The Advantages of Late Count Hitters

Over the years, while love of baseball has only grown, my appreciation of it has evolved. I've gained a new respect for various aspects of the game that I overlooked growing up. It used to be the flashy skills that I caught my eye, but these days I've grown to love the subtleties.

One of the subtle aspects I've come to appreciate is an effective approach at the plate. The game of baseball is largely decided by the battle between the pitcher and hitter over the strikezone, so the importance of utilizing a good approach at the plate truly cannot be understated.

The reason for its importance is remarkably simple. Hitters perform better in hitter's counts, while pitchers thrive in pitcher's counts. Accordingly, any time the hitter can win the battle over the strikezone by working his way into a hitter's count, his chances for success increase. That's why I love "late count" hitters, because they are constantly battling to put themselves in counts that are in their advantage. They understand the importance of forcing a consequence to the plate appearance on their own terms, not those of the pitcher.

OVERALL 2007 REDS OFFENSIVE PERFORMANCE BY COUNT

To illustrate, here is a breakdown of the total offensive performance of the 2007 Reds broken down by count. The counts highlighted in red are the pitcher's counts. The counts highlighted in green are the hitter's counts. The other counts are the neutral counts. The difference in performance is striking.

If the hitter falls behind and ends up in a pitcher's count, then the likelihood of offensive success falls drastically. On the other hand, if the hitter can work his way into a hitter's count, then the likelihood of success improves dramatically. It really does make a difference, so acquiring hitters who understand the nuances of a good approach at the plate would seem to be a wise strategy.





HITTING APPROACH UTILIZED BY REDS PLAYERS

Now, if you take a look at the primary offensive players for the Reds in 2007, you can see who utilizes a "late count" approach to work their way into hitter's counts. The availability of pitch data allows us to examine the approach of batters at the plate. The following spreadsheet is sorted by "Total Hitter's Count %", which is the percentage of counts that a hitter sees that are hitter's counts (3-0, 2-0, 3-1).

Obviously, each pitch thrown results in a different count. So, if you look at the number of hitter's counts seen and divide it by the number of pitches seen, then you get a quick and dirty look at which hitters excel at putting themselves in the best position to succeed. In 2007, 7.8% of the counts seen by the Reds as a team were hitter's counts.



Not surprisingly, Scott Hatteberg tops the list. His approach at the plate is really one of the very best in baseball. He consistently works the count into his favor, which increases his chances of success. He's patient and disciplined, refusing to give in to the pitcher by forcing a conclusion to the At Bat on the pitcher's terms.

In 2007, Hatteberg was in a hitter's count a remarkable 12.1% of the time. Another standout is Ken Griffey Jr. (10.3%) and Adam Dunn (8.5%) doesn't fare too poorly either. Of course, these numbers are still a bit rough, because there is no simple way to exclude intentional walks or unintentional walks.

Griffey benefited a bit under this analysis from his a bit from his 14 IBBs and I suspect David Ross benefited a bit from the unintentional walks frequently given out to 8th place hitters. That said, these factors certainly aren't going to sway the analysis enough to rob it of its merit, as it still provides a very good look at the approach utilized by each hitter.

At the other end of the spectrum, you have Brandon Phillips and Norris Hopper. Of all the counts seen by Phillips, only 4.4% of them were hitter's counts. As for Hopper, only 4.5% of the counts he saw in 2007 were hitter's counts.

CONCLUSION

Of course, there are many ways for a hitter to be successful, but looking at this its difficult for me not to have a strong preference for "late count" hitters. Brandon Phillips had remarkable success in 2007 without working his way into many hitter's counts, so the approach at the plate is clearly a secondary consideration to the production the hitter creates. Phillips is able to succeed on his raw ability alone, regardless of the count in which he hits. However, time will tell whether he'll be able to maintain his level of success given his free swinging approach.

Hitters can be successful using any approach at the plate, but the "late count" approach definitely has its advantages. Ideally, the Reds will be able to find more hitters that utilize this approach. In the meantime, let's enjoy Scott Hatteberg while we can.

Just say no......to Dusty

Reports indicate that the Reds are interested in Dusty Baker, who would be about the last person the Reds should hire. Dusty has a long history of favoring veteran players (Neifi Perez, Mark Gardner, etc) over younger ones. Even more disturbingly, he has a power track record in handling young pitchers. Given that the Reds are finally on the verge of developing impact starting pitching to end a decades long drought, handing the careers of those young pitchers over to Dusty Baker would be a disaster.

Baker was handed one of the top pitching prospects to come out of the amateur ranks in quite a long time. After his first full season under Baker's direction, Prior has never been the same. You can debate how much of the fault lies with Baker, but given the research of Will Carroll based on the work of Dr. Mike Marshall, Dr. James Andrews, and Dr. Frank Jobe indicates a dangerous correlation between heavy workload at a young age and shoulder/elbow injuries. The injury risk for pitchers aged 23 or younger is much higher than for other pitchers, which is why most wise organizations limit the workloads and pitch counts of their young pitchers.

In 2003, Mark Prior was 22 years old and enter his first full season at the MLB level. He was coming out of USC as one of the most heralded pitching prospects of recent memory. He had a fantastic season in 2003, one for the ages, but he's never been the same since. Here's a look at Prior's workload and Dusty's handling of him during that season.


A LOOK AT 2003

In 2003, Mark Prior pitched 211.1 regular season innings and then went on to throw 23.1 more innings in the postseason, so he threw a cumulative 234.2 innings in 2003.

I just checked and by my count, he made 30 starts and here is the number of times he threw under 100 pitches and between 100-109 pitches, 110-119 pitches, 120-130 pitches, and 131+ pitches during the regular season:

Under 100: 4 Times
100-109: 7 Times
110-119: 10 Times
120-130: 6 Times
131 or more: 3 Times

So, he only threw fewer than 100 pitches in 4 out of his 30 starts.


PRIOR IN THE 2003 PLAYOFFS

More fun facts, look what Dusty did to him in September, when the Cubs needed to make a push for the postseason.

Sept. 1: 131 pitches
Sept. 6: 129 pitches
Sept. 11: 109 pitches
Sept 16: 124 pitches
Sept 21: 131 pitches
Sept 27: 133 pitches

By my count, that's 6 starts and 757 pitches in September at the end of a long season. Not to mention, back to back starts of 130+ pitches in the final 2 weeks of the season. After a long year and a lot of innings, Dusty had Prior throw two of his highest pitch count games.

Now, on to the postseason, where Prior put up the following pitch counts:

10/3 NLDS Game 3: CG 132 Pitches
10/8 NLCS Game 2: 115 Pitches (115 pitches despite Cubs scoring 12 runs through 6)
10/14 NLCS Game 6: 119 Pitches


WORKLOAD BREAKDOWN

When you add in the 366 pitches he threw in 3 post season games, Prior threw a grand total of 3,764 pitches in 33 starts in 2003.

Regular Season
Pitches: 3,398
GS: 30
#P/GS: 113

Post Season
Pitches: 366
GS: 3
#P/GS: 122


COMPARED TO A WORKHORSE

Just to help put Prior's workload in his age 22 season into the appropriate context, let's compare his workload to that of legendary workhorse Aaron Harang.

Over the past three seasons, Harang has thrown the following number of pitches:

2005: 3,402 (32 Starts, #P/GS: 106)
2006: 3,734 (35 Starts, #P/GS: 107)
2007: 3,583 (34 Starts, #P/GS: 105)


So, at the ripe old age of 22, Mark Prior threw more pitches in a single season (combined regular season and postseason) than Aaron Harang ever has. And, he did it in fewer starts, which means that he threw far more pitches per start. Modern researches also indicates that an arm is much more susceptible to injury when fatigued, so throwing more pitches means that the risk of arm injury is even higher. Evidently, Prior should be thankful that he missed a few starts over a stretch in July/August, or else his arm might have just flown right off.

In short, what happened to Mark Prior in 2003 is something that should never happen in the modern game. Modern medicine has removed some of the fog over pitching injuries and revealed that one of the quickest ways to ruin a young pitcher is to overwork him. It cannot be definitively said that Baker caused Prior to get injured, but given what we know about young pitchers and heavy workloads, he certainly put Prior at a substantially higher risk of injury.


IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REDS

Given the pivotal role that Homer Bailey and Johnny Cueto will be required to play in the future for the Reds, Dusty Baker is absolutely the wrong choice as manager. The Reds have taken a lot of steps to improve their player development department to ensure the health of their young prospects, but hiring Dusty Baker would be a gigantic step backwards.

Just say no to Dusty Baker.

Brandon Phillps and the 30/30 Season

Brandon Phillips recently became only the 4th middle infielder in MLB history to post a season with 30 homeruns and 30 stolen bases. Of course, he was joined later in the week by Jimmy Rollins and Hanley Ramirez needs only 1 more homerun to join the club as well.

The middle infielders who have done the deed so far are Barry Larkin, Alex Rodriguez, Alfonso Soriano, Brandon Phillips, and Jimmy Rollins.

When you add Brandon Phillips' rock solid defense to his 30/30 season, then it's hard not to be impressed. That said, I don't think we should be TOO impressed. In actuality, Phillips just posted one of the least impressive 30/30 seasons in history.

In fact, when Phillips first reached the 30/30 plateau, I was wondering if it was the worst 30/30 season in history. Given his overall 2007 line of .289/.333/.488/.821, I wouldn't get too carried away by the importance of the counting stats of homeruns and stolen bases.

I found out a number of things about the 30/30 club, including that it isn't quite as a rare a feat as I had previously thought. In fact, three players have already done in 2007, including David Wright, Brandon Phillips, and Jimmy Rollins. Over the years, there are a surprising number of players who have accomplished this feat and the first player to do so was Ken Williams in 1922.


30/30 SEASONS THROUGHOUT MLB HISTORY

Here is a list of all the 30/30 seasons in MLB history up to now, sorted by OPS. Phillips is near the bottom, ahead of only Preston Wilson, Raul Mondesi, Sammy Sosa, and Joe Carter (by the by, it seems like no player's reputation has been hurt more than Joe Carter's by this new wave of statistical analysis).



If you look at the overall level of production, it's clear that Phillips' season ranks near the bottom. His OPS is among the lowest players to reach 30/30 in a season and his slugging percentage is far from overwhelming. So, while it has certainly been an impressive season, I think it's important to keep his actual production in perspective.


STATISTICAL MEASURES

While it is certainly an impressive achievement, some of the more recent metrics developed in this age of statistical analysis are designed to more accurately capture the value of the players.


WIN SHARES

One of these metrics is Win Shares, which was developed by Bill James to capture the offensive and defensive impact of each player on the team's performance. Here is how The Hardball Times defines it:

"Win Shares. Invented by Bill James. Win Shares is a very complicated statistic that takes all the contributions a player makes toward his team’s wins and distills them into a single number that represents the number of wins contributed to the team, times three."

If you look at the 2007 WinShares for NL second basemen, then Phillips isn't even in the top 3 most valuable second basemen.



Phillips' 30/30 season is impressive, but he's not the most valuable 2b in the NL.


RUNS CREATED

Another metric designed to more accurately measure a player's performance is Runs Created. This is a metric designed to more precisely determine the value of a player's offensive production. Again, here is how The Hardball Times defines it:

Runs Created. Invented by Bill James, RC is a very good measure of the number of runs a batter truly contributed to his team’s offense. The basic formula for RC is OBP*TB, but it has evolved into over fourteen different versions. We use the most complicated version, which includes the impact of hitting well with runners in scoring position, and is adjusted for ballpark impact. RC/G refers to Runs Created Per Game, which Runs Created divided by the number of outs made by the batter, times 27.

Again, here is the top Runs Created for NL second basemen in 2007.



Unlike Win Shares, which captures defensive value, Runs Created is strictly an offensive measure. Without taking his defense into account, Phillips actually fares even worse.


SUMMARY

In short, Phillips has been very good, but not great. He's been valuable, but not invaluable. It is certainly an impressive achievement, but I think it is still important to keep it in perspective and not overvalue Phillips. That said, let's hope Phillips continues to produce and even improve in the future.

Norris Hopper shouldn't leadoff in 2008

Norris Hopper has been one of the hottest hitters in baseball in the second half. In fact, since the All-Star break, Hopper is hitting .387, which is tops in the NL. That kind of hot streak has led to a lot of speculation about Hopper hitting leadoff for the Reds in 2008. Unfortunately, I think that would be more than a little unwise.


HOPPER'S APPROACH

Hopper is not a disciplined hitter, which is typically what you want to see out of your leadoff hitter. An ideal leadoff hitter should get on base at a good clip, see a lot of pitches, and grind out every at bat in an attempt to get on base any way possible.

Hopper is an aggressive hitter who consistently forces an early conclusion to an At Bat. That kind of approach really limits the number of pitches you see and walks you get. That kind of approach results in an On Base Percentage that is made up largely of Batting Average. It is difficult to be an effective leadoff hitter if that is the approach you employ. It can be done, but the best leadoff hitters reach base in other ways besides a hit.


LEADOFF HITTERS FOR COMPARISON

If you compare Hopper to four of the best leadoff hitters throughout history, then you'll see a vastly different approach utilized by Hopper than the others.



Key:
IsoOBP: (OBP-BA)
#P/PA: Number of pitches seen per plate appearance
%BB: The percentage of plate appearances that results in a walk
%HBP: The percentage of plate appearances that result in a hit by pitch
1stPitch%: The percentage of times the hitter swings at the first pitch
Contact%: The percentage of times the hitter makes contact when he swings


ANALYSIS

Those four are some of the best leadoff hitters in baseball history, though they utilize different approaches. Here's a bit about the similarities and differences in style.


RICKEY HENDERSON

It's hard to argue against Rickey Henderson being the best leadoff hitter in baseball history. His walk rate is very high (16.4%), sees a ton of pitches (4.34), rarely swings at the first pitch (13%), and makes contact with great frequency (88%). Henderson is the archetypal leadoff hitter.


TIM RAINES

Tim Raines was a similar leadoff hitter to Henderson, but a bit more aggressive. Rock Raines saw fewer pitches (3.76), walked at lower clip (12.8%), swung at the first pitch with greater frequency (25%), and made contact slightly more often (89%). Still, Rock and Rickey were too patient leadoff hitters who were massively successful.


CRAIG BIGGIO

Craig Biggio was a successful leadoff hitter, though he utilized a slightly different approach. Biggio had good speed and baserunning instincts, but had much more power than the usual leadoff hitter. In addition, Biggio had a lower walk rate (9.3%) than Rickey and Rock, but he made up for some of it by using the HBP as an offensive weapon. Over his career, 2.3% of Biggio's Plate Appearances ended in a hit by pitch. That's a much higher percentage than the others listed and helped increase Biggio's OBP.


ICHIRO SUZUKI

At the other end of the spectrum is Ichiro, whose approach at the plate is mirrored by Norris Hopper. Ichiro has tremendous bat control and walks very infrequently (6.4%). He relies on hits, rather than walks and hit by pitches to get on base. Ichiro's OBP is only .046 higher than his batting average over his career. That said, he needs to hit around .315 to even have an OBP above .360. You don't want your leadoff hitter to have an OBP much lower than .360.


NORRIS HOPPER

As for Norris Hopper, the first thing that jumps out at me is the percentage of pitches at which Norris swings (41%). It is almost to the point where Hopper swings at every other first pitch that he sees. It seems difficult to fathom that when this information gets around the league that Hopper will be able to maintain his level of production. If pitchers see that you'll offer at the first pitch so often, then they will refuse to give you a 1st pitch to hit in an At Bat.

Once word gets around the league on Norris Hopper, he'll need to make serious adjustments in order to maintain his success. Similar to Ichiro, Hopper would need to hit for a very high batting average in order to have an OBP high enough to justify batting leadoff. Hopper's IsoOBP is even lower than Ichiro's at .040, so he'd have to hit .320 in order to even post a .360 OBP. As it stands now, even if Hopper hit .300, he would still fail to have an OBP high enough to be an effective leadoff hitter.

In addition, Hopper steals bases at a much lower clip than the others. Over his career, Hopper is only at a 65% success rate, which is poor for someone with his speed. In fact, from a statistical standpoint, a success rate of 65% actually does more harm than good to the offense. If you aren't any more successful than that, then you are better off not attempting to steal at all.


FUTURE IMPLICATIONS

Personally, I don't think it is common for a hitter to adopt a substantially more disciplined approach at the plate. It happens from time to time, but that is more of the exception to the rule, then the rule itself. For the most part, a hitter is who he is at the plate.

So, it would be unwise to pencil Norris Hopper into the leadoff spot in 2008 with the expectation that he'll either hit .320 or suddenly increase his walk rate. Neither seems very likely, so the Reds would be wise to utilize Norris as a 4th outfielder.

Adam Dunn's Late Season Fade?

One of the biggest stories of the offseason for the Reds was the news that Adam Dunn had spent the offseason working out and was reporting to camp in the best shape of his career.

This was welcome news to the Reds nation, as Dunn was coming off an appalling finish to the 2006 season. While Dunn receives much unwarranted criticism, it's hard to argue that he consistently fades away late in the season. Dunn's numbers have suffered over recent years, not because his peak level of production had fallen off, but rather because Dunn has been unable to sustain that peak level in the hot summer months.

Dunn's August and September production has consistently fallen off and dragged down his seasonal averages to much lower levels. Dunn didn't really need to take his offensive performance to a new level, but rather become more successful at maintaining that level over the entire season.

It appears that Dunn's offseason conditioning program may be paying off in a big, big way, as his 2nd half performance in 2007 has actually been better than his first half production. Being in better shape seems to have enabled Dunn to avoid the late season fatigue that has characterized his previous seasons. Accordingly, 2007 may be his finest ever, which is due in no small part to Dunn performing better in the 2nd half than he did in the 1st.



The moral of the story seems to be, sometimes, hardwork pays off.

All Undervalued Team: Adam Everett, ss

It may seem odd to have one of the least productive offensive players on a list of undervalued players, but that's a testament to just how good Adam Everett has been with the leather. Unfortunately, Everett's defense is still tremendously underrated, perhaps because he doesn't do back flips while running onto the field or needlessly field choppers with his bare hand. That said, self-promotion is the only thing keeping Everett from his rightful place among the pantheon of the greatest defensive shortstops in history.


AMATEUR AND MINOR LEAGUE CAREER

Everett was originally drafted by the Boston Red Sox with the 12th overall pick in the 1998 draft. Everett was drafted out of the University of South Carolina, where he excelled at the shortstop position. Everett spent two years in the Red Sox organization, where his impressive defensive abilities were constantly on display, but concerns about his bat led the Red Sox to trade him to the Houston Astros along with Greg Miller for Carl Everett.

Everett spent several years in the Houston minor league system, where the Astros attempted to improve his offense to the point where he would be a viable, everyday shortstop at the MLB level. Taking a break from minor league baseball, Adam also joined the United States Olympic team at the 2000 Olympics in Sydney. That team, which included Ben Sheets, teammate Roy Oswalt, and Doug Mientkiewicz pulled off an upset of the high powered Cuban team to win the Gold Medal.

In 2002, at the age of 25, Everett laid claim to the Astro shortstop job and hasn't relinquished it since.


TRADITIONAL SCOUTING

Adam Everett is the rare player that looks as good on defense in traditional scouting as he does in statistical analysis. All it takes to see why Everett is such a top flight defensive player is to see the way he carries himself at short.

Everett has a strong arm and good agility. His footwork at shortstop is impeccable, as he sets his feet very quickly, which consistently puts him in a good position to throw.

Everett's range and skills are so good that he makes the difficult plays seem routine, which may actually hurt him in the reputation department, as people may not appreciate how good he actually he is.

(Adam Everett Highlights)

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

OFFENSE

Admittedly, Adam Everett is a poor offensive player, there just isn't a polite way to put it. His career line of .247/.299/.357/.656 makes him one of the worst offensive regulars in baseball, so there just isn't much point in dwelling on it. However, the fact that a team carries a player with that level of offensive production is a testament to his defense.

The only positives that Everett brings to the table on offense are his bunting ability and his baserunning. Everett is one of the better bunters in baseball and is very effective at advancing runners. Also, Everett is capable on the basepaths, as evidenced by his 77% stolen base success rate. Unfortunately, when it comes to actually hitting the ball, Everett doesn't excel.


DEFENSE

Defensive statistics are not perfect. Each one has a flaw or two that prevents you from getting directly to a quantifiable value for a player's defensive value. That said, if you take all the defensive statistics together and they all point to roughly the same conclusion, then it's a good bet that it's true.

That definitely rings true with Adam Everett, who is quite simply the best defensive shortstop in baseball. In fact, he's the best defensive player in baseball. Period.



If you look at his statistics from 2006, almost across the board Everett is the top player in each category. He has fantastic range, as evidenced by his Zone Rating, Revised Zone Rating, +/- performance, and the balls he has fielded that are out of his zone. In addition, his fielding percentage is fantastic, so not only does he get to more balls than all other shortstops, but he makes fewer errors on those balls.

To top it all off, you have his performance on turning double plays, where he turned the most double plays among shortstops in 2006. He didn't fare as well on starting double plays, but that speaks more to the ability of Craig Biggio to turn the double play than it does to Everett's ability to start it.


THE IMPACT OF ADAM EVERETT'S DEFENSE

The more difficult question is just how much is Everett's defense worth to his team. In John Dewan's Fielding Bible, they discuss how to use the +/- rating to roughly determine the impact the player's defense has on the team.

The book states that a "little less than half" of a player's plus/minus rating is a good estimate of the number of runs prevented. So, in 2006, Everett's +43 rating prevented about 20 runs. Another rule of thumb is that a good estimate of the value of a win at 10 runs. So, in 2006, Everett's defense prevented about 20 runs, which generated an extra 2 wins for the Astros.

One player accounting for ~2 wins with his defense alone is remarkable and unparalleled in the game today. That's the kind of impact that Everett can have on a team and that's the reason he is still undervalued. You won't find a player in the game who has more impact on a team's performance with his defense.

Reasons to fear 2008 (AKA: The Importance of Defense)

It seems like the more light that statistical analysis sheds on the game of baseball, the more the importance of defense is revealed.

Over the years, it has always been difficult to determine where pitching ends and defense begins. The two are so intertwined, that it has been difficult to separate them out to determine the true abilities and deficiencies of a team. However, modern analysis is beginning to effectively separate out the difference.

Two team defensive statistics, Defensive Efficiency Ratio (DER) and Team +/-, have been developed that effectively quantify the defensive abilities of a team.


DEFENSE EFFICIENCY RATIO (DER)

Here is the definition for DER:

"Defense Efficiency Ratio: The percent of times a batted ball is turned into an out by the teams’ fielders, not including home runs. The exact formula used by the Hardball Times is (BFP-H-K-BB-HBP-Errors)/(BFP-HR-K-BB-HBP). This is similar to BABIP, but from the defensive team's perspective. Please note that errors include only errors on batted balls."

Here is how the National League teams have performed so far in 2007 and their NL DER rank:

Team: Team DER (NL DER Rank)
Arizona: .696 (8)
Atlanta: .698 (7)
Chicago: .712 (1)
Cincinnati: .677 (15)
Colorado: .699 (6)
Florida: .669 (16)
Houston: .683 (12)
Los Angeles: .686 (11)
Milwaukee: .681 (13)
New York: .711 (2)
Philadelphia: .687 (10)
Pittsburgh: .681 (14)
San Diego: .703 (4)
San Francisco: .701 (5)
St. Louis: .691 (9)
Washington: .704 (3)

TEAM +/-

Now, this is how Team +/- is explained by The Hardball Times:

"Our team "plus/minus" stat is an improvement over DER, because it corrects for the type of batted ball allowed. In other words, it adjusts the thinking behind DER by the number of infield flies, line drives and all other types of batted balls allowed by each pitching staff. I explained the system in more detail when we rolled it out last year.

In addition to adjusting DER, the "plus/minus" stat expresses each team's fielding performance as the number of plays above and below the expected number of plays an average team would turn. This is a more concrete and useful way of thinking about fielding."

Team: +/- (NL Team +/- Rank)
Arizona: +42 (3)
Atlanta: +36 (5)
Chicago: +54 (T1)
Cincinnati: -31 (11)
Colorado: -13 (10)
Florida: -81 (16)
Houston: -40 (13)
Los Angeles: -4 (9)
Milwaukee: -40 (14)
New York: +54 (T1)
Philadelphia: -34 (12)
Pittsburgh: -50 (15)
San Diego: +40 (4)
San Francisco: +24 (6)
St. Louis: -2 (8)
Washington: +22 (7)

ANALYSIS

So, if you average out the Team ranks for DER and Team +/- to determine the team's overall defensive prowess, then it breaks down like this:

Chicago Cubs: 1
New York: 1.5
San Diego: 4
Washington: 5
Arizona: 5.5
San Francisco: 5.5
Atlanta: 6
Colorado: 8
St. Louis: 8.5
Los Angeles: 10
Philadelphia: 11
Houston: 12.5
Cincinnati: 13
Milwaukee: 13.5
Pittsburgh: 14.5
Florida: 16

This is how the NL teams rank defensively from best to worst. So, the Cubs are the NL's best defensive team and the Marlins are the NL's worst defensive team. Something interesting comes to light if you look at the Winning percentages of these teams broken down into quartiles.


WINNING PERCENTAGE BY DEFENSIVE QUARTILE

1st quartile: Cubs, Mets, Padres, and Nationals.
2nd quartile: Diamondbacks, Giants, Braves, and Rockies.
3rd quartile: Cardinals, Dodgers, Phillies, and Astros.
4th quartile: Reds, Brewers, Pirates, and Marlins.

Here's how these quartiles stack up when broken out by 2007 winning percentage.

W% of 1st Quartile: .517
W% of 2nd Quartile: .506
W% of 3rd Quartile: .500
W% of 4th Quartile: .458


IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REDS

To me, it is becoming clearer that the Reds cannot win as currently configured. A team that is built around Adam Dunn, Ken Griffey Jr., and Edwin Encarnacion is built on unstable foundation. The offensive prowess of those three is outweighed by their defensive deficiencies. Both Dunn and Griffey are leftfielders, so you can't have both of them in the lineup at the same time. At least one of them has to go. Edwin has taken a step forward defensively, but he's still league average at best.

The problem seems to be that the Reds are going to continue attempting to build their team around poor defensive players. That kind of strategy just doesn't work, as generally speaking: the better the team defense, the better the W/L record.

The general thought is that the Reds need better pitching and I agree, but how much better would the pitching looking with a top notch defensive playing behind it?

If the Reds want to have a better season in 2008, then the first priority has to be improving the defense. That would have the biggest impact of anything that could be done for 2008. Unfortunately, the Reds continue to lock themselves into a roster of defensively deficient ballplayers, which offsets much of the advantages of a good offense and a strong pitching staff.

Sadly, it's difficult to envision the Reds as a winning organization until they improve the defense.

All Undervalued Team: Kevin Frandsen, 2b

If I had written this prior to the 2007 season, I would have selected Kelly Johnson. I always liked Johnson's swing and approach at the plate, both of which he's demonstrating with aplomb this season. Now that Johnson has arrived, he's not really underrated any longer, so I'm turning my eyes West to the second baseman of the future for the San Francisco Giants, Kevin Frandsen.


AMATEUR CAREER

Frandsen was a standout player at Bellarmine College Preparatory in San Jose and then moved on to excel at San Jose State University. At San Jose State, Frandsen posted the following lines:

2002: .317/.409/.522/.931 with 7 HRs
2003: .332/.413/.455/.868 with 4 HRs
2004: .321/.421/.444/.865 with 2 HRs

The Giants selected the hometown kid in the 12th round (370th overall) of the 2004 draft.


ANALYSIS: OFFENSE

In 2007, Frandsen has played 88 games in five different positions (2b, 3b, ss, lf, rf) and logged 213 plate appearances. His numbers over that time period aren't very impressive, as he has posted a line of .230/.294/.340/.634. To go along with that rather uninspiring line Frandsen has posted 4 homeruns and been thrown out in 2 of his 3 steal attempts.

While he will improve upon his stats, it's undeniable that Frandsen lacks tremendous power, great speed, and massive on base skills. That said, Frandsen compensates for what he lacks in tools with his makeup and baseball IQ, which are both off the charts. Frandsen also has the uncanny ability to put the ball in play. His tremendous bat control could make him an ideal #2 hitter in time.

Frandsen's bat control makes him the type of hitter that frequently brings about an early conclusion to his Plate Appearances. That kind of approach reduces both walks and strikeouts, as it is not possible to strikeout without seeing at least 3 pitches or walk without seeing at least 4. While his approach does limit strikeouts and (unfortunately) walks, but it also makes him a very good candidate to post a high batting average.

Over his minor league career, Frandsen has a line of .328/.393/.459/.852. His lowest average in the minors was .287 and his highest was .403 over 67 ABs in AAA Fresno.

In 2007, Frandsen has walked in 7.5% and struck out in 8.9% of his plate appearances. He has also seen just 3.44 pitches per plate appearance and has made contact on 86% of his swings, all of which evidence his great contact skills and his "early consequence" approach at the plate. I'm not sure there is a better bet to be a consistent .290-.300 hitter around, as Frandsen has posted very high averages at every level of his playing career. It seems only a matter of time before he starts cranking out very high batting averages at the MLB level.

Recent statistical analysis has proven that there are more important measures than batting average, which has been largely overrated throughout baseball history. That said, the value of having a player who hits around .300 with tremendous bat control and a very high baseball IQ still cannot be overstated. Placido Polanco is proving just that for the Tigers in 2007.


DEFENSE

Frandsen should develop into a very good defensive second baseman and he's already the best defensive second baseman on the roster. The presence of Ray Durham on the roster has forced Frandsen to play numerous different positions in 2007 in order to get playing time. The Giants even moved Frandsen up the defensive spectrum by having him spell Omar Vizquel at shortstop. Frandsen may ultimately lack the range to play short, but he has acquitted himself admirably in 114 innings there this season. Still, Frandsen is likely to push Ray Durham to the bench or another position in 2008, as neither Durham's bat nor salary justify giving him playing time at the expense of Frandsen. Now that Bonds has gotten his tainted record, the Giants are likely to start the rebuilding process by turning to youth in 2008.


SCOUTING REPORT

Frandsen was ranked the #6 prospect in the Giants system by Baseball America in their 2007 Prospect handbook, where they had this to say about him:

"Frandsen was one of the Giants' most heartwarming stories in 2006. He dedicated himself to making the big leagues to honer his brother D.J., who lost a lifelong battle with cancer in 2004. After he got there, pitching coach Dave Righetti, who was D.J.'s favorite player, quietly insisted that Kevin take his unform number 19, which he had worn since 1981. Frandsen has marvelous bat control and profiles as a solid number 2 hitter in the mold of Robby Thompson. He puts the bat in play consistently, uses the whole field and has occasional gap power. His baseball IQ is off the charts and he has plus makeup and maturity. Even when temperatures hit 112 degrees at Triple-A Fresno, he pestered the coaches for extra infield practice. Frandsen knows he must improve his on-base percentage and limit himself to pitches he can drive - a difficult task because he can put almost any pitch into play. He focuse on working couts in the Arizona Fall League and had success. While he also played shortstop and third base in Triple-A, his range and arm are merely adequate and limit him to second base. The Giants would like him to polish his bunting skills. By hitting .388 in the Arizona Fall League, Frandsen improved his chances of opening 2007 as San Francisco's second baseman. But, the Giants subsequently resigned Ray Durham, so Frandsen will apprentice in a utility role."

FINAL THOUGHTS

While he's unlikely to ever be a great fantasy baseball player or perennial All Star, but he's the type of player that you need to be successful in Major League Baseball. Frandsen is quickly becoming a fan favorite in San Francisco (as he was at Triple-A Fresno and probably throughout his baseball life), for his intelligence, hard work, and always leaving it all out on the field. The only thing Frandsen doesn't leave out on the field after a game is the dirt that covers his uniform.

All Undervalued Team: Jayson Werth, RF

Jayson Werth has long been one of my favorite undervalued players in baseball. The common thread running throughout these undervalued players is that they have some flaw upon which the market focuses. The flaw drives down the value of the player past what his other attributes dictate that it should be.

Th flaw in Jayson Werth is his inability to stay healthy, which can actually be one of the more desirable flaws, as it may not require the player to make any changes to his game. As odd as it sounds, flaws can be desirable for smaller market teams. They can be "something devoutly to be wished", as they can create opportunities for bargain hunting.

In fact, getting more production per dollar spent is the big key to the success of the smaller market organizations. If the A's get the same amount production per dollar spent as the Yankees, then the A's lose because of the far superior financial resources of the Yankees. The A's and all smaller market teams have to develop talent and find bargains.

As for Jayson Werth, I shudder to think what value the market would place on him if he could stay healthy. To me, Werth is a unique player, because his game grades out very well in both traditional scouting and statistical analysis. Adam Dunn generates so much discussion because his production flies in the face of traditional scouting, which wouldn't rate him very highly.

TRADITIONAL SCOUTING

Traditional scouting focuses on the process (mechanics, body type, etc), while statistical analysis focuses on the outcomes of that process (HRs, strikeouts, walks, etc). Both techniques are designed to determine a player's value and likelihood of success at the next level, but go about it in very different ways. At the nexus of these two different paths sits Jayson Werth.

Werth is 28 years old, 6-4, and 210 pounds. Werth has great tools, including a very strong arm, good speed, the projectible body type that scouts like, light-tower power, and the pedigree (he's the grandson of Dick Schoefield). At the plate, Werth possess a quiet stance and a smooth swing. In short, Werth looks good playing the game. He's a natural out there.

Werth's throwing motion is a bit of a short-arm, but that's because he came up as a catcher and he certainly seems to have the high baseball IQ of a catcher, as he is a very good percentage player.

Personally, I'd recommend checking out the following link and watching a few of his highlights under the multimedia section. (Jayson Werth video highlights)

In addition to how he goes about playing the game (i.e. the process), Werth also provides several intriguing outcomes. From a statistical perspective, there is much to like about Werth.


STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

For his career, Werth has seen 4.48 pitches per plate appearance, which is a sign of a disciplined hitter. Recently, John Dewan did a study that took a look at how a team's number of pitches seen per plate appearance correlated to runs scored. In short, the teams with the highest number of pitches seen per plate appearance scored the most runs. That's because the more pitches you see, the more disciplined you are. The more disciplined you are, the higher the your On Base Percentage. And, as countless studies have shown, on base percentage correlates most closely to runs scored.

His career line of .257/.346/.431/.777 also indicates strong on base skills. His career Isolated On Base percentage (OBP-BA) is 0.089. Given what he has done during the extended periods of time when fully healthy, Werth could consistently post an OBP that is .100 points higher than his batting averge.

Werth also has tremendous power, which he hasn't demonstrated very often due to his injuries. That said, when he was healthy in 2004 with the Dodgers, Werth hit 16 homeruns in 290 ABs, which works out to a homerun every 18.1 ABs. For comparison, on his career, Adam Dunn has hit a homerun once every 14.0 ABs and Ken Griffey, Jr. is at one homerun every 14.8 ABs.

In addition, his career secondary average is .315, which works on the same scale as batting average and attempts to measures the value of the production provided by player.

BASERUNNING

For his career, Werth has stolen 19 bases and been caught 4 times in his career. That's an 83% success rate, which is very impressive. He's fast for a tall player and intelligent on the bases.

DEFENSE

In 2007, Jayson Werth has posted very strong defensive numbers in both leftfield and rightfield. His Revised Zone Rating in leftfield was .929 and in rightfield it was .925. For comparison sake, Eric Byrnes was one of the best defensive leftfielders in 2007 and he had .923 RZR, which is lower than Werth. As for rightfield, Jeff Francoeur was one of the top rightfielders and he only had a RZR of .893. In addition, Werth has thrown out 9 runners in only 573 defensive innings, which is a testament to the strength and accuracy of his arm.

While he has been very strong in leftfield and rightfield, he would likely be above average in centerfield as well. In John Dewan's Fielding Bible, Werth fared well in all three outfield spots in 2005 for the Dodgers, when he was well above average in each slot.

2007 SEASON

While Werth has long been one of my favorite undervalued players, he may no longer fit under that label if he continues to play like he has in 2007. Werth has seen increased playing time with the Phillies due to the injury to Shane Victorino and he has made the most of his opportunity.

Earlier this week, Werth went 9 straight ABs with a hit. He had a 5-for-5 game and followed it up with a 4-for-4 game. The NL record for consecutive ABs with a hit is 10, but Werth's 9 AB streak was ended by the crafty Tom Glavine.

On the season, Werth is up to .311/.404/.478/.882 and is seeing 4.52 pitches per plate appearance. If he continues to perform at that level, then his value will skyrocket.

Werth seems to finally be healthy, but now he just needs to stay that way. If he can do so, then he's likely to have a strong MLB career.

Phil Dumatrait's Struggles and Demotion

After four starts, 13.1 innings pitched, and 21 earned runs allowed the Reds had seen enough, as they demoted Phil Dumatrait back to AAA Louisville.

Given his poor situational pitching, weak K/BB ratio, and general lack of command in the minors, his struggles at the MLB level shouldn't really come as much of a surprise. Unfortunately, at this point Dumatrait just is not good enough to be an asset at the major league level. Granted, it's a small sample size, but let's take a look at his pitch data to get a handle on his performance.

During his MLB stint, Dumatrait threw 294 pitches, 168 of which were strikes and 126 of which were balls. So, Dumatrait threw a strike only 57% of the time (Harang: 66%, Arroyo: 65%, Livingston: 65%). It is sometimes said that the most effective pitch in baseball is the first pitch strike. Getting ahead early in the count puts the pitcher in control of the PA and opens up many more options from his arsenal. Unfortunately, Dumatrait only threw a 1st pitch strike 55% of the time (Harang: 65%, Arroyo: 65%, Livingston: 64%).

Accordingly, it seems only logical that Dumatrait would spend more time behind in the count, which is evidenced by the fact that 5% of the plate appearance involved a 3-0 count (Harang: 4%, Arroyo: 4%, Livingston: 1%) which is a bit disturbing when you consider that he issued no intentional walks.

Dumatrait did manage to strike out 6 hitters and all were swinging strikeouts. Dumatrait only managed to get to an 0-2 count in 12% of the plate appearances (Harang: 23%, Arroyo: 19%, Livingston: 18%) and wasn't able to effectively finish off the hitter, which raises questions about the lack of an out pitch. In 33% of 0-2 count situations Dumatrait allowed a hit (Harang: 5%, Arroyo: 6%, Livingston: 4%).

Unfortunately, Dumatrait was done in by a lack of control and just being to hittable. It is very difficult to be successful in the majors if you can't miss bats. If a pitcher gives up too much contact, then he will struggle to maintain consistent success. Dumatrait just allowed to much contact, as 86% of the time contact was made by the hitter when swinging (Harang: 78%, Arroyo: 81%, Livingston: 82%). It may not seem like a big difference, but around 85% seems to be the tipping point, above which sustained MLB success is difficult.

Again, it is undeniably a small sample size, but it does reflect many of the same problems he demonstrated in the minors, only amplified by a better caliber hitter. Hopefully, Dumatrait will head back to the minors, work on his game, and be able to contribute to the Reds in the future. However, at this point, that seems like a bit of a long shot.

Dumi, Livingston, and Homegrown Pitching

After years of futility and a number of false starts, the Reds are finally beginning to build a productive farm system. The Reds have struggled for years to develop quality pitching, but slowly there is a trickle of talent beginning to reach the Majors.

The two blue chip pitching prospects in the Reds farm system, Homer Bailey and Johnny Cueto, have both seen substantial success in the minors. Homer reached the Majors earlier this season, but is down in the minors on a rehab assignment. Johnny Cueto has been dominant at just about every level this year and is poised to make his big league debut either in September or in 2008.

Cueto is also emblematic of another vitally important development for the Reds organization, as he is one of the first prospects to be signed out of Latin America by the Reds revitalized international scouting effort. Adding good international prospects to the farm system each year in addition to those out of the draft is vital for the development of a good farm system. The Reds are finally back to doing so.

The Big Red Machine benefited greatly from international scouting, as Tony Perez was signed by the Reds in 1960 as an amateur free agent, Dave Concepcion was signed as an amateur free agent by the Reds in 1967, as were a few other lesser lights like Manny Sarmiento. Unfortunately, that stream of talent would eventually be dammed up by a shortsighted owner.

Under former owner Marge Schott, the Reds scouting and player development budgets were slashed. Marge believed that she could save money in these areas and plow some of the savings into the Major League roster by doing so. In actuality, Marge wasn't saving money at all, rather she was simply shifting the cost of her actions onto the backs of future Reds' teams. The Reds' organization has had to carry that heavy burden around for the past decade or two.

The Reds enjoyed some short term success, but they mortgaged the future to do so. The cost effective flow of young talent dried up, leaving the Reds struggling to fill holes at the Major League level with expensive free agents (Eric Milton, anyone?). The true cost of Marge Schott's decision is impossible to calculate, but the Reds certainly paid a heavy, heavy price.

While Bailey and Cueto are on the cusp of making their impact at the Major League level, it is a good idea to see what the Reds have to fill the void until they are ready. Bobby Livingston and Phil Dumatrait were both acquired from other organizations, but both are being viewed as potential starting pitchers for the Reds. So, let's take a look and see what we can expect out of them.

Phil Dumatrait has control problems and average stuff. In AAA Louisville this year, he had a 70/48 K/BB ratio in 118.2 innings. Earlier in the year, it was even worse and at times it was almost a 1-to-1 ratio. His promotion to the majors and a more advanced level of competition has only exacerbated the problem. On the season, Dumatrait has a 8.74 ERA, a 2.56 WHIP, a 7.2 BB/9, a 5.6 K/9, and a 0.56 GB/FB ratio in the majors. Granted, it's only been 3 starts and 11.1 innings, but it isn't an encouraging start.

Another disturbing trend is Dumatrait's performance with runners on base. At AAA this year, Dumatrait had a 44/24 K/BB ratio in 60.0 innings pitched with no one on base. However, in 58.2 innings pitched with runners on base, Dumatrait had a 26/24 K/BB ratio. In 31.0 innings pitched with runners in scoring position, Dumatrait had a 12/17 K/BB ratio.

In short, the more crucial the situation, the worse his K/BB ratio. His HR/9 rate also worsens in crucial situations.

Phil Dumatrait 2007 AAA Performance
Situation:____K/9___BB/9 ___HR/9
Bases Empty: ___6.6 ____3.6_____0.6__
Runners On: ____4.0____3.7_____ 0.8__
Scoring Position:__3.5____4.9_____0.9__


That is not a positive trend and to expect much out of Dumatrait would be unwise. He's a flyball pitcher who walks too many, strikes out too few, and seems to pitch worse the more crucial the situation. At this point, it seems unlikely that Dumatrait is ready to be a successful major league baseball pitcher. So, our nation turns its lonely eyes to Bobby Livingston.

On the season, Bobby Livingston has a 4.70 ERA, a 1.45 WHIP, a 4.0 K/9, a 1.4 BB/9, and a 1.36 GB/FB ratio.

In 56.2 innings pitched at AAA with the bases empty, Livingston had a 38/8 K/BB ratio. In 47.2 innings pitched with Runners on Base, Livingston had a 25/9 K/BB ratio. In 26.2 innings pitched with runners in scoring position, Livingston had a 17/6 K/BB ratio.

In short, Bobby fared a bit worse as the situation got more crucial, but overall performed better than Dumatrait. Livingston also did a much better job avoiding the homerun in crucial situations.

Bobby Livingston 2007 AAA Performance
Situation:_____K/9 ___BB/9 ___HR/9
Bases Empty: ____6.0_____1.3_____0.6__
Runners On: _____4.7_____1.7_____0.6__
Scoring Position:___5.8____2.0_____0.7__

It is often said that Dumatrait has better stuff, but that Livingston is a craftier pitcher. Perhaps these numbers begin to bear that out, as Livingston was able to maintain his level of performance more successfully than Dumatrait.

At this point, even though he was roughed up today, Bobby Livingston seems to be a more viable option to fill the 5th spot in the rotation in 2008. Livingston walks few and gets a heavy percentage of groundballs, but needs to do a better job of missing bats. That said, his performance and his baseball I.Q. make him a better bet for success in the 5th slot in the rotation.

All Undervalued Team: Fernando Cabrera, RP

Some interesting and rather surprising news came out of Cleveland today. The Indians released 25 year old reliever Fernando Cabrera. Personally, I'm very surprised they cut him loose and even more surprised that no one traded for him.

"Traded INF Russell Branyan to the Philadelphia Phillies for cash considerations; Claimed INF Chris Gomez off waivers from the Baltimore Orioles; Sent INF Mike Rouse outright to Triple-A Buffalo; Released RHP Fernando Cabrera; Optioned LHP Aaron Laffey to Buffalo."

Given the Reds struggles in the bullpen, picking up Cabrera as fast as possible would seem to be a no-brainer. Cabrera is a young reliever with a power arm, something which is in short supply in the Reds' bullpen. In 2007, Cabrera struck out 10.4 batters and walked 5.9 batters per nine innings. Clearly, he has a tremendous arm, but also some control problems. In his career, Cabrera has posted a 4.6 BB/9 and a 10.0 K/9.

Given his age and upside, this is clearly the type of player on whom the Reds should roll the dice. If he improves his control only a tick or two, then he would likely be a tremendous asset in the bullpen. Not to mention, a switch to the NL should only help, as he would not have to face the DH.

Here's what the 2006 Baseball America Prospect Handbook had to say about Fernando Cabrera:

"The Indians had a poor draft in 1999, as their top pick never made it out of Rookie ball and just one player signed in the first 20 rounds made it past Double-A. That exception is Cabrera, who reached Double-A as a starter but has been groomed as a late-inning reliever since mid-2003. He has been impressive in late-season callups the last two years. Cabrera operates with two plus pitches, a lively 92-96 MPH fastball and a hard, diving splitter. His fastball command has improved since his days as a starter, and he pitches effectively to both sides of the plate. He has both the stuff and the demeanor to close. Cabrera's slider and changeup aren't nearly as effective as his other two offerings. When he stays on top of his slider and doesn't slow down his arm speed with his changeup, both pitches grade out as major league average. He rarely concerns himself with holding runners close to first base.There's no question that Cabrera is Cleveland's closer of the future. The Indians will ease him into the role, however, after re-signing all-star Bob Wickman to finish games in 2006. Cabrera will help set up Wickman this season."

Given the low cost and the substantial upside, it would seem to be exactly the kind of move at which Krivsky excels. Cabrera would be a great risk/reward acquisition. And, if he works out even half as well as the last undervalued player we grabbed from the Indians, then Cabrera would be a huge asset to the bullpen in 2008.

The Hitting Process

In my opinion, the hitting process breaks down into three main components. The way I see it, this is what happens every time a batter steps to the plate. The three components are:

1) Pitch Recognition,
2) Plate Discipline, and
3) Execution.

Personally, I think each component involves a separate and distinct skillset.

First, we have Pitch Recognition. Again, there is a definition in BA which defines Pitch Recognition as "a hitter's ability to identify the type and location of pitchers almost immediately out of the pitcher's hand."

So, the hitting process begins when the ball leaves the pitcher's hand. The batter must immediately begin tracking the pitch and make a determination on the type and ultimate location of the pitch. Identification of the type of pitch and whether it will be a hittable pitch are made in this first stage.

Second, we have Plate Discipline, which again is defined as: "the ability to not swing at pitches out of the strike zone, or pitches that are less hittable than those that might follow." Once a hitter identifies the type of pitch and the impending location of the pitch, it is up to him to determine whether to swing at this pitch. The whole idea of the disciplined hitter is that he knows his strengths and attempts to force a conclusion to each PA on a pitch that plays to his strengths.

I don't care for applying War analogies in sports, as they diminish the severity and sacrifice of the former and inflate the importance of the latter, but I can't think of a better way of explaining this.

The War of the Strikezone is the most important component of the game of baseball. It defines the game and ultimately determines the winner. In essence, Batters and Pitchers are at War in each Plate Apppearance. Within that war, each pitch constitutes a battle. The more battles you win, the more control you have over the PA and the more likely you will win the War.

Generally speaking, the more often a hitter can work the PA into a hitter's count, the better his chances of success. On the flip side, the more often the pitcher can work the PA into a pitcher's count, then the more likely he will succeed. Win the battles and you'll likely win the war.

The disciplined hitter employs a philosophy that involves forcing the pitcher to throw a type of pitch that he can handle to a location within the strikezone that is advantageous to the hitter. He does not give in and let the pitcher define the PA on the pitcher's terms, rather he battles to define the PA on a pitch that maximizes his chances of success.

Finally, we have Execution. Once the batter identifies the type of pitch (breaking ball, changeup, etc), the location (outside corner, down and away, etc), and makes the determination that the pitch/location are to his advantage, then he must make the final step and execute. Execution is the actual putting the bat on the ball.

After identifying the pitch and making a conscious choice that swinging at the pitches is to his advantage, then the batter must be able to put a good swing on the pitch to take advantage of the good position in which he has placed himself.

This step involves the swing. The batter must have a mechanically sound swing and good hand-eye coordination.

A hitter can win all the battles, but still end up losing the war by not successfully executing despite the good position in which he has placed himself.

That's how I see the hitting process. Three separate stages, each involving a different, unique skill.

You don't need to excel at all three to excel. In general, a hitter like Vlad can excel by being able to recognize the type of pitch and being able to hit anything from his nose to his toes. That can make him an elite offensive talent, but it does not make him a disciplined one. Personally, I suspect Adam Dunn excels on Pitch Recognition and Plate Discipline, but falters in the Execution. Dunn is a big man who has a long swing that does not always result in contact, so he can't always take advantage of his ability to put himself in position to succeed. Despite that, I think the truly great hitters excel in all three areas, with Pujols being the best example in the modern game.

Ultimately, it is very possible to have substantial success regardless of which approach you utilize, so production still trumps approach at the plate. However, I think it is still instructive to look at the various approaches that are utilized.

Trades and Shifting Market Valuation

Something unusual has been happening in baseball as of late and it is very relevant for us over the next month. In fact, I think it portends badly for chances at rebuilding via a firesale.

There has been a subtle, but substantial shift in the way the market values players. In short, baseball organizations are beginning to value their top prospects like never before. Baseball writers mention it from time to time, but I think the shift has really become evident this year.

I read a chat with ESPN's Jerry Crasnick last week in which he suggested the reason for the shift was that fans had become more knowledgeable about the prospects in their organization, so GMs would come under fire if they were dealt. He cited Clay Bucholz of the BoSox as an example. Personally, I don't think that's the reason.

HISTORICAL VALUE
In years past, top prospects were often dealt for half season rentals. The best example that comes to mind is the Tigers trading John Smoltz to the Braves for Doyle Alexander. That trade worked out about as well as any half season rental can, as Doyle went 9-0 with a 1.53 ERA for the Tigers and helped them reach the postseason in 1987.

However, those deals have become increasingly rare, as the opportunity cost of dealing blue chip prospects is higher than ever before. The cost of giving up the production of blue chip prospects has begun to heavily outweigh the benefits. If you are dealing away inexpensive prospects, then you likely have to find replacement production via free agency or trade. No matter where the replacement production comes from, it's going to more expensive than the prospect that was dealt away, because prospects are the only inexpensive production available in the market. Not to mention, the cost of replacement production for the prospects that are dealt away is skyrocketing.

CHANGING SALARY DYNAMICS

The average MLB salary in 1988 was $453,020 and players in their first 3 years of service time earned ~$85,000-150,000 and the top veteran pitchers were earning ~$1.75-2.0M. In 2006, the average MLB salary was $2,834,521. Players in their first 3 years of service time were earning $330-550K and veteran pitchers were making ~$10M in free agency.

Over the years, salaries have increased on average about 10% per year. The difference is that a 10% increase in $100,000 salaries is much less than a corresponding 10% increase in the cost of free agents. Accordingly, the disparity between the cost of veteran free agents and the cost of prospects has grown by leaps and bounds.

If you deal away a young prospect, you are throwing away three years of VERY inexpensive production and three years after that of below market production. Instead of getting good production over the next three years for ~$350-500K, you have to replace that production with expensive free agents at a cost of $10M. It costs you $9.5M more per season for the next three seasons in order to acquire a half season rental. In the past, you could find replacement production at a much lower cost, likely ~$2M in 1988.

So, in 1988, the Tigers could replace Smoltz for ~$1.75M. In 2006, that same type of move would cost ~$10M. Personally, I think that it is this cost increase that has led to organization valuing their prospects MUCH more highly. They are just very reluctant to deal these types of prospects.

Inflation certainly plays a part, but prospects are just a much more valuable commodity than in years past. The salary for first year players has risen 3.5 times (from ~$100K to ~$350K), but the cost of free agent pitchers has increased 5-6-7 times (from ~$2M to ~$10-12-14M). And, the cost of free agent pitchers seems likely to continue to outpace the increases in first year player salary.

CURRENT MARKETPLACE

By trading away top notch prospects, you are incurring a huge opportunity cost, because you can no longer take advantage of 6 years of bargain priced production. Dealing away top prospects for half season rentals is becoming impracticable because the cost of replacing the future production of that prospect is exponentially higher than in seasons past. The market has begun to factor in these increasing costs and the valuation of top flight prospects has changed accordingly.

In current marketplace, a player's trade value is driven by the number of years he is under the team's control and how far below the going market rate his salary is and will be. Those two factors create a kind of unique value to the team that controls their rights, which is what is desirable in the current marketplace. The value isn't created solely by the player's production anymore, but rather by the ability of the organization to obtain his production at a lower than market rate.

Unfortunately, that bodes poorly for us, as we are unlikely to reap a huge return for Adam Dunn. The cost of replacement production just doesn't make it feasible to rent high priced veteran players anymore.

This trend seems likely to continue until the salaries at the beginning of a player's career begins to increase. Until then, dealing away top prospects is a risky proposition.

That's unfortunate, given that the Reds are trying to trade Adam Dunn for young talent. At this point, I think the Reds should be willing to pay the market rate or perhaps even overpay to get certain targeted players (I'd like Jarrod Saltalamacchia and especially Matt Kemp). It's time to recognize the market shift and cut a deal with the realization that they can still be beneficial under this new market paradigm.

Update: Dunn and New Approach at the Plate

Just thought I'd check on Dunn and see how if he is sticking with his more aggressive approach at the plate.

Year: BA / OBP / SLG / OPS

2004: .266/.388/.569/.957

2005: .247/.387/.540/.927

2006: .234/.365/.490/.855

2007: .263/.371/.564/.935

Year: IsoOBP_AB/HR_BB/PA_#P/PA

2004: .122____12.3__.159__4.24

2005: .140____13.6__.170__4.24

2006: .131____14.0__.164__4.18

2007: .108____12.8__.143__4.30

Year: % of Called Strikes / % of Swinging Strikes

2004: 31% / 19%

2005: 31% / 19%

2006: 29% / 22%

2007: 27% / 24% <---Decreased 1% and No change

Year: % Pitches Swung At / % Time Contact made when Swinging

2004: 39% / 72%

2005: 39% / 73%

2006: 40% / 70%

2007: 43% / 67% <--- Increased 1%/1%

Year: ABs per Strike Out

2004: 2.9

2005: 3.2

2006: 2.9

2007: 2.6 <--- Worse/Decline of 0.2

Year: % of Time Swinging at First Pitch of PA

2004: 28%

2005: 25%

2006: 28%

2007: 34% <---- Increased 4%

Dunn is staying aggressive. In fact, he's even more aggressive. He's swinging more often, at more first pitches, and making a bit more contact. His production is much better, but unfortunately his strikeout rate has gotten worse.

It'll be interesting to see how his production plays out over the season if he stays aggressive.