the point where we are building around Dunn/Griffey, so reorganizing the roster with this goal in mind would have been wise. With that in mind, it would have been a nice idea if they could have dealt some of their older talent to bring in one or two more players to add to this core of young talent.

The list of players who were rumored to be dealt included Adam Dunn, Ken Griffey Jr., Scott Hatteberg, Jeff Conine, David Weathers, and Mike Stanton. Out of this group, Krivsky only dealt away Kyle Lohse, which, as mentioned previously, is a deal I like. The rest are still with the Reds, so let's take a quick look at their situations.

Adam Dunn: This is the big chip that could have reconfigured the entire roster, which heading into 2008 wouldn't have been such a bad thing. Dunn was the only player whose trade value got substantial worse after not being dealt. Dunn is the only player for whom there was a pressing need to make a deal. At this point, Dunn is very likely to be a Cincinnati Red until after the 2008 season. The Reds have a $13M team option on Dunn for 2008, but Dunn gave the Reds that option during the last contract negotiation in exchange for trade protection.

If the Reds exercise the option, then Dunn gets full no-trade protection from that point until June of 2008. In June of 2008, Dunn will provide a list of teams to which he can be traded. So, in essence, the Reds will be facing the same problem they had with Dunn at this trade deadline, only far worse. Teams no longer want to give up 6 cost effective years of prospect production for a half season rental of an expensive player. That was the problem this year and will be continue to be a problem next year. However, next year Dunn's no trade list will pare down the number of suitors, which will diminish the demand for his services to a level even lower than this year's demand. Less competition and demand, very likely makes for a reduced return in trade.

At this point, Dunn isn't going anywhere until he leaves for compensatory draft picks after the 2008 season, which I think is a wasted opportunity for the Reds to reshape this team.

Ken Griffey Jr.: Realistically speaking, Jr. isn't going anywhere until Jr. pushes to get out. Just like his Seattle departure, Jr. will control when he wants to leave. When Jr. wants to go, then he'll go. Not until then.

Scott Hatteberg: Just a tremendous hitter with an awesome approach and seems to be a Krivsky favorite. Personally, I wouldn't be surprised to see Krivsky work the 2008 roster to save Hatteberg's starting job. At the very least, he could be a very valuable bat off the bench in 2008, so I'm not sorry to see him stay.

Mike Stanton: Frankly, he just may not have had any trade value at all. Veteran savvy only goes so far, at some point you have to produce. Stanton has failed to do so and no one is likely interested in picking up his salary for next season, which is the big stumbling block. Still, Stanton is one possibility to pass through waivers in August and be dealt to a contender. Unfortunately, even that is a long shot.

Jeff Conine: He's 41 years old and might make a nice veteran, bat-off-the-bench for a playoff contender, but no one is likely to give up much to get him.

David Weathers: As for Weathers, I can see the argument for keeping him. I don't agree with it, but the idea of keeping Weathers because he signed to a cost effective contract for 2008 and would preclude the Reds having to bring in both a closer and a setup man is certainly a logical one. That said, I think Weathers would have brought in a nice return and due to his age is no sure bet to even be effective in 2008.

If the Reds head into 2008 with Weathers as the primary setup man, then I think they are once again headed for trouble. Regardless of whether Weathers in the mix in 2008, the Reds need to bring in a shutdown setup man and an effective closer for 2008. I don't think you can count on a 38 year old reliever who relies on grit more than pure stuff to maintain his effectiveness. There is just far too much risk to rely heavily on Weathers for next season. Given that he shouldn't be the primary 8th or 9th inning reliever, Weathers really isn't needed at all. Relying on Weathers for the 7th is overkill, as we have countless young arms who can work the 7th.

To me, Weathers trade value is at an all-time high. In fact, his trade value substantial outpaces his actual value to the Reds at this point. Dealing Weathers looks like the better play, but I can certainly see the logic to keeping him. Only time will tell which strategy is correct.


All in all, I'm really only disappointed that we didn't move Dunn for younger talent. I like the two moves that were made and can understand the rationale for keeping everyone else. That said, I think moving Dunn for young talent would have had a large trickle down effect on this organization. The talent we could have received in trade would have been of value, but moving Dunn may have had substantial ancillary benefits as well. These benefits likely would have included a new style of play for the team, improved outfield defense, a new attitude in the clubhouse, the opportunity to move Griffey to leftfield, and freeing up cash to pursue free agents to fill other holes in the roster. There are just far too many advantages to have been gained by trading Dunn to jusitify keeping him for 2008.

Some people want to remove Krivsky due to the lack of activity at the deadline. Personally, I think that's a mistake. It seems fans in Cincy are always of the mind that the grass is always greener on the other side. The Reds have had far too much turmoil over the past decade and you cannot have a successful organization without stability. It's time to give Krivsky some time to build this organization. "The Trade" was truly terrible, but outside of that he hasn't done anything that truly makes him deserving of being fired. He's made some tremendous acquisitions of undervalued talent and may have done so again with Cantu. Not to mention, for the first time in quite a while, the Reds farm system is starting to bear fruit.

Despite the knee-jerk public outcry to the contrary, there's actually much more positive than negative going on in Cincy these days.

Now, if they had only traded Adam Dunn....

And, so it continues...

Well, the Reds traded Kyle Lohse to the Phillies for LHP Matt Maloney. To me, that doesn't seem like a good deal at first blush, but if we dig deeper it may actually be the best deal we could have cut. While originally I had hoped to see Lohse net compensatory draft picks for the Reds after leaving via free agency, but I'm no longer sure that would have been possible.

Here is Maloney's scouting report from the 2007 Baseball America Prospect Handbook, in which he ranked #9:

Maloney was worn out from pitching Mississippi to the NCAA super regionals when he turned pro in 2005, so the Phillies didn't see him at his best until 2006. His best was very good, as he was named South Atlantic League pitcher of the year after leading the circuit in wins, innings, and strikeouts while finishing second in ERA. Maloney attacks hitters by throwing four pitchs for strikes. His stuff is average across the board, but his advanced feel makes it play up, and he creates good deception with his easily repeatable delivery. His 86-88 mph sinker is his best pitch because of its late movement. His changeup isn't far behind and he'll throw it in any count. He also has an 11-to-5 curveball and a slider. Maloney's lack of velocity leaves him with little margin for error, and his secondary pitches need work to translate at the upper levels. his curveball has good downward spiral but can flatten out at times, and his slider needs to be tighter and harder if it's going to remain in his arsenal. On the high end, Maloney could be a No.4 starter. Without better breaking stuff, he could be a middle reliever. Considering his savvy and that he'll be 23 in 2007, he could skip a level and head straight to Double-A.

At the very least, he's a southpaw whose best pitch is his sinker and also features a nice change-up. He's not great, but not a bad return on Lohse. Unfortunately, given that Lohse did not even qualify as a type C pitcher in 2006, it hardly seems likely that he'll be qualified as a type A or B free agent after this year. So, compensatory picks may not have been a realistic option after all. Given the choice between letting Lohse walk for nothing and adding Maloney, it seems like a rather nice trade for the Reds.

Here is an explanation from Baseball America of the rules for ranking players for Free Agent Compensation:

Every offseason, the Elias Sports Bureau compiles rankings of all major league players, based on the previous two years' stats. The players are ranked by position groups: catchers; designated hitters, first basemen and outfielders; second basemen, third basemen and shortstops; starting pitchers; and relief pitchers. The players are then broken down into Type A, Type B and unranked free agents.

Type A players are players rated in the top 20 percent of all players at their position. Type B players are players rated in the 21-40 percent bracket at their position. Because players are only compared to others at similar positions, some players might be a Type A but seem to be not as good as some Type B players, etc., but that's how the system works.

When a team loses a free agent who is ranked in one of the two categories, it receives compensation as follows (if and only if it offered the free agent arbitration before he signed with his new team):

• Type A: Team losing player gets signing team's first-round pick as well as a supplemental first-round pick. If the signing team is picking in the first half of the first round, it loses its second-rounder instead of their first-rounder.
• Type B: Team losing player gets a supplemental first-round pick.

If a team doesn't offer arbitration to its free agent, it gets nothing when he signs with another team. This brings up the next question of why don't the teams always offer arbitration? The answer is, they might simply be afraid he'll accept it. It's a gamble some teams aren't willing to take, even if it seems likely the player is heading out of town.

In 2006, Kyle Lohse was ranked by Elias as the #67 starting pitcher in the NL.

http://www.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/2006-10-31-elias-rankings.htm#nl


That ranking was based on his 2005 and 2006 seasons, in which his total combined stats were:

305.2 IP, 361 Hits, 37 HRs, 88 BBs, 183 Ks, W/L 14-23, an ERA of 4.87, and a 1.47 WHIP.

After 2007, his ranking will be based on his 2006 and 2007 seasons. I projected out his 2007 season on the basis of his production up to this point and his combined total 2006/(projected)2007 stats were:

306.2 IP, 346 Hits, 37 HRs, 89 BBs, 206 Ks, W/L 14-24, an ERA of 5.10, and a 1.42 WHIP.

Those stats are eerily similar to his 2005 & 2006 stats and a case could be made that they are a bit worse. In order for the Reds to have received compensatory picks for Lohse, he would have to climb up around 15 places in the 2007 rankings, which would have made him a type B pitcher. However, his combined 2007 & 2006 stats do not represent a substantial improvement over his combined 2006 & 2005 stats, so he may not move up high enough to warrant compensatory picks. Anything less than an improvement of ~15 spots in the rankings would result in him being classified as a type C player or not even ranked at all, and, of course, neither of those two designations would have garnered the Reds compensatory picks.

Basically, the Reds made a calculated gamble that Lohse wouldn't have brought in any draft picks after the season, so they made the only logical decision. They brought in value rather than end up with nothing after the season. Given that Lohse's agent is Scott Boras, there is very little chance the Reds would be able to re-sign him, even if they wanted to do so. So, all in all, it seems like another solid move by the Reds, as "something" is still more valuable than "nothing".

And so it begins....

Well, the Reds made their long anticipated splash before the trade deadline, but it came in the form that few could have expected. The Reds acquired Jorge Cantu, Shaun Cumberland, and cash for Brian Shackelford, Calvin Medlock, and future considerations.

Oddly enough, I like the deal itself more than I like Jorge Cantu. The Reds acquired a hitter with some upside, but gave up little of note to do so. Shackelford spent some time in the majors, but had some legal trouble last year and never seemed to regain his composure. Medlock had a very nice year at AA, but doesn't have the kind of upside that may make the Reds regret giving him up.

This type of deal is where Reds GM Wayne Krivsky seems to thrive. These low risk/high reward deals have been very good to Wayne Krivsky. He has acquired several undervalued players who have paid huge dividends. Krivsky acquired Brandon Phillips, Josh Hamilton, and David Ross at a very low cost. These deals cost little to make, but have the potential for a substantial payoff. The acquisition of Jorge Cantu is just such a deal.

While I like the nature and type of deal, I'm not wild about Jorge Cantu. Cantu has more potential than the players the Reds gave up, but he's far from certain to be a viable MLB player. He's the type of player that the Reds really don't need. He is an undisciplined hitter who lacks speed and is a liability with the glove.

Cantu's glove prevents him from being a viable option in the middle of the infield, while his bat prevents him from being a viable option at a corner infield spot. As such, he's really nothing more than a bench player and a spot starter, especially when you consider that the Reds have top prospect Joey Votto as the future at first and Brandon Phillips entrenched at 2b. Accommodating Cantu as a starter would require some heavy duty roster reworking and potentially playing players out of position. If the Reds envision Cantu as being a utlity player and bat off the bench, then this is a solid acquisition.

Much is made of Cantu's performance in 2005, as he hit 28 homeruns and had 117 RBI. That said, he also posted a less than inspiring line of .286/.311/.497/.808. His counting stats were good that season, but his ratios weren't great. Not to mention, he had a strikeout to walk ratio of 83/19. That kind of free swinging approach can be exploited by pitchers as they become more familiar with a hitter and word of his weaknesses spreads around the league.

Earlier this year, Cantu lost his roster spot on the Devil Rays. In the process, he didn't comport himself very well. He openly campaigned for a trade and displayed a generally poor attitude. Rather than work hard to improve his game and reclaim his spot at the Major League level, Cantu instead seemed to sulk and pout.

At AAA Durham this year, Cantu hit a paltry .244/.303/.356/.659, indicative of a poor skillset, a poor attitude, or both. Maybe the change of scenery will be just what he needs, but at this point his performance and attitude are cause for concern.

Krivsky seems to be much more adept at trades that bringing in undervalued talent than he is at executing winning trades that involve giving up value. Krivsky's stated asking price for Adam Dunn, a proven pitcher, an infielder, and a top prospect, did little more than scare off potential trading partners. Krivsky seems to be better at spotting undervalued talent than he is at understanding the market valuation for established players.

However, time will tell if the acquisition of the undervalued Jorge Cantu will be yet another winner for Krivsky. At the very least, Cantu should be a nice bat off the bench, but he'll need to prove that he is deserving before being given a more substantial role.

Trades and Shifting Market Valuation

Something unusual has been happening in baseball as of late and it is very relevant for us over the next month. In fact, I think it portends badly for chances at rebuilding via a firesale.

There has been a subtle, but substantial shift in the way the market values players. In short, baseball organizations are beginning to value their top prospects like never before. Baseball writers mention it from time to time, but I think the shift has really become evident this year.

I read a chat with ESPN's Jerry Crasnick last week in which he suggested the reason for the shift was that fans had become more knowledgeable about the prospects in their organization, so GMs would come under fire if they were dealt. He cited Clay Bucholz of the BoSox as an example. Personally, I don't think that's the reason.

HISTORICAL VALUE
In years past, top prospects were often dealt for half season rentals. The best example that comes to mind is the Tigers trading John Smoltz to the Braves for Doyle Alexander. That trade worked out about as well as any half season rental can, as Doyle went 9-0 with a 1.53 ERA for the Tigers and helped them reach the postseason in 1987.

However, those deals have become increasingly rare, as the opportunity cost of dealing blue chip prospects is higher than ever before. The cost of giving up the production of blue chip prospects has begun to heavily outweigh the benefits. If you are dealing away inexpensive prospects, then you likely have to find replacement production via free agency or trade. No matter where the replacement production comes from, it's going to more expensive than the prospect that was dealt away, because prospects are the only inexpensive production available in the market. Not to mention, the cost of replacement production for the prospects that are dealt away is skyrocketing.

CHANGING SALARY DYNAMICS

The average MLB salary in 1988 was $453,020 and players in their first 3 years of service time earned ~$85,000-150,000 and the top veteran pitchers were earning ~$1.75-2.0M. In 2006, the average MLB salary was $2,834,521. Players in their first 3 years of service time were earning $330-550K and veteran pitchers were making ~$10M in free agency.

Over the years, salaries have increased on average about 10% per year. The difference is that a 10% increase in $100,000 salaries is much less than a corresponding 10% increase in the cost of free agents. Accordingly, the disparity between the cost of veteran free agents and the cost of prospects has grown by leaps and bounds.

If you deal away a young prospect, you are throwing away three years of VERY inexpensive production and three years after that of below market production. Instead of getting good production over the next three years for ~$350-500K, you have to replace that production with expensive free agents at a cost of $10M. It costs you $9.5M more per season for the next three seasons in order to acquire a half season rental. In the past, you could find replacement production at a much lower cost, likely ~$2M in 1988.

So, in 1988, the Tigers could replace Smoltz for ~$1.75M. In 2006, that same type of move would cost ~$10M. Personally, I think that it is this cost increase that has led to organization valuing their prospects MUCH more highly. They are just very reluctant to deal these types of prospects.

Inflation certainly plays a part, but prospects are just a much more valuable commodity than in years past. The salary for first year players has risen 3.5 times (from ~$100K to ~$350K), but the cost of free agent pitchers has increased 5-6-7 times (from ~$2M to ~$10-12-14M). And, the cost of free agent pitchers seems likely to continue to outpace the increases in first year player salary.

CURRENT MARKETPLACE

By trading away top notch prospects, you are incurring a huge opportunity cost, because you can no longer take advantage of 6 years of bargain priced production. Dealing away top prospects for half season rentals is becoming impracticable because the cost of replacing the future production of that prospect is exponentially higher than in seasons past. The market has begun to factor in these increasing costs and the valuation of top flight prospects has changed accordingly.

In current marketplace, a player's trade value is driven by the number of years he is under the team's control and how far below the going market rate his salary is and will be. Those two factors create a kind of unique value to the team that controls their rights, which is what is desirable in the current marketplace. The value isn't created solely by the player's production anymore, but rather by the ability of the organization to obtain his production at a lower than market rate.

Unfortunately, that bodes poorly for us, as we are unlikely to reap a huge return for Adam Dunn. The cost of replacement production just doesn't make it feasible to rent high priced veteran players anymore.

This trend seems likely to continue until the salaries at the beginning of a player's career begins to increase. Until then, dealing away top prospects is a risky proposition.

That's unfortunate, given that the Reds are trying to trade Adam Dunn for young talent. At this point, I think the Reds should be willing to pay the market rate or perhaps even overpay to get certain targeted players (I'd like Jarrod Saltalamacchia and especially Matt Kemp). It's time to recognize the market shift and cut a deal with the realization that they can still be beneficial under this new market paradigm.