The Tony Cingrani "Problem" and Shoulder Impingements

Tony Cingrani has been a personal favorite (I've rated him as high as 2nd on my Reds prospect rankings) since the day he was drafted. He is such a favorite that I advocated signing him to a long-term extension, pegging him as the right player to lock-up in order to take advantage of annual player salary inflation. All of which made Cingrani's 2014 season rather disconcerting for me.

It's no secret that shoulder injuries are much scarier for pitchers than elbow injuries. Repairing elbow injuries is almost routine these days, shoulder injuries less so. Perhaps that's not surprising because the shoulder is simply a more complicated joint than the elbow (So complicated that it's worth pointing out again that I'm not a medical professional, so this is just a layman's overview). In actuality, there are four different joints that make up the shoulder complex: glenohumeral, scapulothoracic, acromioclavicular, and sternoclavicular. Pitching is an unnatural motion, it's a motion that can create a problem in the interplay between those fours joints, resulting in a shoulder impingement.

The good news is that a shoulder impingement is not a traumatic injury. It's not a blown out tendon or ligament, it's not a torn rotator cuff or labrum. The bad news is that isn't always the easiest ailment to identify and resolve. The worse news is that, if unresolved, it could lead to one of the aforementioned serious injuries.

Over the years I've come around to the idea that most of these traumatic arm injuries are actually more like "symptoms" than "diseases." While you may be able to effectively treat the symptoms, that's not the same thing as curing the underlying disease. Put another way, traumatic arm injuries are frequently the "downstream effects" of an "upstream cause."

The "upstream cause" might be flawed mechanics, overwork, poor physical conditioning, or any number of other factors. Here's something worth considering, what's the value in treating the downstream effect if you don't also remedy the upstream cause? We have the ability to patch up pitchers faster and more effectively, but are we curing the disease? Or, are we just sending pitchers back out to the mound until the upstream cause once again sends carnage floating down the river?

Why do I bring all of this up? Because Tony Cingrani's shoulder impingement might ultimately be an upstream cause, which, if left unresolved, leads to a serious downstream injury.

Tony Cingrani is a unique pitcher, one who leans heavily on his fastball for success. The effectiveness of that pitch is due to some combination of velocity, deception, and movement, all of which are tied directly to his pitching mechanics.

In the best case scenario, which is still a reasonable possibility, Cingrani's shoulder impingement can be resolved without changing his mechanics. That may, in fact, be, by far, the most common resolution, but it's tough to say just how common because those impingements are resolved so quickly and quietly that we never really know they existed. Hopefully, that's what happens with Cingrani, as that would allow him to continue to build on his success, rather than trying to recreate it with a different arm action. It's hard enough to invent the wheel the first time, recreating it may be impossible.

If the impingement can't be resolved easily, then the Reds may be left to choose between effectiveness and health. That's a helluva choice. Two equally bad options.

If Cingrani needs to change his mechanics to eliminate the impingement, then he may lose all effectiveness. On the other hand, if he keeps his mechanics to maintain effectiveness, then he may lose all durability.

The fact that Cingrani missed the majority of the 2014 season is one reason to think that the impingement might not be easily resolved. Unfortunately, there may also be something identifiable in his mechanics that points to continuing problems.

Here's one part of Cingrani's mechanics that I've always loved, the differential between the hip and shoulder rotation:

Tony Cingrani demonstrating impressive differential between hip rotation and shoulder rotation.

That differential really allows the kinetic chain to work, as the force generated by the body is transferred to the ball in a way that minimizes the stress on his arm. His mechanics are built on a very efficient kinetic chain and have a real fluidity. That's a real and substantial positive to his mechanics.

The problem with Cingrani's mechanics, which, in light of the above, I've been willing to downplay and deemphasize, is that his arm is later than normal in the delivery. Typically, you want the pitching arm up in throwing position at foot-strike. As you can see below, when his stride foot touches, his pitching arm is down, parallel to the ground. It's late.

Late arm, increases whip and deception, but at what cost?

Late arm, parallel to ground.

The combination of the differential and the late arm might actually be what makes his fastball so effective. It creates a real looseness and whipiness in his arm action, a crack-the-whip type motion. Furthermore, the late arm action serves to increase the deception, as the above photos show he hides the ball behind his pitching shoulder. So, the combination of these two components of his delivery might be central to his success, creating both a whip-like arm-action and real deception.

While the late arm action may be a significant key to his performance, there is a possible downside to that lateness. The arm dragging behind the body when it first starts to accelerate can lead to an "internal impingement" (just one type of impingement). The late cocking and early acceleration of the arm can create problematic contact between the rotator cuff muscles and the postsuperior lip of the labrum. This repetitive contact between the structures can lead to partial rotator cuff tears, fraying or tears of the labrum, or cystic changes in the humeral head.

Pitchers with internal impingements generally suffer pain while throwing and often have stiffness or trouble getting loose. These pitchers often suffer decreased velocity and command.

The Reds were fairly tight lipped about Cingrani's injury, but, in many respects, it sounds like he could have been dealing with an internal impingement. If so, is the "cure" to get the arm up into proper position earlier? If so, will that reduce the effectiveness of his most important pitch, the fastball?

In light of the Reds efforts to rebuild while contending, the team needs Cingrani more than ever. The departures of Alfredo Simon and Mat Latos and the likely impending departure of Johnny Cueto mean that they need young, cost-controlled options for the rotation this year and into the future.

Next season will provide a very important data point on the question of whether Cingrani can dependably hold down a rotation spot. The shoulder impingement has me worried (maybe far more than it should) about the answer to that question. Fortunately, the early reports about his health are good and the Reds have named him a front runner for a rotation spot, so we should have our answer one way or the other.

The Case for Signing Tony Cingrani to a Long-Term Extension....Like, Right Now

"There are contract extensions and contract extensions. This is the latter."

Earlier this offseason, Walt Jocketty stepped up and got a long-term extension done with Homer Bailey. Prior to that point, media reports stated that the Reds and Homer were "far apart" in negotiations. Like most Reds fans, conditioned by years of ownership frugality, I had fully expected Homer to walk after the year, but when I saw the arbitration hearing deadline looming on February 20th, it suddenly hit me that this is exactly how Jocketty operates. He waits until there is some type of pressure, some level of urgency for both sides to get a deal done and then he strikes.

More than most GMs, Jocketty seems to operate in shadow. It can make for interesting times for the fan base. It may be his preferred working style. It may allow him to get things done free from scrutiny. But, it can also be a weakness. He doesn't control the message that fans receive. He passes on the chance to control public opinion. That's fine when you're winning, but if things turn south then you run the risk of losing the fan base.

But, this isn't a post about Jocketty's operating style. It's about why the Homer extension and others like it make a tremendous amount of sense for the Reds right now.


TWO TYPES OF INVESTMENTS

There are two types of investment gambles: (1) finding an individual asset in which to invest that you feel is valued inaccurately by the market, or (2) finding flaws in the market itself and betting against the entire system.

An example of the first would be finding a single family dwelling that is priced $50,000 below where it should be. A residence that, because of a solid foundation, an unappreciated chandelier, and a great location is worth more than others realize. So, you buy that asset for less than it's worth and reap the value.

An example of the second would be recognizing that the entire subprime mortgage industry is completely corrupt, setting the entire housing market up for imminent collapse, and betting against the entire system.

The first type of gamble can earn you a tidy profit, the second type of gamble can make you stinking rich...if you invest heavily enough in it.

Courtesy: Gene Puskar, AP

Homer's contract extension (even if the Reds don't recognize it) actually works well under both investment scenarios.



I support the extension given to Homer Bailey. I support it because of reasons specific to Homer, including his performance line trending upward and his impressive durability. Homer seems like a good individual investment. However, in addition to these Homer-specific reasons, it's an even better idea for systemic reasons.


EXPLODING MLB REVENUE AND LAGGING PLAYER SALARIES

Revenue is exploding in Major League Baseball and has been for a number of years. However, unlike salary cap leagues that base their salary structure expressly on a percentage of league-wide revenue, MLB relies on market forces to determine the percentage of revenue that will trickle down to the players. One of the big knocks on salary caps is that they are a "wealth transfer" mechanism, shifting money from players to owners. Instead of letting market forces dictate how much of the revenue naturally goes to the players, the percentage that goes to the players is artificially established through collective bargaining. Not surprisingly, market forces typically allocate more revenue to the players than the percentages that are collectively bargained by the owners. However, when the salary structure is determined by a percentage of revenue, it is calculated on an annual basis. As a result, salary cap systems more quickly allocate revenue gains to player salaries than market forces, even if those slower market forces eventually allocate a significantly greater share of the new revenue to player salaries.

Currently, the revenue in Major League Baseball is increasing at such a massive rate that the percentage trickling down to player salaries is lagging behind. It just can't trickle down fast enough to keep pace with the new revenue, resulting in the percentage of league-wide revenue that is allocated to the players falling far below where it used to be. As of now, the MLB percentage has even fallen below the percentage of revenue that salary cap sports (NHL players receive 50% of Hockey Related Revenue; NBA players receive 49-51% of Basketball Related Revenue) mandate be allocated to player salaries.

What this creates is an opportunity for teams bold enough to grab it. As it stands, players are being paid based on an outdated reality. Player salaries haven't caught up to the revenue boom, so players are being paid less than they should be.

In short, the owners are living in the luxurious "new revenue" world, but are still paying costs under the "old revenue" reality.

Baseball contracts are largely pulled upward by the contracts of superstar players. As their contracts are extended or they receive a free agent contract, those contracts set the market for everyone below. The new market creates upward pressure on the salaries of all players below. Unfortunately, those deals don't come up all that often, so it may take awhile for those deals to reset salary expectations. That is clearly starting to happen with the recent deals for Clayton Kershaw and Miguel Cabrera, but it seems clear that there are still bargains to be had because the percentage of total revenue that goes to MLB salaries is lower than standard business practices would dictate.

Here are some rough numbers to illustrate the point:



Major League Baseball Salaries as a Percentage of MLB Revenues, Salaries per Cot's Contracts

2000: 50.02%
2001: 53.08%
2002: 56.24%
2003: 54.55%
2004: 46.03%
2005: 43.84%
2006: 41.55%
2007: 40.64%
2008: 41.33%
2009: 40.40%
2010: 40.12%
2011: 41.10%
2012: 40.14%
2013: 39.79%



Major League Baseball Salaries as a Percentage of MLB Revenues, Salaries per Lahman Database

2000: 49.00%
2001: 52.99%
2002: 56.34%
2003: 54.70%
2004: 46.05%
2005: 43.85%
2006: 41.53%
2007: 40.69%
2008: 41.40%
2009: 40.48%
2010: 38.91%
2011: 39.82%
2012: 39.10%
2013: --------



Again, what's important is the trend line, not the specific percentages. Under each salary calculation, the percentage of revenue that goes to player salaries has fallen ~10% since the 2000 season. Forbes just reported, citing to The Associated Press, that Major League Baseball spent $3,767,445,277 on total player salaries in 2013, representing 47% of total league wide revenues. So, Forbes is obviously calculating salaries differently (and, probably more accurately), but, despite the different methodology, 47% is still significantly lower than in previous years.

As it stands, the percentage may not catch up until revenue growth slows, but it seems very likely that owners will eventually, and naturally, spend what they used to spend on players. So, if the market for players isn't reflecting the "true" percentage of revenue that typically goes to players, then there are bargains to be had system-wide.

If owners are spending a lower percentage of their total revenue on labor costs, then they can afford, and will ultimate be forced, to spend more. They have shown in the past that they can effectively operate their business while paying more for labor costs. If the market for labor is lagging behind the revenue, then longer term contracts that take advantage of this disparity make sense. If you can lock in talent at the current "lower percentage of revenue labor market rate", then you can lock in a below market rate for years to come. Act before the market correction and you are ensuring significant cost savings, which would seem to mitigate much of the risk of a signing someone like Homer Bailey in the first place.

If the Reds were smart, then they'd lock up desirable assets to long-term deals now, BEFORE the market correction arrives. One asset I'd look to lock up right now is Tony Cingrani.


WHY CINGRANI IS WORTH A LONG-TERM EXTENSION

Courtesy: Tom Uhlman, AP

Personally, I don't share the common fear that hitters will suddenly adjust to the fastball. It's obviously a plus-pitch with good velocity and late hop. And, to the extent that they do adjust, it seems very likely that Tony's improved secondary offerings, which should only get better, will counteract that. And, I'm a big fan of Tony's pitching mechanics, which should reduce his risk of arm injury. So, I buy the performance level, believe he has a lower injury risk, and give him a boost in value for being a southpaw. He's a good investment from an individual point of view.


And, it's a good bet from a systemic point of view, as there are two scenarios where this type of contract would pay off:

1. Either revenues level off, but the % of revenue that goes to labor costs increases back to more "normal" levels, or
2. Revenues continue to grow, making it irrelevant whether the % of revenue increases back to more normal levels. 

Basically, this type of extension would pay off if (1) the future slice of the pie that goes to players increases or (2) the whole pie continues to grow. Either way, any contract signed under today's market reality is a potential bargain because both scenarios reflect continuing market escalation. And, quite frankly, I'm not sure I see any scenario OTHER THAN continuing market escalation playing out over the next 5 to 7 years.


MATT MOORE AS A COMPARABLE

I'm higher on Cingrani than most, so that needs to be factored in, but I think there's very likely a deal here that makes sense. If you consider the deal the Rays handed to Matt Moore as a baseline, then I think it would make a lot of sense. So, let's revisit it:

Matt Moore lhp

5 years/$14M (2012-16), plus 2017-19 options; signed extension with Tampa Bay 12/9/11
$0.5M signing bonus

12:$1M, 13:$1M, 14:$1M, 15:$3M, 16:$5M, 17:$7M club option ($2.5M buyout), 18:$9M club option ($1M buyout), 19:$10M club option ($0.75M buyout)

2017 club option increases by $0.5M with 600 IP in 2014-16
2018 club option increases by $0.25M each with 1) 85 starts or 570 IP in 2015-17, 2) 90 starts or 600 IP and 3) 95 starts or 630 IP
2019 club option increases by $0.5M each with 1) 98 starts or 600 IP in 2016-18 and 2) 66 starts or 400 IP 2017-18

The Rays signed Matt Moore to this extension after he had thrown something like 10 MLB innings. Now, the key to this deal making sense is the existence of team options. Contracts are substantially about risk allocation, the team option years shift that allocation more favorably in the direction of the team. The Rays were undoubtedly comfortable handing this type of deal out because (1) Moore had a longer minor league track record of success and (2) was more highly regarded than Cingrani.

The Moore extension was signed prior to the 2012 season, but it was also given to a pitcher with (arguably) less risk and more certainty. So, maybe a similar deal (maybe a couple million needs to be tacked on to each year's salary) could be struck now, as Cingrani's higher level of risk would help offset inflation and the revenue explosion. And, seriously, how much risk is there in that Matt Moore deal? He's set to earn $9M and $10M in 2018 and 2019? Is there ANY scenario, other than injury, in which a lefthanded pitcher with a mid-90s fastball ISN'T worth that?

Given what Clayton Kershaw just signed for and, hell, what Jason Vargas just signed for, I see very few ways in which this type of deal DOESN'T pan out. If Jason Vargas is worth $8.5M NOW, then what are the odds that Cingrani ISN'T worth ~$12M in 2019?


FINAL THOUGHTS

Personally, I think an extension for Tony Cingrani is something that should be seriously considered. Given the explosion of revenue and the lag in it trickling down to player salaries, it seems like there are more ways for this type of deal to pay off than not. Realistically, how much risk is there in a ~$12M salary in 2018 and 2019?

If I could extend Tony through his first 6 years AND get a team option year or two, then I'd jump at the chance to do it. Now is the time to spend. Take advantage of the league-wide financial conditions and the fact that Tony's reputation has yet to catch up to his performance level. Waiting, even a year, could change both of those realities. Kershaw type contracts and a top flight year by Tony would make this opportunity far less likely to happen.

The Reds were smart enough to lock up Homer Bailey under the current, below-market salary structure, but in order to get really wealthy they need to double down in their bet against the system. There is a low risk, high reward opportunity right now to exploit a systemic inefficiency. Right now, it's as much about being right about this systemic inefficiency as it is being right about the player who will receive an extension. In fact, the former will mitigate the risk of being wrong about the latter.

Sign Tony BEFORE the market correction arrives!!!

Pitching Mechanics: Tony Cingrani's Rotation Differential

Sometimes a picture is worth a thousand words. That rings especially true when talking about the mechanics of baseball, as a visual frequently drives home a point more effectively than eight paragraphs of labored description.

So, I'll keep this short and sweet. The below Cingrani photo more effectively illustrates one of the key tenets of kinetic-chain pitching mechanics than I ever could.

I've written at length about kinetic-chain pitching mechanics and the benefits they can have on both performance and injury prevention. Part of the reason why I'm so high on Tony Cingrani is his mechanics. Since he's the flavor of the month, it's worth highlighting part of what makes him so effective.

One of the key concepts of kinetic-chain based pitching mechanics is the differential between the rotation of the hips and the rotation of the shoulders. The greater that differential, the greater the ability to generate the force that powers the pitch with the body, instead of the arm.

Here's a look at Cingrani in action against the Marlins:

There is a clear and very substantial differential between the rotation of his hips and the rotation of his shoulders. In this photo, if you were to draw a line through the hips, it would run basically from 1st base to 3rd base. If you were to draw a line through the shoulders, it would run basically from 2nd base to home plate. Basically, his hips are square to homeplate, while his shoulders are square to first base.

The earlier rotation of the hips creates significant tension in the spine. That tension creates energy that moves from the hips to the shoulders to the pitching arm as the spine uncoils. Cingrani's delayed shoulder rotation basically results in the pitching arm being pulled around by the energy of the body, rather than having to rely on the arm itself to generate that energy.

Cingrani's effective use of kinetic-chain mechanics is part of what makes his fastball so effective. And, it should have the added benefit of reducing the risk of arm injury.

Why I rated Tony Cingrani higher than Robert Stephenson

Just about every scouting list has Billy Hamilton and Robert Stephenson rated 1 and 2 in the Reds system. I went with Hamilton and Tony Cingrani. Here's why. For me, Stephenson slots in behind Tony Cingrani because Stephenson's advantage in upside over Cingrani is smaller than Cingrani's advantage in probability over Stephenson.

Cingrani's performance level was so high in 2012 that even if everything breaks right in Stephenson's development he'll likely only be able to match what Cingrani did in 2012. And, it'll take Stephenson 1-2 years to even reach triple-A. Stephenson has a slight advantage in stuff, but unlike Cingrani he also has to manage 1-2 years of performance and injury risk. Ultimately, Cingrani's advantage in polish, probability, and pitching mechanics outweighs Stephenson small advantage in stuff.

Cingrani is an interesting one. I like him a lot. More than any of the scouting reports I've read and I've read a number of them. So, either I'm overly optimistic or the pundits are overly pessimistic. Granted, it's probably the former, but I can't help but feel that the scouting reports are all parroting the same talking points. And, somehow, it all feels much more like group-think than independently formed opinions constituting a consensus. Maybe it's just because I disagree with many of the points, but I wonder if the internet, by speeding up the flow of information, is resulting in more overlap in opinion. Or, maybe the pundits are just correct.

It can't really be argued that Cingrani has a higher probability than Stephenson, so pundits are focused on Cingrani's performance level. Citing potential issues that would prevent that performance level from carrying over to the majors.

Over his minor league career, spread across every level, Cingrani has a 1.62 ERA, 0.926 WHIP, 2.6 BB/9, and 11.8 K/9 in 211.2 total innings. In the majors, he's tossed 5.0 innings with a 9/2 K/BB ratio. That's a truly elite performance level. However, the pundits focus on a few reasons why they view this performance level as unlikely to hold up, including:

1. Cingrani leans too heavily on his fastball. 
2. Cingrani's fastball is effective because of deceptive arm action, which won't "fool" MLB hitters for long. 
3. Cingrani needs to refine his breaking ball.

As to the first, while the reports point out his heavy fastball usage, most downplay his plus change-up, which is an effective pitch for him. So, he has two plus-pitches, not just one.

As to the second, the arm action is one of the things I really like about him. He has nice kinetic-chain pitching mechanics and the resulting delayed shoulder rotation really gives his arm a strong whip-like action. In addition, while he doesn't look big, he actually stands 6-4. The height, and resulting longer arms, means that he (1) releases the ball closer to the plate and, (2) because of his mechanics, gets more whip out of his longer arm. I'm just not at all convinced that the success of the fastball is based on "deception", nor am I convinced that it's a pitch that will be easily "figured out" by MLB hitters.

And, as to the third, while I certainly agree that Cingrani needs to refine his slider, the whip-like arm action should ultimately work well with a slider. In addition, Cingrani's change-up has a tailing action, which makes it an effective weapon against opposite-side hitters, so it's not like he profiles out as a lefty-specialist who can't be successful against righties.

Ultimately, I'm excited to see what Cingrani can do. Maybe the pundits are right, but I'm really optimistic about his future. His MLB career gets underway in earnest tonight against the Marlins. Time will tell.

2013 Top Prospect List: #2 Tony Cingrani, lhp

TONY CINGRANI
DOB: 7/5/1989
HEIGHT 6-4, WEIGHT 200, B/T: L/L

Courtesy MILB.com

Reds director of scouting, Chris Buckley, has stated that Tony Cingrani was one of his "gut-feel guys." Given Buckley's track record, Reds fans should feel very comfortable trusting his gut.

The level at which Cingrani has performed in his 1+ professional seasons has completely altered the perception of him as a prospect. In professional baseball, it's not easy to shake a label once it has been applied. Cingrani has done that. However, I now think it's fair to wonder whether he is still being undervalued. Whether the original view of him is still dragging down the current view.

Given that the previous opinion was based, at least in part, on Cingrani before he changed his mechanics and before he switched from the bullpen to the rotation, it arguably has little bearing on the pitcher he is now. If we didn't have that initial data point, would he rate higher than he is now? (Is this scenario akin to the Daniel Kahneman improper anchor effect?) If you throw out the original opinion and view him based solely on who he is now and what he has done as a professional, then he *might* actually be considered even better than the current hype, which would really be saying something. 



DRAFT POSITION AND AMATEUR CAREER

The Reds selected Cingrani out of Rice University with the 114th overall pick in the 3rd round of the 2011 draft.

Cingrani actually began his collegiate career by pitching two seasons at South Suburban Junior College in Illinois, breaking both the single-season and career strikeout records.  He transferred to Rice and posted a lackluster 8.58 ERA in six starts as a junior. Due to his struggles, he reworked his pitching mechanics at the behest of Rice pitching coach, David Pierce, and head coach, Wayne Graham, resulting in a breakout season as a senior. (Another example of taking the good with the (alleged) bad when it comes to college programs. Programs like Rice, with pitcher workload, and Stanford, with the swing mechanics they teach, take so much criticism that it becomes easy to overlook all the things they do well.)

In 2011, as a senior, Cingrani was used as a closer and truly excelled, posting a 1.74 ERA, 12 saves, and a 66/10 K/BB ratio in 57.0 innings. The baseball program at Rice University is one of the best in the country, but also, justifiably or not, has the reputation of overworking its starting pitchers. As a result, Cingrani's time in the bullpen could be a blessing, as it arguably reduced his injury risk and left him with a fresh arm when he reached the professional ranks. Working exclusively as a reliever also, for better or worse, enabled him to rely heavily on his fastball, a focus which made that a special offering and left his other offerings unpolished. The final benefit of Cingrani's bullpen role was a lowered profile, which enabled Chris Buckley's "gut" to land him in the 3rd round for the Cincinnati Reds.


2011 AND 2012 SEASONS

Shortly after the draft, some pundits, including John Sickels, immediately pointed to Cingrani as a sleeper for the Reds. One of the great things about sleepers (for organizations) is that their lack of mainstream appeal limits their leverage, which resulted in Cingrani signing a contract quickly enough to pitch in the 2011 season. He wasted little time in proving those pundits (and the Reds scouting department) correct.

Cingrani joined the Billings Mustangs of the rookie Pioneer League, where he dominated the competition to the tune of a 1.75 ERA, 0.80 WHIP, and 80/6 (!!) K/BB ratio in 51.1 innings. As a college age prospect, he had a significant age vs. level advantage, but he even outperformed that expected advantage, raising his prospect profile and setting himself up nicely heading into the 2012 season.

In 2012, Cingrani started out in high-A Bakersfield, but again proved way too advanced for the competition, posting a 1.11 ERA, 0.92 WHIP, and a 71/13 (!!) K/BB ratio in 56.2 innings. His GB/FB ratio was a neutral 0.94 and his batting average against was a miniscule189. It was clear that he was too polished for high-A and the Reds promoted him up the ladder to double-A.

Courtesy Jamie Sabau/Getty Images

At Pensacola, Cingrani continued to roll, posting a 2.12 ERA, 1.10 WHIP, and a 101/39 (!!) K/BB ratio in 89.1 innings. He also put up a neutral GB/FB ratio of 1.03 and a .192 batting average against. The organization was impressed enough to give him a September call up to the big leagues.

For the big club, Cingrani pitched 5.0 innings over three appearances, posting a 1.80 ERA, 1.20 WHIP, and a 9/2 (!!) K/BB ratio. During his MLB stint, Cingrani leaned heavily on his fastball (91.0% of the time), occasionally mixing in his slider (5.0% of the time) and changeup (4.0% of the time). Obviously, going forward, he'll need a better mix of pitches, but it was an impressive debut, though not one that earned him a spot on the postseason roster. When considered in total, Cingrani's two promotions and performance at three separate professional levels was just as impressive as his remarkable 2011 debut.   



PITCHING MECHANICS

There's something special about Cingrani's fastball. For a pitcher with very good, but not elite, velocity, he generates swings-and-misses at a very high rate. For a pitcher still developing a consistent breaking ball, his strikeout rate is tremendous. So, is it deception? Is it late "rise/hop" like Matt Cain's fastball? Whatever it is, it's not readily apparent, so we turn to the mechanics.

There's an amusing and insightful article on MILB.com discussing Cingrani entitled "Cingrani Looking Smooth: Billings southpaw racking up strikeouts with easy delivery."  Amusing because the article is paired with the following photo:

Courtesy Chris Talley/FutureStarPhotos.com

Insightful because of the following blurb: "Cingrani said he worked to tweak his mechanics and that his arm and lower body became synched. That allowed him to throw with more velocity and be more consistent in the strike zone."

The photo shows the arm swing that Cingrani used at Rice before tweaking his mechanics, so it's a poor fit for both the title and substance of the article. The blurb supports the notion that Cingrani followed through with the refinements to his mechanics to more effectively generate force with the lower body, resulting in improved performance and less stress on the body.

As with Robert Stephenson's mechanics, Cingrani's mechanics are very clean during the first phase. It's the second stage, after the apex of the leg kick, where things get interesting.  The primary difference between the mechanics of the two prospects is efficiency. Cingrani does a better job transferring all the momentum generated in the first phase of the windup to the baseball in the second phase, whereas Stephenson's delivery bleeds some momentum due to his limited hip rotation.

Cingrani begins his windup with an actual rocker step, which is becoming increasingly rare. These days, it seems much more fashionable to simply step down and forward with the stride foot to begin the windup. Cingrani takes a legitimate step towards third base to trigger his windup, which I prefer both for its fluidity and potential for increasing the generation of momentum. After the rocker step, he rotates his body and brings his leg up into the leg kick. His knee comes up past parallel and he maintains good balance at the apex. His leg kick doesn't include much body coil, as his knee doesn't wrap around the body, but he does manage to cock his hips. 

As he begins to unpack the leg kick and drive to the plate, he breaks his hands to begin his arm swing, which is probably the most recognizable characteristic of his mechanics. Even after he reworked his mechanics, Cingrani still has a long arm action, beginning when he breaks his hands and ending when he brings the ball up into throwing position. Cingrani's arm-swing goes from 9 o'clock to almost 3 o'clock. When his arm reaches 6 o'clock, he begins using a wrist-wrap. Before he changed his mechanics at Rice, he would swing his straight arm all the way up to the 9 o'clock position (see photo above), a la Madison Bumgarner and Marc Rzepczynski, but now Cingrani bends the elbow to a 90 degree angle when the arm reaches the 5 o'clock position, just before bringing the arm up into throwing position. It's impressive just how quickly and effectively Cingrani revised his mechanics, which isn't always easy to do.


In the two photos below, taken at similar points in his delivery, you can see the refinements he made to his arm swing, as his pitching arm is more rigid in the left photo and more fluid and flexed in the right photo. Cingrani believes the refinements he made to his mechanics allowed his upper and lower body to work more effectively together.

Courtesy Eric Sorenson

Courtesy Chris Nelson, MILB.com

Cingrani's longer arm swing and the use of the wrist-wrap actually cause him to be late in getting the arm up into throwing position. When his stride foot lands, his pitching arm is not up in proper throwing position. However, while this is usually a bit of a red flag, it may actually work to Cingrani's advantage, as the lagging arm seems to effectively delay the rotation of his upper body, increasing the differential between his hip rotation and shoulder rotation. This differential increases the force he can impart to the baseball and reduces stress on the arm by generating more of the required force with the lower body. The coordination and rotation of Cingrani's upper and lower body is both very impressive and highly efficient. The strong hip rotation and delayed shoulder rotation combine to ensure that the hip rotation simply pulls the upper body and the arm right along with it, rather than the arm having to generate that force by itself.     

Another factor that seems to really boost Cingrani's fastball is his physical stature. He stands 6-4, which gives him longer arms. Taller pitchers, with longer arms, not only release the ball slightly closer to the plate, but their longer levers also have the ability to generate more whip-like force. In the kid's game of crack-the-whip, the longer the whip, the more force generated at the end of the whip.

The combination of Cingrani's kinetic-chain mechanics, longer arm, and longer arm-action seems to give his arm-action added whip-like force. When his hips fire, they pull his upper body (including a long and loose arm that generates its own whip-like force) right along with it.   

Cingrani utilizes a high three-quarters release point when he pitches. Some people point to good deception as a reason for his impressive fastball, but, in light of his extensive arm swing, I'm not convinced that that's the main the reason. He really shows the ball to the hitter when he brings it away from his body, but there is a touch of deception when he brings the ball to the release point, as the delayed shoulder rotation keeps the ball lower and hidden behind his head for a touch longer than normal.  


After he releases the ball, his strong body rotation naturally brings his trailing leg all around to finish the pitch and controls his momentum into a balanced, squared-up fielding position.


Here's a good look at Cingrani in action courtesy of Steve Fiorindo on YouTube: 






And, since I couldn't decide between the two, here's another good look at Cingrani courtesy of Mike Newman on YouTube:






Overall, Cingrani features my favorite pitching mechanics in the system.


REPERTOIRE

Cingrani has 90-94 mph fastball that serves as his main pitch. The whip-like arm action, possibly adding rise/hop to the pitch, and a touch of deception in his delivery enable his fastball to play up, as it gets on the hitter sooner than he expects. He also has the ability to locate his fastball, not just throwing strikes, but consistently hitting his spots inside the zone. To go along with his impressive fastball, Cingrani features both a slider and changeup.

The changeup, which has late movement, fading to the arm side, is already a plus pitch. And, the movement on the pitch works to his advantage, as it tails away from a righthanded hitter, giving him an effective weapon against opposite side hitters. The fact that he already has a pitch to get opposite side hitters out is yet another reason for long-term optimism.

The slider is the pitch that Cingrani needs in order to be an effective MLB starter, as his main two pitches are essentially straight offerings. He needs a breaking ball to change the eye level of hitters, giving him a pitch with a two-plane break. His slider shows flashes of being a very good pitch, but remains inconsistent. Still, giving the arm-whip generated by his mechanics, he should be able to get good wrist snap on a breaking ball. If he can master it, it'll increase his effectiveness, especially against lefthanded hitters. Cingrani has leaned heavily on the fastball (and justifiably so) in his professional career, but his other pitches have the potential to be effective in their own right.   


FINAL THOUGHTS

Before digging into both pitchers for these write-ups, I was expecting Robert Stephenson to rate higher than Tony Cingrani. Cingrani turned out to be more impressive. In the long run, Stephenson certainly could turn out to be the superior pitcher, but, for me, Cingrani's combination of effective and efficient pitching mechanics, lefthandedness, plus fastball, and higher probability of panning out simply outweighed Stephenson's better velocity and more polished breaking ball. 

It'll be interesting to see how Cingrani's career plays out. He needs to continue refining his secondary offerings in order to have consistent success as a starter, but has had experience and success as a reliever. The Reds rotation is also getting crowded, especially if the "Aroldis to the rotation" experiment is carried through to fruition. At the same time, Cingrani has yet to run into a level of competition that has managed to slow him down, though the MLB experience was a very, very small sample size.

Given his ability and upside, the Reds would be wise to see what he can do as a starter, even if the temptation is to shift him to the bullpen. For now, Tony Cingrani lands comfortably in the #2 slot on the list.